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ABSTRACT	
This	 thesis	 contributes	 a	 rich	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 urban	water	 governance	 in	Delhi,	with	
particular	attention	to	informality,	groundwater	and	reforms.		My	research	aims	to	develop	
understanding	 of	 the	 relationships	 between	 reforms,	 under	 both	 private	 sector	
management	 and	 a	 new	 progressive	 government,	 and	 existing	 informal	 water	
arrangements,	 particularly	 groundwater	 use,	 which	 households	 rely	 on	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
adequate	public	 sector	 supply.	 	 I	 draw	on	 interviews	with	150	 residents,	 as	well	 as	water	
suppliers,	project	officials,	government	staff,	politicians	and	party	workers	over	18	months	
of	multi-sited	research	in	South	Delhi’s	unauthorised	colonies	and	urban	villages.		I	use	the	
idea	 of	 ‘informal	 infrastructures’	 or	 ‘infrastructural	 informality’	 connects	 my	 empirical	
research	across	different	sites	and	scales.		Bringing	ideas	from	the	literature	on	informality	
and	 infrastructures	 together	 under	 this	 framing	 offers	 modifications	 to	 the	 ways	 that	
‘informality’	and	 ‘infrastructures’	are	often	understood	and	used.	 	 I	use	 informality	 in	 this	
way	‘as	a	method’	to	focus	on	the	contingently	enacted,	materially	and	socially	constituted	
character	of	various	infrastructure	processes.			
	
I	analyse	the	informal	governance	and	politics	of	water	supply	at	three	difference	sites	and	
scales.	 	 Within	 Delhi’s	 government	 network	 at	 an	 all-city	 level	 I	 note	 the	 formally	 and	
informally	 differentiated	 nature	 of	 the	 network	 and	 the	 challenges	 of	 knowledge	 and	
control	of	 it.	 	Outside	of	the	piped	network,	 I	examine	the	decentralised	infrastructures	of	
tubewells	and	water	tankers,	primarily	in	the	South	Delhi	areas	of	Sangam	Vihar	and	Deoli.	
These	decentralised	supply	modes	are	socially	embedded	in	systems	of	party	politics,	caste	
and	 land-ownership	 with	 a	 range	 of	 opportunities	 for	 discretion,	 patronage	 and	
misallocation.		They	illustrate	the	connection	and	contrasts	between	informality	in	different	
resources,	such	as	land	and	water,	and	infrastructures.		I	then	examine	an	additional	layer	of	
urban	water	governance,	in	a	Public	Private	Partnership	(PPP)	for	urban	water	reform,	in	a	
zone	 around	 the	Malviya	Nagar	 area,	 also	 in	 South	Delhi.	 	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 complexity	 of	
India’s	 urban	 social	 hydrology,	 even	 in	 wealthy	 areas,	 has	 been	 underestimated	 by	 this	
initiative,	and	that	despite	an	evolution	of	the	PPP	model	concerns	over	the	project’s	equity	
and	viability	remain.		The	high	level	of	informality	across	different	infrastructural	systems	in	
my	 research	 sites	 suggests	 the	 coexistence	 of	 a	 submerged	 ‘technopolitics’	 operating	
through	bureaucratic	and	technical	modes	of	governance,	with	both	overt	and	covert	uses	
of	intercession,	personalisation	and	force.			
	
The	study	makes	contributions	 to	knowledge	 in	 the	 following	areas:	 informal	urban	water	
supply	in	India,	particularly	in	unauthorised	colonies	and	urban	villages,	in	a	region	of	high	
groundwater	 use,	 its	 relationship	 to	 water	 supply	 reforms	 from	 both	 government	 and	 a	
multinational	public-private	partnership.			
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CHAPTER	1.	INTRODUCTION	
	
This	 thesis	 contributes	 a	 rich	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 urban	 water	 in	 Delhi,	 with	 particular	
attention	 to	 informality,	 groundwater	 and	 reforms.	 	 My	 work	 breaks	 new	 ground	 by	
analysing	a	range	of	common	features	of	urban	water	in	India	–	informal	groundwater	use,	
decentralised	 infrastructures	 (such	 as	 tubewells	 and	 tankers),	 and	 private	 sector	 network	
management	–	and	their	relation	to	urban	governance	and	politics.		I	introduce	the	idea	of	
‘informal	 infrastructures’,	which	connects	my	empirical	 research	across	different	sites	and	
scales.		
	
This	 introduction	consists	of	 four	 sections:	a	 rationale	 for	 the	 research;	a	 summary	of	 the	
contribution;	background	on	Delhi;	and	an	outline	of	the	thesis	structure.			
	
RATIONALE	
Inadequate	access	to	water	kills	a	lot	of	people,	mostly	poor,	mostly	children,	mostly	in	the	
global	south	(UN	World	Water	Assessment	Programme,	2006).	 	Annual	deaths	from	water	
borne	diseases	number	in	the	millions	and	exceed	those	from	malaria,	armed	conflict	or	the	
projected	effects	of	climate	change	(UN	World	Water	Assessment	Programme,	2006,	p.	18;	
P.	P.	Mollinga,	2007,	p.	1235;	E.	Swyngedouw,	2006,	p.	4;	World	Health	Organization,	2017).		
In	South	Asia	up	to	15%	of	annual	deaths	are	attributed	to	inadequate	water	and	sanitation		
(World	Health	Organization,	 2012,	 p.	 7).	 	 The	 burden	of	 inadequate	water	 and	 sanitation	
falls	disproportionately	on	women	and	girls	(UNDP,	2006).			
	
Water	is	also	an	urban	issue;	of	over	a	billion	people	globally	without	access	to	‘adequate’	
water	 supply	 one	 in	 four	 is	 an	 urban	 resident	 (UN	World	Water	 Assessment	 Programme,	
2006).	 	 The	 scale	 and	 speed	 of	 urbanisation,	 which	 exceeds	 spatial	 planning	 and	
infrastructure	 provision,	 make	 water	 and	 sanitation	 a	 key	 present	 and	 future	 urban	
challenge	(Bakker	2008:1891).			
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Water	 is	 also	 an	 issue	 of	 political	 ecology.	 	 The	 water	 challenges	 of	 urbanisation	 are	
primarily	 of	 distribution,	 not	 absolute	 scarcity	 (L.	 Mehta,	 2005).	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 a	
discourse	of	 crisis	 is	used	 to	 support	 further	big	 infrastructure	development	and	 resource	
extraction	 from	 rural	 areas	 through	 a	 ‘supply	 management	 approach’	 (Giglioli	 &	
Swyngedouw,	2008).		The	failure	of	public	and	private	sector	to	adequately	provide	for	poor	
people	 leads	 to	 a	 proliferating	 informal	 sector	 and	 further	 resources	 degradation.	 	 For	
example,	 eight	 of	 the	world’s	 ten	most	water	 stressed	 cities	 rely	 on	water	 pumped	 from	
underground	aquifers	(McDonald	et	al.,	2014).		Yet,	the	use	of	urban	groundwater	to	cope	
with	 inadequate	 water	 supply	 is	 ‘largely	 unexplored’	 and	 ‘has	 not	 been	 the	 topic	 of	
sustained	research’	(Grönwall,	Mulenga,	&	McGranahan,	2010,	p.	3).			
	
Water	 security	 in	 South	 Asia	 will	 be	 a	 critical	 challenge	 over	 the	 next	 half-century	
(Chellaney,	 2011;	 Gleeson,	 Wada,	 Bierkens,	 &	 van	 Beek,	 2012;	 Rodell,	 Velicogna,	 &	
Famiglietti,	2009).		Groundwater	exhaustion,	glacial	melt	and	increasingly	short	and	erratic	
monsoons	are	an	already	present	 threat	 for	 the	 region’s	 rapidly	growing	urban	areas	and	
agricultural	production	(T.	Shah,	2009).		Rising	climate	variability	and	declining	groundwater	
coupled	with	India’s	increasing	population,	urbanisation	and	inequality	are	likely	to	lead	to	
severe	 human	 and	 economic	 development	 impacts	 (see	 e.g.	 Cronin,	 Prakash,	 Sridhar,	 &	
Coates,	2016;	C.	B.	Kumar,	2013;	Laghari,	Vanham,	&	Rauch,	2012;	Moors	et	al.,	2011).		This	
makes	water	access	and	equality	increasingly	urgent	in	the	region.				
	
In	June	2015,	Indian	Prime	Minister	Narendra	Modi	appeared	on	a	well-decorated	stage	in	
New	 Delhi,	 exactly	 a	 year	 after	 his	 swearing	 in	 ceremony,	 to	 formally	 announce	 three	
ambitious	new	urban	programmes	for	India:	Smart	Cities	Mission,	AMRUT1	and	Housing	for	
All.		 In	 addition	 to	 e-governance	 and	 redevelopment	 projects,	 a	 key	 component	 of	 Smart	
Cities	 and	 AMRUT	 has	 been	 stated	 as	 uninterrupted	 power	 and	 water	 supplies.	 	 Initial	
statements	 show	 enthusiasm	 for	 Public-Private-Partnerships	 (PPPs).	 	The	 consequent	
deepening	 of	 private	 sector	 engagement	 in	 urban	 planning,	 development	 and	 services	 is	
being	seen	by	 international	observers	as	a	golden	opportunity	for	business	(Dezan	Shira	&	
                                                            
1	Atal	Mission	for	Rejuvenation	and	Urban	Transformation.		Atal	Vajpayee	(1924-)	was	the	first	BJP	
Prime	Minister	of	India.		This	scheme	continues	much	of	the	work	of	the	Jawaharlal	Nehru	National	
Urban	Renewal	Mission.			
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Associates,	 2016;	 Hypercat,	 2015;	 UK	 Trade	 &	 Investment,	 2015).	 	 The	 challenge	 of	
‘reforming’	water	supply	will	be	central	for	Indian	urban	development,	policy	and	politics.			
	
However,	 to	 date,	 despite	 support	 at	 higher	 levels	 of	 government	 (and	 amongst	
international	 donors	 and	 development	 agencies),	 private	 involvement	 in	 Indian	 water	
supply	 has	 presented	 considerable	 challenges.	 	 The	 number	 of	 initiatives	 has	 been	
increasing	 since	 the	 small	 number	 of	 early	 water	 privatisation	 projects	 in	 the	 1990s	
(including	Navi	Mumbai	and	Tirrupur).	 	Since	 the	 late	90’s	water	projects	with	 the	private	
sector	have	been	cancelled	in	Hyderabad,	Goa,	Pune,	Bangalore	(twice),	Delhi,	Maharashtra,	
and	Mumbai	(Economic	and	Political	Weekly,	2015).		From	the	mid-2000s,	a	‘second	wave’	
of	 water	 projects	 has	 been	 taking	 place	 (Nagpur,	 Hubli-Dharwad,	 Pimpri-Chinchwad)2.		
Nevertheless,	a	recent	article	describes	the	number	of	PPP	projects	and	percentage	of	the	
country’s	 population	 served	 as	 ‘insignificant’	 (X.	Wu,	House,	&	 Peri,	 2016).	 	 Advocates	 of	
commercialisation	offer	a	story	of	institutional	learning	and	improvements	in	viability,	but,	
in	addition	to	technical	challenges,	political	opposition	continue	to	be	a	significant	obstacle	
for	projects	 involving	the	private	sector	(Bretton	Woods	Project,	2015;	World	Bank,	2012).		
Some	research	suggests	that	informal	governance	arrangements	for	water	supply	are	likely	
to	be	a	key	element	of	these	difficulties	(N.	Anand,	2015;	Bawa,	2013;	Björkman,	2015;	M.-
H.	 Zérah,	 2000;	 Sami,	Weinstein,	&	 Shatkin,	 2013).	 	We	 have	 at	 first	 glance	 the	 ‘clash	 of	
rationalities’	 between	 technocratic	 market-oriented	 governance	 and	 the	 prevalence	 of	
everyday	informal	practices	(Watson,	2003,	2009).			
	
Although	 a	 feature	 of	 daily	 life	 for	many	 people,	 alternatives	 to	 official	water	 supply	 are	
little	studied	in	the	academic	literature	on	urban	India.		‘Informal	water’	is	primarily	pumped	
from	below	ground	and	India’s	groundwater	is	being	extracted	at	some	of	the	fastest	rates	
in	the	world.		70%	of	India’s	irrigation,	80%	of	domestic	and	85%	of	drinking	water	needs	in	
India	 are	met	with	 groundwater.	 	 Groundwater	 is	 the	major	water	 source	 across	 all	 uses	
(Cullet,	2012),	yet,	as	mentioned	above,	urban	groundwater	is	little	studied	in	social	science	
and	this	‘underground	political	ecology’	of	water,	both	sub-soil	and	illicit,	is	under-explored	
in	research	to	date	(Bebbington,	2012;	T.	L.	Birkenholtz,	2015;	Grönwall	et	al.,	2010).		Across	
                                                            
2	The	NGO	Manthan	has	compiled	one	of	the	most	extensive	lists	of	early	water	privatisation	initiatives	
in	India	(Dwivedi,	2010).			
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North-West	India,	groundwater	levels	have	been	falling	dramatically	since	the	introduction	
of	tubewell	technology	in	the	1970s	(Kulkarni	&	Shah,	2013).		Estimates	for	urban	use	in	the	
country	 as	 whole	 suggest	 that	 groundwater	 accounts	 for	 around	 50%	 of	 water	 used	 (M.	
Shah,	2014,	p.	11).		Studies	already	show	dangerous	levels	of	depletion	(Rodell	et	al.,	2009).		
Groundwater	 demand	 is	 expected	 to	 exceed	 supply	 by	 2020	 (T.	 Birkenholtz,	 2008;	 Cullet,	
2012;	World	Bank,	2010).		Delhi	is	an	extreme	case	of	this	depletion	and	the	second	largest	
water	 stressed	 city	 globally	 (McDonald	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 	 However,	while	 the	 economics	 and	
politics	of	rural	groundwater	use	has	been	a	rising	area	of	research	for	some	time	(Dubash,	
2001;	 T.	 Shah,	 2008;	 T.	 Birkenholtz,	 2009b),	 urban	 groundwater	 use	 has	 been	 relatively	
ignored,	even	‘a	blind	spot’	(M.	Shah,	2014).			
	
Delhi	 is	situated	at	the	apex	of	North	 India’s	extreme	groundwater	depletion.	 	 India	 is	the	
world’s	largest	user	of	groundwater	and	the	upper	Ganges	aquifer	is	being	depleted	at	some	
the	fastest	rates	 in	the	world,	along	with	California	and	Syria	 (Cullet,	2014;	Gleeson	et	al.,	
2012).	 	 Indeed,	 Cullet	 states	 that	 “groundwater	 is	 now	 the	main	 source	 of	 water	 for	 all	
major	water	uses	 in	 India”	 (Cullet,	 2012	my	 italics).	 	Much	of	 the	 country’s	urban	 system	
relies	on	heavy	groundwater	use	 (Kulkarni,	Vijay	Shankar,	&	Krishnan,	2011).	 	Delhi,	along	
with	 many	 large	 and	 medium	 cities,	 and	 the	 majority	 of	 smaller	 towns,	 is	 also	 highly	
groundwater	 dependent.	 	 This	 is	 an	 important	 point	 of	 commonality	with	 the	 urbanising	
parts	of	 India	where	transformation	 is	taking	place	the	fastest,	the	potential	opportunities	
for	 impact	are	highest,	and	the	need	is	greatest.	 	While	in	Delhi	groundwater	accounts	for	
only	 11	 percent	 of	 the	 total	 raw	 water	 supply	 to	 the	 Delhi	 Jal	 Board,	 some	 researchers	
suggest	 it	accounts	 for	almost	50	percent	of	the	volume	received	by	the	end	users	 (Maria	
2006).	 	 Groundwater	 use,	 as	 a	 supplement	 to	 inadequate	 public	 supply,	 in	 peri-urban,	
unplanned	 areas	 of	 Delhi	 is	 particularly	 extensive	 and	 weakly	 regulated.	 	 Indeed,	
unauthorised	neighbourhoods	are	often	 reliant	on	groundwater	 from	 formal	and	 informal	
sources.		
	
High	groundwater	use	as	a	consequence	of	unreliable	public	supply	forms	the	background	
for	 controversial	 recent	 reforms	 in	Delhi.	 	One	 set	of	 initiatives	 intends	 to	 improve	public	
water	supply	by	transforming	it	into	viable	commercial	venture,	while	others	more	recently	
introduced	 provide	 a	 ‘lifeline’	 quantity	 of	 water	 for	 free.	 	 Efforts	 to	 make	 public	 water	
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supply	 financially	viable	 in	Delhi	 through	public-private	partnerships	began	 in	2012.	 	After	
Delhi’s	 December	 2013	 elections,	 the	 new	 government	 under	 the	 Aam	 Aadmi	 (Common	
Man)	Party	(AAP),	which	had	campaigned	on	corruption	and	improvements	in	basic	services	
and	 is	 led	 by	 an	 appropriately	 ordinary-looking	 former	 tax	 official,	 NGO	worker	 and	 anti-
water	privatisation	 campaigner,	Arvind	Kejriwal,	managed	 to	gain	enough	 seats	 to	 form	a	
minority	 government	 and	 began	 attempts	 to	 transform	 Delhi’s	 water	 policy	 in	 a	 more	
progressive	direction	(Naqvi,	2017).		
	
Thus	 formal	 and	 informal	 politics,	 at	 city	 and	 neighbourhood	 level,	 becomes	 intrinsically	
enmeshed	 in	 understanding	 the	 governance	of	Delhi’s	water.	 	 Previous	 research	 suggests	
that	 populist	 policies	 and	 local	 business	 interests	 may	 subvert	 attempts	 at	 water	
commercialisation	 (N.	 Anand,	 2011;	 Björkman,	 2011;	 Contractor,	 2012;	 Kacker	 &	 Joshi,	
2012;	Ranganathan,	2014a;	M.-H.	Zérah,	2000),	yet	there	is	little	academic	research	on	how	
relations	 between	 water	 dealers,	 politicians	 and	 residents	 influence	 urban	 water	 supply	
improvements	and	very	little	on	the	role	of	urban	groundwater	(Maria,	2006;	Rohilla,	2012).			
	
Despite	being	India’s	capital,	around	50%	of	Delhi’s	population	do	not	have	access	to	piped	
water.		Even	for	those	that	do,	official	supply	operates	on	a	rotating	basis	of	a	few	hours	a	
day	with	 preferential	 treatment	 for	 ‘better	 connected’	 areas.	 	 Families	without	 adequate	
supply	 depend	 on	 illegal	 connections,	 illicit	 bore-wells	 and	 the	 ‘tanker	 mafia’	 to	 access	
water	that	is	frequently	unsafe,	expensive	or	simply	unavailable.	This	has	negative	effects	on	
people’s	 health,	 education	 and	 livelihoods	 (particularly	 for	 women	 and	 children)	 (Datta,	
2012,	pp.	114–145).		This	situation	is	by	no	means	unique	to	Delhi	and	appears	to	be	a	facet	
of	public	services	in	many	less	developed	cities.		
	
CONTRIBUTIONS	
In	this	thesis,	I	treat	water	reforms	under	Delhi’s	new	AAP	government	and	a	Public	Private	
Partnership	 in	 the	 city	 as	 a	 ‘diagnostic	 event’	 around	which	 social	 relations	 are	 disturbed	
and	 realigned.	 	 This	 allows	 me	 to	 examine	 the	 ways	 water	 reform	 may	 reshuffle	 the	
distribution	of	water,	modes	of	 access,	 and	methods	of	 negotiation	 (Das,	 1996;	 Jensen	&	
Winthereik,	2013;	Tarlo,	2003).			
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The	thesis	makes	several	original	research	contributions.		Empirically,	I	add	to	work	on	the	
informal	political	economy	of	urban	groundwater	use,	new	models	of	private	sector	water	
management,	and	the	relationships	between	urban	groundwater	and	reforms.		I	additionally	
contribute	 to	 research	 on	 governance	 and	 urban	 services	 in	 unauthorised	 colonies	 and	
urban	 villages.	 	 Conceptually,	 I	 introduce	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘informal	 infrastructures’	 as	 a	
theoretical	 frame	and	methodological	approach,	which	connects	my	fieldwork	across	sites	
and	scales.		Practically,	my	project	studies	how	the	interactions	of	reform	initiatives	with	the	
complexities	of	the	existing	water	governance	environment	shape	the	possibilities	for	better	
water	access	and	management.			
	
I	 use	 the	 concept	 of	 informal	 infrastructures	 to	 connect	 my	 empirical	 material.	 	 Both	
informality	and	infrastructures	are	understood	relationally:	as	terms	that	must	be	defined	in	
context.		Thus	informal	infrastructures	include	both	urban	services	at	a	distance	from	official	
regulation	 (such	 as	 private	 water	 tankers,	 private	 tubewells	 and	 illegal	 bottled	 water	
factories)	 and	 informalised	 official	 infrastructures	 (such	 as	 diverted	 public	 water	 tankers,	
captured	 government	 tubewells	 and	 modifications	 to	 the	 official	 piped	 network).	 	 The	
informal	 infrastructures	of	 interpersonal	 arrangement	 that	often	mediate	access	 to	urban	
services	 (administratively	or	physically),	 that	others	have	 called	 ‘people	 as	 infrastructure’,	
‘zero	degree’	or	‘invisible’	infrastructures3	are	an	additional	area	of	my	research	(De	Boeck	
&	Plissart,	2004,	p.	235;	Simone,	2004).		In	this	way	I	use	‘informality	as	a	method’	to	direct	
attention	towards	the	contingent,	assembled	and	enacted	nature	of	infrastructures.		
	
Bringing	informality	and	infrastructure	together	brings	fresh	perspectives	to	both.		Research	
on	infrastructure	can	contribute	to	work	on	informality	by	introducing	different	dynamics	to	
work	on	spatial	planning	and	 livelihoods.	 	 Infrastructure	studies	also	 foregrounds	complex	
material	 and	 technical	 realities	 that	 may	 be	 overlooked	 by	 more	 theoretically	 oriented	
urban	 scholarship.	 	 Informality,	 like	 infrastructure	 (see	 below)	 is	 relational,	meaning	 that	
what,	 when,	 where	 and	 why	 a	 practice	 is	 informal	 is	 a	 question	 of	 definition.	 	 This	
understanding	 forces	 us	 to	 attend	 to	 empirical	 processes	 and	 practices.	 	 Thinking	 about	
                                                            
3	Or	more	simply	‘brokers’	(e.g.	I.	M.	Cook,	2015;	Schindler,	2017).		This	literature	is	discussed	in	
Chapter	Two.	
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informality	 leads	 us	 to	 question	 the	 boundaries	 of	 concepts	 such	 as	 ‘the	 state’,	 ‘the	
economy’,	‘politics’	and	‘infrastructure’.		By	virtue	of	its	knowing	relationship	towards,	and	
exploitation	of,	these	boundaries,	informality	is	inherently	tied	up	with	questions	of	power,	
to	evade	as	much	as	enforce.	 	A	 focus	on	 smaller	 technologies	 (tubewells,	 tankers,	 tanks,	
filters),	often	used	 in	 the	global	 south,	provides	a	different	perspective	 to	work	on	public	
networks	and	other	large	technical	systems.				
	
My	 treatment	 of	 the	 reforms	 under	 a	 PPP	 model	 and	 the	 new	 Delhi	 government	 as	 a	
‘diagnostic	event’	provides	a	novel	approach	to	understanding	the	social	ecology	of	urban	
groundwater	use	and	its	relationship	to	water	reforms	and	urban	governance.		I	employ	the	
idea	 of	 informality	 ‘as	 method’	 to	 investigate	 the	 challenges	 to	 infrastructure	 reform	
initiatives	as	the	neat	models	of	planners	become	drawn	 into	the	mud	of	actually	existing	
material	and	social	realities.		Writing	on	neoliberalisation	and	rationalisation	projects	forms	
a	 conceptual	 background	 to	 my	 work	 (Brenner,	 2004;	 Ferguson,	 1994;	 Mitchell,	 2002;	
Mosse,	2004;	Scott,	1998).	 	However	 I	am	as	keen	 to	understand	 the	close	 texture	of	 the	
‘local’	 situations	 into	 which	 these	 reforms	 insert	 themselves	 as	 the	 projects	 themselves	
(Gopakumar,	2011;	Walters,	2013).		Moving	beyond	the	arenas	of	state	policy	processes	and	
NGO-mediated	pilot	projects,	opens	up	a	wide	array	of	practices	relevant	to	the	successful	
implementation,	and	challenge,	of	reforms.						
	
My	 research	 aims	 to	 develop	 empirical	 and	 analytic	 understandings	 of	 the	 relationships	
between	‘informal’	water	supply,	water	sector	reforms	and	urban	governance	in	New	Delhi.		
The	 thesis	builds	on	 recent	work	 in	 social	 science,	which	 treats	water	as	a	perspective	on	
state-society	 relationships	 in	 India.	 	 I	 introduce	 two	 factors	 currently	 under-researched	 in	
the	literature:	use	of	groundwater	as	a	supplement	to	government	water	supply	and	private	
sector	reforms.		I	use	the	recent	election	of	a	progressive	government,	and	the	introduction	
of	a	PPP	project	to	 investigate	the	relationships	between	modes	of	 ‘formal’	and	 ‘informal’	
water	supply	in	the	context	of	reform.		I	use	‘informal’	here	to	refer	to	any	method	of	water	
access	 that	 does	 not	 comply	with	 official	 procedures	 and	 regulations	 (e.g.	 registered	 and	
billed	by	the	official	agency	and	paid	for	the	by	the	consumer	according	to	correct	use	and	
current	tariff	levels).		My	aim	is	to	understand	how	and	why	‘informal’	water	supply,	public	
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sector	reform	and	PPPs,	work	in	particular	ways,	and	what	they	can	tell	us	about	water	as	a	
measure	of	social	relations.			
	
DELHI	BACKGROUND	
There	 are	 compelling	 reasons	 to	 research	 infrastructural	 informality	 through	 urban	water	
(and	groundwater)	use	and	governance	 in	Delhi.	 	The	National	Capital	Territory	of	Delhi	 is	
India’s	 fastest	 growing	 metro,	 with	 a	 growth	 rate	 of	 46.31%	 from	 1991-2001,	 against	 a	
national	 average	 of	 21.34%	 (Dutta	 et	 al	 2005:440).	 	 The	 NCT	 population	 is	 currently	
estimated	 at	 19	 million	 making	 it	 the	 world’s	 fifth	 largest	 megalopolis.	 	 Growth	 is	
considerably	faster	at	the	edges	of	the	city	and	is	slowing	or	declining	in	the	centre,	as	with	
almost	 all	 other	 Indian	 cities	 (Kundu	 and	 Sivaramakrishnan	 2007).	 	 Delhi’s	 water	 system	
struggles	 with	 the	 pressures	 of	 fast	 urbanisation,	 fragmented	 governance,	 political	
interference	and	a	limited	budget.			
	
The	 six	 metropolitan	 cities	 (Mumbai,	 Delhi,	 Bangalore,	 Chennai,	 Kolkata,	 Hyderabad)	 are	
already	well	 represented	 in	 literature	on	urban	 India	 (Harris,	2012;	McFarlane,	2013;	Roy,	
2009a).	 	 However,	 Delhi,	 the	 only	 ‘megacity’	 in	 North	 India,	 with	 no	 natural	 barriers	 to	
growth,	 is	 also	 one	 of	 the	 only	 major	 cities	 to	 continue	 displaying	 high	 rates	 of	 growth,	
similar	 to	 India’s	 smaller	 urban	 centres	 (Sivaramakrishnan,	 Kundu,	 &	 Singh,	 2007).	 	 Also,	
unlike	Bangalore	or	Chennai,	Delhi	has	access	to	a	very	high	quantity	of	water	is	provided	on	
average,	 so	 a	 natural	 scarcity	 of	 water	 is	 not	 the	 issue.	 	 Delhi	 also	 has	 good	 access	 to	
funding,	expertise,	and	political	influence	–	which	should	be	favourable	conditions	for	good	
water	 supply.	 	However,	water	 supply	 is	 sufficiently	 uneven	 and	unreliable	 that	 it	 can	 be	
seen	as	 ‘a	 typical	 example	of	 a	 city	with	an	unreliable	water	 supply,	 both	 in	 respect	with	
quantity	and	quality’	(Marie-Hélène	Zérah,	2000a).		
	
Despite	being	 India’s	 capital,	Delhi’s	water	 supply	 is	below	average.	 	 In	 a	 survey	of	water	
services	in	seven	major	Indian	cities,	Delhi	was	ranked	worst	with	the	exception	of	Kanpur,	
(Shaban	&	Sharma,	2007).		Although	definitive	figures	are	not	available	(and	official	figures	
vary)	educated	estimates	place	the	proportion	of	population	relying	on	piped	supply	 from	
the	Delhi	government	at	around	50%	(Jain,	2012;	Maria,	2008;	Narain,	2011).		Between	1994	
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and	 2004	 Delhi’s	 water	 network	 increased	 by	 three	 percent	 to	 1.09	million	 connections.		
Population	 in	the	city	over	the	same	period	grew	by	50%	(Narain,	2011,	p.	84).	 	Relatively	
newer	 areas	 at	 the	 edges	of	 the	 city	 (such	 as	Noida,	Dwarka,	Nangloi	 and	 Sangam	Vihar)	
have	little	or	no	public	water	service.		
	
Delhi	also	has	a	large,	and	growing,	‘informal’	city	where	people	born	in	the	city,	and	those	
drawn	from	the	vast	semi-rural	hinterland	and	beyond,	struggle	 to	make	a	 foothold.	 	This	
situation	 is	 due	 to	 a	 combination	 of	 fast	 urban	 and	 population	 growth,	 restrictive	 urban	
planning	 following	 the	 1962	 Master	 Plan,	 and	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 Delhi	 Development	
Authority	 (DDA)	 –	 under	 the	 Central	 Government,	 not	 Delhi	 Government,	 and	 more	
concerned	with	making	profits	and	land	banking	than	public	housing	–	to	provide	more	than	
a	 token	amount	of	 lower-income	housing	 (Bhan,	2013).	 	 ‘Informal’	areas	are	often	said	 to	
house	 70%	 of	 the	 city	 population	 (Kundu	 and	 Sivaramakrishnan	 2007).	 	 Urban	 services,	
including	 water,	 to	 these	 different	 kinds	 of	 neighbourhoods	 are	 differentially	 provided	
depending	on	planning	status	of	the	 location	(see	Chapter	Four).	 	 In	2009,	75%	of	the	city	
population	were	served	by	the	official	water	network	of	pipes,	wells	and	hand	pumps,	while	
24.5%	 of	 the	 population	 received	 government	 water	 from	 tankers	 only	 (CAG	 2009).		
Informal	water	access	 is	widespread.	 	 	 	There	are,	however,	multiple	water	supply	 reform	
projects	with	 the	private	sector	and	 international	agencies,	which	allow	contrast	between	
different	 approaches	 to	 water	 governance.	 	 Further,	 Delhi	 has	 recently	 elected	 a	 new	
unorthodox	 political	 party,	 the	 Aam	 Aadmi	 Party	 (AAP),	 into	 government	 –	 partly	 on	 a	
mandate	of	improved	water	supply.			
	
Delhi	 might	 be	 described	 as	 the	 ‘battleground’	 of	 three	 governments.	 	 As	 the	 national	
capital,	Delhi	 is	occupied	by	the	Government	(or	Union)	of	 India	(GoI)	otherwise	known	as	
the	Central	Government	 (‘Centre’	 is	 commonly	 used).	 	Delhi’s	 police	 force	 remains	 under	
Central	government	control,	as	does	the	Delhi	Development	Authority	(DDA),	the	parastatal	
with	 the	 mandate	 to	 develop	 housing	 and	 manage	 land	 in	 Delhi	 (see,	 e.g.	 Bhan	 2011,	
Ghertner	 2015).	 Secondly,	 actual	 governance	 of	 Delhi	 is	 executed	 by	 a	 State	 Assembly	
(‘State’),	 equivalent	 to	 the	 other	 states	 in	 India’s	 federal	 system	 such	 as	 Maharashtra,	
Karnataka,	 Uttar	 Pradesh,	 etc.	 	 Politicians	 elected	 to	 the	 State	 Assembly	 are	 known	 as	
Members	 of	 the	 Legislative	 Assembly	 (or	 ‘MLA’	 in	 popular	 use).	 	 Thirdly,	 Delhi	 has	 five	
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municipal	governments	or	Urban	Local	Bodies	 (ULBs).	 	The	Municipal	Corporation	of	Delhi	
(MCD)	was	trifurcated	in	2009	into:	South	Delhi	Municipal	Corporation	(SDMC);	North	Delhi	
Municipal	Corporation	(NDC);	and	East	Delhi	Municipal	Corporation	(EDMC).		New	Delhi	(the	
Lutyen’s	 Delhi	 ‘bungalow	 zone’,	 housing	 senior	 politicians,	 the	 very	 wealthy,	 foreign	
dignitaries,	 parliament,	 government	 offices	 etc)	 and	 Delhi	 Cantonment	 (military	 housing)	
are	also	governed	by	separate	bodies;	New	Delhi	Municipal	Corporation	(NDMC)	and	Delhi	
Cantonment	Board	(DCB).	 	Politicians	elected	to	Delhi’s	municipal	governments	are	known	
as	counsellors.		This	layer	of	governance	is	more	junior	in	the	hierarchy,	with	responsibility	
for	cleaning	of	nallas4	and	collection	of	waste.			
	
Official	public	water	 supply	 in	Delhi	 (‘government	water’)	 is	 the	mandate	of	 the	Delhi	 Jal5	
Board	(DJB).		The	DJB	is	a	para-statal	body,	nominally	separate	from	the	State	and	Municipal	
Governments,	but	still	headed	by	Delhi’s	Chief	Minister	(CM),	the	most	senior	politician	 in	
the	Delhi	State	Government	(for	a	longer	history	of	the	DJB’s	formation,	see	Chapter	Four).		
This	 parastatal	 corporate-structure	 approach	 to	 water	 supply	 was	 instituted	 after	
liberalisation	 in	 the	1990s,	 in	dialogue	with	 international	 agencies.	 	 Popular	opposition	 to	
the	 involvement	 of	 the	 private	 sector	 in	 Delhi’s	 water	 however	 meant	 that	 introducing	
corporate	 investment	 and	expertise	was	delayed,	 limited	and	 tightly	 controlled.	 In	 formal	
terms,	Delhi	does	not	have	a	water	policy	as	such	(Delhi	Jal	Board,	2016b,	p.	8).		The	closest	
thing	would	be	the	Delhi	Jal	Board	Act	(1984).		Various	documents	stating	the	policies	of	the	
DJB,	 such	 as	water	 tariffs,	 procedures	 for	 requesting	 a	 new	 connection,	 ordering	 a	water	
tanker,	and	 the	yearly	 summer	action	plan	of	measures	 to	address	water	 shortage	during	
the	hot	weather,	are	available	on	 the	DJB	website6.	Water	 tariffs	are	 the	 responsibility	of	
the	State	Assembly.		Previously	very	low	and	below	the	cost	of	supply,	since	2010	they	have	
been	subject	to	fixed	increases	of	10%	a	year.	 	Provision	of	water,	although	under	the	DJB	
overall,	 becomes	 the	 responsibility	 of	 different	 government	 agencies	 according	 to	 the	
planning	status	of	receiving	areas.		Although	formally	headed	by	Delhi’s	Chief	Minister,	the	
DJB	is	managed	by	a	CEO,	usually	a	senior	Indian	Administrative	Service	(IAS)	bureaucrat.		In	
2015,	under	the	new	AAP	government,	the	DJB	began	to	address	the	lack	of	a	formal	policy	
                                                            
4	 Hindi	n.	drains	at	the	sides	of	the	street,	uncovered	or	with	concrete	slabs	laid	over,	but	not	piped.		
Carrying	sewage,	sullage,	rainwater	etc	
5	jal	is	a	Sanskrit-derived	Hindi	noun	for	water	
6	http://delhi.gov.in/wps/wcm/connect/DOIT_DJB/djb/home/	
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by	 releasing	 a	 white	 paper	 and	 then	 a	 draft	 policy	 (Lalchandani,	 2015b).	 	 The	 document	
states:	
	
Presently,	Delhi	does	not	have	a	water	policy.		While	DJB	is	the	organization	with	the	
largest	 mandate	 in	 Delhi’s	 water	 sector,	 it	 does	 not	 have	 the	 sole	 and	 exclusive	
mandate.	 	 There	 are	 several	 organizations	 and	 factors	 within	 and	 without	 Delhi	
which	 have	 substantial	 influence,	 directly	 or	 indirectly,	 over	 Delhi’s	 water	 sector.		
Fragments	 of	 a	 medium	 term	 strategy	 exist	 but	 these	 are	 not	 comprehensive	 or	
cogently	organized.		(Delhi	Jal	Board,	2016b,	p.	8)		
	
This	 Draft	 Policy	 provides	 a	 list	 of	 ‘major	 unaddressed	 areas’.	 	 These	 include:	 ‘lack	 of	
emphasis	on	demand	management’	(listed	twice),	‘efficient	use	of	resource’,	 ‘conservation	
and	 augmentation	 of	 the	 groundwater	 reserves’,	 ‘ensuring	 adequate	 water	 supply	 to	 all	
sections	of	the	population’,	‘equity	in	distribution	spatially	and	amongst	economic	classes’,	
‘sourcing	supplies	from	distant	basins	in	the	face	of	increasing	local	resistance’.		It	should	be	
clear	that	many	of	these	align	with	the	arguments	of	this	thesis.	
		
Delhi’s	water	system	is	in	a	constant	state	of	flux,	both	material	and	political.		During	much	
of	 my	 fieldwork	 period,	 Delhi’s	 politics	 were	 unsettled.	 	 The	 latest,	 and	 very	 significant,	
change	in	Delhi’s	water	provision	is	the	emergence	of	a	new	political	party,	the	Aam	Aadmi	
(common	man)	Party	(AAP),	onto	India’s	political	scene.		
	
“I	tell	people,	‘We	don’t	do	politics.		We	want	to	change	politics’.”	
(Fieldnote	117,	interview	with	AAP	MLA,	DJB	Head	Office,	24/08/2015)		
	
A	 central	 campaign	 of	 the	 AAP	 promise	 was	 to	 free	 people	 from	 dependence	 on	 the	
brokerage	of	 ‘vote	bank’	politics;	 the	requirement	 for	political	 intercession	to	access	even	
low	quality	urban	services	(see	Chapter	Two).		The	current	Chief	Minister	of	Delhi	is	Arvind	
Kejriwal,	formerly	an	Indian	Revenue	Service	bureaucrat	and	social	activist	involved	with	the	
Indian	Against	 Corruption	movement	 and	 the	NGO	Parivartan	 in	 campaigning	 for	 services	
for	 low-income	 communities	 in	 Delhi.	 	 Kejriwal	 has	 been	 a	 prominent	 opponent	 of	 the	
privatisation	 of	 Delhi’s	 water.	 	 After	 coming	 to	 power,	 the	 AAP	 introduced	 a	 number	 of	
significant	 initiatives	 aimed	 at	 reforming	 Delhi’s	 water	 supply	 in	 a	 progressive,	 pro-poor	
direction.	
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In	 February	2014	 the	AAP	 resigned	 from	government	 citing	obstruction	 from	 rivals	 Indian	
National	Congress	and	Bharatiya	 Janata	Party	 (BJP)	at	State,	Municipal	and	Federal	 levels.		
This	 first	 period	 in	 office	 has	 become	 known	 as	 ‘the	 49	 days’	 (30	 December	 2013	 to	 17	
February	 2014).	 	 Following	 their	 resignation,	 the	 Delhi	 State	 Assembly	 was	 placed	 in	
‘suspended	 animation’	 and	 the	 capital	 was	 given	 over	 to	 President’s	 Rule	 by	 Lieutenant	
Governor	 Najeeb	 Jung.	 	 This	 meant	 that	 the	 work	 of	 the	 State	 Assembly	 and	 elected	
representatives	at	this	level	(MLAs)	was	temporarily	frozen.		This	allowed	the	major	parties	
to	focus	their	strengths	on	national	elections	until	a	new	round	of	Delhi	state	elections	was	
held	 in	November	 2015.	 	On	10	 February	 2015,	 the	Delhi	 State	Assembly	 election	 results	
showed	the	AAP	with	a	historical	landslide	victory.		The	AAP	formed	a	second	government	
with	an	almost	total	majority;	67	of	the	70	constituencies	elected	AAP	MLAs	with	just	three	
going	to	the	BJP	opposition.		
	
Under	the	AAP	Government,	Kapil	Mishra,	formerly	one	of	CM	Kejriwal’s	closest	colleagues,	
was	appointed	DJB	Vice	Chairman	and	Water	Minister7.		Mishra	has	previously	worked	as	a	
public	 relations	 officer	 with	 Greenpeace	 and	 Amnesty	 International	 and	 has	 been	 a	
prominent	campaigner	against	the	Commonwealth	Games	 in	Delhi	and	degradation	of	the	
Yamuna	river.		I	met	with	Kapil	three	or	four	times,	chatted	and	ate	with	him	and	observed	
him	working	in	his	office,	but	he	would	not	give	an	interview	and	deputed	a	junior	member	
of	his	staff	 to	 talk	 to	me	about	 their	work.	 	One	of	 the	strongest	 themes	 in	 this	 interview	
was	 the	difficulty	of	working	with	a	 fragmented	and	baroque	governance	 structure	which	
required	 coordination	 between	 agencies	 and	 individuals	 with	 a	 complex	 division	 of	
responsibilities	 whose	 interests	 were	 not	 always,	 to	 put	 it	 mildly,	 aligned.	 	 Other	
ethnographic	work	on	the	AAP	has	described	difficulty	in	policy	implementation	as	a	‘central	
contention’	of	their	politics	since	coming	to	power.					
	
The	 party	 claims	 that	 they	 find	 it	 hard	 to	 implement	 their	 people	 centred	policies	
that	 they	 had	 been	 voted	 in	 for	 in	 2015.	 During	my	 time	 in	 the	MLA’s	 office	 this	
                                                            
7	In	2016	Mishra	was	dismissed	as	Water	Resources	Minister	and	his	AAP	party	membership	was	suspended.		
He	claimed	that	his	removal	was	retaliation	for	his	investigation	into	corruption	in	DJB	tanker	hiring,	which	he	
alleged	involves	current	AAP	politicians	as	well	as	the	previous	government.		AAP	politicians	claim	he	is	
following	a	BJP	‘script’	(his	mother	is	BJP	Mayor	for	East	Delhi).		Although	these	allegations	of	high	level	
corruption,	political	intrigue	and	inadequate	regulation	of	outsourced	government	contracts	are	relevant	they	
are	outside	the	scope	of	this	project.		The	issue	has	been	given	extensive	media	coverage	(J.	Anand	&	Pillai,	
2017;	Kaushika	&	Dutta,	2017;	The	Indian	Express,	2017a).	
BIRKINSHAW: MURKY WATERS  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
22 
complaint	 surfaced	 almost	 every	 day.	 	 The	 volunteers	 in	 the	 office	 burst	 into	 a	
frustrated	 tirade	 every	 time	 they	 faced	 a	 resident’s	 complaint	 that	 they	 found	 no	
instant	solution	for.	“What	can	we	do,	the	police	is	not	with	us,	MCD	is	not	under	us	
and	we	have	no	control	of	the	DDA.”	(Perczel,	2016,	pp.	24–25)	
	
In	 September	 2017,	 with	 Mishra’s	 successor	 hinting	 at	 ‘massive	 mismanagement’	 and	
‘politicisation’	within	the	DJB,	Kejriwal	took	on	the	role	of	Water	Minister	himself	(Times	of	
India,	2017).		Despite	the	challenges	they	face,	the	AAP	has	begun	to	make	decisive	and	far-
reaching	changes	to	Delhi’s	water	governance.	 	They	have	 introduced	a	set	of	progressive	
water	reforms,	with	strong	input	from	water	professionals	and	campaigners,	rather	than	the	
commercial	orientation	that	usually	dominates.		For	example,	the	AAP	government	reduced	
the	 cost	 of	water	 connections	 for	 unauthorised	 colonies,	 introduced	 a	 limited	 amount	 of	
household	water	as	a	free	‘lifeline’	free	water	tariff	block,	and	made	it	possible	to	apply	for	
a	water	connection	regardless	of	tenure	status	(Bhan,	2016).		They	have	also	attempted	to	
counter	 corruption	 in	 the	 DJB,	 the	 prevalence	 of	 informal	water	 supply,	 and	 stated	 their	
opposition	to	further	privatisation	of	water	in	Delhi.	 	After	the	AAP	government	coming	to	
power,	 the	DJB	 has	 laid	 pipelines	 and	 released	 piped	water	 in	 101	 unauthorised	 colonies	
and	pipelines	have	been	laid	in	another	1033	unauthorised	colonies.		
	
OUTLINE	OF	THESIS	
My	 project	 aims	 to	 understand	 the	 (spatial	 and	 social)	 patterns	 of	 water	 access	 and	
governance	 in	 South	 Delhi,	 through	 documenting	 the	 presence	 and	 characteristics	 of	 the	
urban	 informal	 water	 economy,	 and	 effects	 of	 recent	 reforms	 on	 access,	 supply	 and	
governance	for	users	and	suppliers.			
	
In	Chapter	Two,	Literature,	I	outline	three	bodies	of	literature	that	my	study	both	draws	on	
and	 contributes	 to:	 research	 on	 water	 reforms,	 particularly	 in	 India;	 research	 on	
infrastructures,	 especially	 water	 supply;	 and	 research	 on	 urban	 informality	 and	 informal	
politics.		
	
Chapter	Three,	Methods,	discusses	my	research	design	and	the	methods	used.		I	open	with	a	
brief	overview	of	my	 research	questions	and	objectives,	 then	discuss	 the	 specific	areas	of	
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Delhi	that	I	chose	to	work	in	and	the	process	of	gaining	access.		I	move	on	to	the	reasons	for	
using	my	 specific	 research	 tools:	 interviews,	 group	 interviews,	participant	observation.	 	 In	
closing,	I	consider	research	ethics	and	positionality,	and	some	limitations	of	my	project.			
	
Chapter	 Four,	Government	Water	 builds	an	argument	 in	 response	 to	 the	question	of	how	
Delhi’s	public	water	supply	is	governed,	and	why	it	appears	to	be	so	uneven	and	unreliable.	
Areas	 of	 the	 city	 with	 different	 planning	 statuses	 are	 allocated	 differential	 quantities	 of	
water,	 through	 different	 supply	 modes.	 	 The	 water	 supply	 actually	 delivered,	 however,	
varies	even	 further.	 	There	appears	 to	be	no	way	of	 tracking	water	distribution,	 supply	 to	
consumers,	 revenue	 and	 losses	 across	 the	 city.	 	 Provision	 of	water	 from	 the	DJB	 appears	
susceptible	to	‘informal’	influence	at	a	range	of	scales	as	a	result	of	lobbying	by	politicians,	
neighbourhood	groups	and	individual	households.		The	resulting	unreliability	has	led	to	the	
system	 being	 physically	 modified	 in	 many	 ways,	 including	 unauthorised	 changes	 to	 the	
piped	network	and	ubiquitous	private	household	infrastructures	such	as	pumps,	tanks	and	
filters.	 	 These	 informal	 modifications	 create	 further	 problems	 for	 efficient	 network	
management,	as	I	discuss	in	Chapters	Five	and	Six.		
	
In	Chapter	Five,	Water	Underground,	I	analyse	the	politics	of	water	supply	outside	of	Delhi’s	
piped	network,	through	decentralised	‘off-grid’	 infrastructures	of	public	and	private	sector	
tubewells,	 water	 tankers,	 and	 informal	 bottled	 water	 suppliers.	 	 Both	 government	
(tubewells)	 and	 private	 sector	 (tubewells,	 tankers,	 bottled	 water	 factories)	 supplies	 are	
reliant	on	groundwater.	 	Either	unobtrusive	or	mobile,	 these	decentralised	 infrastructures	
are	socially	embedded	in	local	structures	of	land	ownership	and	political	dominance.		These	
decentralised	 supply	 modes	 have	 greater	 room	 for	 discretion	 from	 key	 individuals	 than	
piped	network	supply.	 	Consequently,	 these	modes	are	also	more	susceptible	 to	diversion	
and	 capture,	 and	 present	 more	 opportunities	 for	 patronage,	 bias	 and	 rent-seeking	 than	
network	supply.		This	makes	them	hard	to	reform.		These	modes	of	water	supply	also	vary	
considerably	 from	 one	 another,	 having	 different	 topologies	 and	 temporalities,	 as	 well	 as	
different	political	and	economic	possibilities.		The	informal	capture	of	tankers	and	tubewells	
is	not	a	 consequence	of	 informality	as	 state-led	deregulation	but	 lack	of	 state	 capacity	or	
political	 will	 to	 regulate	 or	 institute	 long-term	 improvements.	 	 The	 differences	 between	
water	supply	modes	highlight	the	varieties	of	informality	within	water	supply,	as	well	as	the	
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similarities	and	contrasts	with	other	empirical	areas,	such	as	 land	and	 labour,	which	many	
scholars	theorising	informality	draw	on.			
	
Chapter	Six,	Models	and	Mud	analyses	a	PPP	for	urban	water	supply	in	Delhi	(‘the	Project’)	
as	an	additional	layer	of	urban	water	governance.		While	earlier	water	privatisation	projects	
‘cherry	 picked’	 the	most	 profitable	 zones	 for	 revenue	 (Bakker,	 2010),	 the	Delhi	 PPP	 zone	
studied	 is	a	deliberately	diverse	mix	of	areas,	 including	unplanned	as	well	as	very	wealthy	
areas,	 as	 a	 ‘test’	 for	 the	 operator	 from	 the	 government.	 	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 complexity	 of	
India’s	 urban	 social	 hydrologies	 has	 been	 underestimated	 by	 this	 initiative,	 partly	 due	 to	
insufficient	 pre-contract	 due	 diligence	 from	 the	 multinational	 partner.	 	 The	 key	 project	
objective	of	continuous	(24/7)	water	has	been	technically	and	socially	challenging,	and	was	
scaled	back	after	consumer	complaints,	highlighting	the	inertia	of	established	systems	even	
within	 wealthy	 and	 planned	 neighbourhoods.	 	 My	 research	 highlights	 the	 continued	
importance	of	groundwater,	even	within	a	zone	of	private	sector	efficiency.	 	While	for	the	
city	as	a	whole	groundwater	use	mitigates	some	of	the	public	dissatisfaction	associated	with	
network	 inefficiency,	 within	 the	 PPP	 zone	 it	 reduces	 the	 frictions	 produced	 by	 greater	
network	efficiency.	 	For	example,	consumers	 in	unauthorised	neighbourhoods	 (mainly	 low	
income	and	minority	households)	who	refuse	 to	accept	water	meters	will	not	be	supplied	
piped	water	and	be	left	reliant	on	groundwater.		However,	as	there	is	insufficient	bulk	piped	
water	available	 for	 the	project,	 leaving	some	households	 reliant	on	groundwater	will	be	a	
necessary	factor	in	the	overall	arrangements.			
	
In	Chapter	Seven,	Conclusions	I	make	conclusions	and	suggestions	for	future	work.		My	work	
suggests	 that	 informality	 in	 water	 supply	 functions	 in	 a	 range	 of	 ways	 which	 are	 best	
discussed	by	reference	to	the	specifics,	e.g.	meter	reading	issues,	government	tubewells	or	
illegal	 connections.	 	 The	 high	 level	 of	 informality	 in	 these	 different	 infrastructures	
demonstrates	 the	 coexistence	 of	 a	 submerged	 ‘technopolitics’,	 operating	 through	 more	
bureaucratic	 and	 technical	 modes	 of	 governance,	 with	 both	 overt	 and	 covert	 uses	 of	
discretion,	 personalisation	 and	 force.	 	 In	 addition,	my	 findings	 indicate	 that	 the	 need	 for	
transparency	and	accountability	of	non-network	water	sources	is	an	important	dimension	of	
improving	water	access	in	urban	areas	where	the	public	network	supply	is	limited.		They	also	
suggest	 that	 extension	 of	 the	 formal	 network	 is	 preferable	 to	 decentralised	 solutions.		
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Urban	groundwater	in	Delhi	is	a	very	low	quality	water	source	and	the	aquifer	degradation	
increases	 the	 importance	 of	 finding	 alternatives.	 	 Lastly,	 the	 effects	 of	 private	 sector	
involvement	 in	 operations	 and	 maintenance	 are	 dependent	 on	 contract,	 regulation	 and	
politics.	 	Thus	PPPs	are	not	necessarily	anti-poor	and	can	be	a	means	of	 increasing	service	
efficiency,	provided	governmental	oversight	and	regulation	are	rigorous	and	well	informed.		
While	this	appears	to	be	the	case	for	the	Delhi	PPP	project	studied,	it	may	well	be	difficult	to	
replicate	elsewhere.					
	
I	 close	 by	 suggesting	 three	 directions	 for	 future	 research	 projects	 arising	 from	 this	work.		
First,	further	analysis	of	new	models	of	urban	governance	in	India	through	research	into	the	
effects	of	new	urban	policies	(Smart	Cities	and	AMRUT)	and	their	emphasis	on	private	sector	
participation,	 on	 urban	 water	 availability	 and	 governance.	 	 Second,	 research	 into	
progressive	public	sector	water	reforms	such	as	 those	 led	by	the	AAP	 in	Delhi	which	have	
made	strong	use	of	inputs	from	well-informed	water	sector	professionals	and	campaigners.		
Many	of	 these	changes	were	only	beginning	during	my	 initial	 fieldwork.	 	Outside	of	Delhi,	
state-led	 reforms	 of	 urban	 water	 supply	 have	 also	 been	 taking	 place	 in	 Orissa	 and	
Maharashtra	 and	 appear	 to	 be	 progressive	 changes	 to	 the	 existing	 system,	 rather	 than	
grafting	 in	 enclaves	 of	 private	 expertise.	 	 Lastly,	 as	 noted	 above,	 a	 changing	 climate	 will	
severely	 impact	 life	 in	south	Asia,	particularly	 in	relation	to	water	use.	 	Understandings	of	
the	 relationships	 between	 urbanisation,	 water	 governance	 and	 reform	 in	 a	 region	 that	
supports	 around	 a	 fifth	 of	 the	 world’s	 population	 are	 important	 now,	 and	 will	 become	
increasingly	urgent	over	time.		
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CHAPTER	2.	LITERATURE	
	
This	 chapter	outlines	 the	bodies	of	 literature	 that	my	 study	draws	on	and	 contributes	 to.		
Conceptually,	 I	 am	 influenced	 by	 research	 on	 urban	 informality,	 infrastructures,	
neoliberalisation	and	the	post-colonial	state.		Empirically,	I	build	on	work	on	water	reforms,	
particularly	in	India	and	actually	existing	water	supply	arrangements.		This	chapter	contains	
four	sections:	informality;	water	infrastructures;	water	governance	reforms;	urban	water	in	
India.					
	
INFORMALITY	
The	 tension	 between	 reason	 (singular)	 and	 its	 others	 has	 been	 a	 long	 running	 theme	 in	
social	 science.	 	 Much	 work	 has	 analysed	 a	 tendency	 towards	 uncritical	 imposition	 of	
‘rational’	 models	 has	 been	 observed	 among	 modernisers,	 including	 colonial	 official	 and	
development	workers	(Blomley,	2003,	2008;	Ferguson,	1994;	Mitchell,	2002;	Mosse,	2004;	
Scott,	 1998).	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 a	 celebration	of	 informality	 and	 the	 ‘anti-plan’	 has	 been	
criticised	 for	 political	 and	 ethical	 homogenisation	 and	 projection	 (Bayat,	 2000;	 Benjamin,	
2008;	Björkman,	2015;	Gilbert,	2007a;	Jones,	2011;	Ranganathan,	2014b).			
	
One	 focal	 point	 for	 an	 unreconstructed	 opposition	 between	 rational	 knowledge	 and	 its	
outside	has	been	formal	and	informal	activity.		Informality	has	become	a	well-used,	if	under-
analysed,	trope	in	Geography	and	Urban	Studies	(Bayat,	1997).		‘Mainstream	urban	studies	
literature’	 has	 often	 posited	 ‘the	 informal’	 as	 a	 convenient	 ‘catch-all	 category’,	 ‘in	
opposition	 to	 a	 well-defined	 ‘formal’’	 (Burt	 &	 Ray,	 2014,	 p.	 108).	 	 The	 Oxford	 English	
Dictionary	states	that	‘informal’,	in	our	context,	refers	to	‘unofficial’	behaviours8.		Official,	in	
turn,	gives	 ‘relating	 to’	or	 ‘employed	by’	an	authority	or	public	body	and	 its	activities	and	
responsibilities’9.	 	 ‘Informal’	 as	 used	 in	 relation	 to	 an	 economy,	 suggests	 an	 area	 of	
economic	activity	which	does	not	follow	state	regulation	(Harriss-White	2003,	Kanbur	2009,	
                                                            
8	https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/informal	
9	https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/official	
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Meagher	 2010).	 	 Consequently,	 an	 informal	 labour	 force	 may	 still	 be	 highly	 disciplined,	
without	 the	 term	 losing	purchase	 (cf	McFarlane,	2012).	 	 Informal	economic	activities	may	
not	encounter	state	regulation	(as	in	housework)	or	exploit	its	weaknesses	(as	in	corporate	
tax	 avoidance).	 	 Extending	 this	 use	 to	 governance,	 we	 then	 have	 a	 structure	 of	 decision	
making	which	is	‘outside	of’	or	‘exploiting’	official	norms.		Thus	the	use	of	religious	concepts	
or	social	affiliations	to	make	decisions	within	an	explicitly	secular,	bureaucratic	organisation	
could	be	said	to	be	informal	in	this	sense	(see	e.g.	Brass,	1997).			
	
Early	modernist	arguments	saw	the	informal	economy	as	a	residue	of	the	rural	or	traditional	
destined	for	incorporation	into	the	formal	economy	with	economic	growth.		Legalists,	such	
as	De	Soto,	would	see	 the	 informal	economy	as	caused	by	excessive	 state	controls	of	 the	
economy	(Gilbert,	2002;	Mitchell,	2005,	2008;	Soto,	2003).		Structuralists	on	the	other	hand	
would	see	the	informal	economy	as	a	necessary	accompaniment	of	the	‘modern’	capitalist	
economy	(Portes,	Castells,	&	Benton,	1989).		This	parallels	the	understanding	of	imperialism	
which	suggests	that	capitalist	production	relies	on	incorporating	value	from	other	areas	and	
sectors	(Harvey	2004;	Luxemburg	2001).		For	example,	Kalyani	Sanyal	suggests	that	in	India	
capitalist	 production	 co-exists	 alongside	 other	 ‘uncapitalist’	 forms	 of	 production	 (Sanyal,	
2014),	 while	 Sharan	 argues	 that	 India	 has	 a	 great	 simultaneity	 of	 historical	 elements	
(Sharan,	2014).			
	
Informal,	as	a	term,	has	now	spread	promiscuously	to	encompass	informal	economies	more	
generally	 (not	 just	 labour);	 informal	 housing,	 informal	 urbanism,	 informal	 politics	 (Bayat	
1997,	 2000),	 before	 becoming	 a	 noun,	 ‘informality’.	 	 Reviews	 of	 the	 literature	 describe	
‘informality’	 as	 used	 in	 four	 ways:	 in	 reference	 to	 space	 (most	 typically	 the	 ‘the	 slum’),	
labour	 or	 a	 sector	 of	 the	 economy	 (‘informal	 vendors’),	 governance	 (a	 deregulated	
economy),	and	the	negotiation	of	value	(contested	and	performative)	(McFarlane	&	Waibel,	
2012;	 Roy	 &	 AlSayyad,	 2004).	Michelle	 Kooy	 gives	 an	 alternate	 list	 of	 partial	 definitions,	
suggesting	 that	 informality	 is	 a	 form	 of	 practice	 rather	 than	 a)	 location	 b)	 level	 of	
development	 c)	 type	 of	 technology	 (e.g.	 decentralised)	 or	 d)	 form	 of	 regulation	 (state-
sanctioned).		She	makes	visible	the	ways	state	and	development	actors	themselves	engage	
in	informal	processes	and	the	development	of	formal	infrastructures	also	develops	informal	
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processes	 through	government	 sanctions	and	definitions,	 zones	of	 exclusion,	 contestation	
and	redefinition	of	subjects	(Kooy,	2014)	
	
In	my	use	in	the	thesis	‘informal’	water	represents	any	method	of	water	access	that	is	not	
from	‘by	the	book’	Delhi	Jal	Board	(DJB)	or	their	subsidiary	Public-Private	Partnerships	(PPPs)	
(billed	and	recorded	by	DJB/PPP	and	paid	for	the	by	the	consumer	according	to	correct	use	
and	current	tariff	levels).		Under	this	definition	self-provision	from	wells	would	be	‘informal’	
although	not	necessarily	illegal.		It	would	be	illegal	if	the	wells	were	dug	after	2007	and	not	
registered	 with	 the	 DJB.	 	 Even	 if	 the	 wells	 were	 registered,	 it	 was	 also	 be	 illegal	 if	 the	
groundwater	 was	 being	 sold	 commercially.	 	 Similarly	 using	 river	 water	 or	 rain	 water	 for	
household	 purposes	 is	 not	 illegal,	 but	 not	 part	 of	 the	 formal	 system	 either,	 so	 can	 be	
considered	 informal	supply	although	 it	does	not	deviate	from	or	exploit	any	rule	or	norm.		
The	term	‘alternatives’	is	a	more	neutral	indication	of	water	supply	modes	which	avoids	the	
normative	associations	of	 ‘informality’.	 	 To	be	 clear,	 illegality	 is	 a	narrower	 category	 than	
informality.		Actions	are	illegal	if	they	are	counter	to	legal	norms.		Actions	are	informal	with	
respect	to	many	kinds	of	norms.			
	
Unfortunately,	being	defined	in	the	negative,	 informality	and	related	concepts	run	the	risk	
of	being	used	as	 ‘undifferentiated’	 ‘residual	categories’	 (Star	&	Bowker,	2007).	 	As	Ananya	
Roy	argues,	‘the	organizing	divide	is	not	so	much	between	formality	and	informality	as	the	
differentiation	 that	 exists	 within	 informality—that	 which	 marks	 off	 different	 types	 of	
informal	 accumulation	 and	 informal	 politics’	 	 (Roy	 &	 AlSayyad,	 2004,	 pp.	 13–14).	 	 More	
sophisticated	work	in	this	vein	gets	beyond	the	general	label	with	more	specific	analysis	of	
the	 phenomenon	 in	 question	 (an	 excellent	 example	 is	Gandhi,	 2012).	 	 In	my	 case,	 rather	
than	 ‘informal	 water’,	 it	 is	 more	 helpful	 to	 discuss	 the	 dynamics	 of	 private	 tankers	 and	
public	tubewells,	for	example.			
	
As	 I	will	not	be	able	 to	be	more	specific	before	analysing	my	empirical	data,	a	provisional	
definition	 seems	 appropriate.	 	 Guha-Khasnobis,	 Kanbur	 and	 Ostrom	 acknowledge	
arguments	that	the	concept	of	an	informal	sector	of	the	economy	suffered	from	“misplaced	
dualism,	misplaced	isolation	and	confusion”.		They	also	accept	that	‘informal’	is	a	term	‘too	
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well	 ingrained	 in	 the	 academic	 and	 policy	 discourse’	 ‘to	 be	 suppressed’,	 and	 suggest	 two	
dimensions	of	informality:	
	
‘[1]	 the	 extent	 to	which	 [something]	 interacts	with,	 or	 comes	 into	 the	 net	 of,	 the	
structures	of	official	governance	at	the	national	or	local	levels;		
[2]	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 an	 activity	 and	 the	 interactions	 among	 its	 constituent	
individuals	are	structured	according	to	a	predictable	framework	(not	necessarily	one	
that	 is	 written	 down)’	 (Guha-Khasnobis,	 Kanbur,	 &	 Ostrom,	 2006,	 pp.	 4–10	 my	
italics).			
	
They	go	on	to	propose	a	critical	element	of	the	concept	–	informality	is	multi-dimensional:		
	
[T]he	 formal–informal	continuum	[should]	apply	strictly	 to	the	continuum	between	
relatively	 high	 and	 relatively	 low	 levels	 of	 the	 reach	 of	 official	 governance	
mechanisms,	suitably	specified	and	measured	 in	each	context”	 	 (Guha-Khasnobis	et	
al.,	2006,	p.	11	my	italics).			
	
Similar	to	the	term	‘infrastructure’	as	we	will	see	below,	the	label	‘informal’	is	relational	and	
tells	 us	 very	 little	 without	 specification.	 	 Informal	 in	 relation	 to	 what?	 	 Law,	 land-use	
planning,	 building	 regulations,	 business	 registration,	 organisational	 procedures,	 norms	 of	
behaviour,	 etc…	 	 What,	 when,	 where	 and	 why	 a	 practice	 is	 informal	 is	 a	 question	 of	
definition.	 	 The	 concept	 of	 ‘performativity’,	 used	 in	 the	 studies	 of	 science	 and	 technology	
that	 illuminate	much	work	on	 infrastructure,	draws	our	attention	 to	 the	productivity,	 and	
contestation	 of,	 a	 citational	 structure	 (‘gender’,	 ‘truth’,	 ‘economics’)	 and	 the	 imperfect	
materialisation	of	its	effects	(Butler,	2011;	Barad,	2003;	Mitchell,	2006).		This	understanding	
of	informality	forces	us	to	attend	to	empirical	processes	and	practices.		
	
I	 investigate	 knowledge	 incorporated	 in	 daily	 events	 and	 activities	 rather	 than	
knowledge	 articulated	 in	 words	 and	 images	 and	 printed	 on	 paper.	 I	 privilege	
practices	over	principles	and	study	them	ethnographically.		(Mol,	2002,	p.	32)	
	
In	this	thesis,	I	research	four	main	areas	of	informal	practices:		
• ‘informal	water’	gained	through	methods	which	are	outside	the	official	operations	of	
the	Delhi	Jal	Board	and	their	contractual	partners;		
• ‘informal	 land-use’,	meaning	built	environments	which	do	not	comply	with	the	city	
master	plan	and	hence	require	either	or	both	of	the	following	arrangements	
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• ‘informal	 politics’,	 negotiated	 arrangements	 between	 individuals	 and	 groups	
operating	on	a	case	by	case	basis	as	exceptions	to	formal	written	arrangements	
• ‘informal	roles’,	whose	reality	is	constituted	by	its	performance.		
	
The	 last	 sense	 of	 informal	 behaviour,	 or	 social	 roles	 in	 which	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 role	 is	
constituted	by	 its	performance	(‘performativity’),	will	become	apparent	 in	the	practices	of	
neighbourhood	 intermediaries,	 social	workers	 and	minor	 politicians.	 	 The	 performance	 of	
political	 authority	 in	 India	 is	 discussed	 under	 this	 lens	 by	 Hansen	 on	 the	 model	 of	 the	
sovereign	 who	 acts	 outside	 of	 the	 law	 (Hansen,	 2001,	 p.	 227	 ff.,	 2004,	 2009;	 Hansen	 &	
Verkaaik,	 2009).	 	 Ayona	Datta	 also	discusses	 the	performativity	 of	 legitimacy,	 gender	 and	
power	under	this	framework	(Datta,	2012,	p.	86	ff.).		
	
Prior	 to	 its	 adoption	 for	 labour	 market	 economics,	 ‘informal’	 was	 being	 used	 in	
anthropology	 and	 sociology	 to	 discuss	 social	 roles.	 	 Early	 examples	 are	 debates	 on	
customary	 law	 in	 anthropology	 (Gutkind	 1965,	 Van	 Velsen	 in	 Gluckman	 1969).	 	 Ernest	
Gellner	 in	a	1963	discussion	of	kinship	and	social	roles	suggests	a	continuum	of	formal-to-
informal	roles.		At	the	highly	formalised	end,	supported	by	their	formal	status,	there	may	be	
a	 substantial	 gap	 between	 the	 roles	 and	 what	 actually	 happens.	 	 Conversely,	 highly	
informalised	 roles	 rely	 on	 their	 ‘performance’	 and	 do	 not	 have	 a	 recognisable	 ‘reality’	
outside	of	 this	 (Gellner	1963:244).	 	For	example,	 the	 ‘street	politician’,	broker,	dalaal10	or	
sevak11	is	likely	to	perform	this	role	in	addition	to	some	other	more	stable	source	of	income	
which	provides	a	base	for	their	other	activities	(Shah	2010:81).		Once	a	previously	informal	
role	 has	 become	 established,	 such	 as	 the	 pradhan	 system	 of	 local	 leaders	 in	 Delhi,	
performance	may	ossify	 and	other	 actors	may	 need	 to	 take	 on	 the	 role	 (see	 p77).	 	 Delhi	
itself	has	been	described	as	a	 city	of	 ‘many	 forms’,	a	 trickster	–	behrupriya	 in	Hindi	–	 the	
name	for	traditional	wedding	entertainers	who	gate-crash	celebrations	in	disguise,	as	police	
for	example,	and	attempt	 to	 fool	 the	hosts	 (Sarda	&	Shveta,	2010;	Shukl,	2010).	 	Blurring	
and	divergence	of	roles,	which	writers	on	postcolonial	statehood	have	called	‘doubling’,	is	a	
commonly	 observed	 phenomenon	 (Bhabha,	 1984,	 p.	 129;	 De	 Boeck	 &	 Plissart,	 2004;	
Mbembe,	2001).	 	To	take	an	example	from	popular	culture,	 in	the	2003	film	Maqbool,	the	
                                                            
10	Dalal	(Hindi)	a	broker,	tout	or	pimp	
11	Sevak	(Hindi),	‘server’,	worker	–	often	translated	to	English	as	‘social	worker’		
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Hindu	police	officers	working	for	a	mafia	don	make	their	 important	decisions	by	following	
astrological	charts	 (V.	Bhardwaj,	2003;	 for	the	role	of	police	 in	communal	riots	see	Ayyub,	
2016;	Brass,	1997;	Hansen,	2001).			
	
These	 informal	 roles	 and	 the	 informal	 politics	 they	 give	 rise	 to	 are	 important	 in	
understanding	 later	 theorisations	 of	 informality	 as	 a	 ‘mode’	 of	 urbanisation	 or	 ‘series	 of	
transactions’.		A	central	thinker	on	urban	informality,	Ananya	Roy	suggests	that	informality	
is	 a	 ‘mode’	 of	 urbanisation	where	 “planning	modalities	 can	 produce	 the	 “unplannable”—
informality	 as	 a	 state	 of	 exception	 from	 the	 formal	 order	 of	 urbanization…	 Against	 the	
standard	dichotomy	of	two	sectors,	formal	and	informal,	we	suggest	that	informality	is	not	a	
separate	 sector	 but	 rather	 a	 series	 of	 transactions	 that	 connect	 different	 economies	 and	
spaces	 together”	 (Roy	 2005:148-149).	While	 I	 follow	 her	 use	 of	 informality	 as	 a	mode	 of	
social	 action,	 as	 has	 long	 been	 common	 in	 anthropology,	 I	 suggest	 that	 Roy’s	 argument	
generalises	unhelpfully	and	 imports	statist	Schmittian	assumptions	that	do	not	hold	for	all	
forms	of	informality.		Her	reading	of	informality	as	the	creation	of	sovereign	power	suggests	
that	 in	cases	 like	the	Sangam	Vihar	tubewells,	where	state	power	 is	not	sovereign,	we	are	
dealing	instead	with	popular	sovereignty	(cf	‘panni	maliks’	–	Hindi,	owner	or	boss,	Chapter	
Five),	however	I	feel	this	stretches	the	concept	of	sovereignty	too	far.					
	
I	want	to	suggest	that	much	work	on	informality,	like	Ananya	Roy’s,	is	derived	from	work	on	
land	and	labour	–	particularly	land	in	Roy’s	case	(Roy,	2005).		In	parallel	to	the	point	made	
by	 Rose	 that	 land	 is	 taken	 as	 the	 model	 of	 property	 in	 law,	 theorisations	 of	 informality	
derived	from	land	use	are	also	based	on	assumptions	of	stasis	and	monopolistic	use,	which	
may	not	be	appropriate	for	other	contexts,	such	as	water	(Rose,	1995).		Lines	of	thought	are	
extrapolated	from,	say,	land-use	planning	in	Kolkata	or	architecture	in	Egypt,	to	‘urban	life’	
in	general	(Roy	&	AlSayyad,	2004	see	introduction	and	chapter	by	AlSayyad).		For	example,	
the	 informalities	 Roy	 describes	 in	 land-use	 planning	 in	 Kolkata	 are	 ‘de-regulation’,	 wilful	
ignorance	from	state	agencies	(Roy,	2002).		Solomon	Benjamin	describes	informal	land-use	
in	 Delhi	 and	 Bengaluru	 as	 economically	 productive,	 even	 redistributive	 (Benjamin,	 2004;	
Benjamin	 &	 Raman,	 2011).	 	 As	 my	 empirical	 work	 illustrates	 neither	 of	 these	 things	 are	
generally	 true	 for	 informal	 water	 access	 and	 it	 would	 be	 a	 misjudgement	 to	 attempt	 to	
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construct	a	theory	of	‘urban	informality’	that	does	not	recognise	the	specifics	of	place	and	
resource.			
	
While	we	 primarily	 deal	 with	 the	 sectors	 of	 housing	 and	 land,	 the	 implications	 of	
urban	 informality	 go	 beyond	 these	 discrete	 sectors	 […]	 urban	 informality	 while	
manifested	in	distinct	sectors,	is	an	organizing	logic.		It	 is	a	process	of	structuration	
that	 constitutes	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 game,	 determining	 the	 nature	 of	 transactions	
between	 individuals	 and	 institutions	 and	within	 institutions.	 	 If	 formality	 operates	
through	the	fixing	of	value,	 including	the	mapping	of	spatial	value,	then	informality	
operates	 through	 the	 constant	 negotiability	 of	 value	 and	 the	 unmapping	 of	 space	
(Roy	&	AlSayyad,	2004,	pp.	13–14).	
	
How	does	this	‘negotiability	of	value’	take	place?		There	is	a	large	literature	on	the	‘informal	
politics’	of	patronage	and	negotiation	which	describes	the	mediated	engagement	with	local	
state	agencies	that	is	a	common	mode	of	access	to	state	institutions	and	services	by	weaker	
sections	of	 society	 (for	example	Benjamin,	2008;	P.	Chatterjee,	2013b).	These	channels	of	
influence	 may	 work	 through	 local	 politicians,	 local	 leaders	 of	 various	 kinds,	 agency	 staff	
acting	outside	their	remit	or	through	individual	intercessions.			
	
A	subset	of	this	research	concerns	‘fixers’	(Berenschot,	2011;	Reddy	&	Haragopal,	1985)	or	
‘brokers’	 (I.	 M.	 Cook,	 2015;	 Schindler,	 2017;	 Blok,	 1969)	 who	 arrange	 access	 to	 state	
agencies	 or	 resources.	 Kumar	 and	 Landy	 argue	 that	 ‘corruption	 cannot	 be	 understood	
without	examining	socio-political	practices	such	as	patronage	and	brokerage	that	are	traits	
of	 everyday	 Indian	 life,	 more	 specifically	 in	 metropolitan	 settings,	 where	 complex	
clientelistic	 relationships	 intertwine	 due	 to	 numerous	 interpersonal	 and	 intergroup	
networks’	(G.	Kumar	&	Landy,	2009,	p.	106).	This	is	well	documented	in	research	on	urban	
water	access	(Björkman,	2015;	Contractor,	2012;	Cooper,	2011;	Jha,	Rao,	&	Woolcock,	2007;	
Ranganathan,	2014a).		
	
Several	 studies	describe	 the	personalised	 infrastructure	of	mediation	 that	 facilitates	 these	
informal	economies	of	 the	state,	or	what	Hansen	and	Verkaaik	call	 ‘informal	government’	
(Hansen	&	Verkaaik,	2009,	p.	13	also	see;	Anjaria,	2011;	Manor,	2000;	Hansen,	2001).	 	For	
example,	Berenschot	offers	an	 illuminating	picture	of	 time	spent	with	a	municipal	elected	
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representative	in	Ahmedabad,	who	sets	up	office	each	morning	at	a	road	side	pitch	where	
he	receives	queues	of	 local	residents	asking	him	to	 intercede	 in	various	problems	on	their	
behalf.	 	 The	 most	 commonly	 presented	 issue,	 Berenschot	 found,	 was	 access	 to	 water	
(Berenschot,	 2010a).	 	 Thomas	 Blom	 Hansen	 notes	 that	 the	 intercession	 of	 ‘big	 men’	 is	
‘central’	 to	 relationships	 between	 ordinary	 people,	 authorities	 and	 formal	 institutions	
(Hansen,	2005,	p.	 130).	 	 ‘Big	men’	 are	not	only	male;	 Sen’s	 (2007)	work	with	 female	Shiv	
Sena	 activists	 in	 Mumbai	 and	 Pune	 slums	 shows	 their	 use	 of	 judicious	 networking	 and	
applied	violence	as	‘party	workers’	capable	of	delivering	‘vote	banks’	(as	well	as	beatings),	
to	achieve	services	for	themselves	and	their	community.			
	
Ubiquitous	 networks	 of	 strongmen,	 brokers	 and	 fixers	 can	 be	 found	 in	 any	
neighbourhood,	slum	and	chawl	in	Indian	cities.		Most	of	the	activities	of	these	men	
defy	 conventional	 distinctions	 between	 legality	 and	 illegality:	 they	 assist	 in	 getting	
water	 connections,	 jobs,	 housing,	 school	 admission,	 they	 adjudicate	 in	 disputes	
between	 neighbours,	 provide	 protection	 for	 those	 who	 are	 loyal	 and	 dependent	
upon	 them,	 etc.	 	 But	 some	 of	 them	 also	 service	 debt,	 extort	 money,	 beat	 up	
opponents	 and	 threaten	 those	 who	 defy	 or	 betray	 them.	 	 However	 morally	
ambiguous	these	men	and	their	activities	are	in	the	eyes	of	local	residents	they	are,	
nonetheless,	 the	 elementary	 units	 of	 local	 politics,	 of	 social	 and	 of	 cultural	
organisation.		(Hansen,	2009,	p.	193)			
	
Several	 scholars	 have	 drawn	 on	 Hansen’s	 performative	 understanding	 of	 politics	 and		
brokerage.		The	neologism,	‘infra-power’,	builds	on	James	Scott’s	idea	of	infra-politics	or	the	
politics	 of	 the	 marginalised	 (Scott,	 2012).	 	 Infra-power	 is	 ‘performative	 competence’	 of	
urban	registers	 ‘only	shows	 itself	 in	action	and	outcome	and	 is	reinvented	through	action’	
(McFarlane	2011:56)	and	is	‘achieved	through	individual	and/or	social	agency	outside	of	the	
state	apparatus’;	in	other	words	‘power	from	below’	(Gupte,	2008,	pp.	6–7).	
	
Even	though	 infra-power	refers	particularly	to	non-state	and	extralegal	channels	of	
agency,	 the	 potency	 of	 infra-power	 is	 also	 tapped	 into	 by	 state	 (or	 ‘legitimate’)	
actors	 such	 as	 policemen	 […]	 infra-power	 not	 only	 competes	 with	 the	 authority	
(monopoly)	of	the	state,	but	it	can	also	collude	or	even	have	a	corrosive	effect	on	it	
(Gupte,	2008,	p.	10)	
	
Whatever	terms	we	use	to	describe	this	 ‘power	 from	below’,	understandings	of	 ‘water’	 in	
this	context	are	 likely	 to	be	articulated	 in	a	 range	of	ways	 in	addition	to	 the	predominant	
policy	presentation	of	a	purchased	service.		They	may	be	seen	as	a	right	of	urban	citizenship,	
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a	 source	 of	 tenure	 security	 or	 livelihood	 quietly	 or	 brazenly	 encroached,	 or	 a	 concession	
provided	as	 a	 ‘paralegal’	 ‘exception’	 via	negotiations	between	 residents,	 brokers,	 and	 the	
municipality	(Mehta	et	al	2013,	Ranganathan	2013,	Björkman	2011,	Chatterjee	2011,	Bawa	
2011,	Benjamin	2008).			
	
While	alternative	systems	of	water	provision	are	informal	economies,	they	are	also	political	
economies,	connecting	to	both	 formal	and	 informal	politics.	 	The	contrasting	Marxian	and	
liberal	 uses	 ‘political	 economy’	 as	 a)	 the	 political	 structure	 of	 economies	 and	 b)	 the	
economies	of	politics,	are	in	this	case	both	applicable.			
	
‘informal	politics’	might	be	summed	up	by	the	phrase	‘politics	is	everywhere’	…	It	is	
about	 forming	 alliances,	 exercising	 power,	 getting	 other	 people	 to	 do	 things,	
developing	 influence	 and	 protecting	 and	 advancing	 particular	 goals	 and	 interests.		
(Painter	and	Jeffrey	2009:7)	
	
At	a	macro	scale	this	strategic	distributional	(‘pork-barrel’)	aspect	of	Indian	politics	has	been	
dubbed	 ‘patronage	 democracy’	 (Kanchan	 Chandra,	 2007).	 	 For	 example,	 there	 are	
indications	 that	 	 infrastructure	 budgets	 are	 used	 to	 fund	 electoral	 campaigns	 and	 reward	
party	supporters	(Wilkinson,	2006).		After	the	1970s,	the	Congress	system	of	patronage	and	
political	 redistribution	 moved	 into	 	 a	 more	 fragmented	 and	 unstable	 (but	 still	 cliental)	
political	 society	 of	 ‘demand	 groups’	 (Kohli,	 2009,	 pp.	 23–42;	 also	 Saez,	 2002,	 pp.	 43–68;	
Varshney,	 2000;	 Yadav,	 1999).	 	 At	 the	 community	 level,	 organisations	 such	 as	 Shiv	 Sena	
shakas	 (local	 groups)	 in	Mumbai	or	 Yadav	 caste	networks	 in	North	 India,	 also	 function	as	
mechanisms	 for	 participation	 in	 urban	 resource	 allocation	 (P.	 Chatterjee,	 2013b;	 Hansen,	
2001;	Harriss,	2005;	Michelutti,	2008;	Sen,	2007).		Infrastructure	capture	and	delivery	plays	
an	 important	 role	 in	 this	 informal	economy,	as	 the	 following	quote	 from	Björkman	 (citing	
Michelutti	2007:641)	illustrates:	
	
“Election-time	 distributions	 of	 goods,	 as	 well	 as	 particularistic	 benefits	 towards	
specific	constituencies	–	infrastructural	investments	in	roads,	drains,	or	water	pipes	
for	 instance	 –	 have	 generally	 been	 described	 …	 as	 evidence	 of	 the	 socially-
embedded,	“vernacular”	character	of	Indian	democracy.”	(Björkman	2013:7)	
	
Partha	 Chatterjee,	 in	 a	 highly	 influential	 analysis	 of	 relationships	 with	 the	 state,	 posits	 a	
hard	distinction	between	civil	society	relationships	with	the	state,	as	imagined	in	normative	
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political	theory,	and	the	reality	for	‘most	of	the	world’,	of	contingent	and	contested	claims,	
based	 not	 on	 liberal	 principles,	 but	 on	 instrumentality	 and	 utility	 for	 governmental	 and	
individual	interests	(2004,	2008,	2011).		Claims	made	in	the	mode	of	‘political	society’	aim	to	
mobilise	their	influence	to	exert	exceptions	to	state	policy.		I	find	Chatterjee’s	conception	of	
civil/political	 society	more	useful	 if	 viewed	as	a	 continuum,	 including	a	 range	of	 tactics	 in	
negotiations	between	state	and	non-state	actors,	rather	than	separate	‘domains’	occupied	
by	distinct	groups.	 	For	example,	a	poor	people’s	organisation	may	employ	both	the	 ‘civil’	
approach	of	rights	rhetoric	through	petitions	or	formal	legal	channels	and	also	the	‘political’	
approach	of	the	promise	of	member	votes,	or	the	threat	of	disruption.	 	Similar	 ideas	have	
been	 articulated	 by	 Nivedita	 Menon	 and	 Stuart	 Corbridge	 (Chatterjee	 2011:90	 –	 see	
Corbridge	et	al	2013	 for	a	 solid	 critique	of	Chatterjee).	 	Asher	Ghertner’s	work	on	middle	
class	informality	in	Delhi	provides	some	empirical	examples	(Ghertner,	2011,	2012).		For	my	
purposes,	Chatterjee’s	idea	of	political	society	is	important	as	a	mode	of	political	action	with	
informal	objectives;	the	exceptional	suspension	of	rule	or	policy.			This	is	different	to	political	
action	with	 informal	methods	 (those	outside	 the	ambit	of	 ‘politics’	ordinarily	understood)	
such	as	bribery,	coercion,	blackmail	and	so	on,	used	by	a	wide	range	of	actors	but	aiming	at	
formal	political	objectives	such	as	policy	implementation	or	change.		
	
These	 literatures	 broadly	 situate	 use	with	 regards	 to	 the	 ‘how’	 of	my	 research	 objects	 –	
informal	processes.		Next	we	need	to	consider	the	‘what’	–	water	infrastructures.			
	
WATER	INFRASTRUCTURES	
Research	in	geography	and	anthropology	on	urban	infrastructures	has	been	a	background	to	
my	own	work	(for	a	review	see	Larkin,	2013).		This	literature	is	itself	influenced	by	work	on	
large	technical	systems	(Bijker,	Hughes,	&	Pinch,	1987;	Coutard,	1999)	and	studies	of	science	
and	 technology	 (Haraway,	 1988;	 Latour,	 1993).	 	 An	 interest	 in	 power	 and	 knowledge	 in	
South	Asia	has	partly	been	an	outcome	of	colonial	attempts	at	classification,	and	there	have	
been	 several	 notable	 works	 from	 South	 Asia	 in	 these	 fields	 (Prakash,	 1999;	 Bear,	 2007;	
Gopakumar,	2011).			
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Work	on	 large	technical	systems	attempts	to	understand	socio-technical	development	and	
change	 in	 infrastructures	 such	 as	 roads,	 sewers	 and	 water	 supply	 (Geels,	 2007;	 Geels	 &	
Kemp,	 2007;	 Marie	 Llorente,	 2004).	 	 A	 large	 influence	 from	 this	 stream	 of	 work	 is	 an	
emphasis	on	the	mutual	constitution	of	technology	and	society	and	the	specific	case-by-case	
interactions	 that	preclude	generalisation	 (Bijker	et	al.,	 1987;	 Latour,	1988;	Winner,	1986).		
This	 may	 seem	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 conception	 of	 reforms	 as	 legibility	 and	 informality	 as	
opaque,	 however	 the	 outcomes	 of	 reform	 initiatives	 in	 close	 up	 appear	 more	 complex,	
nuanced	and	variable	than	some	macro	accounts	would	suggest.	 	A	conception	of	reforms	
as	contingent	and	provisional,	even	fragile,	assemblages	also	borrows	from	this	literature,	as	
well	 as	 related	work	 in	 the	 study	 of	 development	 (Ferguson,	 1994;	 Latour,	 2005,	 p.	 245;	
Mitchell,	 2005;	 Tsing,	 2005).	 	 A	 related	 point	 of	 interest	 is	 consideration	 of	 the	 role	 of	
information	flows	in	rendering	projects	of	all	kinds	possible,	and	the	infrastructures	required	
for	these	(Hull,	2012;	Latour	&	Hermant,	2004).							
	
These	types	of	work	also	call	for	refocussing	on	material	characteristics,	and	components	of	
networks	that	might	easily	be	overlooked,	such	as	the	famous	examples	of	hammers,	door-
openers	 and	 bridges	 (de	 Laet	&	Mol,	 2000;	 Latour	&	Hermant,	 2004).	 	 Katherine	 Furlong	
argues	 that	 there	 has	 been	 less	 attention	 given	 to	 small	 technologies	within	 science	 and	
technology	studies	 (STS)	 (K.	Furlong,	2011).	 	Water	meters	are	something	of	an	exception	
and	are	better	represented	(Loftus,	2006;	Schnitzler,	2008).	 	However	water	tanker	trucks,	
tubewells,	pumps	and	filters	as	discreet	and	sometimes	mobile	infrastructural	technologies	
bring	 different	 dynamics	 into	 play	 and	 allow	 research	 from	 a	 different	 angle	 to	 the	
predominant	 focus	 on	 large-scale	 government	 run	 piped	 networks	 (Coelho,	 Karen,	 2004;	
Gopakumar,	2011;	Walters,	2013).		The	material	qualities	of	water	have	been	emphasised	in	
several	 recent	 studies,	 and	 I	 will	 return	 to	 this	 in	 more	 detail	 later	 (N.	 Anand,	 2017;	
Björkman,	2015).	
	
Infrastructure	 has	 encapsulated	 growing	 interests	 in	 mobility	 and	 technology	 from	
researchers	 far	 beyond	 the	 dry	 realms	 of	 public	 services	 and	 other	 ‘boring	 things’	 (Star,	
1999).	 	 However,	 over-enthusiastic	 and	 provocative	 uses	 of	 the	 term	 lead	 to	 confusion.		
Rather	 like	 informality,	 infrastructures	 appear	 to	 be	 everywhere,	 and	 the	 term	 becomes	
unhelpful	(e.g.	McFarlane	&	Vasudevan,	2013).		Guarding	against	this,	there	are	two	ways	in	
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which	 I	 am	not	using	 infrastructure.	 	 First,	 sociologist	Michael	Mann	coins	 the	 concept	of	
‘infrastructural	 power’	 (against	 ‘despotic	 power’)	 to	 describe	 the	 power	 of	 liberal	
democracies	to	influence	civil	society.		In	Foucauldian	language,	we	could	understand	this	as	
governmentality	(against	sovereign	power).		I	do	not	use	the	term	in	this	sense.		The	similar	
concept	 of	 ‘infra-power’	 used	by	Hansen,	McFarlane	 and	 Jaideep	Gupte	 is	 in	 fact	 derived	
from	 James	 Scott’s	 ‘infra-politics’	 (mentioned	 on	 page	 33	 above),	 or	 politics	 from	 below	
(Mann,	 2008;	 Hansen	 &	 Verkaaik,	 2009;	 Gupte,	 2008;	 McFarlane,	 2011;	 Scott,	 1987).		
Second,	 both	 Simone	 and	 de	 Boeck	make	 valid	 points	 in	 their	 descriptions	 of	 ‘people	 as	
infrastructure’	and	the	 ‘body	as	 infrastructure’	 (Simone,	2004;	De	Boeck	&	Plissart,	2004).		
While	the	action	of	intermediaries	is	important	in	my	work	also,	I	prefer	to	support	Simone’s	
argument	 without	 accepting	 his	 language.	 	 Here,	 I	 generally	 use	 ‘infrastructure’	 as	
commonly	understood	to	refer	to	material	non-human	things	 like	pipes	and	trucks.	 	While	
people,	social	relations,	money,	language	etc	can	be	considered	infrastructures,	I	don’t	find	
this	increasingly	figurative	use	analytically	helpful.			
	
A	 related	 conception	 of	 infrastructures	 as	 ‘background’,	 ‘ready-to-hand’,	 or	 ‘black	 boxes’	
(e.g.	Graham,	2010;	Kaika,	2005;	Heidegger,	1962),	can	be	clarified	by	adopting	Susan	Leigh	
Star’s	understanding	of	infrastructure	as	a	relational	concept.			
	
Good	infrastructure	is	by	definition	invisible,	part	of	the	background	for	other	kinds	
of	 work.	 	 It	 is	 ready	 to	 hand	 […]	 	 However,	 in	 light	 of	 a	 deeper	 analysis	 of	
infrastructure,	 and	 especially	 to	 understand	 large-scale	 technical	 systems	 in	 the	
making,	 or	 to	 examine	 the	 situations	 of	 those	who	 are	 not	 served	 by	 a	 particular	
infrastructure	this	definition	is	both	too	shallow	and	too	absolute	[…]		One	person’s	
infrastructure	 is	 another’s	 brick	 wall,	 or	 in	 some	 cases,	 one	 person’s	 brick	 wall	 is	
another’s	object	of	demolition.		(Star,	2002,	p.	116)		
	
[I]nfrastructure	 is	 a	 fundamentally	 relational	 concept.	 	 [Something]	 becomes	
infrastructure	in	relation	to	organised	practices.		Within	a	given	cultural	context,	the	
cook	considers	the	water	system	a	piece	of	working	infrastructure	integral	to	making	
dinner;	for	the	city	planner,	 it	becomes	a	variable	 in	a	complex	equation.	 	Thus	we	
ask,	when—not	what—is	an	infrastructure	(Star	&	Ruhleder,	1996,	p.	112,	my	italics)	
	
Taking	the	concept	of	temporalities	and	topologies	of	infrastructure	further	we	can	think	of	
informal	 infrastructures	as	performative	 (existing	only	 in	process)	and	relationally	creating	
various	 spaces	 and	 times,	 similar	 to	 the	 consideration	 of	 informality	 (informal	 roles)	 and	
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governance	(Mitchell’s	state	effect)	above	(Mol	&	Law,	1994;	Ghertner,	2017;	Allen,	2011;	P.	Harvey,	
2012).		Performativity	is	useful	to	think	with	here	for	both	infrastructure	and	informality	as	a	
concept	drawing	attention	to	‘what	things	do’,	(or	‘how	they	are	done’)	not	‘what	they	are’.			
It	 also	highlights	 the	performatively	 constituted	 separation	between	entities	 such	 as	 ‘the’	
economy,	society,	government,	nature,	politics,	engineering	and	so	on	(Butler,	2010).		As	my	
empirical	 chapters	 show,	 whether	 we	 are	 discussing	 infrastructures	 or	 governance,	 the	
boundaries	 between	public	 and	private,	material	 and	political,	 or	 technical	 and	 social	 are	
not	so	easily	separated.		
	
An	emphasis	on	materiality,	is	the	last	point	where	infrastructure	studies	resonates	with	my	
empirical	work.		Recent	as	well	as	classic	works	stress	the	importance	of	material	factors	or	
‘agency’	(N.	Anand,	2017;	Björkman,	2015;	Latour,	1996;	Winner,	1986).		In	my	fieldwork	it	
became	apparent	that	physical	and	technical	factors	such	as	slope	gradient,	pipe	diameter	
and	valve	location	are	all	 instrumental	in	determining	the	quality	of	water	access	available	
(Alankar,	2013).							
	
There	are	several	material	characteristics	of	water,	which	make	it	more	complex	than	other	
infrastructure	areas	 (Bakker,	2005,	p.	559;	also	 Iyer,	2003,	2007;	Madari,	2007).	 	Water	 is	
essential	 for	 humans,	 animals,	 plants	 and	 the	 environment	 as	 a	 whole.	 	 As	 it	 is	 non-
substitutable,	demand	is	inelastic	and	access	to	water	is	important	for	public	health	(as	well	
as	environmental	aesthetics).	 	As	a	naturally	occurring,	and	flowing,	resource	with	uneven	
distribution	 in	 space	 and	 time	water	 has	 a	 complex	 ‘supply	 chain’	 with	 variation	 in	 both	
source	and	mode	of	acquisition.		This	complexity	is	increased	as	environmental	features	are	
fundamental	 to	 the	 hydrological	 system	 and	 factors	 of	 topography,	 geology,	 social	
geography	 and	 built	 environment	 are	 strongly	 influential.	 	 As	 a	 bulky,	 heavy	 and	 fluid	
substance,	 transport	 and	 storage	 costs	 are	 significant	 and	 water	 infrastructure	 is	
capital/labour	intensive	with	large	sunk	costs.		These	strong	natural	monopoly	features	have	
often	been	advanced	as	arguments	for	a	public	role	in	water	provision.			
	
However,	water	does	not	well	 fit	economic	conceptions	of	a	 ‘public	good’	as	water	use	 is	
both	‘rivalrous’	and	exclusionary.		Water’s	complex	‘supply	chain’	and	variety	of	source	and	
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access	modes	 helps	 perhaps	 explain	 debates	 over	 the	 extent	 to	 which	water	 is	 a	 public,	
private,	 merit,	 club	 good	 or	 common-pool	 resource.	 	 Of	 course	 these	 properties	 can	 be	
modified	depending	on	the	access	arrangements	in	place.		Production	and	distribution	can	
be	augmented	locally	by	boreholes,	tanks	or	reservoirs,	for	example.		Groundwater	can	be	
depleted	 (and	 polluted)	 by	 industrial	 and	 agricultural	 uses	 (e.g.	 Aiyer,	 2007).	 	 Political	
ecology	perspectives	on	urban	water	in	India,	particularly	including	the	role	of	groundwater	
(Mehta	 et	 al	 2013)	 and	 ‘extended	 urbanisation’	 (e.g.	 large	 dams),	 are	 useful	 here	 in	
highlighting	the	political	economy	of	water	processes	(L.	Mehta,	2001).			
	
The	production	of	cheaper	food	supply	after	India’s	green	revolution	has	been	bankrolled	by	
unsustainable	use	of	this	fast	diminishing	natural	resource	(T.	Shah,	Roy,	Qureshi,	&	Wang,	
2003).		With	the	increasing	availability	of	tubewell	technology,	groundwater	use	has	grown	
exponentially	in	India	since	the	1970s	leading	to	a	looming	groundwater	crisis.		A	tubewell	is	
constructed	by	drilling	into	the	underground	rock	and	inserting	a	metal	pipe	into	the	hole	to	
tap	underground	water12.	 	 Pumps	 to	extract	 the	water	 can	be	attached	above	ground,	or	
submersible	 and	 sunk	 into	 the	 pipe.	 	 Groundwater	 use	 complicates	 our	 socio-technical	
understandings	 of	water	 networks	 by	 introducing	 governance	 /	 political	 dynamics	 around	
tubewells,	 tankers	and	water	 factories,	operating	within	and	outside	of	official	 regulation.		
For	example,	Dubash	describes	the	high	risk,	high	return	potential	of	tubewells	in	crystalline	
aquifers	because	of	the	random	distribution	of	water	in	the	rock.		
	
The	economics	and	politics	of	rural	groundwater	use	has	been	a	rising	area	of	research	for	
some	 time	 (T.	 Shah,	 2008;	 Sultana,	 2009,	 2011).	 	Over	 several	 papers,	 Trevor	 Birkenholtz	
argues	 the	 need	 for	 more	 research	 on	 specific	 ‘groundwater	 political	 ecologies’	 and	
‘groundwater	 governmentalities’	 (T.	 Birkenholtz,	 2009a;	 T.	 L.	 Birkenholtz,	 2015).	 	 Navroz	
Dubash	 describes	 the	 implications	 of	 groundwater	 use	 for	 agrarian	 change	 in	 Gujarat	
(Dubash,	 2001).	 	 He	 also	 notes	 collective	 governance	 of	 joint	 financed	 tubewells	 through	
‘members’	 committees	 (Dubash,	2001,	p.	229).	 	 In	my	empirical	 research	however,	 I	have	
only	 encountered	 private	 tubewells	 installed	 by	 wealthy	 individuals	 or	 households,	 not	
                                                            
12	Borewells	are	similar	structures	used	in	hard	rock	formations	at	less	depth	with	PVC	pipes.		While	the	
term	‘borewell’	is	commonly	used,	strictly	speaking	most	of	these	wells	in	Delhi	are	tubewells.		In	this	
thesis	the	terms	do	not	indicate	a	significant	difference.			
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collectives.	 	 However,	 the	 rotating	 or	 ‘serial’	 supply	 from	 urban	 tubewells	 mirrors	
descriptions	of	rotating	rural	tubewell	water	supply	(‘waribanda’)	in	Gujarat,	a	phenomenon	
also	described	 in	 South	 India	by	Robert	Wade	 (T.	 Shah,	 2008,	p.	 11;	Wade,	1988).	 	A	 key	
difference	however,	is	that	rural	tubewell	rotations	are	said	to	provide	‘timely’	water	supply	
‘discipline’	(Dubash,	2001,	pp.	190,	218).	 	Urban	tubewell	supply	was	frequently	described	
to	me	as	random	and	unpredictable	(see	Chapter	Five).		
	
Literature	 on	 urban	 groundwater	 in	 social	 science	 is	 limited.	 	 Mihir	 Shah’s	 authoritative	
report	 describes	 urban	 groundwater	 as	 a	 ‘blind	 spot’,	 and	 virtually	 neglected	 by	 social	
science	(M.	Shah,	2016).		Most	research	is	from	a	hydrogeological,	chemical	or	engineering	
perspective.		Work	in	environmental	science	has	started	to	move	towards	a	model	of	‘social-
hydrology’	 (Malghan,	Kemp-Benedict,	Goswami,	Muddu,	&	Mehta,	 2013;	 Srinivasan,	 Seto,	
Emerson,	 &	 Gorelick,	 2013;	 Troy,	 Konar,	 Srinivasan,	 &	 Thompson,	 2015),	 and	 increased	
recognition	of	 governance	 challenges	 for	 groundwater	management	 is	 leading	 to	 calls	 for	
more	 interdisciplinary	 research	 (Kulkarni,	 Shah,	 &	 Vijay	 Shankar,	 2015).	 	 Relatedly,	 the	
majority	of	work	on	urban	water	focusses	on	piped	supply	from	the	public	sector,	despite	
this	 accounting	 for	 a	minority	 of	water	 provision	 in	 South	Asia	 (T.	 Shah,	 2007;	UN	World	
Water	Assessment	Programme,	 2006).	 	 For	 example,	Nikhil	 Anand	mentions	 groundwater	
briefly	in	his	work	on	Mumbai	as	providing	alternative	political	possibilities	(N.	Anand,	2011,	
p.	557),	but	the	topic	barely	gets	five	pages	in	his	recent	book	(N.	Anand,	2017).		In	Delhi,	a	
site	 of	 heavy	 groundwater	 use,	 there	 are	 three	main	 social	 science	 papers	 (Maria,	 2006,	
2008;	Rohilla,	2012).		In	Chennai,	Veena	Srinivasan	et	al	discuss	tanker	markets	(Srinivasan,	
Gorelick,	&	Goulder,	2010).		
	
The	 role	 that	 groundwater	 as	 a	 resource	 plays	 for	 the	 urban	 poor	 remains	 largely	
unexplored.	 […]	 The	 extent	 to	 which	 urban	 dwellers	 depend	 on	 groundwater,	
especially	those	living	in	low-income	areas,	and	the	difficulties	they	face	as	a	result,	
has	not	been	a	topic	of	sustained	research;	nor	has	 it	been	a	topic	of	 international	
policy	debate.		(Grönwall	et	al.,	2010)	
	
The	urban	use	of	groundwater	as	an	alternative	to	public	supply,	little	present	in	the	social-
science	 literature,	 but	 common	 in	 Delhi	 and	most	 Indian	 cities,	 forces	 us	 to	 develop	 our	
understandings	 of	 urban	water.	 	 Urban	 groundwater	 use	 is	 heavily	 class	 inflected,	 as	 the	
following	table	shows:		
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	Table	1.	Percentage	of	urban	households	in	India	using	wells	as	primary	water	source	2005-6	
	 Quintile	1	 Quintile	2	 Quintile	3	 Quintile	4	 Quintile	5	
Percent	 39	 28	 25	 15	 23	
(Grönwall	et	al.,	2010,	p.	82)	
	
Research	 on	 city	 size	 and	water	 use	 shows	 that	 it	 is	 not	 until	 urban	 settlements	 reach	 a	
population	 of	 about	 five	 million	 that	 they	 become	 higher	 users	 of	 surface	 water	 than	
groundwater	 (Kulkarni	 &	 Shah,	 2015,	 p.	 60;	M.	 Shah,	 2016,	 p.	 10).	 	 The	 vast	majority	 of	
India’s	 urban	 settlements	 are	 groundwater	 users.	 	 Delhi,	 as	 with	 Bengaluru	 (formerly	
Bangalore)	and	Chennai,	is	also	heavily	groundwater	dependent.		In	this	respect	it	has	more	
in	 common	 with	 India’s	 smaller	 cities	 and	 towns.	 	 This	 is	 also	 a	 significant	 difference	 to	
Mumbai,	 where	 much	 recent	 work	 on	 urban	 water	 has	 been	 situated	 (N.	 Anand,	 2017;	
Bawa,	2011;	Björkman,	2015;	Button,	2016;	Contractor,	2012;	Cooper,	2011;	Gandy,	2008;	
Graham,	Desai,	&	McFarlane,	2013;	McFarlane,	2011).		
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Generalised	Trends	of	Surface	and	Groundwater	Use	across	variously	sized	Urban	Settlements	in	India	
(Kulkarni	and	Shah	2015)	
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Most	of	Delhi	lies	on	high	recharge	alluvial	aquifers	(blue),	although	the	medium	recharge	crystalline	spur	
shown	(pale	green)	extends	into	the	south	of	the	city	(Mukherjee	et	al.,	2015)	
	
Groundwater	use	forces	us	to	extend	our	frameworks	beyond	the	socio-technical	frames	of	
institutions,	 built	 environment	 and	 technical	 systems,	 and	 to	 include	 a	 wider	 range	 of	
material	 factors,	 with	 different	 rates	 of	 change,	 such	 as:	 aquifer	 formation	 and	 location;	
levels,	 quality,	 and	 pollution	 sources	 of	 underground	water;	 topography,	 slope,	 soil	 type;	
rainfall,	 run-off	 and	 recharge.	 	 Aquifers	 are	 closely	 linked	 to	 the	wider	 ecology	 (Banister,	
2014;	 Linton	 &	 Budds,	 2014;	 Erik	 Swyngedouw,	 2009),	 and	 consequently,	 industrial	 and	
household	 pollution	 levels,	 geology,	 rainfall	 variations	 and	 climate	 change	 affect	
groundwater	quality	and	availability	(Narula	&	Gosain,	2013).			
In	order	not	to	burden	the	reader	with	a	truly	ugly	term	like	‘informal	politico-socio-techno-
hydro-ecology’,	let’s	assume	for	now	that	‘socio-technical’	processes	are	inherently	political,	
operating	along	a	formal-informal	spectrum	for	any	given	parameters,	and	that	‘hydrology’	
naturally	includes	wider	ecological	processes.		For	ease	of	reading	then,	please	assume	that	
when	you	see	‘Delhi’s	water’	or	similar,	we	can	understand	this	phrase	to	refer	to	this	multi-
dimensional	and	shifting	object.			
	
Delhi	
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We	 have	 considered	 the	 ‘how’	 and	 the	 ‘what’	 for	 our	 research	 object,	 but	 what	 is	 the	
motivation?	 	 In	 the	 next	 section	 I	 will	 outline	 why	 informality	 in	 water	 infrastructures	
matters.		
	
WATER	GOVERNANCE	REFORMS	
Since	 the	mid-1990s,	 the	 rise	of	market	oriented	neoliberal	policies	around	 the	world	has	
been	mirrored	by	a	new	transnational	policy	network	generating	a	global	agenda	on	water	
with	a	prominent	 role	 for	private	sector	 involvement	 	 	 (Gilbert,	2007b;	Goldman,	2007;	L.	
Mehta	&	Madsen,	2005).		Ramaswamy	Iyer’s	description	of	the	‘international	water	circuit’	
involved	 includes	 ‘the	World	 Bank,	 Asian	 Development	 Bank	 (ADB),	 United	 Nations	 (UN)	
agencies,	the	World	Water	Council,	the	Global	Water	Partnership	and	its	national	affiliates,	
the	 International	 Water	 Management	 Institute	 (Colombo)’	 (Iyer	 2006:201).	 	 This	
international	 model	 of	 water	 management	 can	 be	 termed	 ‘global	 water	 governance’	
(Castro,	 2007b;	 Urueña,	 2012).	 However,	 informal	 water	 supply	 arrangements	 have	
generally	been	a	fairly	limited	part	of	this	discussion.			
	
There	 has	 historically	 been	 a	 high	 level	 of	 donor	 agreement	 on	 the	 case	 for	 private	
investment	in	infrastructure	(Bakker,	2013a;	Gilbert,	2007b;	Goldman,	2007;	Sohoni,	2012),	
despite	causal	links	between	private	investment	and	development	outcomes	not	being	well	
understood	 (Shah	 and	 Batley	 2009).	 	 Advocates	 argue	 that	 private	 sector	 participation	 in	
water	 provision	 brings	 in	 financial	 and	 technical	 resources,	 improves	 the	 efficiency	 of	
utilities,	reduces	corruption,	poor	governance,	political	interference,	and	leads	to	increased	
access	and	improved	quality	of	water	supply	(Prasad,	2006;	see	e.g.	Briscoe	&	Malik,	2006).		
Researchers	 suggest	 that	 pressure	 from	 international	 agencies	 and	 donor	 countries	 to	
promote	private	sector	 involvement	 in	basic	services,	 including	water,	 is	motivated	by	the	
search	 for	 new	 markets	 for	 Euro-American	 expertise	 and	 technology	 (Mehrotra	 &	
Delamonica,	2005,	p.	166;	also	see	Goldman,	2005,	p.	xvii	 ff.;	Bakker,	2010).	 	Researchers	
have	 found	World	 Bank	 discourse	 in	 Delhi	 (V.	 Asthana,	 2009,	 2011;	 Kejriwal	 &	 Bhaduri,	
2005)	and	elsewhere	in	India	(Sangameswaran,	2006)	to	be	market-centric	and	technocratic	
(Moretto,	2006).		For	example,	a	strongly	commercial	tendency	in	‘global	water	governance’	
has	been	promoted	by	the	World	Bank,	such	as	in	Maharashtra	and	Karnataka,	where	it	has	
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been	a	conditional	requirement	of	a	loan	from	the	Bank	to	the	State	governments	(Bakker,	
2013a;	 Gilbert,	 2007b;	 Sohoni,	 2012;	 on	 Karnataka	 see	 Goldman,	 2007;	 Ranganathan,	
2014b;	Baindur	&	Kamath,	2009;	on	Maharashtra	see	Sangameswaran,	2009,	2014;	World	
Bank,	2012).	 	 The	model	 is	based	on	commercialisation	of	water	 supply,	 through	creating	
financially	 viable	 institutions	 through	New	Public	Management	 in	order	 to	 secure	private-
sector	 investment	 and	 expertise.	 	 This	 overly	 prescriptive	 policy	 agenda	 to	 the	neglect	 of	
local	 context	 can	 result	 in	 both	 deleterious	 outcomes	 for	 low-income	 users	 and	 severe	
difficulties	for	project	implementation.			
	
The	majority	of	water	users	globally	are	currently	served	by	the	public	sector	or	‘alternative’	
supply	methods	including	self-	and	community-provision.		Around	90%	of	‘formal’	water	and	
sanitation	provision	is	public	(Prasad	2006:670).		In	much	of	the	world,	however,	the	spatial	
and	 economic	 legacies	 of	 colonialism	 have	 made	 the	 development	 of	 universal	 public	
service	 provision	 a	 substantial	 challenge.	 	 In	 addition	 to	 physical	 and	 macro-economic	
constraints,	 public	 infrastructure	 in	 developing	 countries,	 as	 in	 the	 global	 north,	 is	 often	
affected	 by	 political	 intervention,	 patronage	 and	 corruption.	 	 A	 circular	 ‘low-equilibrium	
trap’	 stemming	 from	 poor	 quality	 service	 leads	 to	 alternative	 arrangements	 thereby	
reducing	utility	revenues.		Subsequent	reduction	in	capital	(or	more	likely,	increased	deficit)	
results	 in	 reduced	 operating	 expenditure	 and	 further	 declines	 in	 service	 quality	 (Prasad	
2006:670).	 	 This	model	 fits	 publicly	managed	water	 supply	 in	 India	well.	 	 Both	 state	 and	
municipal	utilities	suffer	from	low	service	levels,	below-cost	pricing,	low	recovery	levels,	and	
vast	subsidies	from	local	and	State	governments.			
	
The	principle	of	commercial	 logics	 in	urban	water	supply	remains	politically	contested	and	
private	sector	involvement	in	water	has	been	the	subject	of	particularly	heated	debate	(see	
e.g.	 Araral	 &	 Wang,	 2013;	 Bakker,	 2010;	 Coelho,	 2011).	 	 Developing	 in	 parallel	 with	
understandings	 of	 water	 as	 a	 commercial	 service	 has	 been	 the	 development	 of	 a	 ‘minor	
discourse’	of	water	as	a	human	right	(L.	Mehta,	Allouche,	Nicol,	&	Walnycki,	2014;	Urueña,	
2012).	 	Privatization	 initiatives	 in	many	countries	have	faced	criticism	on	efficiency,	equity	
and	accountability	grounds.	 	Critics	allege	 that	private	 sector	participation	can	exacerbate	
inequalities	of	service	and	may	have	little	incentive	to	extend	coverage	to	unprofitable	areas	
(Budds	 &	 McGranahan,	 2003,	 pp.	 88–89;	 Castro,	 2007a).	 	 Advocates	 of	 private	 sector	
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involvement	in	water	supply	have	had	to	reassess	their	approach	in	the	face	of	political	and	
commercial	difficulties.	 	Very	 few	privatisation	projects	 to	date	have	been	successful,	and	
the	 majority	 did	 not	 achieve	 what	 they	 intended	 (Economic	 and	 Political	 Weekly,	 2015;	
Prasad,	2006,	p.	682).			
	
It	 seems	 unlikely	 that	 private	 sector	 is	 interested,	 or	 will	 be	 able	 to,	 address	 water	 and	
sanitation	 service	 challenges	 at	 scale.	 	 The	 level	 of	 private	 sector	 participation	 in	 water	
supply	 globally	 did	 increase	during	 the	 90s,	 but	was	 primarily	 directed	 at	 those	 countries	
with	 larger	 populations,	 economies	 and	 levels	 of	 urbanisation.	 	 From	 the	 private	 sector’s	
perspective,	low-income	countries	and	the	poor	in	particular	are	unattractive	and	have	high	
levels	of	 risk.	 	 In	order	 to	 circumvent	 this	 risk,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 the	private	 sector	 ‘cherry	
picks’	the	better-off	customers	in	an	urban	area	or	a	less	risky	environment	(Bakker,	2010,	p.	
94;	 E.	 Swyngedouw,	 2006,	 p.	 56).	 	 It	may	 also	 rely	 on	 subsidies	 or	 soft	 loans	 to	 provide	
services	 to	 the	 poor	 (Prasad	 2006:688).	 	 Apparently	 low	 costs	 may	 also	 be	 based	 on	 an	
assumption	 of	 contract	 renegotiation	 after	 the	 project	 is	 underway	 (P.	 B.	 Mehta,	 2013).		
While	private	sector	investment	is	declining	due	to	a	relatively	low	rate	of	return,	overseas	
development	aid	is	also	declining,	which	Bakker	attributes	to	expectations	that	the	private	
sector	 will	 increase	 investment.	 	 Bakker	 argues	 that	 the	 development	 of	 neoliberal	
approaches	has	led	to	private	involvement	in	water	and	sanitation	becoming	more	spatially	
differentiated	 (Bakker,	 2013a,	 2013b;	 Ferguson,	 2005;	 Harrison,	 2001).	 	 While	 there	 has	
been	a	gradual	overall	increase	in	private	sector	participation	in	water	infrastructure,	there	
has	also	been	a	strategic	retreat	from	less	profitable	regions,	especially	South	Asia	and	sub-
Saharan	 Africa	 (R.	 Shah	 &	 Batley,	 2009,	 p.	 398).	 	 China	 however	 has	 seen	 increasing	
numbers	 of	 projects,	 in	 comparison	 with	 which,	 PPP	 water	 projects	 in	 India	 are	
‘insignificant’	both	in	terms	of	investment	and	population	served	(X.	Wu	et	al.,	2016).			This	
pattern	 is	replicated	at	 lower	scales	with	 ‘unserved’	populations	concentrated	 in	rural	and	
peri-urban	areas,	smaller	towns,	and	low-income	neighbourhoods	where	the	private	sector	
has	 shown	 little	 interest	 in	 investing	 upfront	 costs	 for	 limited	 and	 risky	 returns	 (Budds	&	
McGranahan,	2003,	p.	88).				
	
As	the	challenges	to	private	involvement	have	become	increasingly	clear,	researchers	across	
political	 positions	 now	 recognise	 that	 governance	 and	 regulation	 of	 utilities	 is	 critical	 in	
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supporting	reforms	to	deliver	social	or	economic	benefits	(Budds	and	McGranahan	2003:87,	
Bakker	 2008:1893).	 This	 presence	 of	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 actors	 in	 infrastructure	 provision	
through	 private	 sector	 participation	 and	 international	 investment	 (‘financialisation’)	
(Torrance,	2007,	2008,	2009)	means	that	 infrastructure	governance	 increasingly	 involves	a	
more	 corporate	 and	 internationalised	 governance-beyond-the-state	 (Swyngedouw	 et	 al	
2002,	 Swyngedouw	2005).	 	 The	 promotion	 of	 private	 sector	 involvement	 by	 international	
agencies	 also	 currently	 appears	 to	 be	 moving	 towards	 more	 realistic	 assessments	 and	
discussions	over	the	most	appropriate	form	for	management	and	ownership	of	utilities.		
	
A	 shift	 from	 privatisation	 to	 governance	 has	 followed	 the	 limited	 success	 of	 earlier	
privatisation	initiatives.		‘Governance’	–	a	classic	Third	World	lack	–	has	a	gentle	ambiguity,	
conveniently	 encompassing	 both	 political	 influence,	 badly	 designed	 contracts,	 and	 vested	
interests,	as	well	as	operating	as	a	code	word	for	commercialisation.		The	primary	sense	in	
which	‘governance’	is	commonly	used	is	in	academic	literature	refers	to	a	networked,	multi-
nodal	 style	 of	 decision-making	 and	 action	 involving	 the	 combination	 and	 coordination	 of	
different	 actors	 (Rhodes	 1996,	 Stoker	 1998,	 Jessop	 2002).	 	 A	 second,	 derivative,	
understanding	 of	 ‘governance’	 is	 as	 ‘good	 governance’	 a	 normative	 donor-led	 agenda	
focussing	 on	 accountability,	 stability,	 effectiveness,	 regulatory	 quality,	 rule	 of	 law,	 and	
control	of	corruption	(Weiss	2000,	Doornbos	2001).		This	sense	dates	from	the	World	Bank’s	
1989	Report	on	sub-Saharan	Africa,	as	an	element	of	the	(post-)Washington	consensus	on	
(softened)	 market	 liberalisation.	 	 Vicky	 Walters’	 research	 into	 the	 water	 reforms	 in	
Karnataka	does	an	excellent	 job	of	 illustrating	 the	anti-democratic	 consequences	of	 ‘good	
governance’	in	water	reforms	in	Karnataka	(Walters,	2013).		Indeed,	this	second	sense	that	
has	been	a	key	element	of	urban	and	water	policy	in	India	since	the	early	2000s	(Batra	2006,	
Young	 in	 Kamat	 eds.	 2013,	 Cullet	 2007).	 	 The	 term	 ‘water	 governance’	 often	 appears	 to	
reference	 this	 ‘good	 governance’	 understanding	 (Cleaver	 &	 Hamada,	 2010;	 Franks	 &	
Cleaver,	 2007).	 	 Discursively,	 ‘governance’	 is	 commonly	 presented	 normatively,	 as	 the	
opposite	of	‘politics’,	with	the	implication	of	a	technocratic,	objective	and	rational	decision	
making	style.				
	
The	 categories	 of	 states	 and	 markets,	 or	 public	 and	 private,	 and	 the	 term	
“governance”	 as	 a	 means	 of	 capturing	 the	 articulations	 between	 the	 two,	 are	
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unhelpful	in	delineating	the	contours	of	the	problem.	…	The	term	“governance,”	in	
turn,	 allows	 the	 fiction	 of	 apolitical	 negotiation	 to	 be	 sustained	 and	 enables	
development-policy	 experts	 to	 relegate	 failure	 to	 the	 merely	 technical	 realm.	
(Bakker	2010:47).			
	
	
The	 extent	 to	 which	 ‘governance	 talk’,	 per	 se,	 is	 depoliticising,	 as	 Bakker	 argues,	 I	 think	
remains	 open.	 	 While	 some	 commentators	 (for	 example	 Rhodes	 1996)	 appear	 over-
optimistic	 in	 their	 assessment	 of	 the	 transformative	 power	 of	 restructure	 relationships,	
others	are	more	cautious	 (for	example	Davies	2002).	 	 In	my	use	the	term	“governance”	 is	
not	a	normative	concept,	merely	a	reflection	of	the	density	and	complexity	of	relationships	
in	 urban	management	 and	 services	 beyond	 ‘the	 state’	 (Hansen,	 2009;	 Erik	 Swyngedouw,	
2005).		Kaviraj	makes	similar	use	of	the	word	to	refer	to	the	interactions	of	multiple	political	
actors	 and	 ‘short-term	 nexus	 of	 interests’	 (Kaviraj,	 2012,	 p.	 110).	 	 Another	 response	 to	
claims	 of	 depoliticisation	 aimed	 at	 the	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘governance’	 is	 the	 moderate	
optimism	from	Mollinga	et	al,	who	suggest	that	it	provides	a	‘wedge’	to	lever	discussion	of	
water	 politics	 onto,	 and	 higher	 up,	 the	 mainstream	 policy	 agenda.	 	 Acknowledging	
arguments	about	the	depoliticisation	of	development	made	by	Ferguson	and	Scott,	Mollinga	
suggests	that	use	of	‘governance’	may	be	a	‘step	forward’	as	it	enables	consideration	of	‘the	
kind	of	politics	that	is	found	in,	or	desirable	for,	water	resources	management’		(Ferguson,	
1994;	Scott,	1998;	P.	Mollinga,	2008,	pp.	8–9).			
	
The	 question	 of	 how	 ‘actually	 existing’	 neoliberalisation	 processes	 engage	 with	 the	 local	
context	has	been	the	theme	of	much	work	 in	urban	geography	(Brenner,	2004;	Brenner	&	
Theodore,	2002;	D.	Harvey,	2005;	Jamie	Peck,	Theodore,	&	Brenner,	2013).		A	related	body	
of	research	considers	how	policy	 ideas	travel	and	mutate	across	sites	and	scales	(McCann,	
2011;	J.	Peck,	2011;	Jamie	Peck	&	Theodore,	2010).		I	have	found	work	on	individuals,	such	
as	 engineers	 and	 consultants,	 as	 vectors	 of	 policy	 ideas	 particularly	 interesting	 (Larner	&	
Laurie,	2010;	Prince,	2012).		For	example,	Vicky	Walters’	study	of	water	reform	in	Karnataka,	
mentioned	 above,	 highlights	 the	 technocratic	 use	 of	 consultants	 by	 public	 officials	 and	
donors	 and	 the	 challenges	 for	 accountability	 this	 causes	 (Walters,	 2013,	 p.	 167).	 	 Private	
sector	 consultants	 are	 also	 ‘people	 as	 infrastructure’,	 acting	 analogously,	 but	 at	 different	
scales,	to	the	brokers	mentioned	above.	
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Water	 governance	 reform	 recognises	 that	 privatisation	 is	 just	 one	 option,	 along	 with	
commercialisation	of	public	sector	organisations,	‘alternative	service	delivery	models’,	and	a	
range	 of	 outsourcing	 and	 contractual	 approaches	 (Kathryn	 Furlong,	 2012,	 2015;	 Kathryn	
Furlong	 &	 Bakker,	 2010).	 	 The	most	 complete	 form	 of	 ‘privatisation’	 is	 full	 divestiture	 in	
which	 assets,	 capital,	 risk	 and	 service	 management	 are	 transferred	 to	 the	 private	 sector	
permanently,	 as	 in	 the	UK	water	 sector	 (one	 of	 the	 few	 successful	 examples).	 	 However,	
there	 are	 a	 variety	 of	 contractual	 arrangements	 in	 which	 control	 over	 assets,	 tariffs,	
operations	and	risk	are	shared	or	divided	between	public	and	private	sector	parties.		In	the	
‘lightest’	forms	of	private	sector	involvement,	management	and	operations	are	outsourced	
for	a	short	amount	of	 time	to	avail	of	private	sector	efficiency,	 technology,	and	expertise.		
The	PPP	approach	currently	favoured	in	India	grows	out	of	this	background	(Iyer	2007:211).			
	
In	 India,	 despite	 being	 fierce	 opponents	 at	 different	 ends	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum,	 both	
Modi’s	right-wing-populist	Bharatiya	Janata	Party	 (BJP)	at	the	National	 level	and	Kejriwal’s	
progressive-populist	Aam	Aadmi	Party	(AAP)	in	Delhi	gain	populist	appeal	with	their	strong	
rhetorical	emphasis	on	good	governance	and	anti-corruption	measures.		In	this	they	are	part	
of	 larger	 pattern	 in	 India	 politics,	 identified	 in	 the	 early	 days	 of	 liberalisation	 by	 Partha	
Chatterjee	 as	 ‘rational	 planning’	 in	 tension	 with	 ‘irrational	 politics’	 (P.	 Chatterjee,	 1999,	
2013a).		Indeed,	the	Indian	central	government	urban	policy	has	been	increasingly	adopting	
a	pro-market	 ‘good	governance’	agenda	for	several	decades,	 in	parallel	with	the	country’s	
wider	economic	liberalisation.		These	economic	changes	introduced	since	the	late	80s	have	
a	normative	appellation;	‘reforms’	(see	Bhabha,	1984	on	the	colonial	history	of	this	word).		
A	comprehensive	review	of	this	process	of	urban	restructuring	and	rescaling,	along	the	lines	
of	 Brenner’s	 work	 on	 Europe	 (Brenner,	 2004),	 remains	 to	 be	written	 (but	 see	 Baindur	 &	
Kamath,	2009;	Batra,	2006;	Shatkin,	2013;	Sivaramakrishnan,	2011).		The	promotion	of	PPP	
models	and	the	opening	of	real-estate	and	urban	development	to	international	investment	
has	been	a	central	theme	over	the	last	decade.		This	process	has	taken	a	further	turn	with	
the	ascent	of	the	National	Democratic	Alliance	(NDA)	government	in	2014	leading	to	a	push	
for	Smart	Cities	as	well	as	basic	infrastructure	improvements	(Datta,	2015).			
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In	previous	research	I	looked	at	India’s	national	‘Urban	Renewal	Mission’	(JNNURM),	which	
aimed	at	creating	a	cadre	of	 ‘world-class	cities’	across	India.	 	 I	was	curious	about	the	gaps	
and	 transformations	 in	 policy	 and	 ideology	 as	 they	 moved	 across	 different	 sites;	 from	
international	agencies	and	local	actors	to	national	policy	and	then	to	urban	governments	in	
different	states.		My	findings	highlighted	the	promise	and	challenges	of	the	introduction	of	
new	technology	and	private	sector	models	(and	partners)	into	established	processes	of	city	
governance.		These	issues	continue	to	play	a	role,	perhaps	a	greater	one,	in	India’s	current	
Smart	 Cities	Mission.	 	 From	 this	 research	 the	 diffusion	 of	 policy	 packages	 and	 ideologies	
(such	as	‘neoliberalism’)	across	tiers	of	government	did	not	look	as	mechanistic	as	some	had	
suggested	 (Banerjee-Guha,	 2009).	 	 Instead	 it	 began	 to	 seem	 much	 more	 precarious,	
contingent	 and	 contested,	 rather	 like	Mitchell’s	 discussion	 of	 neoliberalism	 (Mitchell,	 2005,	
2008;	also	see	Tsing,	2005).		Far	from	a	corporate	juggernaut	of	international	origin	reshaping	all	
in	 its	 path,	 the	 Urban	 Renewal	 Mission’s	 journey	 to	 city	 level	 resembled	 more	 a	 ‘crumb	
thrown	 in	 an	 ant’s	 nest’	 (Ferguson,	 1994,	 p.	 225).	 	 It	 appears,	 as	 Barbara	 Harriss-White	 has	
observed,	that	in	India	there	is	some	distance	between	the	‘World	Bank	state’	imagined	by	
reform	projects,	and	the	actually	existing	‘shadow	state’	with	strong	incentives	to	maintain	
the	current	situation	(Harriss-White,	2003,	p.	88	ff.).			
	
Water	 is	 an	 important	 target	 of	 reform,	 a	 critical	 input	 for	 agriculture,	 industry	 and	
urbanisation,	and	highly	emotive	 issue.	 	The	reform	agenda	mentioned	above	 is	described	
neatly	as	comprised	of	two	contradictory	and	unequal	tendencies,	market-based	‘neoliberal’	
approaches,	 and	 rights-based	 ideas	 (Urueña,	 2012).	 	 Water	 was	 the	 largest	 sector	 of	
spending	 under	 the	 JNNURM	 and	 the	 pattern	 of	 reforms	 was	 echoed	 in	 sector	 specific	
policies,	particularly	the	National	Water	Policies	of	2002	and	2012	and	Guidelines	for	Sector	
Reform	 and	 Successful	 Public–Private	 Partnerships	 (2004).	 	 Water	 and	 sanitation	 also	
formed	 a	 ‘core	 of	 the	 approach’	 in	 the	 City	 Challenge	 Fund,	 which	 incentivised	 urban	
reforms	prior	 to	 the	 JNNURM	and	Smart	Cities	Mission	 (Gopakumar,	2011,	p.	128;	Naidu,	
2002,	 pp.	 11–12).	 	 The	urban	governance	 reform	components	of	 the	 JNNURM	have	been	
carried	 forward	 under	 the	 National	 Democratic	 Alliance	 government	 into	 the	 AMRUT	
mission	(Town	and	Country	Planning	Organization,	2016).			
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As	 urban	 development,	 water	 and	 land	 are	 state	 government	 mandates	 under	 India’s	
constitution,	 central	 government	 can	 only	 obliquely	 influence	 them.	 	 Although	 in	 India’s	
federal	system,	water	is	constitutionally	a	subject	of	State	governments,	broad	outlines	for	a	
reformist	 approach	 can	 be	 given.	 	 Indian	 water	 researchers	 suggest	 that	 these	 policies	
include:	unbundling	of	 the	 ‘supply	 chain’	 (source,	 transmission,	distribution);	 independent	
(‘apolitical’)	regulator;	full	cost	recovery	for	operations	and	maintenance;	increasing	tariffs,	
which	should	be		‘depoliticised’;	elimination	of	subsidies;	cut-offs	for	non-payment;	ending	
and	 removal	 of	 public	 supplies	 (standposts,	 public	 taps);	 staff	 retrenchment	 to	 meet	
international	norms	of	four	staff	for	every	thousand	connections	(most	Indian	utilities	work	
with	 a	 ratio	 five	 or	 six	 times	 higher);	 public-private	 partnerships;	 water	 markets	 and	 or	
trade-able	 water	 rights;	 allocation	 of	 water	 to	 highest	 value	 use	 (Dwivedi,	 Rehmat,	 &	
Dharmadhikary,	2007,	pp.	36–37).	 	For	other	examples	from	India	see	(Asian	Development	
Bank,	 2011;	Dwivedi,	 2010;	Dwivedi	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Sangameswaran,	 2006;	 Sangameswaran,	
Rozario,	&	Madhav,	2008).				
	
The	connotations	of	private	sector	 involvement	 in	water	 in	the	 Indian	context	are	double-
edged.	 	On	the	one	hand,	as	Simanti	Dasgupta	has	argued,	 following	the	success	of	the	 IT	
and	 Business	 Process	 Outsourcing	 industries,	 the	 Private	 Sector	 in	 India	 has	 been	
accompanied	 by	 associations	 of	 national	 pride,	 innovation	 and,	 particularly,	 good	
governance	–	in	contrast	to	the	perceived	inefficiency,	political	bias	and	corruption	of	state	
agencies	(Dasgupta,	2015;	cf	Sachdeva	&	Rajadhyaksha,	2003).	 	On	the	other	hand,	talk	of	
privatisation,	especially	where	it	involves	foreign	companies,	taps	in	to	(justifiable)	anxieties	
of	 neocolonial	 exploitation	of	 Indian	 resources	 and	markets.	 	Water,	 in	 particular,	 evokes	
strong	emotions,	as	a	substance	essential	for	life,	sacred	in	south	Asian	belief	systems,	and	
part	of	the	triad	of	 jungle,	jal,	jameen	(forests,	water	and	land),	which	serve	as	rallying	cry	
for	activists.		Rivers	in	India	are	sacred	to	both	Hindu	and	tribal	people,	water	has	a	special	
place	in	Islam	(Wescoat,	1995),	and	Dalit	struggles	have	very	often	organised	around	access	
to	water.	 	An	illustration	of	this	strong	cultural	attachment	to	water	provision	are	the	free	
public	 drinking	 stations	 (piaos)	 still	 commonly	 seen	 across	 Indian	 cities.	 	 Consequently,	
‘privatisation’	 forms	 a	 powerful	 rhetorical	 charge	 against	 which	 politicians	 and	
administrators	must	respond.		The	‘PPP	mode’,	most	favoured	by	contemporary	politicians,	
already	 responds	 to	 these	 concerns	 (cf	 e.g.	 Baindur	 &	 Kamath,	 2009,	 p.	 6).	 	 It	 can	 be	
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considered	a	‘second-wave’	of	neoliberalisation	in	water	which	has	learnt	from	the	failures	
of	earlier	attempts	(Smith,	2004).			
	
At	the	same	time,	high-pitched	‘privatisation’	rhetoric	obscures	the	role	of	the	local	private	
sector	 in	 existing	 water	 supply,	 whether	 market	 operators	 supplying	 bottled,	 tanker	 and	
ground	water	across	Indian	cities,	the	private	contractors	who	already	perform	much	of	the	
maintenance,	 construction,	 development	 and	 consultancy	 works	 for	 municipal	 water	
services,	 or	 the	 ‘privatisation’	 of	 public	 positions	 through	 discretionary	 and	 highly	
personalised	 ways	 of	 working	 (Ahlers,	 Schwartz,	 &	 Güida,	 2013;	 A.	 Asthana,	 2008;	
Berenschot,	 2010a;	M.	 Llorente	&	 Zerah,	 2003;	 National	 Institute	 of	 Urban	 Affairs,	 2002;	
Ranganathan,	 2014a).	 	 As	 Harriss-White	 observes	 this	 is	 true	 of	 both	 the	 opponents	 and	
advocates	of	reform:	
	
Contemporary	calls	for	the	radical	privatisation	of	the	State	[…]	ignore	the	effective	
radical	privatisation,	informalisation	and	now	mafianisation	that	south	Asian	States	
have	been	undergoing	for	much	 longer	than	the	era	of	 liberalisation	of	the	1990s	
(Harriss-White,	2003,	p.	101).	
	
Harriss-White	 notes	 the	 trend	 towards	 ‘information-intensive’	 state	 practices,	 a	 tendency	
that	has	become	only	more	apparent	since	her	book	was	published	(Harriss-White,	2003,	p.	
101).	 	 There	 are	 possibilities	 for	 increased	 accountability	 and	 transparency	 with	 higher	
capacity	 to	 process	 information;	 dependent	 on	 the	 circumstances	 of	 local	 politics	 and	
corrupt	 practices	 (Bussell,	 2012;	 Masiero,	 2015).	 	 However,	 information	 and	
communications	technology	may	be	ignored	or	confined	to	an	isolated	element	of	a	process	
thereby	rendered	 ineffectual,	perhaps	more	often	than	 it	 is	 idolised	as	a	panacea	or	well-
integrated	(Heeks,	1998;	Heeks	&	Mathisen,	2012).		In	a	2003	survey,	85%	of	Indian	officials	
judged	 the	 e-governance	 processes	 they	 had	 been	 involved	 with	 to	 have	 been	 ‘total’	 or	
‘partial	failures’	(Heeks,	2003).					
	
Just	 as	 the	 ability	 of	 informal	 practices	 to	 maintain	 themselves	 depends	 on	 flows	 of	
information	(Scott,	1998),	water	reforms	too	are	as	much	about	assembling	and	maintaining	
flows	of	 information	as	 they	are	 flows	of	water	 (K.	Furlong,	2011;	Monstadt,	2009).	 	How	
much	water	 is	 delivered	 to	 the	Demand	Management	Area	 from	which	Water	 Treatment	
BIRKINSHAW: MURKY WATERS  CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE 
 
53 
Plants?		How	many	connections	exist?		How	much	water	is	billed?		How	many	of	these	bills	
are	 collected?	 	 Creating	 systems	 to	 answering	 these	 questions	 is	 essential	 for	 water	
managers	seeking	to	implement	financial	viability.	 	Various	 technologies	are	fundamental	to	
this	process	(cf	Latour	&	Hermant,	2004).		In	addition	to	these	prosaic	circuits	of	information	
concerning	 material	 non-human	 actors	 (such	 as	 taps	 or	 water	 meters),	 there	 is	 a	 wider	
sense	in	which	reform	is	also	about	constructing	flows	of	information	which	channel	human	
thought	 and	 behaviour.	 	 In	 this	 context	 ‘water	 conservation’,	 ‘municipal	 water	 as	
commodity’	and	‘social	 legitimacy	of	the	private	suppliers’	are	areas	in	which	reforms	may	
need	 to	 shape	 consumer	 thought	 and	 behaviour	 (Latour,	 2005,	 p.	 226;	 also	 see	Mitchell,	
2005,	2008).		We	can	also	consider	‘good	governance’,	‘democracy’,	or	‘nationalism’	in	this	
way	 (e.g.	 P.	 Chatterjee,	 1993).	 	 In	 a	 postcolonial	 context,	 such	 as	 India,	 the	 limited	
productivity	 of	 the	 debate	 over	 public	 or	 private	 solutions	 is	 heightened	 by	 the	 tenuous	
translation	of	concepts	–	such	as	‘nationalism’	(Chakrabarty	2000).			
	
While	 from	 an	 external	 perspective	 the	 variation	 of	 water	 supply	 arrangements	 in	
contemporary	Delhi	appears	as	a	symbol	of	breakdown	and	failure	(cf	Gandy,	2008),	some	
understanding	of	 the	historical	 context	 reveals	continuity	with	pre-existing	 local	practices.		
Work	 on	 the	 histories	 of	 water	 use	 in	 India	 highlights	 the	 specificity	 of	 the	 dominant	
international	 understandings	 of	 ‘public’	 and	 ‘private’	 water.	 	 David	Mosse’s	 work	 on	 the	
political	role	of	water	in	southern	India’s	Hindu	kingdoms	is	a	strong	example	(Mosse,	2005).		
The	histories	of	water	infrastructure	in	north	India	are	quite	different,	but	similarly	call	into	
question	a	simple	public-private	binary.		I	suggest	that	the	presence	of	multiple	overlapping	
water	supply	arrangements,	and	 ‘waters’	 (Hamlin,	2000)	 instead	suggests	 the	resilience	of	
historically	 embedded	 practices	 of	 water	 supply	 (cf	 Chakrabarty,	 2009).	 	Most	 studies	 of	
water	 in	 India,	 if	 they	 consider	 history,	 start	 at	 the	 colonial	 period;	 perhaps	 because	
Mumbai,	a	colonial	city,	is	a	frequently	chosen	site.		This	leads	to	an	over-emphasis	on	the	
‘limited	 liberalism’	 of	 colonial	 infrastructure	 provision	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 recognition	 of	 the	
structures	of	pre-existing	water	supply	practices	(N.	Anand,	2017;	Björkman,	2015;	Gandy,	
2008).	 	 However,	 the	 range	 of	 water	 supply	 modes	 evident	 in	 historical	 accounts	
demonstrate	 that	 splintered	urban	 infrastructures	are	not	only	a	product	of	neoliberalism	
(Graham	&	Marvin,	2001)	or	colonialism	(Kooy	&	Bakker,	2015)	but	in	many	places	are	part	
of	longer,	layered,	histories	(Alsayyad	&	Roy,	2006;	cf	Mann,	2008).			
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The	specific	political	histories	 (and	geographies)	of	 the	 Indian	subcontinent	do	not	 fit	well	
with	 North	 Atlantic	 conceptions	 of	 state	 sovereignty	 (Legg	 2007,	 Mosse	 2003).		
Consequently,	 the	application	of	 ‘international’	water	governance	models	drawn	 from	the	
experience	 of	 the	 global	 North	 runs	 against	 the	 grain	 of	 local	 understandings.	 	 The	
appropriateness	of	their	use	could	be	called	into	question	in	the	same	way	as	the	concepts	
of	‘civil	society’	and	‘democracy’	(Lewis	2002,	Kaviraj	et	al	2001,	Michelutti	2007,	Corbridge	
et	al	2012).		As	Sudipta	Kaviraj	and	Partha	Chatterjee	(among	others)	have	argued,	both	civil	
society	and	the	state	took	on	quite	different	characters	 in	South	Asia	from	their	European	
origins	(P.	Chatterjee,	2011;	Kaviraj,	2010).		Anderson	gives	a	compelling	recent	account	of	
four	 central	 contradictions	 of	 India’s	 national	 ideology	 (Anderson,	 2013).	 	 In	 India,	 it	 is	
argued	that	rather	than	the	state	being	‘governmentalised’	by	civil	society,	first	the	Colonial,	
then	 Nehruvian	 state	 took	 on	 the	 task	 of	 governmentalizing	 society	 (e.g.	 making	 it	 into	
rational,	 individual,	modern	 actors,	 responsible	 for	 their	 own	 civic	 conduct	 and	operating	
along	bureaucratic	lines).		At	the	same	time,	society	appears	to	have	influenced	state	actors	
away	 from	 putative	 bureaucratic	 impartiality	 towards	 shifting	 arrangements	 of	
differentiated	 responsiveness	 and	 bias.	 	 The	 complexity	 of	 ‘local’	 societies	 led	
administrators	 to	 the	 instrumental	 government	 of	 population	 groups	 (Hindu,	 Muslim,	
Punjabi,	peasants,	etc)	as	groups,	for	whom	the	individual	rights	of	citizenships	were	always	
already	deferred	 (P.	 Chatterjee,	 2013b).	 	 In	North	 India,	 these	dynamics	 relate	 to	 the	 co-
optation,	and	 later	occupation,	of	Mughal	state	structures	by	the	East	 India	Company	and	
British	 Raj,	 and	 their	 selective	 treatment	 of	 different	 population	 groups,	 most	 obviously	
defined	by	race,	religion	and	caste	(Dirks,	2011;	Spear,	1990).		In	sum,	rather	than	the	state	
influencing	 forms	 of	 informality	 in	 India	 the	widespread	 presence	 and	 power	 of	 informal	
practices	is	argued	to	have	led	to	an	‘informalisation	of	the	state’,	or	‘jughee	/	jugaad	state’	
–	Kaviraj’s	‘feet	of	vernacular	clay’	(Chattaraj,	2012;	also	see	Jeffrey,	2010,	p.	163).		Political	
theorists	 in	 India,	 also	 refer	 to	 India	 local	 state	 structures	 as	 ‘porous’	 (Benjamin),	
‘vernacular’	 (Kaviraj),	 ‘blurred’	 (Gupta),	 ‘medieval’	 (Roy),	 ‘leaky’	 (Coelho),	 ‘embedded’	
(Björkman)	 and	 so	on.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 introduction	of	 electoral	 democracy	has	 led	 to	
strong	attempts	at	selective	redistribution	compromised	by	 limited	resources	and	political	
strategy	
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Attempts	 to	 bring	 private	 sector	 expertise	 and	 models	 from	 developed	 countries	 to	 the	
global	south	are	undertaking	a	very	different	project	from	the	transition	from	public	sector	
to	private	sector	water	supply	in	the	West.		The	commercialisation	of	water	was	not	simple	
even	in	England	and	Canada	(Bakker,	2005;	Kathryn	Furlong,	2015).		In	a	country	like	India,	
network	provision	 is	 very	 far	 from	complete,	and	 the	 introduction	of	 the	private	 sector	 is	
therefore	faced	with	an	entirely	different	set	of	problems.		The	‘universal	network	model’	of	
provision,	an	infrastructural	equivalent	of	the	Weberian	bureaucratic	state,	based	on	equal	
citizenship,	 never	 existed	 and	 the	 post-colonial	 developmental	 state	 was	 not	 only	 in	 a	
radically	 inferior	 economic	 position	 to	 the	 welfare	 states	 of	 Western	 Europe	 but	 was	
undergoing	a	very	different	political	 transformation	(Corbridge	&	Harriss,	2000;	Graham	&	
Marvin,	2001;	Kaviraj,	2010,	p.	212).			
	
Informality	 is	 in	tension	with	reforms	 in	 India,	and	Delhi,	at	a	range	of	scales,	 from	city	to	
household	level.		At	the	same	time,	informality	and	reform	are	not	binary	oppositions.		Tim	
Mitchell	 has	 discussed	 the	 ways	 that	 rationalisation	 reforms	 create	 knowledge	 in	
interactions	 with	 their	 objects	 and	 highlights	 the	 ‘knowledge	 transfer’	 (or	 ‘epistemic	
violence’)	 involved	where	dispersed	 local	understandings,	opaque	or	 invisible	to	outsiders,	
are	replaced	with	more	portable	knowledge	transparent	to	wider	networks	of	readers	(such	
as	colonial	officials,	development	agencies,	 international	credit	markets,	financial	 investors	
and	 so	 on)	 (Mitchell,	 2002).	 	 We	 can	 take	 this	 argument	 further	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 the	
reification	and	separation	of	‘state’,	‘society’	and	‘economy’	is	a	fiction	central	to	the	idea	of	
‘free	markets’	and	liberalisation	reforms:			
	
The	 apparent	 boundary	 of	 the	 state	 does	 not	mark	 the	 limit	 of	 the	 processes	 of	
regulation.		It	is	itself	a	product	of	those	processes.		[…]		The	state	is	no	longer	to	be	
taken	as	an	actor	with	the	coherence,	agency,	and	autonomy	this	term	presumes.		
The	multiple	 arrangements	 that	 produce	 the	 apparent	 separateness	 of	 the	 state	
create	effects	of	 agency	and	partial	 autonomy,	with	 concrete	 consequences.	 	 Yet	
such	 agency	 will	 always	 be	 contingent	 on	 the	 production	 of	 difference	 –	 those	
practices	that	create	the	apparent	boundary	between	state	and	society.		(Mitchell,	
2006,	pp.	175–176)	
	
Where	 reforms	 such	 as	 Cities	 Challenge,	 JNNURM,	 Smart	 Cities,	 AMRUT,	 and	 individual	
private	 sector	 involvement	 initiatives,	attempt	 to	 increase	 legibility,	entrepreneurialism	or	
investment	capacity,	we	have	then	a	tension	between	‘modernisation’	and	‘informality’.		Or	
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in	 Chatterjee’s	 terms	 (above)	 ‘rationalisation’	 and	 ‘politics’.	 	 Lisa	 Weinstein	 writes	 that	
research	on	economic	restructuring	in	India	has	neglected	informal	governance,	while	at	the	
same	time	work	on	informal	governance	has	neglected	economic	restructuring	(Weinstein,	
2008).	 	 Indeed,	despite	some	engagement	with	‘informal	water’	from	policy	organisations,	
work	 on	 the	 relationships	 of	 these	 alternative	 arrangements	 to	 water	 supply	 reform	
programmes	is	still	growing.			
	
Research	 indicates	 that	 the	 informal	 political	 economy	 and	 governance	 of	 infrastructure	
strongly	 influenced	 JNNURM	 implementation.	 	 For	 urban	 governments	 with	 weaker	
domestic	 and	 external	 political	 networks,	 opposition	 to	 reforms	unpopular	with	 residents	
and	 entrenched	 interests	 may	 present	 a	 serious	 obstacle	 (Birkinshaw,	 2013,	 2016).	 	 The	
difficulties	 in	doing	water	and	energy	audits	 in	 Indian	 cities	point	 to	 this	 issue	 (N.	Anand,	
2015;	 Björkman,	 2011).	 	 There	 is	 some	 support	 in	 the	 literature	 for	 thinking	 that	 these	
dynamics	 also	 apply	 to	water	 interventions,	 although	 the	 relationships	 between	 informal	
water	supply	and	reforms	have	not	been	heavily	studied.			
	
Zérah’s	study	in	Pune,	suggests	that	informal	supply	arrangements	can	present	an	obstacle	
to	reforms	(M.-H.	Zérah,	2000).	 	 In	work	on	a	PPP	project	 in	Karnataka,	researchers	found	
that	informal	water	use,	such	as	storage	and	non-payment,	continued	in	the	system	despite	
reforms,	and	were	not	reduced	by	them	(Burt	&	Ray,	2014).	 	Researchers	have	considered	
‘neoliberal’	water	reform	projects	in	Mumbai,	Pune,	Maharashtra	as	a	whole,	Bengaluru	and	
Karnataka,	 Chennai	 and	 Jaipur	 (T.	 Birkenholtz,	 2010;	 Björkman,	 2011;	 Gopakumar,	 2011,	
2014;	Kamath,	Baindur,	&	Ranganathan,	2009;	Ranganathan,	2014b;	Sangameswaran,	2006,	
2009;	Sangameswaran	et	al.,	2008;	Walters,	2013;	M.-H.	Zérah,	2000).	 	There	 is,	however,	
very	limited	work	on	pipe	network	rehabilitation	projects	(which	I	study	in	Chapter	Seven)	
outside	 of	 the	 Berkeley	 research	 project	 in	 Hubli-Dharwad,	 Karnataka	 (Burt	&	 Ray,	 2014;	
Ercumen	et	 al.,	 2015)	 and	 studies	by	 the	ADB	 (Asian	Development	Bank	&	 Lee	Kuan	Yew	
School	of	Public	Policy,	2010).			
	
Both	 Nikhil	 Anand	 and	 Lisa	 Björkman	 consider	 private	 sector	 involvement	 in	 Mumbai	
(Björkman,	 2011;	 Anand,	 2015).	 	Björkman’s	 work	 places	 some	 of	 the	 dysfunction	 in	
Mumbai’s	 water	 system	 on	 an	 inappropriate	 application	 of	 norms	 taken	 from	 developed	
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world	 cities	 to	 Mumbai.	 	 She	 suggests	 that	 desire	 for	 privatisation	 has	 led	 to	
underinvestment	 in	 municipal	 management.	 	 However,	 her	 account	 also	 highlights	 the	
relative	power	of	 the	Mumbai	Water	Department	 regarding	 the	proposed	 reforms	by	 the	
World	Bank.		To	the	extent	that	in	her	account	the	Water	Department	was	able	to	take	the	
money	 for	 the	 project	 without	 undue	 tension	 to	 deliver	 the	 results	 that	 the	 Bank	 was	
looking	 for.	 	 Anand	 describes	 the	 impossibility	 of	 producing	 accurate	 data	 on	 Mumbai’s	
water	system,	despite	the	frequently	with	which	numerical	measurements	are	given	by	his	
respondents.	 	 In	 both	 these	 accounts,	 the	 privatisation	 project	 failed	 to	 start	 during	 the	
fieldwork	 period	 (but	 work	 has	 now	 begun	 under	 the	 same	multinational	 that	 I	 study	 in	
Chapter	 Seven),	 consequently	 we	 have	 in	 these	 accounts	 sensitive	 explorations	 of	 the	
effects	of	proposed	privatisation	on	the	government	water	body.			
	
An	 important	 contribution	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 water	 reforms	 in	 South	 India	 is	 Govind	
Gopakumar’s	work	on	Bangalore,	Chennai	and	Kochi.		The	Greater	Bangalore	Water	Supply	
project	 in	particular	has	been	an	 instructive	a	 case	 study	of	market-oriented	 reforms	and	
the	 involvement	 of	 international	 agencies	 (World	 Bank,	 ADB,	 USAID).	 	 Research	 found	
‘serious	disconnects	between	the	[water	reform]	model	and	technical,	social	and	economic	
realities	 on	 the	 ground’	 (Kamath,	 Baindur,	 &	 Ranganathan,	 2009,	 p.	 61).	 	 For	 example,	
despite	collecting	beneficiary	contributions	from	peri-urban	areas,	the	project	struggled	to	
provide	 water	 to	 (potential)	 consumers	 (Ranganathan,	 2014b).	 Researchers	 have	 also	
highlighted	 the	 projects	 initiative	 to	 replace	 free	 of	 cost	 standpipes	 from	 slums	 	 with	
chargeable	 water	 connections	 (Walters,	 2013,	 p.	 107	 ff.	 Gopakumar,	 2014).	 	 Gopakumar	
observed	 the	 integration	 of	 informal	 areas	 in	 the	 Bengaluru	 reform	project	 through	NGO	
service	provision.		He	describes	this	as	an	a	‘territorialisation	of	state	power’,	‘spatial	fix’	and	
attempt	 to	 create	 archipelagos	 of	 good	 service	 (Gopakumar,	 2014).	 	 This	 integration	 of	
informal	 areas	 of	 the	 city	 with	 formal	 networks	 strongly	 resembles	 in	 infrastructure,	 the	
influential	approach	 to	 informal	 land	 tenure	advocated	by	De	Soto	 (Gilbert	2002,	Mitchell	
2005).		Research	by	World	Bank	staff	on	water	privatisation	and	non-payment	in	Manila	also	
observes	that	the	concessionaires	had	effectively	outsourced	operations	and	management	
as	well	as	billing	and	collection	for	unserved	areas	to	 local	entrepreneurs	or	CBOs.	 	This	 is	
described	 in	 an	 influential	 early	 paper	 and	more	 recent	 study	 (Solo,	 1999;	 Cheng,	 2013).		
Cheng	notes	 that	 the	 informal	networks	have	effectively	been	 included	within	 the	 formal	
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system	and	may	also	serve	to	extend	it,	although	she	does	note	some	concerns	around	the	
governance	 and	 affordability	 of	 these	 ‘micro-networks’.	 	 This	 is	 a	 similar	 approach	 to	 the	
Delhi	water	board’s	 incorporation	of	 informal	areas	through	intermediary	groups	reported	
by	Kacker	and	Joshi	(2012).		These	blurred	edges	of	the	city’s	network	are	the	subject	of	my	
research	discussed	in	Chapter	Six.			
	
There	 has	 been	 much	 discussion	 of	 the	 privatisation	 in	 Delhi,	 with	 some	 good	 short	
academic	papers	(Kejriwal	&	Bhaduri,	2005;	Sampat	&	Koonan,	2012).		Asthana	focusses	on	
Delhi’s	 proposed,	 and	 at	 the	 time,	 failed,	 privatisation	 and	 a	 standalone	water	 treatment	
plant,	but	not	network	infrastructure	or	at	neighbourhood	scale	(V.	Asthana,	2009).		I	adopt	
a	different	approach	by	 investigating	 the	material	 realities	of	 reforms	at	a	neighbourhood	
level,	and	their	relationships	with	informal	water	supply	(Chapters	Six	and	Seven).			
	
URBAN	WATER	IN	INDIA	
Urban	water	has	attracted	increasing	interest	for	geographers	and	anthropologists	over	the	
last	 decade,	 coincident	with	 the	 ‘infrastructural	 turn’	 in	 the	 disciplines	 (Stephen	Graham,	
2010,	 p.	 10;	 Anand,	 Bach,	 Elyachar,	 &	 Mains,	 2011).	 	Graham	 and	 Marvin’s	 ambitious	
synthetic	attempt	to	situate	urban	infrastructures	as	sites	of	neoliberal	accumulation	set	the	
tone	for	subsequent	debates	(Stephen	Graham	&	Marvin,	2001;	Coutard,	2008).		The	topic	is	
not	new,	the	relationship	between	urban	flows,	money	and	power	has	been	discussed	since	
the	 late	 1960’s	 at	 least	 (Lefebvre,	 2011;	 Castells,	 1977;	 Foucault,	 2007).	 	On	 water,	
specifically,	 Swyngedouw	 and	 Kaika	 made	 important	 early	 contributions	 to	 our	
understandings	 of	 the	 politics	 of	 urban	 water	 by	 drawing	 on	 science	 studies	 and	 large	
technical	 systems	 (Swyngedouw,	 2004;	 Kaika,	 2005).	 	Matthew	 Gandy’s	 work	 on	 urban	
metabolism	again	draws	on	science	studies	and	political	ecology	(Gandy,	2003,	2005).			
	
Work	in	on	urban	water	in	South	Asia	is	mainly	concentrated	in	India,	and	mainly	on	public	
urban	water	networks.		Research	on	urban	water	provision	in	India	describes	partial,	biased,	
corrupt,	 inefficient,	 politically	 instrumentalised	 services.	 	 Informal	 water	 governance	 in	
urban	India	is	a	small	(but	growing)	area	of	work	and	the	subject	of	only	a	few	ethnographic	
papers	 (Cooper	2011,	Anand	2011,	2012,	Ranganathan	2013,	2014,	Björkman	2011,	2014,	
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forthcoming)	 and	 mentioned	 briefly	 in	 others	 (Berenschot	 2010,	 2011a,	 2011b,	 Gandy	
2008).	 	 Indeed,	 while	 early	 works	 do	 exist	 (Coelho,	 Karen,	 2004;	 Marie-Hélène	 Zérah,	
2000b),	 the	 major	 monographs	 that	 exist	 on	 urban	 water	 governance	 (Anand,	 2017;	
Björkman,	 2015)	 and	 urban	 water	 reforms	 (V.	 Asthana,	 2009;	 Gopakumar,	 2011;	
Sangameswaran,	2014;	Walters,	2013)	have	largely	been	published	in	recent	years.			
	
An	early,	comprehensive	and	still	instructive	study	of	Delhi’s	water	supply	by	Marie-Hélène	
Zérah,	 Water:	 Unreliable	 Supply	 in	 Delhi,	 highlights	 the	 gaps	 in	 official	 statistics	 by	
illustrating	the	difference	between	connection	to	the	water	network	and	adequate	supply.		
Zérah’s	 survey	 found	 that	around	50%	of	 the	Delhi	population	do	not	have	 reliable	water	
supply,	and	must	supplement	with	alternative	sources.		This	is	often	despite	connection	to	
the	 piped	 network	 as	 the	 water	 from	 the	 public	 utility	 is	 available	 at	 unpredictable	 or	
inconvenient	times,	at	very	low	pressure,	in	low	quantity	or	not	of	sufficient	quality.		Zérah	
found	that	the	average	length	of	supply	was	two	hours.	 	 In	the	south	and	west	of	the	city	
30%	of	households	used	ground	water	via	hand	pumps	or	tubewells	and	40%	of	households	
collected	water	from	other	sources	‘at	least	occasionally’	(West	48%,	South	26.7%).		Zérah’s	
work	also	found	that	a	large	number	of	households	used	supplementary	sources	due	to	the	
unreliability	 of	 government	 supply.	 	 Note	 that	 despite	 better	 service	 levels	 residents	 in	
South	Delhi	were	more	 likely	to	complain	(South	30.8%,	compare	7.2%	in	West,	8%	in	the	
North	 and	 East)	 (Zérah	 2000:300).	 	Of	 the	 seven	water	 reform	areas	 in	Delhi,	 two	of	 the	
most	well	publicised,	Vasant	Vihar	(upper	middle	class)	and	Malviya	Nagar	(mixed	income),	
have	active	RWAs.		Zérah’s	work	in	Delhi	give	an	indication	of	the	scale	of	alternative	uses	
and	 suggest	 that	 alternative	 uses	 are	 a	 response	 to	 inadequate	 supply	 quality	 (reliability,	
timings,	 pressure	 and	 quality)	 (Marie-Hélène	 Zérah,	 2000b).	 	 She	 makes	 an	 important	
advance	 in	 moving	 beyond	 simple	 binary	 connection	 metrics	 to	 highlight	 the	 quality	
dimension	of	urban	infrastructures	(Marie-Hélène	Zérah,	1998).		There	is	however	potential	
to	 build	 on	 this	 work	 with	 research	 on	 alternative	 access	 arrangements,	 their	 ‘social	
regulation’,	differences	across	areas,	and	relationships	to	reforms	in	formal	supply.			
	
More	 recent	work	 by	 Yaffa	 Truelove	 extends	 Ayona	 Datta’s	 observation	 of	 the	 gendered	
nature	 of	 water	 access	 in	 jhuggi-jhompri	 clusters	 (self-built,	 unauthorised,	 unrecognised	
settlements)	 and	 slums	 (Datta,	 2012;	 Truelove,	 2011).	 	 In	 parallel	 to	 Vicky	 Walters	 work	 in	
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Bangalore,	Truelove	also	considers	the	limitations	of	an	NGO	project	to	improve	water	supply	
to	 an	 urban	 slum	 (Truelove,	 2016).	 	 A	 PhD	 thesis	 by	 Katherine	 Tovey	 describe	 the	
phenomenon	of	‘gali	[lane]	pipes’	in	slums,	and	the	role	of	lower	DJB	officials	and	politicians	
in	facilitating	this	(Tovey,	2002).		Alankar’s	PhD	argues	decisively	that	inequality	is	a	greater	
issue	than	the	claim	of	insufficient	bulk	water	provided	by	the	DJB	(Alankar,	2009).		A	paper	
by	Alankar,	 and	another	by	Marshall	 (by	his	 former	 colleague)	 and	Randhawa	discuss	 the	
important	role	of	place,	centrality	and	topography	for	water	access	in	Delhi	(Alankar,	2013;	
Randhawa	 &	 Marshall,	 2014).	 	 Augustin	 Maria	 raises	 the	 issue	 of	 groundwater	 as	 an	
unremarked	 supplement	 to	 formal	 supply	 (Maria,	 2006,	 2006,	 2008).	 	 Maria’s	 PhD	 also	
analyses	opposition	to	water	privatisation	in	Delhi	(Maria,	2007).		Suresh	Rohilla’s	PhD	and	
an	occasional	paper	discuss	again	 the	role	of	groundwater	and	 its	disconnect	 from	Delhi’s	
planning	 apparatus,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 Dwarka	 sub-city	 (Rohilla,	 2006,	 2012).	 	 Hosagrahar	
traces	 the	 historical	 and	 architectural	 influences	 on	 contemporary	 Delhi’s	 water	 supply	
(Hosagrahar,	2011).	 	Awadhendra	Sharan,	 too	analyses	 the	history,	with	good	material	on	
colonial	 knowledge	 production	 for	 water	 supply	 improvements	 (Sharan,	 2011,	 2014).		
Sudipta	Biswas	 analyses	 the	 formal	 system	 in	 two	planned	neighbourhoods	 and	 still	 finds	
significant	 levels	 of	 inequality	which	he	 attributes	 to	political	 influence	 (Biswas,	 2015).	 	 A	
paper	 by	 Woolcock	 and	 Jha	 discusses	 the	 role	 of	 pradhans	 in	 both	 facilitating	 and	
obstructing	water	 supply	 to	 slums	 (Jha	et	al.,	2007).	 	Other	papers	 from	World	Bank	 staff	
consider	 off-network	 water	 in	 Sangam	 Vihar	 (Kacker	 &	 Joshi,	 2012,	 2016).	 	 The	 Cities	 of	
Delhi	project	from	Centre	for	Policy	Research	has	produced	a	good	discussion	paper	on	the	
DJB	 and	 unauthorised	 colonies	 (Sheik	 &	 Banda,	 2016;	 Sheik,	 Sharma,	 &	 Banda,	 2015).		
Working	 Papers	 from	 Centre	 for	 Civil	 Society	 contain	 interesting	 empirical	 material	 on	
services	in	Sangam	Vihar	(Daga,	2003;	Das	Gupta	&	Puri,	2005).			
	
Informalities	in	public	sector	water	governance	in	urban	India	are	the	subject	of	only	a	few	
detailed	 qualitative	 papers,	 the	 majority	 on	 Mumbai	 (Cooper	 2011,	 Anand	 2011,	 2012,	
Ranganathan	 2013,	 2014,	 Björkman	 2011,	 2014,	 forthcoming)	 and	 mentioned	 briefly	 in	
others	(Berenschot	2010,	2011a,	2011b,	Gandy	2008).	A	new	paper	from	Desai	and	Sanghvi	
describes	the	politicised	informal	water	supply	through	borewells	and	municipal	tankers	in	
an	unauthorised	colony	in	Ahmedabad	(Desai	&	Sanghvi,	2017).		The	literature	suggests	that	
access	to	municipal	water,	particularly	for	lower	income	groups,	requires	a	diverse	array	of	
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strategies	to	place	pressure	on	municipal	officials	and	elected	representatives	(Coelho	2006,	
Anand	2010,	2012).		Informality	is	present	politically	(in	tactics	for	influencing	local	officials),	
economically	 (in	 informal	 funding	 flows	 for	water	 access),	 and	 physically	 (in	 unregistered	
connections,	and	illegal	pipelines).			
	
Coelho’s	 (2006)	work	on	water	access	 in	 the	 context	of	management	 reform	 in	Chennai’s	
public	water	 supplier	 shows	 the	ways	 in	which	 these	politically	negotiated	exceptions	can	
become	sedimented	 into	 the	 fabric	of	 the	city.	 	 Temporary	 ‘bypasses’,	 ‘workarounds’	and	
‘fixes’	 in	the	water	distribution	network	quickly	become	stabilised	and	accepted	as	part	of	
the	structure,	which	is	in	any	case,	of	such	complexity	that	the	‘official’	network	may	only	be	
known	in	certain	areas	to	local	engineers,	and	in	its	totality,	not	at	all.		Gandy’s	historically	
situated	overview	of	Mumbai’s	water	 stresses	 the	need	 for	 specificity	and	grounded	 local	
work.		Groundwater,	tanker	mafias	and	the	fragmentation	of	urban	water	are	all	mentioned,	
briefly	 (Gandy,	 2008).	 	 Gandy’s	 impressive	 synthesis	 presents	 a	 vision	 of	 dysfunctional	
technocracy	and	elite	capture	in	which	ordinary	people’s	agency	is	strikingly	absent	and	we	
learn	little	about	the	daily	realities	of	water	in	the	city.			
	
More	fine	grained	studies	have	come	from	anthropologists.	 	Also	 in	Mumbai,	Nikhil	Anand	
brings	greater	focus	on	political	discretion,	material	factors	and	knowledge	in	urban	water	
supply	 (Anand,	 2011,	 2012).	 	Building	 on	 work	 by	 Swyngedouw,	 Kaika,	 Gandy	 and	
MacFarlane,	 Anand	moves	 to	 a	more	 finely	 grained	 analysis	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 urban	
water	is	made	to	flow,	and	the	material	influences	on	it.		His	intention	is	partly	to	illustrate	
the	ways	that	water	is	constitutive	of	everyday	city	politics	through	introducing	the	agency	
of	informal	settlement	dwellers,	and	to	balance	this	with	the	material	ways	in	which	water	
resists	attempt	at	control	and	management.		At	time	of	writing	Anand’s	book	has	just	been	
published	(N.	Anand,	2017).		Anand	traces	the	colonial	and	postcolonial	impacts	on	water	in	
Mumbai.	 	 Anand	 argues	 that	 water	 is	 not	 only	 ‘figured	 by	 particular	 technopolitical	
formations’	 but	 also	 ‘exceeds	 politics	 and	 destabilizes	 its	 distribution	 regimes’	 (N.	 Anand,	
2011).	 	 Anand’s	 research	 found	 that	 slum	 dwellers	 can	 get	 water	 connections	 pipes	 by	
requesting	 a	 standpipe	 and	 then	 connecting	 pipes	 to	 it	 at	 their	 own	 expense	 (N.	 Anand,	
2011,	p.	549).		This	contrasts	with	Delhi	where	there	is	established	process	for	water	supply	
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to	 unserved	 areas,	 but	 pipes	 and	 other	 infrastructure	may	 be	 self-provided	 or	 developed	
through	politicians’	local	funds.			
	
In	a	similar	vein,	Lisa	Björkman’s	work	is	also	closely	attentive	to	the	material	and	political	
configurations	 that	 unstable	 urban	 water	 supply	 gives	 rise	 to	 (Björkman,	 2014a,	
2014b).	 	Björkman	 explicitly	 links	 water	 supply	 issues	 to	 the	 innovative	 land-use	 policy	
(Transferable	 Development	 Rights)	 that	 Mumbai	 developed	 in	 order	 to	 incentivise	 slum	
redevelopment.		By	detaching	urban	density	from	the	city	masterplan,	this	led	to	‘hydraulic	
chaos’	 in	 which	 the	 water	 board	 had	 no	 way	 of	 providing	 appropriate	 levels	 of	 supply.		
Björkman	(and	Anand)	discusses	how	the	materialities	of	Mumbai’s	water	network	prevent	
any	 simple	 determination	 of	 its	 performance	 through	 social	 and	 political	 influence.	 	 A	
related	 theme	 is	 the	 situatedness	 and	 personalisation	 of	 knowledge.	 	 Björkman	 extends	
these	 insights	 to	 argue	 that	 rather	 than	 political	 power	 and	 knowledge	 influencing	water	
supply,	 power	 and	 knowledge	 of	 water	 supply	 allows	 individuals	 to	 influence	 politics	
(Björkman,	2015,	p.	198ff.).			
	
Anand	 and	Björkman	 urge	 us	 to	move	 beyond	 simplifying	 binaries;	 for	 Anand	 connection	
and	disconnection;	Björkman	the	(formal)	plan	and	(informal)	‘anti-plan’.		However,	while	all	
three	 consider	 informalities	 in	 water	 supply,	 non-network	 water	 is	 never	 subject	 to	 a	
sustained	 discussion.		 Anand	 mentions	 how	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 borewell	 in	 a	 settlement	
allows	a	different	political	possibilities	by	reducing	reliance	on	the	public	network	(N.	Anand,	
2011,	p.	557).	 	Anand	observe	discrimination	against	Muslim	settlers	 in	Mumbai,	by	Hindu	
nativist	 politicians	 (N.	 Anand,	 2017).	 	 	 Björkman	 uses	 the	 image	 of	 tankers	 to	 illustrate	
Mumbai’s	 ‘fitful	 taps’	 but	 her	 work	 is	 solidly	 focussed	 on	 the	 public	 network	 and	 illegal	
connections	 to	 it	 (Björkman,	 2015).		 Further	 discussion	 of	 informalities	 in	 urban	water	 in	
India	occurs	across	a	series	of	individual	papers.			
	
Qudsiya	Contractor,	who	did	earlier	work	 in	 the	 same	neighbourhood	as	Björkman	shows	
similar	political	dynamics	 (Contractor,	2012).	 	 In	work	on	Mumbai	and	Bhubaneshwar,	Cat	
Button	and	Kajri	Misra	both	highlight	the	vast	amount	of	private,	individual	infrastructure	in	
middle-class	areas	that	allows	India’s	urban	water	networks	function	(Button,	2016;	Misra,	
2014).	 	Graham,	MacFarlane	 and	Desai’s	 paper	on	Mumbai’s	water,	 addresses	 informality	
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explicitly	and	considers	the	function	of	talk	of	the	‘water	mafia’,	but,	again,	focusses	on	the	
public	network	(S.	Graham,	Desai,	&	McFarlane,	2013).			
	
In	 further	work	 on	Mumbai,	 both	Contractor	 (2012)	 and	Cooper	 (2011)	 suggests	 that	 the	
political	 economy	 or	 social	 capital	 elements	 of	 informal	 water	 access	 leads	 to	 localised	
natural	monopolies	at	neighbourhood	scale.	 	Research	on	access	to	water	in	a	low-income	
Muslim	 community	 in	Mankhurd,	 east	Mumbai	 (Contractor	 2012)	 explicitly	 builds	 on	 the	
work	of	Anand,	Hansen	(2001)	and	Berenschot	to	show	how	several	layers	of	intermediaries	
negotiate	 water	 access	 for	 socially	 and	 spatially	 peripheral	 areas	 of	 Mumbai.	 	 The	
municipality	is	seen	by	residents	as	indifferent	towards	undersupply	in	the	area,	particularly	
since	a	change	of	political	allegiance	in	municipal	elections.		The	indifference	is	exacerbated	
by	 the	 informal	 income	opportunities	 for	 it	 provides	 for	municipal	workers.	 	 At	 the	 same	
time,	the	‘water	brokers’	or	‘water	mafia’	organising	supply	in	response	to	the	shortage	are	
used	to	symbolically	perpetuate	representations	of	the	criminal	(Muslim)	poor	in	media	and	
official	discourse.	 	Cooper’s	 study	 in	a	 south	Mumbai	basti13	found	 that	 the	 inadequacy	of	
municipal	 water	 service	 led	 to	 small-scale	 entrepreneurs	 arranging	 connections.	 This	
lucrative	 informal	 economy	 has	 expanded	 into	 other	 service	 areas	 and	 formed	 coalitions	
between	 community-based	 water-supply	 organisations,	 gangs	 able	 to	 provide	
security/consent,	 and	 local	 politicians	 with	 channels	 of	 influence	 into	 the	 Mumbai	
bureaucracy	 and	 police.	When	 redevelopment	 approval	 was	 obtained	 for	 the	 area,	 plots	
corresponded	 ‘unsurprisingly’	 to	 territories	 in	 the	 slum	 associated	 with	 rival	 networks	
(Cooper	2011:89).		In	this	case,	the	splintering	of	water	supply	in	the	informal	economy	led	
to	a	 fragmentation	and	appropriation	of	 the	power	over,	a	 range	of	other	urban	services,	
ultimately	 dividing	 land	 and	 housing	 redevelopment	 along	 the	 same	 lines.	 	 Power	 over	
water	becomes	power	over	land	and	urban	development.		(In	my	research	power	over	land	
becomes	power	over	water	–	see	Chapter	Five	and	Six.)			
	
While	 centralised	 public	 sector	 water	 networks	 are	 used	 in	 India,	 they	 are	 not	 the	main	
source	 for	 most	 people,	 even	 urban	 dwellers	 (M.	 Shah,	 2016).	 	 Resonating	 with	 Roy’s	
suggestion	above,	that	the	differences	within	and	between	informalities	are	important	areas	
                                                            
13	Hindi,	noun.	settlement,	used	for	JJ	clusters	and	slums  
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of	 research,	 Anand	 suggests	 that	 while	 scholarship	 has	 raised	 the	 embedded	 politics	 of	
technologies,	 there	 has	 been	 less	 consideration	 of	 the	 specific	 effects	 of	 particular	
infrastructures,	or	 ‘the	manner	 in	which	 the	peculiar	materialities	of	 technologies	matter’	
(N.	Anand,	2017,	p.	11).	 	 I	extend	this	argument	to	suggest	that	means	of	water	provision	
outside	the	public	network,	a	significant	source	of	water	in	Indian	cities,	are	also	worthy	of	
attention.			
	
Work	on	‘off-grid’	water	-	tankers,	wells	and	bottled	water	-	is	less	developed	than	work	on	
public	sector	networks.		Until	recently,	at	least,	there	was	more	work	from	policy-focussed	
organisations	 such	 as	 the	World	 Bank,	 often	 in	 support	 of	 a	 policy	 position	 (e.g.	 Easter,	
Rosegrant,	 &	 Dinar,	 1999).	 	 Prominent	 early	 academic	 research	 on	water	 connecting	 the	
formal	 and	 informal	 is	 Eric	 Swyngedouw’s	 study	 of	 Guayaquil,	 Ecuador.	 	 Swyngedouw	
suggests	that	in	Guayaquil	the	formal	water	utilities	concentration	on	the	central	city	served	
to	 protect	 politically	 connected	 tanker	 business	 in	 peri-urban	 areas	 (Swyngedouw	 2004,	
2006:38).		In	Delhi,	water	tanker	operators	are	the	most	visible	face	of	the	‘water	mafia’	and	
sensational	 media	 stories	 have	 often	 focussed	 on	 them	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 tubewells,	
bottled	water,	illegal	plumbers	and	corruption	in	the	DJB.		For	example:				
	
‘The	water	mafia	created	'artificial	water	crisis'	situation	in	various	posh	colonies	the	
day	Kejriwal	 announced	700	 litres	 of	 free	water	 per	 day	 to	 each	household	 in	 the	
city’	(S.	K.	Singh,	2014);	‘Mrs.	Kaur	and	her	neighbours	depend	on	private	suppliers,	
who	 deliver	 water	 in	 truck-sized	 tankers	 […]	 Activists	 like	 Mr.	 Porwal	 allege	 that	
businessmen	working	with	 the	 ruling	 Congress	 party	 and	 the	 opposition	 Bharatiya	
Janata	 Party	 run	 the	 private	 water	 supply	 operations	 through	 tankers’	 	 (Manish,	
2013)	
	
The	 term	 ‘mafia’	 in	 south	 Asia	 is	 used	 slightly	 loosely	 and	 does	 not	 necessarily	 carry	 the	
connotations	 of	 powerful	 crime	 families	 common	 in	 popular	 media	 or	 the	 control	 of	 an	
illegal	 market	 through	 the	 use	 of	 violence	 that	 a	 strict	 academic	 definition	 might	 give	
(Schneider	 &	 Schneider,	 2008,	 p.	 362).	 	 In	 work	 on	 Mumbai,	 Graham	 et	 al	 state	 that	
‘dominant	discourses	surrounding	Mumbai’s	contemporary	water	crisis’	‘deployed	by	elites	
and	mainstream	media	outlets’	‘tend	to	simplistically	equate	the	city’s	poor	citizens	with	the	
interests	of	a	powerful	and	shadowy	“water	mafia”’.		They	suggest	that	water	mafia	talk,	by	
‘failing	to	reveal	how	such	corrupt	water	practices	negatively	affect	Mumbai’s	poor’	renders	
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the	exploitation	of	residents	of	informal	settlements	‘all	but	invisible’	(Graham	et	al.,	2013,	
pp.	118–119).	 	This	 is	not	the	case	 in	Delhi,	where	 ‘water	crisis’	 is	much	more	 likely	to	be	
blamed	on	 interstate	allocation	 issues.	 	Water	mafia	are	a	common	theme,	particularly	 in	
the	Daily	Mail,	however,	they	are	usually	presented	as	unscrupulous	entrepreneurs	profiting	
from	the	distress	of	 low-income	communities,	who	are	almost	always	quoted	stating	their	
unhappiness14.		Taking	news	articles	from	the	top	of	Google’s	search	results	for	‘water	mafia	
Mumbai’,	 in	 fact	a	similar	pattern	emerges.	 	Low	 income	residents	are	described	as	angry	
and	 frustrated	with	 lack	 of	 water	 and	 blame	 ‘water	mafia’	 for	making	money	 from	 their	
situation	(Indian	Express,	2016;	Raina,	2016).		Regardless	of	the	accuracy	of	Graham	et	al’s	
claim,	the	intuition	that	water	problems	may	be	blamed	on	low-income	residents	is	sound.		
Björkman,	Anand	and	in	another	context	Ghertner,	make	this	point	persuasively	(N.	Anand,	
2012;	Björkman,	2014;	Ghertner,	2012).			
	
Björkman	 in	 her	 recent	 book,	 and	 elsewhere,	 is	 very	 sceptical	 of	 ‘water	 mafia’	 talk	 and	
describes	the	empirically	dubious	but	rhetorically	powerful	use	of	‘water	mafia’	in	Mumbai	
(Björkman,	 2015,	 pp.	 180–189).	 	 She	 describes	 talk	 of	 corruption	 in	 tanker	 delivery	 of	
municipal	 water	 as	 symptomatic	 of	 the	 complex	 public	 system	 and	 widespread	 use	 of	
brokers	 and	 side-payments.	 	 She	 does	 quote	 a	 tanker	 owner	who	describes	 profits	made	
from	black	market	sale	of	municipal	water	but	does	not	find	evidence	of	any	cartel.		Qudisya	
Contractor’s	 research	 in	 the	 same	area	of	Mumbai	provides	an	 illuminating	description	of	
the	criminalisation	of	‘water	brokers’	and	their	media	portrayal	as	‘water	mafia’	(Contractor,	
2012,	p.	63).	 	However,	while	Mumbai’s	water	politics	primarily	revolves	around	municipal	
pipe	supply	(and	resale	of	municipal	water),	in	Delhi,	the	situation	is	quite	different.		A	large	
factor	 in	 this	 is	 the	presence	of	heavy	groundwater	use.	 	As	Mehta	observes	 ‘institutional	
arrangements	 governing	 natural	 resources	 management	 are	 often	 elite-driven,	 exclusive,	
messy	and	conflict-ridden’	(L.	Mehta,	2005,	p.	25).			
	
The	 connection	 between	 illegal	 groundwater	 use	 and	water	 tankers	 is	 explored	 in	Malini	
Ranganthans’	 excellent	 paper	 on	 the	 ‘tanker	 mafia’	 in	 Bengaluru.	 	 She	 finds	 that	 the	
imagined	nexus	of	politicians	and	tanker	bosses	is	reflected	in	the	public	authority	of	tanker	
                                                            
14	See	also	e.g.	(Sethi,	2015;	Majumder,	2015;	Times	of	India,	2012;	Munshi,	2012)	
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bosses	which	 is	modelled	on	 the	 styles	of	politicians	 (Ranganathan,	2014a).	 	Ranganathan	
also	 highlights	 the	 links	 between	 informal	 water	 and	 informal	 land	 development	
(Ranganathan,	 2014a,	 p.	 91).  The	 water	 mafia	 in	 Bengaluru	 is	 said	 to	 have	 demarcated	
territories	(Borthakur,	2015,	p.	25;	Rai,	2012),	a	finding	reported	in	other	cities	also	(Kjellén	
&	McGranahan,	2006).		However,	it	should	be	noted	that	as	I	also	found,	tanker	owners	and	
other	 informal	water	 providers	 seem	 reluctant	 to	 participate	 in	 research.	 	 In	 Borthakur’s	
study	 two	 tanker	 owners	 agreed,	 and	 two	 declined,	 to	 participate.	 	 In	 Joshi	 and	 Kacker’s	
study	 in	Sangam	Vihar,	eight	households	and	 four	water	managers	participated	 (Kacker	&	
Joshi,	 2016,	 p.	 257).	 	 These	 difficulties	 in	 access	 are	 perhaps	 a	 factor	 in	 the	 patchy	
information	available.	 	 For	example,	 several	 researchers	 state	 that	 tanker	prices	 are	 fixed	
(Panda	and	Agarwala	2007,	Goldar	and	Misra	2008,	Daga	2010,	Srinivasan	2010)	–	except	in	
conditions	of	scarcity	when	they	vary	according	to	the	client’s	ability	to	pay.		Srinivasan	et	al	
discuss	tanker	supply	in	Chennai	(Srinivasan	et	al.,	2010).	 	Greater	non-monetary	costs	are	
also	required	for	tanker	or	tubewell	water,	a	burden	that	falls	disproportionately	on	women	
(Truelove,	2011)	and	children	(Datta,	2012,	pp.	136–139).			
	
On	 urban	 groundwater,	 work	 by	 Deepak	 Malghan	 and	 colleagues	 from	 Bengaluru	 (cited	
above),	 introduces	concept	of	urban	hydrology	as	socio-natural.	 	Municipal	tap	capture	by	
criminal	groups	is	described	in	work	on	Mumbai	(Bapat	&	Agarwal,	2003,	p.	82;	Weinstein,	
2008,	p.	26).		Tap	capture	by	local	groups,	along	caste	or	communal	lines,	is	also	described	
in	Patna	(Rodgers	&	Satija,	2012,	p.	4).		A	connection	between	water	tankers	and	tubewells	
is	also,	cursorily	mentioned	by	Graham	et	al	in	work	on	Mumbai:	‘private	water	tankers	also	
obtained	water	from	bore	wells,	pointing	to	profits	being	made	through	excessive	and	often	
unregulated	 groundwater	 extraction’	 (Graham	 et	 al.,	 2013,	 p.	 135).	 	 There	 is	 also	 a	 2016	
Joshi	paper	on	Delhi	tubewell	networks,	the	data	is	ten	years	old	but	similar	to	my	findings	
on	tubewells	in	Sangam	Vihar.		There	is	just	one	page	on	borewells	in	Anand:		
	
‘With	 their	 own	 patrons,	 bore	 wells	 have	 their	 own	 management	 regimes,	 and	
produce	 their	 own	 political	 and	 social	 networks	 that	 run	 through	 and	 parallel	 to	
municipal	systems	of	legitimation	and	patronage.		Wells	therefore	produce	different	
forms	of	political	authority	and	regimes	of	belonging	in	the	city’	(N.	Anand,	2017,	pp.	
212–213).			
	
	
BIRKINSHAW: MURKY WATERS  CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE 
 
67 
CONCLUSIONS	
This	project	was	motivated	by	an	attempt	to	understand	the	relationships	between	reforms	
and	informality	in	urban	infrastructures	and	governance.		My	interest	here	is	in	the	effects	
of	 reform	 programmes	 like	 new	 public	 management	 in	 urban	 governance	 or	 the	
commercialisation	of	 urban	 services.	 	 Ideas	 about	 the	 state	 and	politics	 in	 India	 from	 the	
literature	 discussed	 above	 are	 an	 explanatory	 theme	 that	 runs	 underneath	 discussions	 of	
informality,	water	and	reform	throughout	the	thesis.		I	am	broadly	sympathetic	to	work	on	
neoliberalisation	without	wanting	 to	sacrifice	empirical	accuracy	 for	 theoretical	coherence	
or	 ideological	 purity.	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 while	 there	 has	 been	 extensive	 work	 on	
neoliberalism	 and	 water	 privatisation	 (e.g.	 V.	 Asthana,	 2009;	 Gopakumar,	 2011;	Walters,	
2013),	 ‘actually	existing’	water	arrangements	in	Indian	cities	are	not	heavily	discussed.	 	An	
initial	research	question	for	this	project	was	‘how	do	people	access	water	in	Delhi?’		Despite	
fairly	wide	reading	of	the	literature,	the	answer	was	not	obvious.		The	coexistence	in	Delhi	
of	 commercially-led	 water	 governance	 reforms	 and	 progressive	 government-led	 reforms	
provided	a	compelling	site	for	comparative	research.			
	
I	 suggest	 that	 infrastructure	 studies	 can	 contribute	 to	 debates	 on	 informal	 urbanism	 by	
providing	 contrasting	 and	 sector-specific	 dynamics	 to	 the	 predominant	 focus	 on	 informal	
land-use	 and	 enterprise.	 	 Additionally,	 infrastructure	 leads	 us	 to	 think	 about	 the	material	
and	technical	processes	that	may	be	overlooked	 in	studies	of	 informal	 land	use	or	 labour.		
Conversely,	 attention	 to	 informality	 contributes	 to	 infrastructure	 studies	 by	 forcing	 us	 to	
attend	 to	 the	 interface	 of	 technical	 and	 regulatory	 aspects	 with	 social	 and	 interpersonal	
dynamics,	 and	 the	 impacts	 on	 the	 lived	 experience	 of	 users.	 	 Informality	 forces	 us	 to	
question	the	apparent	boundaries	of	systems	(technological,	natural,	political,	etc)	and	the	
enactment	of	 apparently	 neutral	 categories	 and	actors	 (technical	 systems,	 state	 agencies,	
political	 processes)	 (Latour,	 2005,	 p.	 37;	 Mol,	 2002,	 p.	 32).	 	 I	 suggest	 that	 research	 on	
informal	infrastructures	and	their	‘small	technologies’	(K.	Furlong,	2011),	like	water	tankers	
and	tubewells,	might	speak	usefully	to	theorisations	of	both	informality	and	infrastructure.		
Work	from	the	global	south	might	also	provide	a	fresh	approach	to	a	subject	that	has	been	
northern	 dominated.	 	 De	 Laet	 and	 Mol’s	 work	 on	 water	 pumps	 in	 Zimbabwe	 is	 a	 good	
example	(de	Laet	&	Mol,	2000).	 	The	empirical	material	 in	this	thesis	will	attempt	to	show	
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the	 importance	 of	 further	 refining	 work	 on	 informal	 infrastructures	 to	 account	 for:	 local	
dynamics	 and	 their	 historical	 trajectories;	 sector	 and	 supply	 mode	 specificity	 and	 the	
relationships	 between	 them;	 the	 underestimated	 extent	 of	 these	 socially	 embedded	
modifications	and	the	obstacles	that	they	can	pose	to	reform	initiatives.		For	example,	water	
has	 specific	 material	 characteristics	 unlike	 other	 infrastructure	 systems	 and	 must	 be	
understood	 in	 relation	 to	 wider	 ecology.	 Hydrology,	 particularly	 in	 urban	 settings,	 is	 a	
combination	 of	 social,	 cultural	 and	 political	 as	 much	 as	 material,	 natural	 and	 ecological	
processes.	 	 Access	 to	 water	 is	 structured	 by	 gender,	 class,	 caste	 and	 religion,	 as	 well	 as	
material	factors	such	as	slope,	distance,	geology.			
	
The	 literature	above	 indicates	 that	 informality	 is	multi-dimensional:	 the	 rule	 in	 relation	 to	
which	 something	 is	 considered	 informal	 must	 be	 specified.	 	 General	 theories	 of	 urban	
informality	 will	 become	 problematic	 when	 applied	 in	 other	 settings.	 	 Infrastructures	
informality	and	state	are	performative	–	they	exist	through	action.		The	greater	the	level	of	
informality	 the	 greater	 the	 degree	 of	 performativity.	 	 Infrastructures,	 like	 informality	 and	
the	state,	are	relational;	the	extent	of	the	system	and	its	edges	are	a	function	of	the	scale	
that	 is	 being	 studied.	 	 For	 example,	mediators	 and	 brokers	 are	 essential	 elements	 of	 the	
Indian	 state’s	 blurred	 edges.	 	 Indeed,	 concepts	 and	 systems	 like	 ‘state’,	 ‘civil	 society’,	
‘democracy’,	 ‘public-private	 partnerships’	 may	 change	 as	 they	 are	 transported	 and	
implemented	 across	 sites.	 	 Reforms	 aim	 to	 rationalise	 urban	 governance	 and	 services	
appear	 to	 be	 in	 tension	with	 pre-existing	 practices	which	may	 follow	other	 (more	 or	 less	
benevolent	and	exploitative)	 logics	of	profit	and	politics.	 	However	there	has	been	 limited	
research	on	the	relationship	between	urban	reforms	and	informality,	particularly	in	relation	
to	water.				
	
Using	 the	 conjunction	 of	water	 reforms	 and	 informality	 as	 an	 angle	 for	 research	 into	 the	
governance	 and	 politics	 of	 water	 directs	 the	 research	 methods	 and	 choice	 of	 site.	 	 The	
overlap	between	informal	water	and	groundwater	use	in	much	of	India	is	evident	in	Delhi,	
which	 is	 also	 the	 site	 of	 reforms	 under	 a	 number	 of	 pilot	 projects	 for	 commercial	
management	of	water	as	well	as	changes	brought	in	by	a	new	government	in	the	city.		Later	
in	the	thesis	I	discuss	state	piped	water	supply	(Chapter	Four),	non-piped	and	informal	‘off	
grid’	water	 (Chapter	 Five),	 and	 a	 public-private	 partnership	 in	 the	 city	 (Chapter	 Six).	 	 The	
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research	discussed	in	this	chapter	was	used	to	frame	the	methodological	considerations	and	
choices	that	I	made	in	designing	and	executing	my	own	project,	which	are	the	subject	of	the	
following	chapter.			
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CHAPTER	3.	METHODS	
In	this	chapter	I	discuss	the	study	design	and	methods	chosen	for	this	research.		I	open	the	
chapter	 with	 a	 discussion	 of	 Delhi	 as	 a	 site	 before	 moving	 on	 to	 describe	 my	 specific	
research	 focus	 areas	 of	 Sangam	 Vihar-Deoli	 and	 the	 Malviya	 Nagar	 Public-Private	
Partnership	 (PPP)	 zone.	 	 I	 then	 describe	 the	 process	 of	 data	 collection,	 theoretically	 and	
practically.	 	 In	 closing,	 I	 consider	 research	 ethics	 and	 positionality,	 and	 limitations	 of	 the	
proposed	research.			
The	initial	broad	research	question	I	ask	is:	‘How	is	water	governed	in	Delhi?’		More	
specifically,	‘How	and	why	does	water	affect	politics	and	politics	affect	water	in	Delhi?’,	or	
again	‘What	are	the	politics	of	Delhi’s	water,	and	the	hydraulics	of	Delhi	politics?’		Gaps	in	
the	academic	literature	led	to	three	main	sub-questions:		
	
1. How	 is	 public	 supply	 governed,	 and	 what	 are	 the	 roles	 of	 politics,	 planning	 and	
informality	in	public	water	supply?				
2. What	 role	 does	 groundwater	 play,	 what	 are	 the	 roles	 of	 politics,	 planning	 and	
informality	in	ground	water	use,	and	why?					
3. What	 relationships	 do	 unreliable,	 unequal	 public	 supply,	 groundwater,	 politics,	
planning	and	informality	have	with	water	reform	initiatives?			
	
I	used	two	interventions	–	one	from	government,	one	from	the	private	sector	–	as	windows	
onto	water	 governance	 in	 Delhi.	 	 The	 first	was	 attempts	 to	 regulate	 the	 ‘water	mafia’	 in	
Sangam	Vihar,	a	large	cluster	of	unauthorised	colonies.		The	second	an	attempt	to	transfer	
the	public	 network	 to	private	management	 in	 a	 zone	of	mixed	 tenure	 types	 and	 incomes	
around	 Malviya	 Nagar.	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 two	 primary	 focusses,	 and	 specific	
neighbourhoods	 within	 then,	 I	 also	 conducted	 research	 in	 other	 similar	 South	 Delhi	
neighbourhoods	for	comparison.			
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Despite	being	India’s	capital,	Delhi’s	water	supply	is	below	average	and	near	the	bottom	end	
of	 India’s	 major	 cities	 (Shaban	 &	 Sharma,	 2007).	 	 Estimates	 place	 the	 proportion	 of	
population	relying	on	piped	supply	from	the	Delhi	government	at	around	50%	(Jain,	2012;	
Maria,	 2008;	 Narain,	 2011).	 	 The	 unreliability	 of	 official	 water	 supply	 timings	 and	 quality	
leads	to	a	common	use	of	alternative	access	modes,	which	complicates	any	simple	model	of	
supply	 dynamics.	 	 One	 common	 solution	 is	 the	 use	 of	 groundwater	 on	 which	 Delhi	 is	
considerably	dependent	 to	supplement	 its	water	supply,	both	 through	 the	Delhi	 Jal	Board	
(DJB)	and	alternative	 suppliers.	 	 In	 south	Delhi,	 like	many	of	 India’s	 fastest	growing	cities,	
groundwater	 use	 is	 pronounced	 and	 the	 water	 table	 is	 declining	 rapidly	 –	 see	 Figure	 3	
(Rodell	et	al.,	2009).			
	
	
	
	
Groundwater	in	the	south	of	the	city	has	been	falling	at	10-15ft	per	year	leading	to	wells	up	
to	 650ft	 deep.	 	 At	 around	 this	 level	 groundwater	 usually	 reaches	 the	 end	of	 viable	 use	 –	
becoming	 increasingly	 khada	 (hard	 /	 salty)	 and	 non-potable	 as	 well	 as	 damaging	 the	
submersible	 pumps	 used	 to	 extract	 it.	 	 Data	 from	 the	 Delhi	 Development	 Report	 (from	
Institute	 of	 Human	 Development)	 shows	 South	 Delhi	 as	 having	 a	 higher	 proportion	 of	
residents	 living	 in	 slums	 than	 other	 areas	 of	 the	 city,	 and	 these	 residents	 as	 using	 a	 far	
greater	variety	of	water	supply	modes	than	elsewhere	(Marie-Hélène	Zérah,	2000b,	p.	297,	
mentioned	 earlier	 at	 page	 58	 above).	 	 One	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 Delhi’s	 bulk	 water	
Nagar	
Sangam	
Vihar	
https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/spaceimages/
details.php?id=PIA20206	
Delhi's	groundwater	and	project	research	sites		
(map	data	Google	2018,	image	data	Digital	Globe	2018)	
Sangam	
Vihar	
This image has been removed as the 
copyright is owned by another 
organisation. Malviya	
Nagar	
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infrastructure	 is	concentrated	 in	the	north	of	 the	city.	 	Given	the	high	 levels	of	 inequality,	
neighbourhoods	in	south	Delhi	receive	both	very	high,	and	very	low	amounts	of	water.		The	
Mehrauli	 zone,	 in	 the	 far	 south	 is,	 according	 to	 the	available	data,	 the	 zone	 receiving	 the	
lowest	amount	from	the	public	network.		In	this,	south	Delhi	is	similar	to	India	as	a	whole,	
where,	 while	 centralised	 public	 sector	 water	 networks	 are	 used,	 they	 are	 not	 the	 main	
source	for	most	people,	even	urban	dwellers	(Burt	&	Ray,	2014;	M.	Shah,	2016).		The	parts	
of	 Delhi	 most	 resembling	 the	 ‘ordinary	 cities’	 of	 North	 India	 are	 those	 across	 the	 state	
boundary	 (Ghaziabad,	 Faridabad,	 Gurgaon).	 	 To	 avoid	 the	 additional	 complexities	 of	
research	 in	 a	 site	 under	 a	 different	 state	 government,	 I	 selected	 research	 sites	 in	 South	
Delhi.		These	are	described	in	more	detail	below.				
	
Even	within	 Delhi,	 the	water	 supply	 is	 highly	 spatially	 differentiated,	 as	 Zérah’s	 clustered	
survey	 of	 Delhi	 neighbourhoods	 illustrates	 (Marie-Hélène	 Zérah,	 2000b).	 	 More	 recently	
Biswas	 has	 demonstrated	 the	 variations	within	 formal	 areas	 of	 the	 same	 part	 of	 the	 city	
(Biswas,	2015).		Water	access	can	be	sub-divided	into	official	formal	supply	and	alternative	
methods	of	water	access.		The	predominant	household	[or	neighbourhood]	access	mode	is	
likely	 to	 be	 a	 function	 of	 a	 range	 of	 factors	 including	 planning	 status,	 physical	 geography	
(topography	and	geology)	and	social	indicators	such	as	income	group,	religion	and	political	
alignments,	etc.		Determinants	of	water	supply	within	this	area	of	south	Delhi	may	be	of	an	
intricacy	that	the	division	between	‘public’	and	‘private’	management	begins	to	seem	rather	
crude	and	arbitrary.			
	
Part	of	the	reason	for	the	high	level	of	variation	in	water	supply	is	that	Delhi’s	built	fabric	is	
very	 mixed	 in	 terms	 of	 density,	 age,	 construction	 quality,	 and	 land-use	 (Dupont,	 2004).		
Inequality	has	been	hardwired	into	Delhi’s	urban	planning,	first	by	the	British	with	Civil	Lines	
and	Lutyens’	New	Delhi,	then	post-independence,	through	the	Ford	Foundation	Masterplan	
and	 the	demolitions	of	 the	Emergency.	 	 The	historical	development	of	 the	 city	has	 led	 to	
unequal	water	supply.		Both	Mughal	and	British	rule	entrenched	a	pattern	of	focus	on	bulk	
supply	directed	towards	ruling	classes	and	a	neglect	of	 intra-city	inequality.	 	With	the	new	
developments	of	Shahjahanabad	and	Civil	 Lines	 in	 the	north	of	 the	city	and	 then	Lutyens’	
New	Delhi	 further	 south,	bulk	water	 infrastructure	was	concentrated	 in	 the	north.	 	Public	
supply	was	stretched	by	the	fast	growth	of	the	city	in	the	wake	of	partition,	particularly	in	
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the	 south	 and	west,	 while	 the	 high-modernist	master	 plan	 adopted	 in	 the	 1960s	 further	
formalised	spatial	divisions.	 	The	growth	of	these	new	areas	at	a	distance	from	the	centre	
raised	costs	of	provision,	particularly	in	the	south	of	the	city	which	was	far	from	the	water	
inputs	and	treatment	plants,	and	‘behind’	the	heavy	bulk	consuming	areas	of	New	Delhi	and	
Cantonment.		A	further	layer	of	complexity	is	given	by	the	inadequate	supply	of	low-income	
housing	which	has	 led	 to	a	majority	of	 the	city	population	 living	outside	 the	planned	city,	
and	consequently	facing	restrictions	on	public	services.		
	
The	DJB	typology	of	informal	urban	areas	itemises	jhuggi	jhompri15	(JJ)	clusters,	recognised	
slums,16	 resettlement	 areas,17	 urban	 villages,	 rural	 villages,	 unauthorised	 colonies	 and	
regularised	unauthorised	colonies18	(Bhan,	2013;	Ghertner,	2010).		In	brief,	JJ	clusters,	slums	
and	 unauthorised	 colonies	 are	 areas	 urbanised	 without	 planning	 permission;	 recognised	
slums	and	 regularised	unauthorised	colonies	have	been	granted	 some	official	 recognition;	
resettlement	 areas	 rehouse	 evictees	 from	other,	more	 central,	 informal	 areas;	 and	urban	
and	 rural	 villages	 were	 deemed	 to	 require	 lower	 standards	 of	 urban	 planning	 than	 the	
surrounding	city.			
	
Within	these	categories,	a	salient	feature	of	Delhi’s	urbanisation	and	politics	is	the	presence	
of	 ‘urban	villages’	and	 ‘unauthorised	colonies’.	 	 I	 chose	 to	 focus	on	unauthorised	colonies	
and	urban	villages	in	South	Delhi	as	‘ordinary’	areas	with	irregular	water	provision	beyond	
the	 ‘slum-elite’	 binary	 (Chakravarty	 &	 Negi,	 2016;	 Lemanski	 &	 Tawa	 Lama-Rewal,	 2013;	
Robinson,	 2005).	 	 While	 the	 city	 has	 been	 built	 on	 village	 land,	 urban	 villages	 have	 not	
disappeared	and	are	a	distinctive	feature	of	Delhi’s	landscape	(Chakravarty,	2016;	S.	Kumar,	
2010;	Sengupta,	2007,	pp.	132–154).		A	number	of	villages	were	incorporated	into	the	city	
and	 declared	 ‘urban	 villages’	 by	 the	 1962	 Masterplan	 (Sengupta,	 2007).	 	 Delhi’s	 urban	
growth	since	1931	has	overtaken	surrounding	132	villages	(Mehra,	2005,	p.	284)	and	there	
were	 135	 declared	 urban	 villages	 in	 2007	 (Chakravarty,	 2016,	 p.	 117).	 	 The	 term	
                                                            
15	jhuggee	jhompdree-	Hindi	n.	‘hutments’	(literal	tr.	/	Indian	English)	/	huts,	shacks.		Jhompdree	hut,	
hovel,	cottage,	also	cell	as	in	insect	colonies,	derived	from	jhomp	Hindi	n.	sleep.		
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/jhuggi		
Hindi	dictionary	Pustak.org	defines	jhuggi	as	1.	a	fakir,	sadhu	etc’s	hut	2.	any	very	small	house	
16	JJ	clusters	acknowledged	by	government,	which	may	be	provided	minimal	services	
17	(Bhan	&	Menon	Sen,	2008;	Srivastava,	2015)	
18	for	which	see	inter	alia	(Sheik,	Banda,	Jha,	&	Mandelkern,	2015)		
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‘unauthorised	 colony’,	 is	 connected	 to	 ‘urban	 villages’.	 	 It	 refers	 to	 urbanised	 areas	 on	
agricultural	land	which	had	not	been	rezoned	for	the	new	use	at	time	of	sale.			
	
While	there	has	been	much	work	on	India’s	slums	and	‘slumification’	over	past	decades,	the	
unauthorised	 colony	 is	 an	 almost	 neglected	 typology	 outside	 of	 India,	 generating	 one	
publication	 with	 the	 term	 in	 the	 title	 in	 international	 journals	 (Lemanski	 &	 Tawa	 Lama-
Rewal,	2013).		Urban	villages,	on	the	other	hand,	although	less	studied	in	India,	have	been	
discussed	extensively	in	China	(Wang,	Wang,	&	Wu,	2009;	F.	Wu,	Zhang,	&	Webster,	2013;	
Yan	Song,	Zenou,	&	Chengri	Ding,	2008).		Nevertheless,	both	unauthorised	colonies	and	(to	a	
lesser	extent)	urban	villages,	 are	 central	 to	Delhi’s	political	 and	 social	 equations	 (India	TV	
News,	 2012).	 	 For	 unauthorised	 colonies,	 known	 in	 Bangalore	 as	 ‘revenue	 layouts’	
(Sundaresan,	 2013,	 p.	 25)	 see	 (Dupont,	 2005;	 Lemanski	 &	 Tawa	 Lama-Rewal,	 2013;	
Ranganathan,	 2014b;	 Sheik	 &	 Banda,	 2014,	 2016;	 Zimmer,	 2012);	 for	 urban	 villages	 -	
(Baviskar,	2003,	p.	90;	Chakravarty,	2016;	S.	Kumar,	2010;	Mehra,	2005;	Sengupta,	2007).		
As	areas	constructed	outside	of	planning	oversight	but	not	as	marginalised	and	insecure	as	
bastis	or	slums	more	similar	to	the	mundane	and	unplanned	urbanisation	in	India’s	‘ordinary	
cities’	where	the	majority	live.			
	
	
	
	
Malviya	
Nagar	
Sangam	
Vihar	
South	Delhi,	primary	research	sites.		Urban	density,	a	reasonable	proxy	for	class,	is	clearly	visible	(imagery:	
Digital	Globe	2018;	map	data	Google	2018)	
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South	Delhi	(map	data:	Google	2018)	
	
Research	Focus	Site	A)	Sangam	Vihar,	Deoli	and	surrounds	
My	 first	 set	 of	 research	 sites	 are	 neighbourhoods	 within	 the	 Sangam	 Vihar	 and	 Deoli	
constituencies	 of	 Delhi	 Assembly.	 	 Sangam	Vihar	 is	 a	 large	 low-income	 area	 by	 the	 Delhi	
state		border	which	was	urbanised	without	planning	permission	and	now	houses	around	a	
million	people.		The	area	had	no	government	piped	water	supply	at	all	until	2015	when	the	
AAP	 government	 began	 introducing	 it.	 	 Because	 of	 this	 lack	 of	 piped	 water,	 I	 approach	
Sangam	Vihar	as	a	‘limit	case’,	or	extreme	example,	to	better	examine	water	supply	outside	
of	the	piped	network,	and	in	particular	the	role	of	informal	groundwater	use.		Sangam	Vihar	
as	a	site	helps	to	address	my	overall	research	question	(‘How	is	water	governed	in	Delhi?’)	
through	the	sub-question	‘How	do	people	access	water	outside	the	piped	network?	/	What	
role	does	groundwater	play,	and	why?’		This	then	feeds	into	the	analysis,	in	later	chapters,	
of	 network	 reform	 projects	 –	where	 informalities	 and	 groundwater	 use	 are	 also	 present,	
although	less	starkly.					
Malviya	Nagar	
	/	PPP	zone	
Deoli	&	
Sangam	Vihar	
BIRKINSHAW: MURKY WATERS  CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
 
76 
	
				
	
Although,	 Sangam	 Vihar	 is	 a	 distinct	 spatial	 formation	 (as	 can	 be	 seen	 from	 the	 aerial	
photographs	above),	 it	 is	composed	of	 thirty	eight	unauthorised	colonies	and	divided	 into	
two	 legislative	 assembly	 areas.	 	 As	 a	 location	 of	 unauthorised	 urban	 development	 at	 the	
south-eastern	periphery	of	Delhi’s	 state	boundary,	 rental	 prices	 are	 low.	 	 The	majority	 of	
residents	earn	 low	 incomes	and	very	many	 families	 are	 from	outside	Delhi	 (Sheik,	Banda,	
Jha,	 &	 Mandelkern,	 2015).	 	 The	 name	 reflects	 these	 varied	 origins	 –	 ‘sangam’	 means	
confluence	 of	 people	 or	 rivers	 –	 and	 is	 said	 to	 have	 been	 given	 because	 of	 the	 mix	 of	
different	people	 living	there.	 	Sangam	Vihar	 is	bordered	to	the	south	by	the	Asola	Wildlife	
Sanctuary,	created	in	198619.	To	the	west	is	Sainik	Farms,	clearly	visible	from	the	air	and	on	
the	google	maps	 image	by	the	change	 in	density,	a	very	high-income	unauthorised	colony	
fairly	densely	packed	with	around	5,000	multi-story	luxury	villas	with	gardens	on	individual	
plots	(Sengupta,	2007,	p.	173).		While	not	of	the	opulence	and	spaciousness	of	the	villas	in	
the	Chhattarpur-Mehrauli-Fatehpur	Beri	strip20	(home	to	Delhi’s	wealthiest	Members	of	the	
Legislative	Assembly	and	his	collection	of	luxury	cars,	p.57),	Sainik	Farms	is	very	well	known	
as	a	home	for	“Delhi’s	0.1%”21.		The	size	of	houses	constructed	on	land	zoned	as	agricultural	
were	 restricted	 in	 the	 1961	masterplan,	 but	 by	 1982	 the	 size	 limits	 had	 increased	 1,000	
percent	 (Sengupta,	 2007,	 p.	 174).	 	 To	 the	 north	 west	 is	 the	 village	 of	 Deoli	 and	 the	
unauthorised	colonies,	resettlement	areas	and	villages	of	Khanpur	and	Tigri.	 	Further	east,	
                                                            
19	Thomas	Crowley,	researcher,	Akademie	Schloss	Solitude,	Stuttgart,	personal	communication,	9	November	
2016	
20	See	(Soni,	2000)	
21	Personal	communication,	journalist,	The	Caravan,	South	Delhi,	February	2014,	fn46;	Personal	
communication,	Alankar,	Centre	for	Study	of	Developing	Societies,	Delhi,	24/09/2014,	fn32.			
Sangam	Vihar	displays	a	densely	built-up	urban	environment	of	regular	plot	sizes		
(magery:	Digital	Globe	2018;	map	data	Google	2018)	
BIRKINSHAW: MURKY WATERS  CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
 
77 
Sangam	Vihar’s	northern	side	is	bounded	by	the	Mehrauli-Badarpur	Road	and	the	Hamdard	
Institutional	 Area,	 including	 Indo-Tibetan	 Border	 Force	 and	 Indian	Airforce	 bases.	 	 To	 the	
east,	 is	 more	 army	 land,	 Delhi	 shooting	 range,	 Asola	 Sanctuary,	 and	 beyond	 these,	 the	
industrial	areas	of	Okhla,	Badarpur,	and,	across	the	state	border,	Faridabad	and	NOIDA.		The	
village	of	Deoli	can	be	seen	centre	left	on	the	1866	map	below,	as	well	as	the	Gujjar	village	
inside	Tughlakabad	 fort,	 shown	 in	more	detail	 in	 the	1873	map	on	the	right.	 	These	maps	
also	indicate	the	areas	hilly	topography	and	the	reason	for	the	extensive	flooding.		The	area	
that	is	now	Sangam	Vihar	is	lower	than	surrounding	areas	and	the	eastern	side	was	at	one	
time	a	lake.			
	
	
(left)	1850	map	of	Sangam	Vihar	area	shows	villages	of	Deoli	(left)	and	Tughlakabad	(right)	circled	in	red	
(Burgess,	1866,	©	British	Library	Board,	Maps	I.S.79)		
(right)	Plan	of	Toghlukabad	Fort	1873-74,	'Goojargaon',	considerably	larger	than	the	1850	map,	is	circled	in	red	
(Captain	W.	H.	Wilkins,	Offiz	Depy.	Supt	&	Assistants,	1876,	©	British	Library	Board,	Maps	I.S.152)	
	
As	 with	 much	 of	 Delhi’s	 southern	 fringes,	 the	 region	 was	 previously	 farmland,	 orchards,	
grazing	 land,	 forests,	 scrub	 and	 rocky	 outcrops	 occupied	 by	 villages	 settled	 within	 and	
around	 the	 older	 cities	 of	 Delhi	 (Qila	 Lalkot,	 Mehrauli,	 Siri,	 Jahanpanah,	 Tughlakabad).		
South	Delhi’s	 villages	were	primarily	dominated	by	 Jaat	 (c.30%),	Gujjar	 (c.20%)	and	Yadav	
(c.12%)	communities,	with	an	inner	ring	of	Jaat	and	Yadav	villages	on	areas	better	suited	for	
farmland,	with	Gujjar	villages	on	the	more	rocky	and	outer-lying	areas22.	 	The	adoption	of	
land	less	suited	for	agriculture	is	likely	to	be	because	Gujjar	people	have	traditionally	been	
                                                            
22	On	spatial	distribution	of	castes	personal	communication	with	researchers	working	on	caste	and	land	
use	in	Delhi	-	Tom	Cowan,	Swastee	Ranjan,	Tarini	Manchanda.			
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pastoralists.		In	common	with	other	nomadic	communities,	they	were	classified	as	‘criminal	
tribes’	under	the	Criminal	Tribes	Act	of	1871.	 	A	reputation	for	 ‘toughness’	and	criminality	
persists	to	date	(‘Ethnic	groups	 in	Delhi’,	2016).	 	 	The	 land	on	which	Sangam	Vihar	 is	built	
previously	belonged	to	Gujjar	landlords	from	village	of	Tughlakabad	and	Jaat	villagers	from	
Deoli23.	 	 The	 village	 inside	Tughlakabad	 fort	 is	marked	 ‘Gujjargaon’	 [Gujjar	Village]	on	 the	
map	overleaf.	 	The	 local	MP	(Member	of	Parliament)	 is	also	a	Gujjar	 from	Tughlakabad	as	
are	other	political	players	and	real	estate	dealers24.			
	
Despite	 its	 large	 size,	 the	 urbanisation	 of	 Sangam	 Vihar	 has	 similarities	 to	 Delhi’s	 other	
peripheral	unplanned	neighbourhoods.		The	area	is	a	vibrant,	lively	locality	with	many	small	
businesses,	 proliferating	 range	 of	 housing	 types,	 often	 clean	 and	 nicely	 painted,	 and	 a	
feeling	 that	 rules	 are	 relaxed,	 as	well	 as	 a	 certain	 reputation	 for	 crime.	 	 Sangam	Vihar	 is	
associated	 with	 ‘gangwar’	 and	 violent	 crime	 in	 popular	 media25	 (Indian	 Express,	 2013,	
2015c,	Manral,	 2015a,	 2015b;	News	 24,	 2015;	 Times	 of	 India,	 2016b).	 	 To	 get	 to	 Sangam	
Vihar’s	 western	 side	 today,	 travellers	 must	 take	 shared	 auto	 rickshaws	 that	 run	 through	
Sainik	Farms.		I	was	shocked	on	an	early	journey	when	as	the	rickshaw	pausing	at	a	junction	
the	young	driver	was	hauled	out	bodily	by	 two	burly	men,	 cursing	him	 in	Hindi.	 	Another	
young	man	 jumped	behind	the	wheel	and	sped	off.	 	We	were	not	being	hijacked,	but	 the	
driver	was	in	trouble	for	not	having	paid	his	daily	rent.		Many	people	in	Sangam	Vihar	have	
obvious	scars,	particularly	those	involved	in	politics,	and	the	area	has	a	‘street’	feel	to	it.			
 
                                                            
23	Personal	communication,	party	worker,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	fn83;	Personal	communication,		
water	supplier	and	real	estate	dealers,	Sangam	Vihar,	19/08/2015,	fn133;	Personal	communication,	
real	estate	dealers,	Sangam	Vihar,	06/02/15,	fn17.	
24	As	on	Delhi’s	south	western	border	Yadav’s	are	also	a	presence	in	real	estate	circles.		Personal	
communication	Tom	Cowan,	PhD	researcher,	Kings	University	London	
25	https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=sangam+vihar	
Sangam	Vihar	street	scenes	
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Research	Focus	Site	B)	Malviya	Nagar	PPP	area	and	surrounds	
My	second	set	of	 research	 sites,	within	 the	Malviya	Nagar	Delhi	Assembly	area,	are	more	
central	and	higher	income,	although	still	varied.		This	transfer	water	network	management	
to	 a	 private	 operator	 under	 the	 PPP	 contract	 provides	 a	 unique	 event	 through	 which	 to	
investigate	the	social	and	political	dynamics	around	water	supply	and	access	arrangements	
in	 South	 Delhi.	 	 Private	 sector	 involvement	 is	 heavily	 promoted	 by	 Central	 Government,	
multilateral	and	bilateral	agencies	as	a	means	to	leverage	finance,	expertise	and	technology	
for	urban	infrastructure	and	services	in	Indian	cities.		However,	studies	of	this	form	of	urban	
water	 governance	 in	 India	 are	 relatively	 rare	 (Asian	 Development	 Bank,	 2011;	 Asian	
Development	Bank	&	Lee	Kuan	Yew	School	of	Public	Policy,	2010;	Burt	&	Ray,	2014;	Dwivedi,	
2010;	Dwivedi	&	Rehmat,	2011;	Ercumen	et	al.,	 2015;	Kumpel	&	Nelson,	2013;	 Sampat	&	
Koonan,	2012;	Sangameswaran	et	al.,	2008;	World	Bank,	2012).		This	discussion	of	a	project	
in	a	complex	and	dynamic	area	of	Delhi,	‘the	most	favoured	city’	(Sivaramakrishnan,	2011),	
provides	 a	 second	 limit	 case	 of	 what	 should	 be	 highly	 favourable	 conditions	 for	 private	
sector	involvement.			
	
In	 1947,	 the	Malviya	 Nagar	 area	 was	 largely	 village	 farmland	 on	 the	 edges	 of	 urbanised	
Delhi.	 	 In	 1948,	 land	 for	 refugee	 colonies	 in	 the	 south,	 at	 first	 Malviya	 Nagar	 and	
neighbouring	 Kalkaji,	 was	 selected.	 	 The	 agricultural	 land,	 growing	 ‘rows	 and	 rows	 of	
vegetables’,	was	purchased	for	a	‘pittance’	from	the	farmers	by	the	district	board	as	well	as	
private	developers	 (Sengupta,	2007,	p.	80).	 	Many	other	South	Delhi	neighbourhoods	also	
came	into	existence	as	refugee	colonies.		Today,	Malviya	Nagar	is	well-placed	in	South	Delhi.		
Despite	its	associations	as	a	fairly	wealthy	(certainly	solidly	middle	class)	area	of	Delhi,	the	
PPP	zone	is	substantially	larger	than	simply	Malviya	Nagar	colony	and	covers	a	diverse	range	
of	 settlement	 types	 with	 a	 population	 of	 around	 400,000	 (Delhi	 Jal	 Board,	 2017).	 	 This	
includes	very	affluent	areas	(including	Geetanjali	Enclave,	Shivalik,	Panchsheel	Park).		There	
are	 also	 less	 ostentatious	 but	 still	 comfortable	 Delhi	 Development	 Authority	 (DDA)	 areas	
(Malviya	 Nagar,	 Sheik	 Sarai,	 Saket).	 	 DDA	 housing	 is	 public	 housing,	 but	 was	 largely	
constructed	 for	middle	 income	groups,	 as	 the	 low	 income	housing	was	never	built	 (Bhan,	
2013).	 	 Layout	 and	 construction	 quality	mean	 that	 these	DDA	 complexes	 are	 now	 sought	
after	 neighbourhoods.	 	 At	 the	 south	 east	 corner	 of	 the	 zone,	 is	 a	 very	 large	 area	 of	
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government	housing	(Pushp	Vihar	-	which	has	its	own	arrangements	with	the	DJB	as	well	as	
extensive	 tubewell	 supply).	 	 a	 very	 large	 area	 of	 government	 housing	 (which	 has	 its	 own	
arrangements	with	the	DJB	as	well	as	extensive	tubewell	supply).		To	the	north	of	the	main	
arterial	road,	are	a	 large	cluster	of	unauthorised	colonies	(including	Khirki	Extension,	Hauz	
Rani	 Extension,	 Panchsheel	 Vihar,	 Savitri	 Nagar	 Extension),	 and	 urban	 villages	 sometimes	
over	 a	 thousand	 years	 old	 (including	Hauz	Rani,	 Khirki,	 Begumpur,	 Lado	 Sarai).	 	 The	 zone	
also	 includes	 a	 small	 number	 of	 recognised	 slums	 (Jagdamba	 Camp,	 Indira	 Camp,	 Lal	
Gumbad	 Camp)	 and	 a	 few	 jhuggi	 jhompri	 clusters	 or	 unrecognised	 slums	
(Khumba/Gurudwara	 Camp,	 Satpula	 Camp…).	 	 There	 are	 also	 significant	 commercial	 sites	
including	 run-down	public	 hospitals	 (Mohan	Madan)	 and	 luxurious	 private	 hospitals	 (Max	
Saket,	Saket	City,	south	side	of	the	arterial	road),	five	star	hotels	(Hilton,	Sheraton,	Carlton),	
and	high-end	shopping	malls	(Select	City	Walk,	PVR).			
	 Malviya	Nagar	urban	forms	(imagery:	Digital	Globe	2018;	map	data	Google	2018)	
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In	comparison	with	Sangam	Vihar,	the	Malviya	Nagar	area	displays	much	greater	variety	of	
urban	form.	 	 In	the	top	row	of	aerial	photographs	below,	urban	villages	and	unauthorised	
colonies	are	visible	as	high	density	areas.		In	the	second	row	the	more	spacious	and	regular	
plotted	development	of	high-income	planned	areas	 can	be	 seen.	 	 The	middle	photograph	
shows	a	dense	linear	slum	in	the	top	half	of	the	photo	and	large	planned	households	in	the	
lower	 half.	 	 The	 third	 row	 shows	 dense	 unauthorised	 colony	 development	 in	 the	 first	
photograph,	 an	 urban	 village	 surrounded	 by	 large	 high-income	 planned	 properties	 in	 the	
central	picture	and	institutional	complexes	in	the	photograph	at	right.		In	the	fourth	row	we	
can	 again	 see	 chaotic	 unauthorised	 colony	 development,	 spacious	 planned	 layouts	 and	 a	
historical	monument,	surrounded	by	an	urban	village,	a	fairly	common	feature.		
	
Map	showing	PPP	project	area	(Detailed	Project	Report,	Appendices	and	DMA	Report,	2011,	P272)		
	
The	PPP	project	zone,	which	is	T-shaped	can	be	divided	into	four	bands,	north	to	south	(see	
map	above).		The	top	15%	of	the	zone	is	richer	and	planned,	the	next	10%	composed	more	
of	 DDA	 flats	 and	 unauthorised	 colonies,	 the	 next	 15%	 is	 mainly	 malls	 and	 hospitals	 and	
government	 housing,	 the	 last	 65%	 is	 peri-urban	 and	 unauthorised	 colonies	 (e.g.	 Dakshin	
Unauthorised	colonies	in	the	Project	zone	
This image has been removed as the copyright is 
owned by another organisation. 
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Vihar)	and	‘farmhouse’	villas	(e.g.	around	Neb	Sarai).		This	mix	of	land-use	provides	a	varied	
and	challenging	environment	for	the	PPP	project	operator.	
	
Delhi’s	 ‘dusty	 south’	 is	not	all	marbled	mansions,	 luxury	villas	and	 fancy	malls.	 	 There	are	
many	low-income	areas	between	the	high-end	colonies.		Spending	most	of	my	time	in	these	
areas,	 towards	 the	 end	of	 field	work	 I	 had	 almost	 convinced	myself	 that	 I	 looked	natural	
while	 hanging	 out	 the	 front-driver’s	 side	 of	 a	 speeding	 auto-rickshaw	 bouncing	 over	
unpaved	 roads	 with	 ten	 people	 on	 board.	 	 (The	 legal	 limit	 is	 three	 passengers,	 but	 with	
merely	seven	people	crushed	in,	the	15	year-old	drivers	seemed	to	feel	under-capacity	and	
their	friends	would	jump	in	for	the	ride.)		Sure,	I	was	hanging	on,	rather	than	sitting,	Punjabi	
hip-hop	was	 damaging	my	 ears,	weed	 smoke	 blowing	 in	my	 face	 and	 honking	 4x4s	were	
hurtling	towards	us	–	but	I	was	cool	with	this.		I’d	‘gone	native’…	
	
DATA	COLLECTION	
Informal	water	 access	 is	 highly	 varied,	modes	may	be	household	 specific	 and	 information	
socially,	politically	and	legally	sensitive.		Trust	of	research	participants	is	vital.		For	example,	
in	 Davis’s	 work	 in	 Bangalore	 not	 one	 respondent	 in	 1400	 interviews	 reported	 an	
unauthorised	water	connection	(Davis,	2004).	 	Some	studies	of	water	reform	in	India	have	
concentrated	 on	 discourse	 (V.	 Asthana,	 2009,	 2011,	 Sangameswaran,	 2006,	 2009),	 and	
household	surveys	have	occasionally	been	used	to	good	effect	 (Davis,	2004;	Marie-Hélène	
Zérah,	2000b).		Zérah’s	study	give	an	indication	of	the	scale	of	alternative	uses	and	suggest	
that	 they	 are	 a	 response	 to	 inadequate	 supply	 quality	 (especially	 in	 terms	 of	 reliability,	
timings,	 pressure	 and	 quality)	 (Marie-Hélène	 Zérah,	 2000b).	 	 However,	 informal	 access	 is	
not	an	explicit	concern	and	consequently	she	does	not	give	information	on	how	alternative	
access	 is	 arranged,	 how	 these	 arrangements	 differ	 across	 areas,	 or	 how	 they	 relate	 to	
reforms	in	formal	supply.		In-depth	research	on	urban	water	access	in	India	needs	to	use	on-
the-ground	qualitative	methods,	particularly	for	understanding	the	politics	of	water	access	
(e.g.	N.	Anand,	2017;	Björkman,	2015).	As	an	area	of	potential	sensitivity,	informal	practices	
are	 unlikely	 to	 be	written	down,	 statistics	may	be	unreliable,	 and	one-off	 interviews	may	
replay	the	official	narrative.			Further,	as	a	mundane	part	of	daily	life	things	too	obvious	to	
mention,	or	best	 left	unsaid,	may	only	be	noticed	by	the	researcher	present	over	a	 longer	
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period.	 	 Fine-grained	understandings	 of	 informal	water	 access	 and	 the	 response	of	water	
networks	 to	 changing	 environments	 requires	 a	more	 qualitative	 approach	 because	 of	 the	
dependence	on	trust	and	understandings	of	complex,	intimate	and	changing	processes.			
	
I	 did	 field	 research	 for	 this	 thesis	 over	 18	months	 between	 2013	 and	 2015,	 the	majority	
between	June	2014	and	September	2015.		As	informal	water	supply	is	a	phenomenon	with	a	
high	 degree	 of	 seasonal	 variation,	 a	 full	 annual	 cycle	 is	 likely	 to	 give	 a	 more	 accurate	
reflection.	 	A	 longer	period	of	 fieldwork	also	supports	 the	development	of	 language	skills,	
research	 networks	 and	 participant	 trust.	 	 My	 research	 approach	 was	 ‘ethnographically	
informed’,	in	that	I	spent	extensive	time	with	participants	in	their	workplaces	and	everyday	
surroundings,	 and	met	with	 interviewees	 on	multiple	 occasions	 as	 far	 as	was	 possible.	 	 I	
lived	in	my	research	sites	for	a	majority	of	the	time,	12	months	in	an	urban	village	and	nine	
months	in	an	unauthorised	colony,	both	areas	with	limited	and	unreliable	connection	to	the	
official	 network.	 	 The	 first	 apartment	 had	 a	 private,	 non-potable,	 groundwater	 supply	
available	as	long	as	the	landlord	had	filled	the	tank.		Disliking	the	‘milky’	taste	of	the	water	
from	the	taps,	which	I	was	told	I	would	not	be	able	to	drink,	I	arranged	for	drinking	water	to	
be	delivered	as	is	common	in	the	area.		My	water	supplier	here	was	a	friendly	acquaintance	
I	would	often	see	around	the	neighbourhood,	I	found	out	from	him	by	chance	that	his	water	
factory	was	located	in	a	street	that	I	later	stayed	in.		This	second	apartment	had	an	erratic	
municipal	connection	that	I	needed	to	turn	the	motor	on	for	at	6am.		Again	we	had	drinking	
water	delivered.	 	The	motor	at	a	third	house	I	stayed	in	had	to	be	turned	on	at	4am	each	
day	or	there	would	be	no	water	to	wash,	drink,	wash-up	and	flush	toilets.			
	
For	 accessing	 participant	 individuals	 and	 organisations,	 I	 used	 a	 purposive	 (or	 snowball)	
sampling	 technique,	with	multiple	 different	 points	 of	 entry.	 	 Connections	 from	academia,	
research	institutions	and	civil	society	organisations	as	well	as	cold	contacts	from	press	and	
municipal	offices,	allowed	a	range	of	initial	meetings.		I	aimed	to	minimise	association	with	
any	 particular	 viewpoint,	 and	 facilitate	 faster	 access	 through	 parallel	 processes.	 	 Topic	
guides	 were	 constructed	 for	 broad	 categories	 of	 participant	 (water	 traders,	 residents,	
officials,	 civil	 society,	academic)	and	modified	as	work	progressed.	 	A	number	of	different	
methods	 were	 used	 to	 gather	 data.	 	 In	 addition	 to	 longer	 semi-structured	 interviews,	
informal	conversations,	and	focus	groups	with	local	residents,	some	participants	were	more	
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comfortable	with	‘survey’	style	questions26	and	‘transect	walks’	proved	useful	for	getting	a	
sense	of	localities.			
	
Overall,	information	on	Delhi’s	water	supply	varies,	and	its	accuracy	is	difficult	to	ascertain.		
The	difficulties	in	doing	water	and	energy	audits	in	other	Indian	cities	point	to	this	issue	(N.	
Anand,	 2015;	 Birkinshaw,	 2016;	 Björkman,	 2011).	 	 The	 relatively	 limited	 availability	 of	
empirical	data	on	my	research	topic	and	changing	contemporary	situation	suggested	a	case	
study	 approach	 (Yin,	 2009).	 	 A	 case	 study	 approach	 gives	 access	 to	 live	 informants,	 as	
opposed	 to	 a	 study	of	 policy	 discourse.	 	While	 surveys	 imposing	 preformed	 categories	 to	
give	 wide	 but	 shallow	 information,	 case	 study	 work	 allows	 for	 in-depth	 probing	 of	
understandings	 and	 practices	 that	may	 not	 be	 intuitive	 to	 the	 researcher.	 	 This	 is	 useful	
where	work	is	at	an	early	stage	and	seeks	to	build	initial	understandings	of	‘how’	and	‘’why’	
phenomena	happen.	 	 Case	 study	 data	may,	 however,	 be	 quite	 narrow,	 and	 consequently	
multiple	units	of	analysis	reduce	a	certain	inevitable	amount	of	sampling	bias.		Despite	my	
enthusiasm	 for	 comparative	 work	 across	 sites	 (cities,	 suburbs,	 north/south	 etc)	 and	
infrastructures	 (e.g.	water,	 electricity,	 roads,	Wi-Fi),	 in	 the	 interests	 of	manageability	 one	
site	(Delhi)	and	one	sector	(water)	was	selected.		Research	on	the	implementation	of	water	
sector	 reform	 projects	 allowed	 me	 to	 retain	 some	 of	 my	 previous	 areas	 of	 interest	 in	
governance	changes	and	the	movement	and	implementation	of	ideas	and	policies.	 	Luckily	
for	me,	Delhi	contained	multiple	water	reform	initiatives.			
	
During	 initial	months	of	fieldwork,	 I	spent	time	familiarising	myself	with	the	local	research	
landscape	 and	 anyone	who	might	 be	 able	 to	 provide	 information	 to	 enable	me	 to	 better	
focus	my	research	project.		I	was	hoping	to	conduct	an	ethnography	of	the	local	state’s	role	
in	 water	 provision,	 however	 as	 the	 months	 passed	 while	 the	 Delhi	 Jal	 Board	 stalled,	
postponed	 and	 transferred	 my	 request	 for	 interviews	 and	 research	 access,	 I	 began	 to	
develop	 other	 areas	 of	 research.	 	 I	 read	 recent	 PhD	 theses	 available	 at	 Jawaharlal	Nehru	
University	and	the	Centre	des	Science	Humaines.		I	was	familiar	with	Sangam	Vihar	from	the	
                                                            
26	Not	surprisingly,	people	wanted	to	fit	us	into	the	existing	categories	familiar	to	them.		If	I	was	not	a	
tourist,	then	who	was	I?		The	fact	that	we	were	asking	questions	and	writing	things	down	inevitably	
associated	us	with	government	officials	in	people’s	minds.		This	often	led	to	one	of	two	interpretations:	
either	we	were	sent	from	some	official	body	like	the	DDA	to	check	up	on	housing	irregularities,	or	else	
we	were	doing	a	‘survey’	in	which	case	we	were	expected	to	pose	set	questions	with	one	word	
answers’	(Tarlo,	2003,	pp.	125–126).			
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media	coverage	and	conversations	with	other	academics	who	had	worked	on	water	in	Delhi.		
Following	a	discussion	with	a	 recent	PhD	graduate,	 I	 decided	 to	pay	a	 visit	 to	 learn	more	
about	water	access	in	an	area	without	piped	supply.		Earlier	research	experience	had	proved	
very	fruitful	with	the	support	of	campaigning	organisations,	a	model	I	was	planning	to	follow	
by	situating	my	research	in	Mumbai.		While	I	had	no	contacts	in	Delhi	to	draw	on	I	continued	
to	look	for	supportive	organisations	to	work	with.		I	spent	several	months	volunteering	with	
a	 	 local	NGO	in	Khirki,	and	at	the	offices	of	a	research	organisation	in	New	Delhi,	and	met	
with	a	fairly	large	number	of	relevant	organisations.		However,	most	NGOs	and	campaigners	
were	unable	or	uninterested	in	working	collaboratively	on	water.		However,	I	made	contact	
with	an	NGO	 in	Sangam	Vihar	where	 the	manager	was	very	 friendly	and	 interested	 in	my	
project.	 	 In	Khirki,	where	 I	 lived	 (for	 twelve	months	 in	 the	village,	and	nine	months	 in	 the	
unauthorised	 colony	 /	 extension),	 I	made	 friends	with	 a	 young	 Aam	 Aadmi	 Party	 activist	
living	locally	who	was	also	interested	in	understanding	more	about	water	in	Delhi.		In	Hauz	
Rani	 local	 politicians	 and	 RWA	members	 were	 friendly	 and	 supportive.	 	 Over	 time	 I	 also	
became	friendly	with	AAP	workers	in	Sangam	Vihar	and	Deoli,	where	the	offices	of	the	local	
MLAs	provided	a	sympathetic	base	for	research.		Of	the	three	PPP	projects	in	Delhi,	the	staff	
at	the	PPP	project	by	Suez	 in	Malviya	Nagar	were	very	friendly	and	accommodating	of	my	
research	interest.		Staff	at	the	PPP	projects	under	Veolia	and	SPML	would	not	meet	or	talk	
to	me	beyond	polite	introductions.		I	would	locate	contact	information	for	various	groups	I	
was	 keen	 to	 talk	 to	 (politicians,	 NGOs,	 resident’s	 associations,	 water	 suppliers	 and	 other	
associated	workers,	 real	 estate	dealers)	 from	available	 sources	online,	on	 the	 street	or	 in	
local	papers,	or	through	other	contacts	and	then	attempt	to	arrange	an	initial	meeting	and	
introductory	conversation.	Many	of	the	people	I	contacted	this	way	were	unwilling	to	meet.		
Some	would	meet	me	and	talk	a	little.		Some	would	be	friendly	and	open	and	I	would	stay	in	
touch	with	them	as	our	schedules	allowed.		As	the	time	I	had	spent	in	the	city	increased,	my	
Hindi	 improved,	 and	 I	 became	 adjusted	 to	 the	 processes	 involved,	 I	 was	 able	 to	 present	
myself	as	a	more	credible	researcher	and	my	 ‘success	rate’	at	opening	conversations	with	
potential	 research	 participants	 increased.	 	 This	 was	 offset	 by	 the	 increasing	 number	 of	
research	 leads	 which	 became	 hard	 to	 manage	 and	 keep	 up	 with	 meaning	 that	 some	
inevitably	 got	 dropped	 to	 focus	 on	 those	 that	 were	 continuing	 to	 provide	 high	 quality	
information.		As	phone	calls	and	emails	to	arrange	meetings	were	typically	unsuccessful	on	
occasion	 I	would	 set	off	 to	 an	area	 to	 interview	a	 specific	 type	of	participant	 (e.g.	 tanker	
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owners	in	Chhattarpur,	bottled	water	suppliers	in	Shahpur	Jat,	real	estate	dealers	on	Ratiya	
Marg,	RWA	members	in	Khanpur).	As	my	Hindi	and	level	of	familiarity	with	my	research	area	
improved	 I	 also	 began	 to	 spend	 considerable	 time	 in	 those	 I	was	 not	 already	 living	 in,	 in	
advance	of	and	subsequent	to	scheduled	meetings.	 	 I	used	this	 time	to	roam	and	observe	
the	areas	in	the	spare	time	that	I	had	and	engage	potential	participants	in	conversation	–	if	
they	were	willing	 after	 I	 had	 explained	 that	 I	 was	 a	 researcher.	 	 Certain	 groups,	 notably	
tanker	owners,	were	very	unwilling	to	talk	once	I	disclosed	that	I	was	doing	research.		Other,	
such	as	local	politicians	were	evasive,	without	actually	wanting	to	explicitly	refuse.		The	DJB	
also	falls	into	this	category,	and	both	local	staff	and	head	office	workers	had	been	explicitly	
briefed	 not	 to	 talk	 to	 anyone	without	 a	 letter	 of	 authorisation	 from	 the	 Public	 Relations	
Head	 Ms	 Sanjam	 Cheema.	 	 Ms	 Cheema	 seems	 to	 enjoy	 a	 frosty	 relationship	 with	 the	
researchers	and	campaigners	and	provided	very	adept	at	avoiding	my	requests	to	meet	or	
obtain	access.	 	 This	 rather	 improvised	 style	of	qualitative	 research	allowed	me	 to	 cover	a	
fairly	 large	 area	 in	 some	 depth,	 and	 was	 particularly	 useful	 in	 allowing	 me	 to	 talk	 with	
diverse	groups	of	people	who	often	had	different,	and	opposing,	stories	to	tell.				
	
In	Sangam	Vihar	I	have	spoken	to	over	a	hundred	residents	across	eight	blocks,	six	municipal	
wards	and	both	legislative	assembly	areas,	mostly	in	unauthorised	colonies	but	also	in	urban	
villages	and	jhuggi	jhompri	(self-built	hut)	clusters	(JJCs).		I	also	spoke	to	local	politicians	and	
party	workers	across	parties,	water	suppliers	(tankers,	bottles	and	tubewell	networks),	real	
estate	dealers,	health	workers	and	non-governmental	organisation	 (NGO)	workers.	 	 In	 the	
Public	Private	Partnership	project	Zone	I	have	had	lengthy	and	detailed	conversations	with	
key	members	of	project	 staff.	 	 I	have	also	 spoken	 to	over	 fifty	 residents	across	 the	area’s	
blocks,	 unauthorised	 colonies,	 urban	 villages,	 slums	 and	 jhuggi	 jhompri	 (self-built	 shelter)	
clusters	(JJCs)	as	well	as	local	politicians	across	parties,	water	suppliers	(tankers,	bottles	and	
tubewell	 networks),	 real	 estate	 dealers,	 health	 workers	 and	 non-governmental	 (NGO)	
workers.	 	For	comparison	 I	 spent	some	time	visiting	and	speaking	to	people	 in	other	sites	
similar	 to	my	 primary	 research	 areas;	 unauthorised	 colonies,	 urban	 villages	 and	 JJCs	 at	 a	
comparable	distance	from	the	city	centre	and	state	border	and	with	similar	 land	values	or	
water	supply	arrangements.		I	have	also	spoken	with	a	large	number	of	people	active	more	
at	the	city	 level	than	the	community	 level,	 including	DJB	staff,	politicians,	academics,	NGO	
workers,	activists	and	other	researchers.	 I	spent	some	time	volunteering	with	a	 local	NGO	
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and	 become	 close	 friends	 with	 some	 political	 party	 volunteers,	 NGO	workers,	 and	 other	
residents	around	my	age.			
	
Conversations	 and	 interviews	 took	 place	 in	 English	 and	 Hindi,	 but	 with	 low-income	
residents,	and	especially	in	Sangam	Vihar,	mainly	in	Hindi.		I	have	been	learning	Hindi	part-
time	since	2012	(three	terms	of	evening	classes	at	King	University	Modern	Language	Centre,	
ten	weeks	full-time	training	for	forty	hours	a	week,	and	around	200	hours	private	instruction	
at	Zabaan	in	Delhi).		I	am	able	to	have	conversations	with	valuable	study	participants,	such	
as	water	vendors	or	tanker	drivers,	who	are	unlikely	to	speak	English,	and	follow	meetings	
and	lectures	when	required.		I	can	also	read	and	write	Devanagari	script,	which	allows	me	to	
read	local	press	coverage	–	as	well	as	being	useful	for	text	messages	and	emails.			
	
I	 kept	 extensive	 fieldnotes,	 of	which	 I	 have	 typed	 up	 146,	 recording	 observations	 ‘in	 the	
field’	with	dates,	times	and	locations.		Notes	were	also	usually	taken	during	interviews,	in	a	
mix	of	Hindi	and	English,	except	when	the	topic	was	sensitive.		As	I	would	often	have	many	
conversations	 in	 one	 day	 and	 was	 also	 recording	 observations	 I	 have	 numbered	 and	
referenced	 my	 fieldnotes	 and	 in	 text	 I	 refer	 to	 numbered	 fieldnotes	 (fnX),	 rather	 than	
interviews.		Occasionally	interviews	were	also	recorded.		I	transcribed	interviews	and	wrote	
up	 notes	 on	 the	 day,	 or	 the	 day	 after,	 they	 were	 conducted.	 	 I	 analysed	 transcripts	 for	
themes	and	specific	topics	as	the	work	continued,	and	subsequently,	in	London,	using	nVivo	
11.	 	 Recurrent	 ideas	 were	 identified	 and	 cross-referenced	 across	 study	 participants.		
Information	 from	 transcripts	 was	 then	 triangulated	 with	 data	 from	 academic,	 policy	 and	
media	sources.		Where	my	fieldnotes	are	used	in	the	text	I	have	made	minor	edits	for	style	
and	ease	of	reading	(for	example	expanding	abbreviations),	but	speech	is	unedited.		Where	I	
have	translated	words	or	conversations	from	Hindi	it	is	indicated.		I	have	not	reproduced	the	
Hindi	original	speech	unless	a	construction	was	noteworthy.	 	Occasionally	Hindi	words	are	
left	 in	 the	 original	 (such	 as	 pradhan,	 kholnewala,	 jhuggi)	 but	 are	 italicised	 in	 text	 and	
paraphrased	 in	 brackets.	 	 All	 names	 of	 local	 residents	 have	 been	 changed	 to	 anonymise	
interviewees.		Names	of	politicians	at	Member	of	Legislative	(State)	Assembly	(MLA)	level	or	
above	 are	 retained,	 as	 are	 the	 names	 of	 other	 academics,	 journalists	 and	 well-known	
activists.	 	Consent	was	obtained	 for	all	 interviews.	 	 In	order	 to	protect	 the	 identity	of	my	
interlocutors	 I	 have	 attempted	 to	 keep	 the	 identity	 of	 specific	 areas	 ambiguous	 also	 and	
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have	changed	the	names	of	some	neighbourhoods.		All	project	information	is	kept	securely	
with	personal	information	confidential	and	anonymised.			
	
Participant	observation	is	useful	to	approach	what	people	do,	which	may	contrast	with	what	
they	say	(Burawoy	1992:2).		Research	participants	may	be	reticent	about	revealing	unofficial	
or	socially	undesirable	practices.	 	On	the	other	hand,	 they	may	assume	understandings	of	
taken-for-granted	 ideas	 and	 practices,	 which	 would	 not	 be	 considered	 worth	 reporting.		
Some	 forms	 of	 knowledge	 may	 not	 be	 easily	 verbalised.	 	 Observation	 can	 in	 this	 way	
highlight	context,	 complexity	and	mess	as	opposed	 to	grand,	universalising	 theory.	 	 In	my	
earlier	research	on	infrastructure	reforms	in	India,	for	example,	reforms	were	understood	at	
a	macro-level	 as	 neoliberalising	 tendencies	 however,	 in	 implementation	 locally	 the	 same	
reform	 projects	 turned	 out	 to	 be	much	more	 precarious	 and	 subject	 to	 capture	 by	 local	
coalitions	 and	 agendas.	 	 During	 this	 research,	 informal	 dimensions	 of	 water	 reform	
implementation	were	not	easy	to	observe	but	they	were	discussed	by	participants,	often	in	
comments	 at	 the	 end	 of	 interviews.	 	 Some	 of	 the	most	 productive	 of	 these	 came	 about	
through	 my	 extended	 presence	 at	 Municipal	 offices	 which	 allowed	 me	 to	 develop	
relationships	 across	 departments	 and	 through	 chance	meetings.	 	Municipal	 officials	were	
circumspect,	 but	 sometimes	 very	 frank	 about	 gaps	 in	 implementation	 and	 reporting.	 	 A	
situation	where	processes	were	substantially	different	from	the	“paper	truths”	(Tarlo,	2003;	
cf	A.	Gupta,	2012,	p.	42)	was	expressed	by	a	number	of	interview	participants.		The	official	
table	of	water	price	tariffs	submitted	to	central	government	only	included	the	lowest	price	
band,	for	example	“because	the	others	would	be	too	high	[for	Delhi	to	approve]”.	 	50	per	
cent	 of	municipal	water	 costs	went	 on	 giving	 ‘free’	water	 to	 slums,	 directly	 contradicting	
policy	 standards	 said	 to	 be	 ‘mandatory’	 for	 release	 of	 funds.	 	 And	 so	 on.	 	While	 the	 five	
week	 duration	 of	 this	 2012	 visit	 only	 allowed	 me	 to	 scratch	 the	 surface	 of	 informal	
processes	 it	 revealed	 enough	 to	 confirm	 solidly	 the	 hunches	 impossible	 to	 support	 from	
desk-based	work	and	suggest	directions	for	future	research.			
Ethnographic	 work	 requires	 intimate,	 face-to-face	 interaction	 with	 participants,	 using	
natural	conversation	as	informal	interviews.		Typically	it	takes	the	form	of	an	in-depth	study	
of	 a	 single	 or	 small	 number	 of	 cases,	 although	 this	 has	 shifted	 recently	 in	 response	 to	
debates	 over	 ‘globalisation’,	 and	 the	 advent	 of	 ‘multi-sited’	 ethnography	 (Marcus,	 1995).		
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Attempting	 to	 ‘follow	 the	 thing’	 took	me	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 sites	 (agency	 head	 offices,	 local	
offices,	pumping	stations,	tanker	filling	stations,	illegal	factories,	distributors,	local	network	
managers,	 political	 offices,	many	people’s	 homes,	 different	 neighbourhoods,	NGO	offices,	
etc)	while	 still	 leaving	 some	 crucial	 elements	of	water	 production	outside	of	my	 research	
scope	(remote	dams	in	the	Himalayas,	restricted	access	water	treatment	plants,	and	urban	
areas	across	 state	boundaries).	 	 In	 this	 research	 I	have	 resisted	 the	 temptations	 to	 follow	
movements	of	expertise	and	experts	between	say	Delhi,	London	and	Paris.								
As	 mentioned	 above,	 ethnographic	 research	 is	 a	 craft	 skill,	 perhaps	 like	 statistics	 or	
languages	 that	 must	 be	 developed	 in	 practice.	 	 Data	 collection	 is	 premised	 on	 building	
relationships,	 skilful	 conversations,	 and	 detailed	 note-taking.	 	 Interpretation	 requires	
sensitivity	 to	 the	 field	as	well	 as	 theory.	 	 Expertise	 is	based	on	experience	 in	 context	 and	
aims	to	go	beyond	the	conscious	competency	in	application	of	basic	rules	(be	open-minded,	
patient,	observant	but	not	 intrusive,	etc)	 to	a	more	 fluid	proficiency.	 	Flyvbjerg	 	describes	
this	 process	 of	 case-study	 researchers	 becoming	 experts	 in	 their	 specific	 field	 as	 the	
development	 of	 ‘fluid	 intelligence’	 yielding	 an	 intuitive	 sense	 of	 validity,	 plausible	
interpretations,	 and	 suggestions	 for	 research	 leads	 as	 well	 as	 sensitive	 responses	 and	
intuitive	decision-making	in	complex	and	shifting	circumstances	(Flyvbjerg,	2001).	
	
These	 ‘ethnographically-informed’	 qualitative	 approaches	 do	 raise	 particular	 challenges.		
They	 are	 time	 and	 labour	 intensive,	 competence	 must	 be	 learned	 and	 developed,	 and	
obtaining	 good	 data	 and	 making	 insightful	 interpretations	 depends	 on	 skill,	 knowledge,	
creativity,	and	experience.	 	Establishing	the	significance	of	findings	beyond	a	single	case	 is	
notoriously	 difficult.	 	 In	 an	 unfamiliar	 culture,	 the	 difficulties	 of	 ‘participating’	 or	
‘understanding	 local	 points	 of	 view’	 are	 how	 we	 would	 recognise	 lack	 of	 familiarity	 –	
consequently	an	ethnographic	approach	cannot	be	‘applied’	and	must	be	 learned	for	each	
new	context	(e.g.	government	offices,	activist	meetings).		Ethnography	is	also	not	suited	to	
questions	such	as	the	distribution	of	a	phenomenon	in	a	population	(“what	%	of	residents	of	
area	 x	 ‘use’	 informal	 water?”),	 the	 impact	 of	 an	 intervention	 on	 an	 outcome	 (“what	 has	
been	 the	 effect	 of	 the	PPP	on	water	 supply	 service	 levels	 in	 the	PPP	 area?”),	 or	 people’s	
ideas	on	a	specific	topic	they	may	not	be	familiar	with	(“what	has	been	the	effect	of	the	PPP	
on	water	supply	service	levels?”).			
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More	problematically,	Stacey	draws	attention	to	the	elements	of	betrayal	and	moral	conflict	
unavoidable	 in	close	ethnographic	work	with	people	over	the	medium	term	and	using	the	
form	 and	 content	 of	 those	 relationships	 as	 an	 object	 of	 research	 (Stacey,	 1988).	 	 While	
ethnographic	methods	may	appear	to	provide	the	possibility	of	more	empathetic,	respectful	
and	 participatory	 research	 –	 valuable	 for	 researchers	 in	 solidarity	 with	 their	 ‘subjects’	 –	
Stacey	argues,	based	on	her	own	experiences	of	adopting	an	ethnographic	approach,	 that	
this	 can	 also	 compound	 the	 deception	 and	 instrumentalism	 that	 are	 felt	 to	 be	 ethically	
objectionable.	 	 Stacey’s	model	 is	 feminist	 research,	 and	 it	 can	be	 imagined	 that	 concerns	
around	researcher	positionality	and	power	are	amplified	 in	research	across	 location,	class,	
race,	gender,	education	and	other	dimensions	of	differential	status.			
	
There	 are	 clearly	 very	 real	 differences	 in	 life	 chances	 and	 access	 to	 resources	 between	
researchers	and	subjects,	as	well	as	the	substantial	differences	between	researchers	based	
on	 nationality	 and	 gender.	 	 However,	 we	 might	 want	 to	 suspend	 judgement	 about	 the	
fragility	of	our	research	interlocutors.		Power	is	contextual,	and	in	the	local	contexts	where	I	
met	 most	 of	 my	 research	 ‘participants’	 I	 had	 limited	 power	 (but	 considerable	 privilege).		
However,	 the	 promise	 of	 access	 to	 opportunities	 (for	 status,	 enrichment,	 career	
advancement,	UK	work	visas)	that	I	represented	as	a	white	UK	national	was	also	something	
that	 many	 more	 enthusiastic	 collaborators	 were	 clearly	 aware	 of.	 	 Some	 people	 I	 was	
working	 closely	 with	 would	 have	 made	 an	 excellent	 study	 in	 political	 /	 policy	
entrepreneurship,	 however	 I	 felt	 that	 using	 my	 friends	 (while	 accepting	 that	 the	
relationships	 already	 had	 elements	 of	 instrumentality	 on	 both	 sides)	 as	 the	 object	 of	
research	was	a	line	I	was	not	comfortable	crossing.			
Ethnography	 obviously	 raises	 complex	 ethical	 questions,	 particularly	 around	 informed	
consent	and	anonymity.	 	 I	practised	overt	observation/participation	in	any	situation	where	
an	 introduction	 is	 required	 (I.	 Cook,	 2005,	p.	 175).	 	 Formal	 interviews	 in	official	 or	 ‘work’	
settings	are	likely	to	shape	participant	responses.		During	previous	research	in	India	I	found	
that	 a	 formally	 written	 page	 of	 English	 text	 was	 able	 to	 raise	 reservations	 in	 previously	
willing	participants	remarkably	quickly.		For	this	reason	verbal	consent	following	an	outline	
of	 the	 terms	given	 in	 the	written	 form	was	preferred.	 	On	meeting	research	participants	 I	
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introduced	myself	 and	 outlined	my	work	 in	 English	 or	 Hindi	 as	 appropriate.	 	 I	 alternated	
word	 choice	 with	 context	 depending	 whether	 it	 was	 more	 useful	 to	 present	 ‘status’	
(research	/	shod	/	anusandhaan)	or	inconsequence	and	lack	of	threat	(studies	/	padhai).		For	
example:	
I’m	a	student,	from	London.		I’m	interested	in	water	in	Delhi.		My	name	is	Matt	
Birkinshaw.		Can	we	talk	a	bit	for	my	research	/	studies?			
	
I	 had	 a	 letter	 of	 introduction	 from	 the	 Geography	 Department	 at	 London	 School	 of	
Economics	 and	 letters	 of	 institutional	 affiliation	 in	 Delhi	 which	 were	 sometimes	 also	
required.		I	also	had	standardised	written	consent	forms	for	use	if	formally	required.		A	brief	
outline	 of	 research	was	 also	 prepared	 in	Hindi	 and	 English,	 and	 questionnaires	were	 also	
prepared	in	Hindi	(English	ones	were	not	needed).			
Working	 with	 personally	 difficult	 characters,	 such	 as	 those	 whose	 views	 or	 actions	 are	
distasteful,	introduces	a	further	element	of	complexity.		I	have	found	Sen’s	studies	of	female	
Hindutva	 activists	 (Sen,	 2004,	 2007)	 and	 Gould’s	 work	 as	 an	 ‘embedded’	 critic	 with	 the	
World	Bank	(Gould,	2010)	very	interesting	for	reflecting	on	the	complex	ethical	relationship	
towards	 research	 participants	 with	 whom	 one	may	 strongly	 disagree	 (cf	 Goldman,	 2005;	
Mosse,	2004;	Wade,	2011).		Again,	these	challenges	were	an	issue	experienced,	if	not	well	
addressed,	in	previous	work	in	India:	
	
I	am	trying	to	practice	agnosticism	for	this	research.	 	Since	I	don't	understand	the	
situation	very	well	there's	not	much	point	in	taking	a	hard	line	like	‘privatization	is	
bad’,	 ‘corruption	 is	 bad’,	 ‘Hindu	 fundamentalism	 is	 bad’,	 ‘water	 theft	 is	 bad’,	 or	
whatever.		A)	it	could	get	in	the	way	of	figuring	out	what	is	going	on	and	b)	it	could	
make	talking	to	people	a	bit	tricky!	(Field	notes,	Maharashtra,	29/07/12)	
	
	
Acknowledging	differences	in	situation	and	motivation,	I	attempted	to	approach	interviews	
as	 ‘a	 conversation’	 –	 in	 which	 understanding	 and	 positions	 were	 shared	 between	
discussants	–	rather	than	an	extractive	or	proselytising	exercise	(Brinkmann	&	Kvale,	2015).		
I	downplayed	my	relative	privilege	in	various	ways,	not	least	through	simple	incompetence.			
	
“[Senior	Politician]	is	water	mafia”	Prakhar	says.			
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At	this	point	I	ask,	perhaps	too	eagerly,	if	I	can	record	the	conversation,	which	takes	
Prakhar	 back	 a	 bit	 but	 he	 agrees.	 	Then	 I	 discover	 that	 I	 have	 not	 brought	 my	
recorder.		I	try	and	record	it	on	my	phone	but	the	screen	has	broken,	then	the	back	
falls	off	and	I	have	to	restart	it.		By	this	time	Prakhar	clearly	thinks	I	am	a	clown.				
	
While	I	am	turning	my	phone	off	and	on	Prakhar	tries	to	explain	with	an	example	–	
“It's	 like	 Punjab”	 he	 says,	 “People	 bring	 things	 across	 the	 border	 to	 exploit	 the	
different	tax	rates”.			
	
Despite	 (or	because	of)	 repeated	requests	 to	 talk	slowly	and	use	simple	 language	
Prakhar	 insists	on	 speaking	 very	 fast	 and	 loudly	 to	 the	point	where	he	 is	 literally	
shouting	at	me	across	the	desk!		Maybe	this	is	to	‘help	me’	understand	but	I	wish	
he	 would	 speak	 slowly	 and	 softly	 (dhire	 /	 dhimmi)	 as	 I	 ask	 instead	 of	 getting	
louder!		Later	when	I	am	talking	to	Ravi,	Ritesh	is	also	shouting	at	people	down	the	
phone	which	makes	it	impossible	to	hear	what	Ravi	is	saying.			
	
Conversations	with	 party	workers,	 Sangam	Vihar,	 18/05/2015,	 Hindi	 and	 English,	
F81	–	cf	footnote	seven	above		
	
To	 some	 extent,	 demonstrating	 my	 ‘European	 naivety’	 and	 sympathising	 with	 officials,	
workers	 and	 users	 about	 the	 constraints	 of	 their	 situation	 allowed	 me	 to	 collect	 stories	
about	 the	 progress	 of	water,	 or	 governance	 reforms,	 in	 the	 city.	 Becoming	 researcher	as	
infrastructure;	taking	these	stories	with	me	as	I	travelled	from	site	to	site	allowed	multiple	
conversations,	 or	 at	 least	 situated	 corrections,	 to	 take	 place	 as	 narratives	 merged	 and	
clashed.			
	
Semi-structured	 key	 informant	 interviews	 were	 a	 central	 research	 tool	 allowing	 me	 to	
investigate	how	water	arrangements	are	constructed	and	the	meanings	and	outcomes	they	
have	for	people.		As	ideal	formal	interview	conditions	were	not	always	possible	(see	above),	
I	 made	 use	 of	 informal	 conversations	 with	 study	 participants	 where	 appropriate.	 	 Very	
loosely	 structured	 interviews	 organised	 around	 a	 number	 of	 central	 themes	 were	 found	
most	 productive,	 allowing	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	 naturalness,	 adaptation	 to	 changing	 and	
unexpected	circumstances,	and	a	more	sensitive	negotiation	of	the	interpersonal	dynamics	
of	the	exchange	than	a	more	tightly	scripted	set	of	questions.		Kvale	and	Brinkmann	define	
an	interview	as	“a	conversation	that	has	a	structure	and	a	purpose”,	an	exchange	of	views	
and	interpersonal	interaction	designed	to	elicit	the	interviewee’s	knowledge	or	perspective	
on	a	 topic	 (Brinkmann	&	Kvale,	 2015,	p.	 3).	 	 Interviewing	enables	 the	 researcher	 to	 learn	
local	 understandings	 rather	 than	 imposing	 pre-defined	 categories	 and	 facilitates	 sensitive	
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exploration	of	 complex	 issues.	 	 Research	 interviews,	 then,	 are	not	 a	 neutral	 extraction	of	
information,	 but	 a	 co-construction,	 between	 two	participants.	 	 This	 requires	 sensitivity	 to	
the	 researcher’s	 role,	 and	 the	 interviewee’s	 interpretation	 of	 the	 interview	 situation.		
Feminist	researchers	suggests	being	open,	friendly	and	collaborative	with	interview	subjects	
(Valentine,	2005,	p.	121),	and	to	the	extent	that	this	 is	practical,	 it	 is	something	I	practise.		
While	 I	 accept	Oakley’s	argument	about	minimising	 the	 instrumentalising	and	hierarchical	
tendencies	of	research	there	are	more	awkward	questions	that	must	be	responded	to	about	
the	duplicity	and	betrayal	 that	 this	approach	also	brings	 into	consideration	 (Oakley,	1998;	
Stacey,	1988).			
	
Interviews	 allow	 respondents	 to	 present	 their	 views	 in	 their	 own	 words.	 	 Qualitative	
interviewing,	because	it	allows	respondents	greater	ability	to	frame	their	own	contributions	
to	the	study	is	useful	in	providing	attention	to	voices	and	experiences	which	may	have	been	
under-represented	 in	 previous	 discussions.	 	 For	 example,	while	 the	 voices	 of	 low-income	
girls	and	women	are	presented	in	policy	and	political	discussions	on	water	access,	they	do	
not	have	structural	power	and	this	may	influence	the	way	their	voices	are	represented.		In	
academic	work,	a	focus	on	marginalised	groups	has	led	to	the	presentation	of	the	situation	
of	women	and	girls	as	almost	a	synecdoche	of	the	problems	of	lack	of	water	and	sanitation.		
As	women	and	girls	suffer	the	daily	pain,	humiliation	and	fear	caused	by	inadequate	water	
supply	this	focus	is	absolutely	necessary	and	there	is	much	more	work	to	be	done	(See	e.g.	
Datta,	 2012;	 Truelove,	 2011).	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 voices	 of	 informal	 water	 traders,	
brokers	and	low-level	workers	essential	for	the	functioning	(and	dysfunction)	of	urban	water	
networks	in	Indian	cities	are	almost	completely	absent	from	academic	and	policy	discussions	
of	water	supply.	
	
My	 preferred	 option	 was	 to	 use	 informal	 interviews	 on	 initial	 contact,	 ‘light	 structure’	
interviews	 as	 the	 ideal,	 and	 semi-structured	 with	 high-status,	 very	 busy,	 or	 ‘less	 willing’	
participants.		I	am	using	‘status’	here	as	relative	not	absolute,	to	include	for	example	groups	
powerful	locally.		As	Melissa	Butcher	observes,	high	status	individuals	in	an	expensive	mall	
or	 corporate	design	office	may	be	 low	 status	 in	a	busy	neighbourhood	market	–	and	vice	
versa	 (Butcher,	 2010).	 	 Multiple	 conversations	 was	 again	 my	 preferred	 option,	 using	 an	
informal	 initial	 meeting	 to	 test	 the	 water	 and	 following	 up	 with	 another	 meeting	 to	
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interview	 if	 possible.	 	 Conducting	 an	 interview	 at	 a	 later	meeting	 allows	more	 chance	 to	
build	rapport,	as	well	as	gain	understanding.		Face	to	face	interviews	are	preferred	as	social	
cues	 and	presentation	of	 the	 interviewee	 are	 very	 important	 information	 sources.	 	 In	my	
experience	 physical	 presence	 in	 a	 respondent’s	 immediate	 environment	 (e.g.	
neighbourhood	or	office)	is	the	gold	standard	for	persuading	people	to	make	time	to	talk	to	
you	(even	with	introductions,	shared	interest).	 	This	 is	quite	a	widespread	characteristic	of	
life	 in	 India	 highly	 relevant	 to	 research	 work	 (Gandhi,	 2013).	 	 	 This	 is	 based	 on	 my	
observations	 of	 processes	 in	 a	 number	 of	 mundane	 activities	 as	 well	 as	 protocol	 for	
meetings	in	Indian	government	offices,	which	could	be	described	as	a	darbar	(court),	even	
occasionally	a	darshan	(vision	of	a	saint	or	god).			
	
Critiques	 of	 interviews	 have	 focussed	 on	 an	 often	 de-contextualised,	 artificial	 interview	
setting.	 	My	 intention	was	 to	 interview	 respondents	 in	 a	 ‘natural’	 location,	 such	 as	 their	
workplace,	 home	 or	 neighbourhood,	 and	 ideally	 more	 than	 one	 of	 these.	 	 Additionally,	
‘walking	 interviews’	as	practiced	by	Clark	and	Emmel	offered	some	 interesting	advantages	
(potential	 for	 conversation	 away	 from	 colleagues,	 family;	 potential	 to	 use	 landscape	
features	as	prompts;	more	relaxed	setting	than	‘formal’	sit-down	interview;	public	visibility	
of	discussion	with	foreign	researcher)	and	disadvantages	(public	visibility	of	discussion	with	
foreign	 researcher;	 possibility	 /	 likelihood	 of	 people	 on	 street	 becoming	 involved	 in	
conversation;	 noise	 and	 other	 distractions;	 impossible	 to	 take	 notes	 or	 record)	 (Clark	 &	
Emmel,	2010).			
	
Interviewing	 is	 generally	 time	 consuming	 /	 expensive,	 and	 requires	 careful	 preparation	
including	 travel	 arrangements,	 appropriate	 permissions,	 as	 well	 as	 writing-up	 notes	 and	
transcribing	 recordings.	 	 One	 area	 of	 concern	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 is	 the	 balance	 to	maintain	
between	 encouraging	 contribution	 and	 appearing	 to	 share	 participant’s	 views	 (leading	 to	
experimenter	bias).		With	the	accretion	of	data	from	interviews	with	multiple	participants	it	
may	be	possible	to	build	models	for	common	understandings	of	research	topics.		In	practice,	
interviews	 are	 likely	 to	 yield	 data	 that	 is	 both	 unquestionably	 about	 the	 world	 (such	 as	
timings	 of	 water	 availability)	 and	 respondents’	 understandings	 of	 it	 (such	 as	 perceived	
reasons	for	low	service	levels)	(Byrne	&	Seale,	2011,	p.	212).			
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I	was	not	planning	to	make	 intentional	use	of	group	 interviews.	 	However,	as	Oscar	Lewis	
observes	below,	there	is	a	strong	tendency	in	India,	that	discussions	in	public	or	semi-public	
places	 (e.g.	 anywhere	 that	 is	 not	 a	 formal	 office	with	 a	 closed	 door	 –	 and	 actually	 quite	
often	there	too)	become	group	discussions.		I	used	group	discussion	with	residents,	agency	
staff	and	political	workers	several	times,	and	found	them	useful,	in	a	general	way.		
	
‘Most	of	these	[interview]	sessions	were	group	sessions	as	much	by	necessity	as	by	
design,	 since	 we	 found	 it	 almost	 impossible	 to	 hold	 a	 private	 interview	 without	
neighbours	and	relatives	dropping	in	.		This	situation	must	be	kept	in	mind	by	any	
student	from	the	West	who	takes	privacy	for	granted…’	(Lewis,	1965,	p.	x)	
		
Group	interviews,	or	‘focus	groups’,	have	the	benefit	of	efficiency	and	allow	access	to	a	wide	
range	 of	 respondents	 at	 once,	 thus	 increasing	 the	 amount	 and	 range	 of	 data	 accessible	
within	 a	 given	 timeframe.	 	 The	 format	 also	 has	 the	 advantages	 of	 accessibility,	 as	 focus	
groups:	 ‘do	 not	 discriminate	 against	 people	 who	 cannot	 read	 or	 write	 and	 they	 can	
encourage	participation	from	people	reluctant	to	be	interviewed	on	their	own	or	who	feel	
they	 have	 nothing	 to	 say’	 (Kitzinger,	 1995,	 p.	 299).	 	 These	 last	 two	 points	 (reluctance,	
reticence)	are	an	area	where	focus	groups	would	be	intuitively	valuable	for	my	research.		In	
fact,	 given	 prevailing	 gender	 norms	 in	 North	 India,	 it	 could	 be	 inappropriate	 for	 a	 male	
foreign	 stranger	 to	be	alone	with	 a	woman	as	might	be	expected	 in	 an	 interview	 setting.		
These	 cultural	 strictures	 are	 reduced	 in	 more	 westernised/modernised	 contexts	 (such	 as	
NGO	or	academic	settings)	but	are	still	prevalent.			
	
However,	 in	group	discussions,	 in	addition	to	the	contributory	 influence	of	the	researcher,	
interpersonal	 dynamics	 among	 the	 group	 can	 shape	 the	 content,	 censuring	 outlying	
opinions	or	unlikely	assertions.		Thus	people	may	present	a	more	socially	acceptable	version	
of	their	thoughts,	power	differentials	within	the	group	may	shape	discussion	strongly,	some	
participants	may	 dominate	 discussion	 and	 individual	 views	which	may	 be	marginalised	 or	
silenced	 are	 hard	 to	 follow	 up.	 	 Maintaining	 confidentiality	 can	 be	 a	 problem.	 	 This	
majoritarianism	 has	 both	 helpful	 and	 unhelpful	 effects.	 	 Group	 dynamics	may	 help	 focus	
discussion	 on	 issues	 of	 shared	 importance,	 and	 the	 corroboration	 of	 views	 is	 readily	
observable.	 	Respondents	comment	 in	their	own	words	and	can	be	prompted	to	speak	by	
others	 in	 the	group.	 	As	noted	above	 this	may	help	 in	accessing	 the	experiences	of	 those	
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who	would	not	otherwise	be	interviewed.		Depending	on	the	topic,	a	group	interview	might	
provide	a	less	(or	more)	threatening	environment	to	discuss	an	issue.		Participants	may	even	
enjoy	 the	 discussion	 and	 shared	 discussion	 has	 been	 argued	 to	 be	 empowering	 (Freire,	
1996)	 although	 the	 reverse	 is	 also	 possible	 (Freeman,	 2013).	 	 Handling	 the	 situation	
sensitively	 to	 facilitate	 discussion	 and	 support	 participants	 however	 requires	 skill	 and	
experience	as	well	as	the	trust	of	participants.	 	With	a	small	number	of	residents,	a	group	
discussion	 could	 be	 a	 useful	 way	 to	 get	 a	 sense	 of	 the	 diversity	 of	 situations	 as	 well	 as	
shared	understandings,	such	as	the	difficulty	of	making	complaints	over	poor	service	to	the	
kholnewala	/	pradhan	(see	Chapter	Five,	page	155pp.).			
	
I	 this	 research,	 class	 differences	were	 a	 noticeable	 problem	 in	 group	discussions.	 	 People	
with	 lower	 incomes	 or	 lower	 levels	 of	 water	 access	 were	 sometimes	 unwilling	 to	 speak,	
giving	 a	 sense	 that	 the	 others	 in	 the	 group	 did	 not	 agree	 with	 the	 speaker	 but	 were	
unwilling	to	contradict	them.		Individuals	that	expressed	points	of	view	the	group	as	a	whole	
was	not	willing	 to	 share	–	 like	 the	 young	girl	who	 said	 she	had	 tried	 to	 join	 a	 committee	
meeting	but	had	been	chased	away	–	were	also	quietened	by	the	group.		Facilitation	is	a	key	
challenge	 for	 group	 interviews,	 requiring	 considerable	experience,	 cultural	 awareness	and	
tact	–	as	well	as	linguistic	fluency	obviously.		Although	I	have	some	experience	in	facilitating	
group	discussions	in	a	range	of	contexts,	the	above	qualities	are	not	ones	which	I	currently	
possess	 to	 a	 high	 degree.	 	 For	 this	 reason,	 group	 interviews	 were	 a	 method	 used	
infrequently	and	sometimes	more	by	chance	than	design.			
	
LIMITATIONS	
This	research	project	studies	the	process	of	domestic	water	provision.		It	does	not	primarily	
analyse	 industrial,	 commercial,	 institutional	 supply	 and	 consumption	 or	 the	 use	 by	 public	
agencies,	although	these	all	do	impact	water	availability	for	domestic	use.			
	
My	research	sites	are	within	south	Delhi.		Water	supply	in	the	north	of	the	city	differs,	as	it	
does	across	state	borders	in	parts	of	the	National	Capital	Region	such	as	Gurgaon,	Faridabad	
and	 Ghaziabad.	 	 The	 situation	 in	 areas	 of	 Delhi-NCR	 (like	 those	 named	 above)	which	 fall	
under	different	state	governments,	although	more	interesting	was	excluded	as	introducing	
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unnecessary	 levels	 of	 complexity.	 	 The	 thesis	 should	make	 the	 case	 for	 specificity	 across	
different	urban	scales	and	locations	and	therefore	generalisation	to	other	Indian	cities	is	not	
my	 intention.	 	While	 there	may	well	 be	 points	 of	 similarity	 these	 could	 only	 be	 taken	 as	
tentative	hypothesis	to	guide	further	empirical	research.			
	
As	 the	 earlier	 excerpt	 illustrates,	 despite	 concerted	 and	 regular	 effort	 over	 a	 number	 of	
years	(two	hours	a	week	minimum	in	Delhi,	usually	five,	and	ten	weeks	forty	hours	a	week	
full-time),	my	limited	Hindi	was	a	limitation	to	this	research	in	some	ways.		It	took	at	least	
six	months	before	 I	was	able	to	conduct	research	 interviews	and	conversations	 in	Hindi.	 	 I	
paid	 friends	 for	 assistance	with	 language	 twice	 –	 to	 interview	an	older	man,	 a	 traditional	
water	carrier,	who	spoke	an	accented	and	very	‘high’	Urdu,	and	to	interview	a	tanker	owner	
–	 for	 the	 Urdu,	 interpretation	was	 necessary,	 for	 the	 tanker	 owner,	 it	 did	 not	 add	much	
(although	 I	 learnt	 some	 interesting	 things	 about	water	 in	Dwarka	 from	my	 friend).	 	 On	 a	
number	 of	 occasions	 I	 did	 research	with	 Hindi-speaking	 friends	 (‘Aasha’,	 ‘Sanjay’	 and	 Juli	
Perczel)	which	meant	 that	 I	 could	check	points	which	were	unclear	 to	me	at	a	 later	date.		
However,	I	was	reluctant	to	hire	a	research	assistant	/	interpreter	for	a	number	of	reasons.		
First,	 because	 of	 the	 increased	 rigidity	 this	 would	 impose	 on	 research	 scheduling	 and	
timings.		Second,	because	I	appreciated	the	ability	to	interact	with	people	on	my	own	as	an	
alien	to	 their	social	context,	and	suspect	 that	working	with	other	people	 (foreign	or	 local)	
would	allow	my	interlocutors	to	‘place’	us	in	ways	that	might	restrict	my	freedom	to	create	
interactions	with	them.		Third,	working	on	my	own	forced	me	to	develop	my	Hindi	in	ways	
that	I	would	not	have	done	otherwise.		Relatedly,	I	have	noticed	that	interpreters	not	only	
play	a	major	role	in	steering	conversations	and	interactions	but	also	may	gloss,	embellish	or	
omit	details	of	what	is	being	said.		Lastly,	the	content	of	my	conversations	(water	supply	and	
control)	 was	 primarily	 quite	 straightforward	 and	 therefore	 possible	 with	 a	 nascent	 Hindi	
vocabulary,	 which	 would	 certainly	 not	 be	 the	 case	 had	 I	 been	 researching	 people’s	
understanding	of	religion	or	poetry.			
	
The	challenges	of	accessing	state	and	private	sector	providers	 involved	in	a	politically,	and	
sometimes	legally	sensitive,	process	has	limited	the	extent	of	comparative	work	I	was	able	
to	 undertake.	 	 Other	 researchers	 have	 also	 found	 accessing	 informal	 water	 suppliers	 a	
challenge	(Borthakur,	2015;	Kacker	&	Joshi,	2016).		The	timings	of	fieldwork,	much	of	which	
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took	place	after	 the	 resignation	of	 the	 first	AAP	government	and	before	 their	 re-election,	
also	limited	the	amount	of	research	on	the	Aam	Aadmi	Party	that	I	was	able	to	conduct.		A	
comparative	study	of	changes	under	the	AAP	in	south	and	west	Delhi	(where	there	is	also	a	
PPP	with	a	multinational	company	and	large	areas	of	unauthorised	colonies)	would	make	an	
excellent	future	project.			
	
Skin	tone	in	India	is	a	marker	of	social	prestige	–	and	this	also	applies	to	foreigners.		In	India	
and	 Pakistan	 I	 was	 mistaken	 for	 ‘local	 outsider’	 several	 times	 (Kashmiri,	 Gilgit,	 Khyber)	
mainly	 by	 speaking	 passable	 Hindi	 and	 being	 comfortable	 in	 areas	where	westerners	 are	
rarely	 seen.	 	 Many	 people	 also	 thought	 I	 was	 French	 (smarter	 clothes	 than	 Brits	 are	
perceived	to	wear)	or	American	(shaved	head).	 	While	my	pale	complexion	does	make	me	
stand-out,	 it	 also	 facilitates	 interactions	 with	 people	 in	 a	 way	 that	 an	 Indian,	 or	 African,	
appearance	 would	 not.	 	 In	 discussions	 with	 people	 over	 their	 perceptions	 towards	
foreigners,	dress	was	a	key	marker	of	‘respectability’.		Consequently	I	sported	jeans	or	smart	
casual	clothes	in	the	summer	heat	in	order	to	avoid	being	treated	as	‘dirty’	(‘gande’)	‘Euro-
trash’	 or	 more	 colloquially,	 a	 ‘Paharganj-wale’	 (‘backpacker’).	 	 This	 had	 the	 effect	 of	
positioning	me	as	‘rich’	(‘paise-wale	log’)	instead,	a	marginal	improvement,	which	could	be	
mitigated	 somewhat	 by	 doing	 things	 that	 rich	 people	 do	 not,	 such	 as	 living	 cheaply	 in	 a	
village,	walking,	drinking	unfiltered	water,	 smoking	 leaf	 cigarettes	 (bidi),	eating	 in	dhabas,	
etc.					
	
Having	 English	 (as	 opposed	 to	 Irish,	 French	 or	 Armenian)	 nationality	 is	 from	 previous	
experience	 a	mixed	 blessing	 in	 contemporary	 India.	 	While	 some	 individuals	 seem	 to	 be	
unusually	 friendly	on	 this	 account,	most	 reactions	are	negative	or	 indifferent.	 	Nationalist	
imaginations	and	 the	 independence	 struggle	are	 still	 strongly	 resonant	 in	 India,	 and	Delhi	
has	been	a	key	site	in	both.		The	massacres	of	1857	being	a	key	event	(King,	1976,	p.	210;	N.	
Gupta,	1971,	p.	62).	(N.	Gupta,	1971,	p.	62).		Consequently,	I	mentioned	my	Armenian-Irish	
heritage	if	possible.		Armenians	have	been	a	familiar,	if	minor,	presence	in	the	subcontinent	
for	 hundreds	 of	 years,	 and	 the	 ‘Armenian	 connection’	 was	 generally	 well-received.		
Disclosure	of	English	nationality	on	the	other	hand	was	usually	met	with	an	awkward	silence	
and	change	of	subject.			
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The	not	unreasonable	perception	that	 I	was	some	kind	of	 jasoos	or	spy	who	had	come	to	
India	to	write	about	how	dirty	it	was	appeared	to	be	fairly	widespread.		On	my	first	meeting	
at	 the	Delhi	 Jal	 Board	 headquarters	 I	was	 shown	 from	one	official	 to	 another	 (‘I’ve	 got	 a	
British	National	in	my	office	–	do	you	want	to	talk	to	him?’)	before	eventually	being	left	to	
my	own	devices	 for	 several	hours	 in	a	 run-down	waiting	 room.	 	 Subsequent	 visits	proved	
only	slightly	less	rewarding.		With	considerable	perseverance	I	did	manage	to	find	out	some	
things	about	water	in	Delhi,	but	not	always	from	the	places	that	I	expected	to.			
	
CONCLUSIONS	
An	 interest	 in	 the	ways	 that	 ideas	move	 and	 change	 led	me	 to	work	 on	 reform	projects.		
From	my	reading	and	previous	experience,	it	seemed	that	the	relationships	of	reforms	with	
informal	 practices	was	 an	 area	 of	 potential	 importance	 that	 had	 not	 been	over-explored.		
Delhi	as	a	city	with	multiple	water	reform	initiatives	underway	and	a	high	level	of	informal	
groundwater	use	in	a	Hindi-speaking	region	provided	a	convenient	site.		Delhi	itself	provides	
an	extreme	case,	given	higher	than	average	incomes	and	political	salience.	 	As	south	Delhi	
has	 poor	 water	 supply,	 two	 of	 the	 three	 PPP	 projects	 and	 high	 levels	 of	 inequality	 I	
concentrated	 my	 research	 here.	 	 Urban	 villages	 and	 unauthorised	 colonies	 were	 areas	
largely	 dependent	 on	 informal	 means	 of	 various	 kinds	 to	 access	 water,	 yet	
underrepresented	in	the	literature	which	has	tended	to	focus	on	slums	and	elite	informality.		
Previous	 research	 showed	me	 the	 value	 of	 comparisons	 across	 sites	 for	 perspective	 and	
consequently	 I	 used	unauthorised	 colonies	 in	 two	main	 areas	 (Sangam	Vihar	 and	Malviya	
Nagar)	 as	 primary	 research	 sites	 with	 additional	 research	 in	 similarly	 located	 areas	
(Chhattarpur,	 Kailash	 Colony)	 and	 for	 additional	 background	 comparison.	 	 I	 used	 Sangam	
Vihar	as	an	extreme	case	of	 informal	water	access	because	the	area	was	not,	at	 the	time,	
supplied	 piped	 water	 from	 the	 government.	 	 Malviya	 Nagar	 was	 used	 to	 examine	 PPP	
project	implementation	in	a	mixed	income	area.		Because	of	the	potential	sensitivity	of	the	
issue,	I	adopted	‘ethnographically	informed’	qualitative	methods,	primarily	key	stakeholder	
interviews	and	observations	to	gather	data.		Developing	Hindi	language	skills	and	access	to	
organisational	 informants	from	the	DJB,	PPP	and	 informal	water	suppliers	was	a	challenge	
and	delayed	my	research	timetable.			
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Delhi’s	hydrology	is	complex.		Delhi’s	Water	Board	itself	cannot	know	where	water	is	going,	
or	how	much	is	being	paid	for	 it	(Chapter	Four:	Government	Water).	 	As	we’ll	see	towards	
the	 end	 of	 the	 thesis,	 a	multi-national	 company	with	 professional	 staff,	 extensive	 budget	
and	statutory	authority	has	struggled	over	several	years	to	understand	water	distribution	in	
one	 neighbourhood	of	Delhi.	 	 Shifting	 to	 a	 smaller	 scale	within	 this	 neighbourhood,	we’ll	
meet	 Hafiz,	 the	 muscular	 and	 entrepreneurial	 Residents	 Welfare	 Association	 (RWA)	
president	 –	 and	 learn	 how	 even	 within	 one	 small	 urban	 village	 a	 multitude	 of	 physical	
systems	and	relationships	of	control	and	patronage	exist.		We’ll	investigate	water	supply	in	
unauthorised	colonies	with	Aasha,	Tej	and	others,	and	see	how	from	one	 lane	 to	another	
the	water	quality,	timings	and	relationships	of	users	to	suppliers	vary.		All	claims	to	know	or	
understand	this	system	are	therefore	necessarily	partial	and	provisional.											
	
The	next	 three	chapters	describe	my	understanding	of	government	piped	water,	 ‘off-grid’	
non-piped	 supply	 (both	 government	 and	 local	 private	 sector)	 and	 piped	 network	 under	 a	
PPP	reform	project.		First,	as	it	forms	the	background	on	to	which	subsequent	chapters	add	
additional	layers	of	complexity,	I	discuss	the	‘twilight	zones’	of	government	water.			
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CHAPTER	4.		
GOVERNMENT	WATER:	TWILIGHT	ZONES		
This	 chapter	 builds	 an	 argument	 in	 response	 to	 the	 question	 of	 how	Delhi’s	 public	water	
supply	 is	governed,	and	why	 it	appears	to	be	so	uneven	and	unreliable.	 	The	core	claim	 is	
that	 the	 ‘formal’	 system	 of	 government	 supply	 through	 the	 public	 network	 is	 already	
informalised	in	several	ways.	 	A	simple	binary	understanding	of	formal	and	informal	water	
systems	is	therefore	unlikely	to	be	helpful.		Further,	informalities	within	government	water	
supply	 differ	 from	 each	 other	 substantially,	making	 it	 hard	 to	 treat	 ‘urban	 informality’	 or	
‘informal	water’	as	a	homogenous	category.		It	should	be	apparent	that	this	is	very	much	a	
situation	in	flux	and	that	Delhi’s	water	supply	is	subject	to	constant,	and	changing,	attempts	
at	improvement.				
	
I	 make	 several	 points.	 	 I	 note	 that	 despite	 being	 explicitly	 set-up	 as	 a	 move	 towards	
privatisation	 of	 water	 supply	 in	 the	 city,	 the	 Delhi	 Jal	 Board	 (DJB)	 has	 been	 slow	 to	
implement	commercialisation	reforms.		This	suggests	the	political	salience	of	water	and	the	
challenges	 of	 policy	 transfer	 across	 sites	 which	 we	 return	 to	 in	 Chapter	 Seven.	 	 The	
unevenness	of	water	supply	across	different	areas	of	Delhi	is	compounded	by	an	inability	to	
correlate	water	and	revenue	following	an	increased	number	of	revenue	zones	in	2003.		This	
makes	it	hard	to	measure	the	efficiency	of	water	management	and	revenue	collection.		As	
the	water	distribution	is	not	accurately	measureable,	it	is	impossible	to	say	how	much	water	
is	lost	to	leaks	or	non-payment.		Areas	of	the	city	with	different	planning	status	are	allocated	
different	quantities	of	water	through	different	supply	modes.		The	actuality	of	water	supply	
however	can	vary	widely	within,	and	beyond,	these	norms	as	a	result	of	formal	and	informal	
negotiations.	 	 Provision	of	water	 from	 the	DJB	appears	 susceptible	 to	 ‘informal’	 influence	
over	both	physical	and	administrative	processes,	at	a	range	of	scales.	The	network	has	been	
physically	modified	in	many	ways,	including	unauthorised	changes	to	the	piped	network	and	
ubiquitous	private	household	infrastructures	such	as	pumps,	tanks	and	filters.	 	 In	closing,	I	
note	that	administrative	 informalities	 include	exceptions	at	a	range	of	scales	as	a	result	of	
lobbying	 by	 politicians	 and	 neighbourhood	 groups;	 at	 a	 city-level	 tariffs	 are	 low,	 at	 a	
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neighbourhood	level	there	are	ad	hoc	adjustments,	at	household	level	bills	may	be	waived	
through	arrangements	with	meter	readers.	
	
The	chapter	is	comprised	of	four	sections:	a	brief	history	of	the	Delhi	Jal	Board;	an	outline	of	
the	 challenges	 of	 obtaining	 knowledge	 of	 Delhi’s	 water	 flows;	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	
personalised	 infrastructures	 produced	 in	 response	 to	 unreliable	 supply;	 illustration	 of	 the	
role	of	intercession	in	obtaining	improved	water	access.								
						
DELHI	JAL	BOARD,	ESTABLISHED	1998	
The	formation	of	the	DJB	and	efforts	to	bring	private	sector	investment	and	efficiency	into	
Delhi’s	water	are	closely	related.		In	1997,	the	Approach	Paper	for	the	Ninth	Five-Year	Plan	
strongly	 recommended	 regulatory	 change	 to	 create	 a	 conducive	 environment	 for	 private	
sector	participation	and	investment	in	water,	this	included	full	cost	recovery,	the	removal	of	
‘excessive’	 cross-subsidization	 from	 other	 sectors	 and	 that	 any	 subsidies	 for	 low-income	
groups	 be	 transparent,	 selective	 and	 targeted	 (Pitman,	 2002,	 p.	 7	 cf	 Sangameswaran’s	
(2014)	 description	 of	 similar	 conditions	 for	 World	 Bank	 water	 sector	 lending	 to	
Maharashtra).		In	the	same	year,	World	Bank	officials	in	Delhi	suggested	that	some	leftover	
project	 funds	 be	 used	 to	 appoint	 a	 consultant	 to	 look	 into	 Bombay’s	water	management	
(Björkman,	2015,	p.	29).			
	
In	 early	 1998,	 the	 finishing	 touches	were	 being	 put	 on	 a	 review	 conducted	 by	 the	World	
Bank	on	 India’s	progress	 in	water	sector	reforms	since	1991,	 the	date	of	 India’s	economic	
liberalisation	 and	 the	 Bank’s	 last	 major	 review	 of	 the	 water	 sector.	 	 Meetings	 in	 Delhi	
between	officials	and	Bank	staff	led	the	formation	of	a	set	of	reforms	for	the	water	sector,	
an	 ‘agenda’,	 aimed	 at	 ‘unbundling’	 and	 recognising	 the	 challenges	 posed	 by	 ‘political	will	
and	 commitment’	 to	 ‘the	 Bank’s	 dialogue	 on	 water	 reform’.	 	 These	 discussions	 included	
plans	for	a	project	in	Delhi	(Avjeet	Singh,	2008,	p.	88).					
	
Under	 the	 1998	 reform	 agenda,	 institutions	 and	 practices	 that	 have	 remained	
unchanged	 for	 decades	 are	 to	 be	 tackled	 and	 changed	 quickly	 –	 an	 approach	 to	
institutional	 reforms	 that	 flies	 in	 the	 face	 of	 institutional	 realities	 and	 the	 political	
will	such	as	they	exist	in	India	today.		(Pitman,	2002,	p.	9)	
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In	 March	 1998,	 world	 leaders	 met	 in	 Paris	 for	 the	 three	 days	 before	 World	 Water	 Day	
(March	22nd)	 for	 the	 International	Conference	on	 "Water	and	Sustainable	Development".		
This	was	intended	to	build	on	previous	international	meetings	at	Mar	del	Plata	(1977),	New	
Delhi	 (1990),	Dublin	 (1992)	 (Europe	Environment,	1998).	 	 In	April,	a	month	after	 the	1998	
Conference,	 in	 line	with	the	Bank’s	proposals	for	water	reforms	and	unbundling,	the	Delhi	
government	announced	the	move	to	transfer	responsibility	for	Delhi’s	water	and	sewage	to	
the	Delhi	Water	 Board.	 	 At	 the	 time,	 the	Delhi	 government	was	 spending	 ₹2	 billion	 (£50	
million)	yearly	on	water	supply,	while	collecting	₹1.1	billion	(£27.5	million).		The	utility	was	
massively	in	debt	with	₹14.44	billion	(£358.2	million)	outstanding.		London’s	Financial	Times	
observed	that	‘politics	prevents	any	attempt	at	tariff	reform’.		Delhi	elections	were	looming,	
and	the	BJP	government	were	in	no	mood	to	risk	defeat,	especially	since	at	a	national	level	
they	 were	 leading	 a	 coalition.	 	 Consequently	 tariff	 increases	 were	 ‘out	 of	 the	 question’	
(Financial	Times,	1998a).			
	
In	May	 1998,	 the	 BJP	 controlled	 Delhi	 government	 passed	 the	 Delhi	 Jal	 Board	 Act.	 	 This	
created	the	Delhi	Jal	Board	as	a	corporate	structure	to	manage	Delhi’s	water.		The	DJB	was	
nominally	 separate	 from	 the	 State	 Government	 and	 the	Municipal	 Government,	 but	 still	
headed	 by	 Delhi’s	 Chief	 Minister	 (CM),	 the	 most	 senior	 politician	 in	 the	 Delhi	 State	
Government.	 	 This	 was	 an	 important	 limit	 to	 the	 organisation’s	 autonomy	 from	 political	
pressures.		By	August	of	1998,	the	Delhi	CM	announced	that	they	were	‘on	the	verge’	of	a	
₹16.25	billion	 (£386.9	million)	 loan	 for	upgrades	 to	Delhi’s	water	 system	 (Financial	Times,	
1998b).		India	is	the	World	Bank’s	largest	client	and	their	third	largest	client	for	water	sector	
lending	 (World	 Bank,	 2016a,	 2016b).	 	 The	World	 Bank	 gave	 the	 loan	 for	 privatisation	 of	
Delhi’s	 water,	 and	 the	 DJB	 opened	 a	 tender	 for	 consultants	 to	 advise	 on	 the	 project	
(Daruwala	&	Nayak,	2008,	p.	96;	Ramesh,	2005).			
	
Curiously,	before	the	DJB	was	formed,	in	1997,	Delhi’s	water	supply	indicators	seem	to	have	
been	on	a	par	with	the	other	metro	cities	(Ruet,	Zerah,	&	Saravanan,	2009,	p.	12).		Consider	
the	table	below.		While	hours	of	water	availability	per	day	had	halved	since	1992,	in	1997,	
Delhi’s	performance	was	similar	to	two	of	the	three	other	metro	cities	across	all	indicators.		
Ten	years	 later,	system	performance	 indicators	 for	network	coverage,	 timings,	quality	and	
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non-revenue	 water	 are	 at	 the	 bottom	 end	 of	 a	 survey	 of	 seven	 of	 India’s	 major	 cities	
(Shaban	&	Sharma,	2007).			
	
Table	2.	Service	levels	Mumbai,	Calcutta,	Delhi,	Chennai	1992,	1997	(Ruet	et	al	2009,	p.	12)	[darker	shades	indicate	lower	service	levels]	
		 Mumbai	 Calcutta	 Delhi	 Chennai	
Service	Indicators	 1991	 1997	 1992	 1997	 1992	 1997	 1991	 1997	
Service	Coverage	(in	%)	 N.A.	 100	 64	 66	 69	 86	 48	 97	
Water	Availability	(in	hours	per	day)	 5	 5	 10	 10	 7	 3.5	 3	 4	
Average	Tariff	(₹	per	metre3)	 2.1	 2.7	 1.5	 0.5	 1.4	 1.6	 N.A.	 11.4	
Efficiency	Indicators	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Unaccounted	Water	(%)	 24	 18	 36	 50	 30	 26	 N.A.	 20	
Unit	Production	Cost	(₹	per	metre3)	 1.1	 2.4	 1	 1.2	 0.6	 1.7	 2.9	 8.5	
Operating	Ratio	 0.6	 1.08	 1.11	 5.25	 0.81	 1.48	 1.57	 0.94	
Accounts	Receivable	(months)	 2.5	 19.7	 2	 1.5	 NA	 4.5	 9.5	 5.8	
Staff	per	1000	Connection	 61	 33.3	 16.2	 17.1	 8.9	 21.4	 38.7	 25.9	
Average	 Operating	 &	 Maintenance	 cost	 per	
person	(₹)	
90.3	 1358	 84.3	 25	 98.8	 355	 85.9	 675	
	
The	 formation	 of	 the	 DJB	 was	 precisely	 the	 move	 towards	 a	 less	 politicised	 institutional	
environment	 that	 the	 Bank	 had	 been	 advocating	 as	 an	 incentive	 to	 private	 sector	
investment.	 	 At	 this	 time,	 parastatal	 management	 of	 water	 supply	 was	 limited,	 in	 most	
cases27,	to	towns	which	were	already	under	a	corporate	governance	structure,	such	as	Navi	
Bombay	 (see	 Shaw,	 2004)	 and	 Jamshedpur	 (Asian	 Development	 Bank	 &	 Lee	 Kuan	 Yew	
School	of	Public	Policy,	2010).		Of	the	other	five	metro	cities	in	India,	water	in	Kolkata	and	
Mumbai	is	still	supplied	by	the	Municipal	Corporation,	while	Bengaluru	and	Chennai	have	a	
parastatal	Water	Authority	similar	to	Delhi.		Public-Private	Partnerships	were	introduced	for	
Delhi’s	water	supply	in	2012	(discussed	in	Chapter	Six).	 	This	transition	in	Delhi	anticipated	
the	policy	trajectory	towards	parastatal	management	and	implementation	agencies,	which	
has	become	much	more	widespread	since	urban	policy	changes	under	the	2005	Jawaharlal	
Nehru	National	Urban	Renewal	Mission	(JNNURM)	and	further	increased	in	the	2014	Smart	
Cities	 Mission,	 which	 mandates	 the	 creation	 of	 Special	 Purpose	 Vehicle’s	 for	 project	
implementation.			
                                                            
27	With	the	exception	of	Tirrupur,	an	early,	and	unsuccessful	Public-Private	Partnership	(PPP)	project	
(Mahalingam,	Devkar,	&	Kalidindi,	2011).	
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Physical	 losses	 compounded	 by	 low	 levels	 of	 billing,	 collection	 and	 overall	 revenues	
contribute	 to	 the	DJB’s	 financial	difficulties.	 	Despite	being	a	parastatal,	 the	DJB	has	been	
reported	as	dependent	on	government	for	3.8	billion	rupees	in	2009-10	and	over	2.5	billion	
rupees	losses	from	unpaid	bills	in	2012	(Bagga,	2012;	Ramachandran,	2013).		As	the	national	
capital,	 political	 pressure	 to	 keep	water	 bills	 low	 in	 Delhi	 is	 particularly	 effective.	 	Water	
charge	recovery	rates	at	30%	are	fairly	low	against	an	all-India	average	of	60%	(Jain,	2012).		
Before	 tariffs	 rose	 in	 2004,	Delhi	was	 said	 to	 have	 the	 lowest	water	 charges	 of	 all	 Indian	
metro	 cities	 and	was	 spending	 2.5	 billion	 rupees	more	 than	 its	 revenue	 (Delhi	 Jal	 Board,	
2004c,	 p.	 4;	 Avjeet	 Singh,	 2008,	 p.	 420).	 	 The	 Chief	 Minister	 at	 the	 time,	 Sheila	 Dikshit,	
‘attributed	the	low	tariffs	in	Delhi	to	the	cultural	mindset	of	not	feeling	the	need	to	pay	for	
water	 as	 well	 as	 political	 interference	 to	 some	 extent’	 (Delhi	 Jal	 Board,	 2004b,	 p.	 23).		
Indeed,	 tariffs	 around	 ten	 times	 below	 operation	 and	 maintenance	 costs	 seems	 to	 be	
characteristic	of	many	South	Asian	water	utilities	(Brocklehurst,	Pandurangi,	&	Ramanathan,	
2002,	pp.	4–5).		At	a	flat	rate,	low	tariffs	function	as	regressive	subsidies	by	allowing	higher	
volume	 users	 to	 pay	 proportionally	 less	 per	 unit.	 	 In	 Delhi’s	 case,	 this	 revenue	 deficit	 ‘is	
funded	through	loans	from	Government	(accumulated	debt	~Rs	[₹]	5100	crores28)’	(Delhi	Jal	
Board,	2004c,	p.	4).			
	
‘Rationalising’	 low	 water	 tariffs	 which	 reflect	 ‘political	 interference’	 is	 a	 key	 objective	 of	
efficiency	reforms.		However,	 in	many	cases	of	water	privatisation,	tariff	rises	have	caused	
the	contract	to	be	cancelled.		The	World	Bank	suggests	that	government	which	are	planning	
to	involve	private	sector	in	their	water	service	raise	tariffs	prior	to	handover	of	work	so	as	
not	to	burden	the	private	sector	player	with	public	dissatisfaction	over	rising	charges.	 	For	
example,	after	the	introduction	of	private	sector	management	at	Nagpur	and	Mysore	there	
were	protests	as	tariff	rises	were	too	high	and	the	state	/	municipal	government	ended	up	
paying	 to	 bail	 out	 the	 private	 sector.	 	 In	 Delhi,	 following	 World	 Bank	 best	 practice,	 the	
government	 raised	water	 tariffs	 before	 introducing	 the	private	 sector	 (Kapur,	 2015,	 p.	 2).		
DJB	tariffs	were	revised	in	2010	after	a	tariff	survey	by	Global	Water	Intelligence.		Tariffs	are	
now	 scheduled	 to	 rise	 at	 10%	 per	 year,	 and	 the	 policy	 is	 fixed	 for	 the	 next	 thirty	 years.		
                                                            
28	A	crore	is	ten	million	
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There	has	been	some	criticism	of	the	10%	p.a.	price	rise	as	not	relating	to	the	cost	structure	
of	production,	supply	and	management.		However,	the	DJB	credits	the	rise	with	being	able	
to	balance	its	books	and	reduce	reliance	on	government	support	(Ramachandran,	2013).			
	
In	 the	 2014	 Delhi	 government	 elections,	 the	 cost	 of	 living	 in	 Delhi	 (electricity,	 water,	
inflation)	was	a	central	element	of	opposition	rhetoric	which	I	heard	in	campaign	speeches	
from	Kejriwal	and	other	Aam	Aadmi	Party	(AAP)	candidates.		Discontent	over	tariff	rises	led	
to	 an	 unexpected	 landslide	 win	 for	 a	 new	 political	 party	 headed	 by	 one	 of	 the	 main	
campaigners	 against	 Delhi	 water	 privatisation.	 	 Delhi’s	 election	 commissioner	 suggested	
that	the	water	tariff	increase	under	the	Congress	government	was	a	factor	in	their	electoral	
loss.		It	seems	possible	that	dissatisfaction	with	water	privatisation	in	this	case	was	a	factor	
leading	to	a	change	of	government	and	not	cancellation	of	the	project.			
	
UNKNOWN	LOSSES	
As	one	of	India’s	largest	and	most	politically	powerful	cities,	Delhi’s	water	network	extends	
hundreds	of	kilometres	beyond	its	boundaries.		Despite	having	the	highest	per	capital	water	
supply	 in	 India	 –	 237	 litres	 per	 capita	 per	 day	 (lpcd)	 close	 to	 the	 United	 States	 average	
(UNESCO,	2014,	p.	63)	–	 there	 is	a	persistent	discourse	of	 ‘not	enough	water’	particularly	
from	the	water	board	(e.g.	Ghosal	&	Ashok,	2017;	Halder,	2017b).		The	city’s	substantial	use	
of	groundwater,	a	 suboptimal	 solution,	 indicates	 that	 this	 is	not	 just	empty	 rhetoric.	 	This	
presents	 something	 of	 a	 puzzle.	 	 The	 obvious	 question,	 being	 raised	 (since	 fieldwork	
concluded)	by	 the	Chief	Minister	 and	 the	Delhi	 Jal	 Board	Chief	 Executive	Officer	 (CEO),	 is	
whether	the	DJB	is	pouring	water	into	a	leaking	bucket	(Firstpost,	2017).				
	
Aggregate	 water	 demand,	 and	 supply,	 in	 Delhi	 has	 been	 rising	 steadily.	 	 At	 the	 time	 of	
writing,	 the	utility	supplies	900	million	gallons	a	day	 (MGD)	of	water,	up	 from	835in	2014	
(Delhi	Jal	Board,	2015).		Water	demand	is	likely	to	increase	further	in	future	as	a	function	of	
population	 increase	 (Kundu,	 2009b;	 Sivaramakrishnan	 et	 al.,	 2007)	 and	 rising	 incomes	
(Kundu,	 2009a;	 Kundu	 &	 Saraswati,	 2016).	 	 Delhi	 today	 draws	 bulk	 water	 from	 an	 ever	
increasing	 number	 of	 damns	 in	 the	 Himalaya	 with	 construction	 on	 the	 latest,	 Renuka,	
ongoing.	 	Bulk	water	 to	 the	city	 from	 these	dams	 is	processed	 in	Delhi’s	water	 treatment	
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plants	 (WTP).	 	 Two	 new	WTPs	 were	 added	 in	 2015,	 giving	 a	 total	 of	 nine	 in	 2016	 with	
capacity	of	820	MGD.		At	time	of	writing,	DJB	is	building	a	new	105MGD	WTP	at	Chandrawal	
with	Japanese	development	assistance	and	a	135	WTP	at	Wazirabad	(Delhi	Jal	Board,	2015).		
An	extra	80	million	litres	a	day	(MLD)	is	sourced	from	groundwater.			
	
From	 treatment	 plants,	 water	 is	 pumped	 to	 Underground	 Service	 Reservoirs	 (UGR)	 for	
temporary	 holding	 and	 then	 from	 there	 to	 consumers.	 	 As	 bulk	water	 release	 in	 primary	
distribution	 can	 be	 uneven,	 these	 zonal	 UGRs	 are	 used	 to	 store	 between	 one	 and	 three	
day’s	supply.	 	Collecting	the	water	at	this	intermediary	point	allows	irregular	flow	quantity	
and	 pressure	 to	 be	moderated29.	 	 There	 are	 117	UGRs	 across	 the	 city	 and	 new	UGRs	 are	
being	built	(Delhi	Jal	Board,	2016a)30.	 	These	three	stages	of	the	water	network	have	been	
mapped	 with	 geographic	 information	 systems	 (GIS)	 at	 DelhiGeoSpatial,	 however	 the	
information	is	from	some	years	ago	and	not	updated.		The	DJB	has	started	to	acknowledge	a	
responsibility	to	address	 inequalities	 in	water	provision	to	different	areas	of	the	city.	 	One	
means	of	doing	this	is	the	construction	of	more	underground	service	reservoirs	(UGRs).		The	
Summer	 Action	 Plan	 2015	 notes	 that	 attempts	 are	 underway	 to	 equalise	 the	 quantity	 of	
water	supplied	to	the	different	UGRs	across	the	city.		There	are	less	UGRs	in	the	south	of	the	
city	 and	 building	 new	 ones	 will	 allow	 water	 to	 be	 stored	 closer	 to	 under-served	 areas31,	
while	in	the	past,	water	might	have	run	short	before	reaching	them.			
	
There	 is	 also	 a	 final,	 and	 more	 problematic,	 stage	 of	 the	 distribution	 network,	 self-laid	
consumer	connections	–	most	often	in	unplanned,	or	unsupplied	areas	(see	section	below).		
For	example,	the	Residents	Welfare	Association	(RWA)	president	of	a	Muslim	majority	urban	
village	 drew	 a	 map	 for	 me	 (see	 diagram	 below).	 	 The	 area	 nearest	 the	 road	 gets	 mains	
supply.		The	top	right	area	near	to	the	neighbouring	Hindu	area	get	supply	from	a	tube	well.		
The	top	left	area	has	to	‘make	do’	and,	at	best,	uses	self-laid	‘spaghetti’	pipes	to	the	other	
connections.		These	‘lane’	(gali)	networks	may	run	on	groundwater	or	illegal	connections	to	
piped	supply	(Tovey,	2002).			
                                                            
29	Personal	communication,	Delhi	Jal	Board	official,	DJB	Planning,	DJB	HQ,	10/04/15,	fieldnote	52	(fnX	
subsequently);	Personal	communication,	project	manager,	PPP	offices,	Delhi,	21/04/15,	fn56	
30	Personal	communication,	Delhi	Jal	Board	official,	DJB	Planning,	DJB	HQ,	10/04/15,	fn52		
31	Personal	communication,	executive	(mid	30s,	male)	at	Delhi	Geospatial,	24/09/14,	fn50	
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Illustration	of	water	supply	in	urban	village	(Muslim),	South	Delhi	(Personal	communication,	RWA	President,	
urban	village	(Muslim),	South	Delhi,	10	March	2015,	fieldnote	28)	
	
At	 the	 time	of	 research,	 ‘quantity	 is	 the	 issue’	 remained	 the	official	 line	 from	 the	DJB	on	
Delhi’s	water	issues32,	meaning	that	the	quantity	of	bulk	water	coming	in	is	insufficient	and	
issues	with	water	supply	can	be	solved	by	increasing	bulk	water,	which	is	simply	‘a	matter	of	
time’33.	 	Two	solutions	 for	 increasing	bulk	 inputs	 to	 the	network	are	proposed:	developing	
additional	large	dams	in	the	Himalaya	and	to	a	lesser	extent	by	acquiring	more	water	from	
the	Yamuna	in	Haryana	via	the	Munak	Canal.		At	time	of	writing	the	focus	on	large	dams	has	
been	changing	too,	the	cost	of	dam	projects	has	recently	been	argued	by	the	DJB	CEO	as	an	
incentive	 to	 focus	 on	 more	 efficient	 supply	 through	 public-private	 partnerships	 (Keshav	
Chandra,	2017;	on	the	inefficiency	of	big	dams	see	Ansar,	Flyvbjerg,	Budzier,	&	Lunn,	2014).			
	
However,	 historically,	 the	 rhetorical	 focus	 on	 insufficient	 bulk	 water	 supply	 displaces	 the	
apparent	 inequality	 of	 distribution	 within	 the	 city.	 	 The	 similar	 construction	 of	 a	 natural	
problem	 of	 scarcity	 which	 works	 to	 obscure	 the	 politics	 of	 water	 distribution	 has	 been	
observed	and	critiqued	in	Gujarat	(L.	Mehta,	2001,	2007).		In	Delhi,	it	is	noticeable	that	the	
peripheral	areas	get	limited	supply.		The	map	below	(Figure	15,	page	111)	appears	to	show	
that	 the	 Cantonment	 area	 receives	 509	 litres	 lpcd	 on	 average,	 New	 Delhi	 Municipal	
Corporation	area	462lpcd,	while	Mehrauli,	 in	the	south,	gets	 just	29lpcd	and	Narela	at	the	
northern	edge	gets	31lpcd.		Recalling	the	earlier	mention	of	patterns	of	urbanisation	in	Delhi	
and	 India,	 it	 seems	 likely	 that	 this	 is	 because	 population	 in	 these	 areas	 has	 grown	much	
                                                            
32	Expert	roundtable	on	innovation	in	water	and	sanitation	services,	Development	Alternatives,	
November	2014,	Chatham	House	rules,	fn38	
33	Personal	communication,	Chief	Engineer,	Planning,	DJB	offices,	Jhandewalan,	10/04/15,	fn51	
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faster	than	the	ability	of	the	water	utility	to	provide	for	 it.	 	 India’s	chief	auditor	re-affirms	
this	state	of	unequal	distribution:	
	
The	drinking	water	was	not	being	distributed	equitably	amongst	the	population	due	
to	lack	of	reliable	data	on	population	and	water	supplied	to	different	areas.		Further,	
24.8	per	cent	of	the	households	in	Delhi	were	being	supplied	water	through	tankers	
in	the	absence	of	pipe	lines	where	the	average	per	capita	supply	was	3.82	litres	per	
day	against	a	prescribed	norm	of	172	litres.		Metering	of	water	at	consumer	end	was	
not	comprehensive	due	to	which,	less	than	40	per	cent	of	water	produced	was	billed	
during	last	three	years	(Comptroller	and	Auditor	General,	2009,	p.	5).			
	
It	 seems	 that	 data	 on	Delhi’s	water	 distribution	 is	 not	 only	 not	 available	 but	 not	 easy	 to	
systematically	 collect.	 	 In	a	 recent	video	 from	 the	Delhi	Water	Minister,	Kapil	Mishra,	 the	
DJB	CEO,	Keshav	Chandra,	explains	that	the	DJB	call	centre	is	used	to	determine	which	areas	
are	getting	less	water	through	the	volume	of	complaints	received.		Mishra	quickly	takes	the	
microphone	back	after	Chandra	makes	this	statement	(Kapil	Mishra,	2016)	(cf	page	218-219	
where	the	PPP	manager	says	the	same	thing).			
	
Technology	and	expertise	are	not	absent	however.	 	 In	addition	 to	 the	GIS	mapping,	Delhi	
has	 been	 divided	 into	 Demand	 Management	 Zones	 as	 a	 distribution	 tool.	 	 Demand	
Management	Zones	are	a	technique	first	used	in	the	UK	with	the	intention	of	making	water	
supply	easier	to	track	and	measure.		In	Delhi,	however,	they	have	had	the	opposite	effect.		
Before	2003,	Delhi	was	divided	into	12	distribution	zones,	and	since	then	has	been	divided	
into	21.		The	zones	are	used	to	ration	distribution,	and	are	sub-zoned,	these	smaller	zones	
being	 operated	 by	 means	 of	 valves	 in	 the	 network.	 	 Each	 zone	 has	 dedicated	 UGRs.		
Unfortunately,	 ‘the	 zones	 operate	 as	 maintenance	 and	 revenue	 collection	 zones,	 the	
boundaries	 of	 which	 do	 not	 coincide	 with	 the	 physical	 supply	 boundaries’	
(PriceWaterHouseCoopers,	DHN,	&	TCE,	2005,	p.	11).		As	zones	are	not	hydraulic	units,	data	
on	 the	 quantity	 of	 water	 supplied	 to	 different	 areas	 and	 revenue	 recovered	 would	 be	
impossible	 to	 calculate.	 	 As	 PriceWaterHouseCoopers	 (PWC)	 noted	 ‘[Zones]	 need	 to	 be	
revised	 so	 that	 water	 supplied	 can	 be	 correlated	 with	 water	 consumed	 and	 revenue’	
(PriceWaterHouseCoopers	et	al.,	2005,	p.	20).			
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The	Comptroller	Auditor	General,	India’s	highly	respected	national	auditor	seems	baffled	by	
the	complexity	of	Delhi’s	water	supply	arrangements,	describing	the	zoning	arrangements	as	
‘irrational’.	 	 While	 pumping	 water	 to	 UGRs	 and	 distribution	 lines	 is	 managed	 by	 nine	
Engineering	 and	Maintenance	 (E&M)	 divisions,	 distribution	 lines	 are	managed	 by	 22	 Civil	
divisions.		Allocation	of	areas	among	division	is	on	the	basis	of	MLA	Constituencies,	and	each	
division	has	at	least	two	constituencies.	 	E&M	divisions	receive	water	from	more	than	one	
WTP	and	supply	to	more	than	one	Civil	division.		Civil	divisions	also	receive	water	from	more	
than	 one	 E&M	 division.	 	 Water	 from	 one	 UGR	 may	 be	 supplied	 to	 more	 than	 one	 Civil	
division.	 	A	 single	distribution	 line	may	also	 cover	 two	Civil	 divisions…	 	This	makes	 it	 very	
difficult	to	track	the	flow	of	water.		This	state-instituted	opacity	appears	to	support	the	idea	
of	informality	as	a	state-led	technique	of	deregulation	(Roy,	2009b).			
	
‘In	 this	 scenario,	water	 supplied	 to	each	division	 is	 not	measurable	making	proper	
management	and	distribution	of	 available	potable	water	 ineffective	and	 inefficient	
respectively.		Due	to	the	complicated	system	of	distribution,	water	is	not	supplied	to	
divisions	according	 to	 the	population	of	 the	area	under	 their	 jurisdiction.	 	As	such,	
the	 present	 allocation	 of	 distribution	 work	 amongst	 various	 divisions	 is	 not	
conducive	 to	 efficient	 water	 management	 and	 equitable	 distribution	 of	 potable	
water	 to	 the	populations	of	Delhi.	 	A	proper	distribution	of	 jurisdictional	areas	will	
also	 aid	 in	 making	 individual	 civil	 division	 accountable	 for	 water	 received,	
distributed,	 distribution	 loss,	 non-revenue	 water,	 etc.’	 	 (Comptroller	 and	 Auditor	
General,	2013,	p.	88).		
	
	
The	map	on	page	110	below34,	is	the	earliest	example	I	have	found	of	a	map	which	is	widely	
reproduced	and	cited	 (e.g.	Biswas,	2015,	p.	133).	 	Arvind	Kejriwal,	before	becoming	Chief	
Minister	states	that	the	DJB	CEO	told	him	that	the	figures	used	for	the	map	were	calculated	
provisionally	on	the	basis	of	the	time	that	distribution	pumps	were	running	(BharatKiAwaaz,	
2007	at	17:38	minutes).	 	The	map	uses	 the	12	pre-2003	zones.	 	 It	was	 replicated	without	
amendment	(or	citation)	in	the	Centre	for	Science	and	Environment	(CSE)	two	volume	study	
of	water	supply	in	Indian	cities	(Narain,	2011).	 	CSE	staff	have	told	me	that	a	great	deal	of	
time,	effort	and	expense	went	into	the	study.		The	absence	of	more	recent	figures	suggests	
that	accurate	data	on	the	supply	of	water	to	different	areas	is	hard	to	come	by.			
	
                                                            
34	http://ncrpb.nic.in/pdf_files/Delhi_Fact_Sheet1999.pdf;	Reproduction	available	at	
https://cdn.downtoearth.org.in/dte/userfiles/images/0000025369-inequity%20chart.jpg			
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‘Levels	of	Water	Supply	in	Delhi’,	data	from	DJB	and	National	Capital	Region	Planning	Board.		Originally	
captioned	‘Delhi	Master	Plan	Norms	363	LPCD’	(National	Capital	Region	Planning	Board,	1999,	p.	36).			
	
The	DJB’s	2016	Draft	Water	Policy	also	supports	my	arguments	about	the	limited	knowledge	
of	 water	 supply	 in	 the	 city.	 	 It	 states	 that	 ‘absence	 of	 a	 comprehensive	 database	 is	 an	
obstacle	 to	 policy	making’,	 and	 specifies:	 ‘spatio-sectoral	 data	 of	 consumption	 at	macro-
levels	 does	 not	 inspire	 confidence	 and	 is	 unavailable	 at	 district	 level	 limiting	 scope	 for	
analysis	and	generation	of	options’,	‘the	same	is	true	of	groundwater	database’,	‘monitoring	
of	flows	and	discharges:	this	is	neither	available	by	sector	or	zone,	neither	for	water	supply	
nor	for	sewage	nor	for	stormwater	discharges’	(Delhi	Jal	Board,	2016b,	p.	9).			
	
In	addition	to	the	difficulties	of	tracking	distribution,	the	supply	figures	(e.g.	900	MGD	etc)	
given	for	Delhi’s	water	network	above	are	‘pre-loss’.	 	This	means	that	after	accounting	for	
the	water	lost	in	the	transmission	and	distribution	pipes,	the	net	supply	is	lower	still.		Delhi	
is	 a	 large	 city	with	 a	 9,000km	network	of	 pipes	dating	 from	 the	1890s	 (Narain,	 2011).	 	 In	
Delhi,	as	is	common	in	developing	countries,	exact	figures	are	hard	to	calculate	due	to	the	
non-correspondence	 of	 revenue	 and	 hydraulic	 zones	 mentioned,	 and	 in	 the	 absence	 of	
comprehensive	bulk	and	user	metering	(Frauendorfer	&	Liemberger,	2010,	p.	5).		Some	level	
of	loss	is	normal	in	all	water	systems,	particularly	those,	like	Delhi,	with	larger	networks	and	
older	pipes.			
	
Zonal	water	supply	in	Delhi	in	1999	(litres	per	capital	per	day)	
This image has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
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Using	 data	 from	 over	 900	 utilities	 in	 44	 developing	 countries,	 the	 International	
Benchmarking	Network	 for	Water	 and	 Sanitation	Utilities	 (a	World	 Bank	 database)	 found	
average	Non-Revenue	Water	(NRW)	levels	in	developing	countries	of	around	35%	(Kingdom,	
Liemberger,	&	Marin,	2006,	p.	2).		The	Indian	Ministry	of	Urban	Development	Service	Level	
Benchmark	for	NRW	is	15%	(Ministry	of	Urban	Development,	2016).		Estimates	of	water	lost	
in	Delhi	vary	between	20	and	70%.	 	Different	sources,	 including	official	sources,	state	high	
losses	 of	 water	 during	 transmission	 (JNNURM	 2005,	 Daga	 2004,	 Srivastav	 2006)	 and	
(Alankar,	2009,	pp.	179–186;	Biswas,	2015,	pp.	130–132).	 	For	zones	South	II	and	South	III	
(where	one	of	 the	 city’s	PPP	projects	 is	 sited)	estimates	of	NRW	vary	more	widely	 across	
agencies:	 DJB	 gives	 28%,	 PWC	 48%	 and	 GKW	 59%	 (Biswas,	 2015).	 	 Comptroller	 Auditor	
General	 gives	 non-revenue	 water	 for	 2009-10,	 2010-11,	 2011-12	 as	 66.97%,	 64.80%	 and	
62.59%	respectively	 (Comptroller	and	Auditor	General,	2013,	p.	93).	 	The	PPP	contract	 for	
Malviya	Nagar	places	the	figure	higher	still	at	65-70%	(Delhi	Jal	Board,	2012,	p.	1989).			
	
Augustin	Maria’s	 work	 suggests	 that	 the	 gap	 between	 water	 supply	 and	 demand	 (of,	 he	
argues	around	50%)	is	made	up	through	unregulated	groundwater	use	(Maria,	2008).	 	DJB	
itself	in	a	2004	presentation	stated	that:	‘real	losses	are	around	40%	of	water	produced’	and	
that	 ‘Private	 supplies,	mostly	 through	 tubewells,	meet	 the	DJB	 supply	 shortfall’	 (Delhi	 Jal	
Board,	2004a,	p.	2,	slide	7).		Professor	Gosain,	at	the	Indian	Institute	of	Technology	in	Delhi,	
also	 supported	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 gap	 between	water	 demand	 and	 supply	 is	made	 up	 by	
groundwater.		He	told	me	that	his	research	in	North	India	shows	that	rivers	themselves	are	
losing	water	 due	 to	 groundwater	 extraction	 (Moors	 et	 al.,	 2011;	Narula	&	Gosain,	 2013).		
Recent	 research	 on	 groundwater	 does	 report	 a	 very	 high	 water	 table	 in	 north	 Delhi,	
although	 reports	 from	 the	 Central	 Ground	Water	 Board	 and	 other	 agencies	 show	 falling	
ground	water	across	the	city	as	a	whole,	especially	 in	the	south	(Shekhar,	Mao,	&	Imchen,	
2015).			
	
However,	in	the	wake	of	the	controversy	over	Delhi’s	proposed	water	privatisation	in	2004-
5,	 the	 high	 loss	 figures	 have	 met	 with	 scepticism	 from	 several	 quarters.	 	 A	 common	
argument,	made	by	Kejriwal	(InKhabar,	2013;	IPTsecretariat,	2007),	Dunu	Roy35	and	others,	
                                                            
35	Personal	communication,	Dunu	Roy,	south	Delhi,	21/08/14,	fn4	
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is	 that	 losses	are	 inflated.	 	Aman	Sethi,	a	 journalist	and	author,	 told	me	that	 transmission	
losses	would	be	estimated	by	the	DJB	at	around	20%,	‘because	60%	of	800MLD	cannot	be	
leaking	without	raising	the	water	table’36.		Very	roughly,	this	would	mean	about	13	litres	of	
water	an	hour	leaking	across	every	square	meter	of	Delhi;	this	is	around	forty	times	higher	
than	peak	average	monsoon	rainfall.		
	
A	different	explanation	for	the	overly-high	water	 loss	figures	could	be	that	they	are	based	
on	a	misunderstanding	of	Non-Revenue	Water	(NRW)	and	Unaccounted-For	Water	(UFW).		
UFW	is	‘lost’,	for	example	through	leaks.		NRW	is	all	water	that	is	not	paid	for,	through	leaks,	
theft,	‘free	supply’	(in	response	to	political	considerations	–	see	Chapter	4),	or	non-payment	
of	bills.		Commenting	on	this	widespread	confusion,	we	can	distinguish	three	categories:	
• unbilled	 authorised	 consumption	 (including	 water	 used	 for	 utility	 operations,	
provided	for	free	to	other	agencies	and	consumer	groups)		
• commercial	losses	(including	unmetered	water,	data	errors	and	theft)	
• physical	losses	(including	leaks	and	reservoir	overflows)	(Frauendorfer	&	Liemberger,	
2010,	pp.	5–6)	
	
Table	3.		Water	balance	showing	NRW	components	
Water	balance	showing	NRW	components	(Farley,	Wyeth,	Ghazali,	Istandar,	&	Singh,	2008,	p.	10)	
System	
Input	
Volume	
Authorised	
Consumption	
Billed	Authorised	
Consumption	
Billed	Metered	Consumption	
Revenue	Water	
Billed	Unmetered	Consumption	
Unbilled	Authorised	
Consumption	
Unbilled	Metered	Consumption	
Non-Revenue	
Water	
Unbilled	Unmetered	Consumption	
Water	Losses	
Commercial	Losses	
Unauthorised	Consumption	
Customer	Meter	Inaccuracies	and	Data	Handling	Errors	
Physical	Losses	
(‘Unaccounted	for	water’)	
Leakage	on	Transmission	and	Distribution	Mains	
Leakage	and	Overflows	from	the	Utilities	Storage	Tanks	
Leakage	on	Service	Connections	up	to	the	Customer	Meter	
	
	
It	seems	likely	that	the	bulk	of	the	DJB’s	losses	are	among	the	first	two	categories.		During	
MSc	fieldwork	in	Maharashtra,	a	Municipal	Commissioner	explained	to	me	that	nearly	half	
of	his	city’s	water	balance,	marked	as	‘free	water’	on	their	records,	was	being	given	to	slum	
                                                            
36	Personal	communication,	Aman	Sethi,	journalist	and	author,	Defence	Colony,	Delhi,	02/06/15,	fn86	
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settlements	 (Birkinshaw,	 2016).	 	 In	 Delhi,	 researchers	 on	 urban	 services	 for	 the	 poor	
similarly	suggest	that	an	ambiguous	use	of	NRW	could	be	hiding	commercial	 losses	by	the	
utility	to	various	users,	including	local	industries	and	multinational	water	companies37.		‘Any	
free	connection	permitted	by	the	DJB’	is	an	‘Allowable	Exclusion’	to	the	Malviya	Nagar	PPP	
Operator’s	targets	for	collection	efficiency	(Delhi	Jal	Board,	2012,	p.	2002).		However,	in	his	
2003	PhD	 thesis,	 Alankar,	 now	at	 Centre	 for	 the	 Study	of	Developing	 Societies,	 using	DJB	
figures,	notes	that	just	8%	of	Delhi’s	water	is	unbilled	and	includes	water	to	unauthorised,	
informal	 colonies,	 while	 37%	 of	 billed	 households	 are	 on	 ‘unmetered	 consumption’	 –	
‘average	 bills’,	 which	 function	 as	 a	 regressive	 subsidy	 (see	 p90	 and	 138	 below).	 	 These	
figures	gives	the	actual	physical	losses	as	only	2%,	the	rest	are	commercial	losses	(Alankar,	
2009,	pp.	182–183).		Other	water	researchers	agree.	
	
Physical	 losses	 cannot	 be	 as	 high	 as	 75%	 or	 groundwater	 would	 be	 rising.	
Commercial	 [losses]	 could	 be	 though	 –	 especially	 if	 squeezed	 by	 private	 supply	
from	Sonia	Vihar.		Fixed	payment	[must	be	made],	even	if	water	is	less	than	billed,	
then	fines	[for	DJB	are	levied]	for	failure	[by	the	DJB]	to	supply	required	amount	[to	
PPPs]		
(Personal	communication,	Dunu	Roy,	south	Delhi,	21	August	2014,	fn4).	
	
Another	 analyst	makes	 the	 following	 observation,	 placing	 less	 blame	on	 the	water	 sector	
multinationals	and	more	on	Delhi’s	industrial	and	business	sectors:	
	
Half	of	the	NRW	(Non	Revenue	Water)	is	theft.		Why	is	this	happening?		[rhetorical]	
Tankers	are	very	expensive.	 	Slums	are	not	using	NRW.	 	10lpcd	 from	tankers	and	
40lpcd	 is	 the	 norm	 from	 standposts.	 	 165lpcd	 for	 posh	 houses.		 The	 theft	 is	 in	
industries,	and	the	commercial	sector,	through	political	will	and	cronyism.		Tankers	
are	also	part	of	the	private	system	–	so	the	leakage	may	be	biased.		
(Expert	 roundtable	 on	 innovation	 in	 water	 and	 sanitation	 services,	 Development	
Alternatives,	November	2014,	Chatham	House	rules,	fn38)	
	
The	DJB	now	has	increasing	block	tariffs	under	which	consumers	pay	incrementally	more	for	
higher	 use	 of	 water.	 	 However,	 some	 consumers	 may	 avoid	 paying	 higher	 charges	 by	
registering	a	faulty	meter	in	order	to	be	placed	on	an	‘average	bill’	instead.					The	DJB	has	
consistently	attempted	introduction	of	volumetric	meters	and	billing	by	use,	however	many	
                                                            
37	Afsar	Jafri,	Focus	on	the	Global	South,	meeting	August	2013	(Jafri	cited	for	same	point	in	V.	Asthana,	
2009,	p.	159);	personal	communication,	AAP	workers,	Chirag	Dilli,	December	2015,	fn35	
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metered	consumers	have	found	that	their	meters	do	not	read	accurately.		If	a	meter	is	not	
reading	accurately	the	consumer	can	be	placed	on	an	average	bill	instead.		This	is	the	total	
volume	of	water	supplied	to	Delhi	divided	by	the	number	of	users.		This	can	be	substantially	
cheaper	 than	 metered	 consumption	 and	 removing	 or	 ignoring	 water	 meters	 has	 been	 a	
tactic	 of	 consumers	 since	 before	 the	 DJB	 was	 formed	 (Debroy,	 1997).	 	 According	 to	
respondents,	meter	readers	could	be	induced	to	find	fault	with	the	meters	and	place	users	
on	average	billing	in	response	for	a	small	consideration	(Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	
9	August	2015,	fn110).		The	practice	is	widely	reported:					
	
''DJB	meters	are	dilapidated.	As	per	rules,	a	water	meter	has	to	be	verified	every	
two	years,	a	rule	hardly	followed,''	Harpreet	Singh	Kandra	of	Teri	said.	A	Shalimar	
Bagh	resident,	requesting	anonymity,	said	in	such	cases	''ad	hoc	readings	were	the	
practice''.	
	
''This	a	popular	practice	as	getting	a	meter	replaced	is	a	cumbersome	process.	And	
if	you	are	willing	to	pay	a	certain	amount,	your	rent	is	fixed	at	the	lowest	rate.''	
	
And	this	leaves	ample	space	for	corruption,	making	the	DJB	a	loss	making	body	in	
the	whole	process,	said	DJB	chief	P	K	Tripathi’	(Times	of	India,	2002).	
	
It	is	DJB	field	staff	and	authorised	plumbers	who	are	mainly	responsible	for	the	
huge	[financial]	losses	[…]	in	most	cases	meters	were	not	installed,	while	a	majority	
of	those	installed	were	rendered	non-functional	by	the	field	staff	in	order	to	
minimise	consumers'	bills	(S.	Joshi,	2005).	
	
Available	figures	for	2013	suggest	that	of	1.9m	connections,	850,000	had	‘properly	working	
meters’,	 350,000	 had	 no	 meters,	 and	 70,000	 had	 meters	 which	 were	 ‘non-functional	 or	
faulty.		In	the	absence	of	properly	functioning	meters,	the	DJB	had	been	charging	on	‘an	ad-
hoc	basis’,	resulting	in	‘incomplete	billing	revenue’	(Hindustan	Times,	2013).	 	Meters	are	a	
consistent	 source	 of	 dissatisfaction	 and	 campaign	 target	 for	 opponents	 of	 privatisation.		
Announcing	an	amnesty	on	water	arrears	in	2015,	Delhi	Chief	Minister,	Arvind	Kejriwal	said:	
"When	 we	 analysed	 water	 bills,	 we	 found	 these	 in	 a	 disarray	 as	 most	 water	 bills	 were	
prepared	on	an	average	basis	without	reading	meters.		It	will	be	impossible	to	sit	to	correct	
these	bills.”	(NDTV,	2016)			
	
In	 previous	 research	 on	 urban	 service	 reforms	 in	 Maharashtra	 I	 spoke	 with	 consultants	
involved	metering	reforms	who	had	spent	six	months	working	with	meter-reading	staff	on	a	
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daily	basis	(Birkinshaw,	2013).		In	this	city,	meter	readers	were	so	overworked	that	they	had	
informally	 subcontracted	 their	 rounds	 to	 a	 large	 number	 of	 other	 people.	 	 Our	 interview	
made	it	clear	that	corruption	was	complex,	varied	and	widespread.		 In	a	study	using	1,400	
interviews	with	 customers	 and	 staff	 of	water	 utilities	 in	 Delhi,	 Chennai,	 Bengaluru,	 Tamil	
Nadu,	Kerala,	Hyderabad,	Ahmedabad,	and	Jammu	and	Kashmir	bribes	to	meter	readers	for	
falsified	readings,	were	reported	to	be	the	most	frequent	type	of	corruption	(Davis,	2004,	p.	
55)38.		41%	of	customers	said	they	had	made	a	payment	in	the	last	six	months.		73%	of	staff	
said	 that	 these	 payments	 happened	 “about	 half	 the	 time”	 or	 “virtually	 all	 the	 time”.		
However,	the	amount	was	very	low,	around	₹20	(reported	as	$0.45,	exchange	rate	in	2003	
was	₹45-US$1).		According	to	a	senior	water	board	official	in	Bengaluru:	“The	[meter	reader]	
nexus	 is	 so	 deep-rooted	 that	 it’s	 they	 who	 decide	 the	 change	 of	 officers,	 both	 in	 the	
[Bengaluru	Water	 Board]	 sub-divisions	 and	main	 office.	Most	 of	 the	water	meter	 readers	
and	meter	inspectors	have	amassed	huge	wealth,	only	to	dupe	the	Board”	(Menezes,	2016).			
	
As	one	supervisor	noted:	With	the	meter	reading,	the	men	are	in	the	field	and	we	
have	no	control	over	them.	Most	of	our	meters	do	not	work	properly.	It	is	accepted	
for	 the	meter	reader	to	give	an	estimate	when	there	 is	no	proper	meter	reading.	
We	cannot	go	and	check	all	the	meters	ourselves...	[W]e	must	accept	what	they	tell	
us...	(Davis,	2004,	p.	55)	
	
	
UNRELIABLE	SUPPLY	AND	PERSONALISED	INFRASTRUCTURES	
The	DJB	employs	several	strategies	to	be	able	to	give	water	to	people	in	different	areas	of	
the	city	(Biswas,	2015,	p.	135).	 	For	formal	areas	connected	to	the	piped	network,	a	major	
feature	of	government	water	supply	 is	 rationing	water	 through	 intermittent	supply.	 	As	 in	
many	Asian	cities,	water	supply	is	provided	to	different	areas	for	several	hours	at	a	time	at	
different	times	of	the	day	and	night.		Areas	may	get	supply	for	two-four	hours	twice	a	day,	
an	hour	every	morning,	an	hour	every	second	day	or	an	hour	once	a	week.		Crude	aggregate	
data	 suggests	 that	 the	 timings	 (and	 corresponding	 quantity)	 of	 supply	 is	 a	 result	 of	
population	expansion	in	more	outlying	areas.		However,	this	picture	for	the	city	as	a	whole	
                                                            
38	Similarly,	a	study	in	Bangladesh	found	that	one	third	of	urban	households	had	their	water	bills	
reduced	through	an	arrangement	with	their	meter	reader	(Gonzalez	de	Asis,	O’Leary,	Ljung,	&	
Butterworth,	2009,	p.	12).			
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(see	 NCRPB	 maps	 above)	 is	 overlain	 by	 differential	 quantities	 of	 water	 supplied	 to	
neighbourhoods	with	different	planning	status.	
	
Discussion	of	the	issue	of	water	timings	reveals	a	facet	of	water	inequality	that	is	masked	by	
aggregate	and	average	figures	(Marie-Hélène	Zérah,	1998).		For	those	lucky	enough	to	have	
a	 water	 connection	 the	 length	 of	 time	 and	 hour	 of	 the	 day	 that	 water	 is	 available	 vary	
widely,	as	do	other	attributes	 such	as	pressure	and	quality.	 	 These	variations	are	 strongly	
shaped	by	several	factors,	one	of	the	 largest	being	the	areas	status	according	to	the	Delhi	
Master	Plan.		‘Non-Plan’	areas	such	as	unauthorised	colonies	and	slums	are	often	worse	off.		
However	the	situation	is	the	outcome	of	a	negotiation	of	complex	factors.	Topography	and	
proximity	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 access	 to	 water,	 both	 in	 the	 geography	 of	 naturally	
occurring	 underground	 aquifers	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 water	 infrastructure	 such	 as	
treatment	plants,	underground	and	elevated	service	reservoirs	(Alankar,	2013;	Datta,	2012,	
p.	 135).	 	Material	 influences	 include	 such	 as	 distance	 from	 key	 infrastructure	 (treatment	
plants,	storage	reservoirs,	booster	pumps,	zonal	inlets	etc),	elevation	and	slope	of	the	area,	
extent	 of	 illegal	 ‘tapping’	 of	 the	 network	 upstream,	 and	 age	 of	 the	 pipes.	 	 Socio-political	
influences	 include	 efficiency	 and	 power	 of	 local	 politicians,	 political	 influence	 of	 local	
residents,	class	and	caste	status	of	residents	and	political	affiliation.			
	
My	own	calculations	using	publicly	available	timings	data	for	192	locations	across	zones	East	
I,	East	II,	South	I,	Project	WI,	Project	WVII,	Project	WIX	gives	an	average	supply	of	two	hours	
and	 seventeen	minutes,	 although	 this	 is	 skewed	 upwards	 by	 claims	 of	 twenty	 four	 hour	
supply	 in	 two	 areas.	 	 	 It	 also	 seems	 worth	 observing	 that	 86	 of	 the	 193	 localities	 (the	
majority	in	Mehrauli)	receive	one	hour	on	alternate	days.		75.5%	of	Delhi’s	population	may	
have	 some	 form	of	 connection	 to	 the	network,	 however,	 availability	 of	water	 in	 the	pipe	
varies	 (Comptroller	 and	 Auditor	 General,	 2009).	 	 In	 South	 I	 zone,	 for	 example,	 water	
availability	 is	 stated	 to	vary	between	24	hours	a	day	 (Vasant	Vihar)	 to	one	hour	a	day	 ‘in	
rotation’	 (no	 fixed	 times)	 ‘under	 normal	 circumstances’	 and	 ‘subject	 to	 availability’	
(Mehrauli)	(Delhi	Jal	Board,	2014b).			
	
Intermittent	supply	also	has	a	negative	effect	on	the	physical	structure	of	the	pipes,	causing	
them	 to	 wear	 faster.	 	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 water	 being	 pumped	 through	 then	
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stopping	 causing	 it	 to	 ‘hit’	 the	 corners,	 junctions	 and	 valves.	 	 Joints	 in	 small	 (e.g.	 tertiary	
level)	iron	pipes	are	the	area	most	likely	to	fail	(Kettler	&	Goulter,	1985).		Water	pipes	have	
been	historically	 laid	 next	 to	 sewer	pipes	 (and	electricity	 and	 gas	 cables	 in	more	planned	
areas).	 	 Low	pressure	 intermittent	 supply	 causes	water	quality	problems	as	material	 from	
the	surrounding	soil	is	able	to	enter	cracks	in	the	pipes,	particularly	problematic	when	water	
pipes	are	 laid	next	 to	 sewage	pipes,	or	 lack	of	 adequate	 sewering	or	unlined	 septic	 tanks	
leads	 to	 sewage	 in	 the	 soil.	Where	 sewer	pipes	are	also	 leaking,	or	 there	are	other	 liquid	
pollutants	in	the	soil	these	are	able	to	enter	the	pipes	at	periods	of	low	pressure.		As	a	result	
government	water	supply	is	not	clean	and	not	trusted	by	water	users.		In	addition	to	ingress	
to	 the	 pipes,	 surface	 and	 ground	 water	 sources	 are	 substantially	 contaminated,	 with	
pollutants	including	raw	sewage,	industrial	chemicals	and	heavy	metals39.			
	
The	time	that	water	is	provided,	as	well	as	the	duration	varies	with	location.		Unauthorised	
and	 less	wealthy	neighbourhoods	 get	 shorter	 hours	 at	 less	 convenient	 times.	 	 If,	 like	one	
house	I	lived	in,	water	arrives	sometime	around	four	am,	somebody	must	be	awake	to	turn	
on	the	pump.		If	the	pump	is	not	turned	on	the	household	will	not	be	able	to	fill	their	tanks	
with	water	to	use	later.	 	The	first	people	to	turn	their	pumps	on	may	get	muddy,	gritty	or	
dirty	water,	however,	if	people	are	too	slow	to	turn	their	pumps	on	there	may	not	be	water	
left40.	 	 This	 can	 cause	 fights	 between	 family	 members	 and	 flatmates	 if	 the	 person	
responsible	does	not	wake	up41.			
	
This	kind	of	intermittent	supply	and	variable	water	timings	means	that	the	figures	given	for	
percentage	of	population	 connected	 to	 the	water	network,	 as	provided	by	 the	 census	 for	
example,	can	be	misleading.		Delhi’s	average	water	distribution	figures,	as	with	many	other	
aspects	of	 the	city,	display	a	 staggering	 inequality.	 	When	asked	about	 this,	 the	DJB	often	
                                                            
39	Personal	communication,	local	resident,	(male,	45),	urban	village	(Hindu),	south	Delhi,	21/1/15,	fn14;	
Personal	communication,	local	resident,	unauthorised	colony,	South	Delhi,	5/3/15,	fn27;	Personal	
communication,	local	party	volunteer,	urban	village,	December	2015,	fn35;	Personal	communication,	
local	politician	(male,	45),	Urban	Village	Extension	(Muslim),	South	Delhi,	September	2014,	fn49	
40	Personal	communication,	residents	at	Begumpur,	January	2016,	fn136	
41	Personal	communication,	resident,	(mid	twenties,	female),	7/08/15,	fn109;	Personal	communication,	
Dr	Manisha	Priyam,	NEUPA,	South	Delhi,	2014,	fn42;	personal	observations	
BIRKINSHAW: MURKY WATERS  CHAPTER 4: GOVT WATER 
 
119 
link	the	issue	to	a	scarcity	of	bulk	water	for	the	city42.		The	DJB	claims	to	supply	280-300	lpcd	
on	average,	against	a	 recommended	Central	Public	Health	and	Environmental	Engineering	
Organisation	 (CPHEEO)	 standard	 of	 150lpcd	 or	 Bureau	 of	 Indian	 Standards	 norm	 of	 150-
200lpcd	 (Central	 Public	 Health	 and	 Environmental	 Engineering	 Organisation,	 1999,	 p.	 9;	
Bureau	of	 Indian	Standards,	2007,	 sec.	4.1).	 	The	Bureau	of	 Indian	Standards	also	offers	a	
supplementary	note	that	the	value	of	150-200lplcd	may	be	reduced	to	135lpcd	for	 ‘Lower	
Income	 Groups’	 ‘depending	 upon	 prevailing	 conditions’.	 	 However,	 the	 differences	 in	
distribution	are	larger	than	these	norms.			
	
Within	regions	of	Delhi	that	get	good	overall	average	water	supply	there	is	still	a	dramatic	
difference	between	neighbourhoods.		A	large	influence	on	this	is	planning	status.		The	Delhi	
Jal	Board	officially	distinguishes	seven	categories	of	settlement	to	which	it	provides	water	in	
different	 amounts,	 qualities	 and	 means:	 Planned	 colonies,	 regularised	 unauthorised	
colonies,	 unauthorised	 colonies,	 urban	 villages,	 rural	 villages,	 resettlement	 colonies,	
recognised	 slums,	 JJ	 clusters.	 	 Based	 on	 CPHEEO	 norms	 the	 DJB	 allows	 for	 four	 levels	 of	
water	supply	to	different	settlements	(see	Table	below).	 	However,	the	Centre	for	Science	
and	Environment	argues	that	‘according	to	the	State	of	Environment	Report	for	Delhi,	2010,	
actual	 water	 supply	 is	 somewhat	 different.	 	 Slums	 and	 unauthorised	 colonies	 barely	 get	
9lpcd	while	planned	colonies	are	provided,	on	an	average,	270	lpcd’	(Centre	for	Science	and	
Environment,	no	date).	 	 In	other	 studies,	 the	difference	 in	 supply	quantity	 is	even	higher;	
Dutta	found	average	daily	consumption	in	the	unplanned	areas	was	67	lpcd	but	cites	other	
studies	 in	which	average	consumption	ranged	from	646	 lpcd	 in	wealthy	areas	to	16lpcd	 in	
slum	areas	(Dutta,	2010,	p.	27).			
	
Table	4.		Delhi	settlement	types,	approximate	population	in	2000,	and	water	situation	
Delhi	settlement	types,	approximate	population	in	2000,	and	water	situation	
(Kavarana	et	al.,	no	date;	Maria,	2008,	p.	10;	Planning	Department,	2001,	p.	129)	
TYPE	 POP.	
(MILLION)	
%	OF	TOTAL	
EST.	POP.	
DJB	LPCD	
NORM	
ACCESS	TO	WATER	CONNECTION	
(PRE-2016)		
TENURE	
	
POVERTY	
	
JJ	clusters	 2.072	 14.8	 70	 No	right	to	individual	connection	 Illegal	 High	
Slum	designated	areas	 2.664	 19.1	 70	 Restricted	by	technical	features	 Legal	 Mixed	
Unauthorized	colonies	 0.74	 5.3	 70	 No	individual	right		 Semi-legal	 Mixed	
                                                            
42	Expert	roundtable	on	innovation	in	water	and	sanitation	services,	Development	Alternatives,	
November	2014,	Chatham	House	rules,	fn38;	Personal	communication,	Superintendent	(Planning),	DJB	
offices,	Jhandewalan,	Delhi,	10/04/15,	fn51	
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JJ	resettlement	
colonies	
1.776	 12.7	 150	 Official	right	not	respected	 Legal	 High	
Rural	villages	 0.74	 5.3	 150	 Not	under	responsibility	of	DJB	 Legal	 Low	
Regularized-unauthorized	
colonies	
1.776	 12.7	 168	 Good	situation	 Legal	 Mixed	
Urban	villages	 0.888	 6.4	 168	 Good	situation	 Legal	 Mixed	
Planned	colonies	 3.308	 23.7	 200	 Good	situation	 Legal	 Low	
Total	 13.964	 100	 	 	 	 	
	
Delhi	has	hundreds	of	unauthorised	colonies	of	which	1639	have	applied	for	regularisation	
and	895	have	been	deemed	eligible	 (Sheik	&	Banda,	2016).	 	 Scholars	 suggest	around	 four	
million	people	in	the	capital	live	in	unauthorised	colonies,	although	data	is	imprecise	(Sheik	
&	Banda,	2014;	Zimmer,	2012).		As	mentioned	unauthorised	colonies	and	urban	villages	are	
related	by	more	than	their	exceptional	status	in	Delhi’s	planning	regime.		Village	fields	are	
sold	to	real	estate	dealers	who	then	subdivide	them	into	plots	of	various	sizes	and	conduct	
negotiations	 with	 the	 builder-developers,	 individual	 families	 or	 investors	 who	 will	 take	
possession	of	the	plots	for	construction	(or	investing	in	land	–	which	conveniently	soaks	up	a	
lot	of	cash,	which	accumulates	in	black	market	transactions	across	the	city)43.			
	
Unauthorised	colonies	have	no	automatic	right	to	urban	services	and	must	be	issued	with	a	
No	Objection	Certificate	from	the	Delhi	government	before	they	can	be	supplied	with	water.		
In	 2008,	 guidelines	 and	 regulations	 for	 authorisation	 were	 issued;	 ‘a	 whole	 thicket	 of	
legislation’	 (Sheik	 &	 Banda,	 2016,	 p.	 140)44.	 	 It	 was	 also	 around	 this	 time	 that	 electricity	
distribution	was	being	privatised	in	Delhi.		So	a	private	electricity	lobby	may	well	have	been	
interested	in	access	to	these	consumers.		Indeed,	innovative	billing	and	collection	methods	
were	 developed	 for	 electricity	 in	 unauthorised	 areas	 (Das	 Gupta	 &	 Puri,	 2005).	 	 The	
regularisation	process	is	ongoing	on	a	case	by	case	basis.			
	
This	 sizeable	proportion	of	 the	city	population	 (c.17%)	 is	primarily	 reliant	on	discretionary	
spending	and	support	from	politicians	for	urban	services.	 	The	possibility	of	regularisation,	
again	an	area	for	the	exercise	of	political	influence,	offers	not	only	improved	services,	but	a	
                                                            
43	Personal	communication,	water	supplier	and	real	estate	dealers,	Sangam	Vihar,	19/0815,	fn133;	
Personal	communication,	real	estate	dealers,	Sangam	Vihar,	06/02/15,	fn17;	Personal	communication,	
real	estate	dealers,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/05/15,	fn76;	cf	(A.	Bhardwaj,	2015c)	
44	Personal	communication,	Aman	Sethi,	journalist,	South	Delhi,	2/06/15,	fn86	
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substantial	increase	in	real	estate	values.		A	real-estate	dealer	and	relative	of	a	senior	local	
politician	described	this	‘vote	bank	politics’	to	me	bitterly:			
	
Government	does	nothing,	unauthorised	[colonies	are]	only	a	vote	bank.		We	can’t	
complain,	they	will	just	say	“unauthorised”.		The	MLA,	MPs	get	money	in,	but	can’t	
spend	 it	 on	 unauthorised	 colonies.		 This	means	 it	 is	money	 in	 their	 pockets	 that	
they	can	use	for	re-elections.		It	costs	about	one	crore45	to	fight	an	election	-	liquor,	
votes.		 Give	 5	 lakh46	 to	 the	 police,	 they	will	 look	 the	 other	way	 and	 a	 car	 full	 of	
liquor	will	come	through.			
(Personal	communication,	real	estate	dealer	(c.40,	male),	Sangam	Vihar,	06/02/15,	
Hindi,	fn17.			
	
The	‘money’	he	referred	to	is	from	discretionary	local	area	funds.		MPs	and	MLAs	have	Local	
Area	 Development	 Funds	 of	 five	 crore	 (₹50,000,000	 /	 c.	 £500,000)	 and	 four	 crore	
respectively,	while	 local	counsellors	get	 less.	 	The	 idea	that	they	are	not	allowed	to	spend	
these	in	unauthorised	areas	is	prevalent,	however	some	spending	does	still	take	place,	and	
these	discretionary	funds	are	often	the	only	source	for	areas	which	are	excluded	from	other	
sources	of	government	funding	for	urban	development.			
	
However,	for	government	as	a	whole,	a	major	disincentive	to	provide	individual	connections	
to	households	 in	non-plan	areas,	 like	unauthorised	colonies,	 is	 that	this	will	be	seen	as	an	
implicit	approval	of	tenure.		For	researchers,	non-governmental	organisations	and	residents,	
it	seems	obvious	that	provision	of	services	should	be	separate	from	tenure	status	and	the	
cost	 of	 provision	 would	 be	 recovered	 in	 a	 few	 years	 through	 health	 cost	 savings47.	 	 An	
elderly	villager	put	it	like	this:	
			
You	need	papers	to	get	a	connection.		Village	people	don’t	have	any	papers!			
(Personal	 communication,	 elderly	 resident	 (c.70,	 male),	 urban	 village	 (Muslim),	
South	Delhi	10/03/15,	Hindi,	fn16)	
	
In	 other	 words,	 ‘access	 is	 prevented	 by	 layers	 of	 bureaucracy:	 a	 letter	 from	 Municipal	
Corporation	 is	needed,	a	No	Objection	Certificate	 from	the	police…	 	These	are	 things	 that	
only	the	politically	connected	can	get.		Even	within	areas	of	piped	water	supply	these	social	
                                                            
45	A	crore	is	10	million	
46	A	lakh	is	one	hundred	thousand	
47	Expert	roundtable	on	innovation	in	water	and	sanitation	services,	Development	Alternatives,	
November	2014,	Chatham	House	rules,	fn38	
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issues	and	differentiations	are	there’48.		As	Hafiz,	a	young	RWA	president	and	businessman,	
explained:	
	
Getting	water	is	a	‘grey	market’.		It	is	a	lot	of	hassle	to	get	a	connection.		You	must	
have	a	 lot	of	documents,	 like	two	forms	of	 ID,	a	proof	of	address.	 	No	one	 in	the	
village	has	a	proof	of	ownership	because	 it	 is	 all	 Power	of	Attorney	 transactions.		
Once	 you	 have	 got	 all	 this	 stuff	 and	 put	 in	 an	 application.	 	 The	 survey	 guys	will	
come	to	check	that	your	house	actually	exists.		They	will	want	some	money	to	make	
sure	 that	 the	work	gets	done	ok.	 	After	 this	 some	people	will	 come	to	check	you	
docs,	they	will	also	want	some	money.		It	takes	about	45	days	to	get	a	connection.”			
(Personal	 communication,	 RWA	 President,	 urban	 village	 (Muslim),	 South	 Delhi,	
10/03/15,	fn28)	
	
The	DJB	approach	before	2016	was	to	supply	unplanned	areas	through	a	mix	of	tubewells	
and	tankers.		At	time	of	research,	the	DJB	is	using	water	from	tubewells	for	some	unplanned	
areas	in	Malviya	Nagar	(Khirki,	Hauz	Rani)	and	Vasant	Kunj.		The	DJB	justifies	giving	tubewell	
water	because	it’s	not	for	drinking49.		DJB	data	(at	Appendices	WU	and	PD,	p289	and	p291)	
describes	 Hauz	 Rani	 as	 having	 15,627	 residents	 and	 937	 consumers.	 	 The	 same	 data	
describes	 Khirki	 village	 and	 extension	 as	 having	 2834	 consumers	 and	 43,567	 residents.		
Clearly	many	residents	in	these	areas	have	alternative	water	sources	to	the	DJB.	
	
[Talking	 about	 urban	 villages	 and	 unauthorised	 colonies:]	 Sonia	 Vihar	water	 only	
came	 5-6	 years	 ago	 -	 before	 this	 the	 whole	 area	 was	 on	 tubewell	 and	 tanker	
water.		But	people	now	don't	want	tubewell	water	they	expect	Sonia	Vihar	water	-	
they	 don't	 like	 it	 because	 it's	 hard.	 	 They	 demand	 piped	 water.	 	The	 previous	
government	promised	Sonia	Vihar	water.		
(Personal	 communication,	 PPP	 Public	 Relations	 Officer,	 M	 45,	 South	 Delhi,	
21/04/15,	fn55)	
	
Technically	the	tubewell	networks	and	piped	supply	are	supposed	to	be	running	in	parallel	
but	 in	 reality	 they	 are	 connected	 and	 groundwater	 is	 also	 in	 the	 treated	 water	 pipes	
(Personal	 communication,	 PPP	 senior	 manager,	 Delhi,	 21	 April	 2015,	 fn56,	 the	 Detailed	
Project	Report	(DPR)	also	shows	this).	An	elderly	resident	told	me	that	the	large	government	
                                                            
48	Expert	roundtable	on	innovation	in	water	and	sanitation	services,	Development	Alternatives,	
November	2014,	Chatham	House	rules,	fn38	
49	Personal	communication,	Aman	Sethi,	journalist,	South	Delhi,	2/06/15,	fn86	
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tubewells	 in	 the	area	were	 installed	 fifteen	years	ago	had	dried	up	 five	years	ago50.	 	They	
were	 replaced	 by	 smaller,	 deeper	 wells.	 	 The	 tubewells	 were	 described	 as	 politically	
convenient	ad	hoc	solutions.							
	
“The	 Councillor	 and	MLA	 need	 a	 vote	 bank	 -	 so	 they	 give	 piecemeal	 solutions	 -	
every	time	when	people	complain	they	will	give	a	new	tubewell	for	votes	but	will	
not	fix	the	system	properly.		There	are	about	25	tubewells	inside	the	lal	dora51.”		
(Personal	communication,	local	resident,	urban	village	(Hindu),	21/01/15,	fn14)	
	
The	use	of	government	tubewells	to	supply	water	to	some	areas	leads	to	direct	provision	of	
untreated	 groundwater.	 	 Some	 areas	 where	 I	 lived	 are	 supplied	 by	 DJB	 tubewells.	 	 This	
water	 is	 supplied	untreated	and	 is	 very	hard	and	 clearly	distinguishable	by	a	 ‘milky’	 taste	
and	‘thicker’	appearance.		Tubewell	water	is	supposed	to	be	supplied	in	a	parallel	network	
to	treated	water,	if	treated	water	is	provided,	however,	in	my	research	sites,	both	networks	
are	interconnected.		Kishore	described	the	water	supply	to	our	village	with	some	anger:			
	
DJB	borewells	are	there.		They	give	dirty	water.		Bills	are	still	given	by	the	DJB.		The	
water	used	to	be	20	feet	below	ground	20	years	ago.		Now	it	is	400	feet,	salty	and	
hard.	 	The	water	 is	very	bad.		The	TDS	[total	dissolved	solids]	 is	high.		The	 limit	 is	
150,	 but	 quantity	 is	 100052.		 The	water	 is	 so	 bad	 that	 RO	 [reverse	 osmosis	 filter]	
machines	will	break.		I	have	stones	in	both	kidneys	from	the	dirty	water.		My	hair	is	
gone	[many	people	believe	bad	water	causes	hair	to	fall	out].		We	use	the	tap	water	
in	 food,	 for	 lentils	 [daal],	 bread	 [chapatti]	 and	 for	 bathing.		 What	 can	 you	
do?		Everyone	uses	it.		All	people	know	that	it	is	bad	so	only	bathe	and	drink	bottled	
water,	 80-90%	 of	 people,	 everyone	who	 can	 afford	 it.		 Very	 poor	 people	 cannot	
afford	bottled	water	and	they	have	to	drink	tap	water.		We	still	get	billed	by	the	DJB	
for	ground	water	though.		They	have	meters	for	it.		There	are	1,	2,	3,	4,	5	tube	wells	
in	this	area	[points	in	various	directions,	an	arc	going	south	to	north	east].		I	cannot	
show	 you	 for	 my	 own	 safety.		 These	 are	 government	 tubewells,	 but	 they	 get	
captured.	
(Personal	communication,	resident	(male,	c.45),	urban	village	(Hindu),	south	Delhi,	
21	/01/15,	fn14)	
	
                                                            
50	Personal	communication,	RWA	president,	urban	village	(Hindu),	21/01/15,	fn14	
51	Lal	dora	[red	thread]	was	the	line	demarcating	village	common	lands	on	official	plans,	these	are	the	
areas	that	have	become	unauthorised	extensions	–	see	page	52	
52	This	was	also	mentioned	by	other	respondents,	and	PPP	technical	reports	confim	it.		Personal	
communication,	local	politician	(male,	45),	Urban	Village	Extension	(Muslim),	South	Delhi,	September	
2014,	Hindi,	fn49;	Personal	communication,	pradhan,	Sangam	Vihar,	03/07/15,	Hindi,	fn91;	PPP	Project	
reports	confirm	this	(DRA	Consultants	Pvt.	Ltd.	&	Shah	Technical	Consultants	Pvt.	Ltd.,	2011a,	p.	192)	
see	Appendix	WQ	page	288	
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I	 was	 told	 that	 main	 Muslim	 neighbourhood	 in	 Malviya	 Nagar,	 Hauz	 Rani	 Extension,	 is	
entirely	supplied	by	tubewells,	while	Hauz	Rani	village	is	divided	into	three	areas,	one	with	
piped	 supply,	 one	 with	 tubewells	 and	 one	 with	 no	 supply53.	 	 Discrimination	 and	
marginalisation	mean	that	Muslim	neighbourhoods	are	very	dense.	 	Cheap	rents	 lead	to	a	
visible	population	of	international	migrants	in	this	part	of	the	city.		Total	dissolved	solids	in	
the	water,	used	as	a	proxy	measure	for	pollution	in	India,	in	Hauz	Rani	was	quoted	to	me	as	
1200	mg	per	litre.	 	DJB	data	also	shows	low	water	quality	and	gives	the	reading	as	around	
1,000	 for	 a	 neighbouring	 area	 (Khirki	 Extension,	 see	 Appendix	WQ,	 page	 288).	 	Water	 is	
considered	 brackish	 (and	 no	 longer	 acceptable	 for	 human	 consumption)	 at	 levels	 of	 over	
500mg	 per	 litre.	 	 According	 to	 the	 DJB’s	 own	 chemical	 analysis,	 only	 three	 out	 of	 24	
tubewells	 in	 the	 Malviya	 Nagar	 area	 tested	 were	 supplying	 water	 fit	 for	 drinking	 (DRA	
Consultants	Pvt.	Ltd.	&	Shah	Technical	Consultants	Pvt.	Ltd.,	2011a,	pp.	192–194).		In	Hauz	
Rani,	estimates	are	that	of	the	40,000	residents,	25%	use	RO	filters,	25%	drink	bottled	water	
and	50%	drink	the	groundwater	directly54.	 	The	groundwater	 is	said	to	cause	 jaundice	and	
kidney	 stones55.	 	 A	 popular	 belief	 is	 that	 it	 will	 make	 drinkers’	 hair	 fall	 out56.	 	 Residents	
described	it	as	zaher,	poison57.		
				
Nishan:	Water	 is	 the	 biggest	 problem	 in	 this	 area,	 it	 causes	 diarrhoea,	 vomiting,	
[another	illness	mentioned,	but	I	don’t	know	the	word],	loose	motions,	you	know...		
What	 else?	 	 <she	 asks	 the	 receptionist>	 	 Viral	 fever,	 typhoid	 -	 typhoid	 is	 fatal	 if	
untreated.		[…]		Maybe	2-3	cases	a	day,	or	a	week.		If	the	case	is	serious	they	will	
refer	to	a	government	hospital	like	AIIMs,	Safdarjung	or	Batra	[...]			
(Personal	 communication,	 hospital	 staff,	 Private	 Hospital,	 Sangam	 Vihar,	 16	May	
2015	(Hindi),	fn75)	
	
                                                            
53	Personal	communication,	local	politician	(male,	45),	Urban	Village	Extension	(Muslim),	South	Delhi,	
September	2014,	fn49;	Personal	communication,	RWA	President	(male,	30),	urban	village	(Muslim),	
South	Delhi	10/03/15,	fn28	
54	Personal	communication,	RWA	President	(male,	30),	urban	village	(Muslim),	South	Delhi	10/03/15,	
fn28	
55	Personal	communication,	local	politician	(male,	45),	Urban	Village	Extension	(Muslim),	South	Delhi,	
September	2014,	fn49;	Personal	communication,	local	resident	(male,	45),	21/01/15,	fn14		
56	Personal	communication,	local	resident	(female,	25),	7/08/15,	fn109;	Personal	communication,	local	
resident	(male,	45),	urban	village	(Hindu),	south	Delhi,	21/01/15,	fn14		
57	Personal	communication,	local	resident,	(male,	45),	urban	village	(Hindu),	south	Delhi,	21/01/15,	
fn14;	Personal	communication,	local	resident,	unauthorised	colony,	South	Delhi,	5/03/15,	fn27;	
Personal	communication,	local	party	volunteer,	urban	village,	December	2015,	fn35;	Personal	
communication,	local	politician	(male,	45),	Urban	Village	Extension	(Muslim),	South	Delhi,	September	
2014,	fn49	
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In	order	to	cope	with	these	various	and	unreliable	types	of	supply,	many	forms	of	deviation	
from	the	public	system	exist:	personalised	infrastructures	such	as	pumps,	tanks	and	filters;	
modifications	of	the	piped	network;	and	illegal	connections	and	non-payment.	 	These	may	
be	both	‘co-production’	of	service	(as	with	tanks)	or	‘quiet	encroachment’	(as	with	pumps)	
(Ahlers,	Cleaver,	Rusca,	&	Schwartz,	2014;	Bayat,	2000).			
	
The	 most	 easily	 available	 way	 of	 coping	 with	 unreliable	 water	 supply	 is	 storage	 in	
underground	and	over-ground	tanks.		Even	for	people	on	very	low-incomes	water	storage	is	
essential.	 	 Studies	 in	 other	 cities	 have	 found	 that	 overhead	 storage	 are	 ‘available	 almost	
exclusively	to	upper	income	households’	(Burt	&	Ray,	2014,	p.	111),	however	this	is	not	the	
case	 in	 Delhi.	 	 People	 store	 water	 in	 overhead	 plastic	 tanks,	 and,	 for	 larger	 households,	
underground	 tanks.	 	People	 with	 very	 limited	 space	 store	 water	 inside	 their	 houses	 or	
outside	in	the	street	(Datta,	2012,	p.	141).		This	imposes	a	need	for	space,	which	becomes	
an	 issue	 for	 people	 with	 less	 money	 as	 tanks	 and	 barrels	 take	 up	 household	 space58.		
Rooftop	tanks	in	shared	buildings	are	padlocked	to	prevent	water	stealing59.			
	
As	Delhi’s	water	supply	 is	often	at	 low	pressure,	households	 in	many	parts	of	South	Delhi	
use	supplementary	pumps	installed	on	their	line	to	increase	the	pressure.60	 	These	booster	
pumps	suck	water	out	of	the	pipes	during	supply	hours.		Without	a	pump	the	pressure	is	too	
low	 for	 water	 to	 reach	 in	 any	 quantity	 and	 certainly	 not	 to	 upper	 floors.	 	 As	 different	
powered	pumps	give	greater	suction,	spending	more	on	illegal	pumps	(above	1hp)	will	allow	
greater	 water	 security	 and	 reduce	 the	 amount	 that	 other	 nearby	 users	 are	 able	 to	 take.		
Booster	 pumps	 (or	 ‘motors’)	 are	 usually	 installed	 in	 cages	 outside	 people’s	 houses,	
occasionally,	bigger	motors	are	 in	 the	ground	 floor	parking	area.	 	 In	unplanned	areas,	 the	
whirring	of	water	motors	can	be	heard	throughout	the	lanes	at	all	times	of	day	and	night,	
not	 just	 water	 supply	 times.	 	 This	 suggests	 that	 many	 residents	 use	 groundwater	 as	 a	
supplement	to	the	DJB	piped	supply.			
	
                                                            
58	Observations,	Sanvam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn24;	Personal	communication,	group	of	residents,	slum	
colony,	28/01/16,	Hindi,	fn128;	Observations,	South	Delhi	JJ	Cluster,	23/08/14,	fn139	
59	Personal	communication,	residents,	Khirki	Extension,	field	note	95;	conversations	and	observations	at	
Kapasevra	village,	south	west	Delhi,	fn89	
60	Personal	communication,	PPP	Public	Relations	Officer	(mid	40s,	male),	Malviya	Nagar,	21/04/15,	fn55	
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Online	booster	pumps	are	illegal.		Absolutely	illegal.		[They]	can	be	used	[legally]	to	
pump	water	 from	 a	 ground	 tank	 to	 an	 upper	 tank	 but	 that	 is	 it.	 	You	 see	 them	
outside	of	houses	in	cages.		In	some	houses	you	will	see	a	whole	row	lined	up	like	a	
booster	 pumping	 station!”	 	<laughs>	 	 […]	 	 Everyone	 is	 using	 them.	 	 Even	 our	
customer	 care	 centre	 has	 a	 pump!	 	[This	 was	 repeated	 because	 I	 didn't	 write	 it	
down	the	first	time.]		Even	the	DJB	facilities	have	pumps!			
(Personal	 communication,	 PPP	 Public	 Relations	 Officer	 (male	 45),	 South	 Delhi,	
21/04/15,	fn55)	
	
	
	
Motors	fixed	on	government	connections	cannot	be	automated61.		As	previously	mentioned,	
intermittent	supply	gives	water	at	set	times,	however,	timings	of	government	water	are	not	
exact62.	 	More	affluent	areas	get	better	 timings	and	 longer	hours,	and	variation	 in	 timings	
can	be	considered	another	aspect	of	supply	quality.		Running	a	motor	without	water	in	the	
pipes	is	bad	for	the	motor	and	will	pull	air	through	the	meter,	if	there	is	one,	leading	to	high	
bills.	 	This	means	that	someone	must	be	able	to	manually	turn	on	the	motor	at	the	water	
timings	to	receive	water.		Waiting	for	water	to	come	in	the	pipes	to	turn	the	motor	on	can	
lead	to	disturbed	sleep,	delays	 in	 leaving	the	house,	and	can	be	a	source	of	tension	in	the	
household.		This	is	one	reason	why	groundwater	can	be	preferred	-	it	can	be	accessed	at	any	
convenient	time	-	for	no	charge.			
	
	
People	do	not	generally	have	private	bores	anymore	[his	friend	had	earlier	said	80%	
of	people	use	private	bores).		There	are	private	bores	from	before	they	got	banned	
but	 these	 do	 not	 work	 anymore	 because	 the	 water	 table	 has	 fallen.		 It	 costs	
                                                            
61	Personal	communication,	water	pump	dealer	(mid	50s,	male),	Malviya	Nagar,	21/08/15,	fn135	
62	For	this	phenomenon	in	19th	century	London	see	(Taylor	&	Trentmann,	2011)	
Water	pumps	or	'motors',	legal	and	illegal	
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₹500,000	 (£5,000)	 to	 get	 a	 private	 bore	 [this	 is	 the	 same	 as	 school	 admission	 or	
starting	a	business].		This	goes	to	the	SDM	[Sub	Divisional	Magistrate].		Under	him	
is	 the	 new	 Naib	 Tehsildar.		 I	 have	 filed	 [a	 complaint]	 against	 him	 [the	 Naib	
Tehsildar].		Boring	is	not	done	by	companies	or	publicly	recognisable	people.		There	
are	one	or	 two	offices	 that	 I	know.		 It	 is	done	by	people	that	you	have	a	 'setting'	
with.		The	police	station	[thana],	the	SDM	and	the	Tehsildar	can	arrange	for	you	to	
meet	people	also.		
(Personal	communication,	local	resident,	property	dealer	and	Right	to	Information	
activist,	urban	village	(Hindu	/	Dalit),	South	Delhi,	21/01/15	(in	Hindi),	fn14)	
	
As	 increasing	numbers	of	people	use	motors,	for	both	DJB	water	and	ground	water,	those	
without	become	less	likely	to	receive	any	water.		As	Ram	Singh,	who	owns	a	small	chai	shop	
in	 an	 unauthorised	 colony	 in	 Malviya	 Nagar,	 explained	 the	 water	 situation	 in	 his	
neighbourhood	to	me.		People	had	laid	pipes	themselves	(illegally)	which	were	connected	to	
the	DJB	piped	network.	 	Water	 comes	between	4.30	 and	 6am	 in	 the	morning	 and	 at	 the	
same	times	in	the	evening.			
	
When	there	are	too	many	people	on	a	connection	the	people	closest	to	the	main	
line	 and	with	 the	 bigger	 pumps	 get	 the	water	 and	 the	 people	 at	 the	 ‘tail	 end’	
cannot	get	any.		For	the	first	half-hour	the	water	that	comes	is	dirty,	we	have	to	
pump	 that	 and	 throw	 it	 away,	 then	 clean	water	 comes.	 	[…]	 	 Sometimes	 sewer	
water	gets	in	the	pipes	when	the	pipes	get	broken.			[…]		The	problem	is	that	as	
more	and	more	people	live	there	and	houses	get	built	higher	the	people	become	
too	 much.	 	Everyone	 has	 motors	 that	 they	 use.	 	So	 after	 time	 a	 connection	
becomes	bad	and	the	water	gets	over.		Then	we	must	abandon	the	old	pipe	and	
get	a	new	connection.		It	costs	4-5,000	rupees	for	a	connection.			
(Personal	communication,	chai	shop	owner	and	three	customers,	urban	village,	28	
January	2016,	conversation	in	Hindi,	fn129)	
	
Research	 in	 Delhi	 15	 years	 earlier	 also	 gives	 the	 figure	 of	 ₹5,000	 to	 ₹7,000	 for	 illegal	
connections	 from	 the	 DJB	 (Tovey,	 2002).	 	 When	 I	 asked	 Ram	 Singh	 if	 they	 needed	 DJB	
permission	to	make	a	new	connection,	he	replied	vehemently:	“this	government	wants	you	
to	 take	a	permission	 just	 to	eat	 food!”	 	He	would	not	 say	who	did	 the	work	of	providing	
connections.		In	a	different,	but	nearby,	urban	village	Kishore,	a	real	estate	broker	and	AAP	
volunteer,	told	me	that	a	water	connection	required	a	much	larger	illicit	payment,	₹15,000	
(£150	at	time	of	research)63.			
	
                                                            
63	Personal	communication,	residents,	urban	village	(Hindu/dalit),	south	Delhi,	21/01/15,	fn14	
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Household	investment	in	personalised	infrastructures	in	India	has	been	observed	in	previous	
research	 (Marie-Hélène	 Zérah,	 2000a;	 Briscoe	 &	 Malik,	 2006,	 p.	 57;	 Burt	 &	 Ray,	 2014;	
Button,	 2016).	 	 In	 a	 report	 for	 the	World	 Bank,	 Briscoe	 and	Malik,	 note	 the	 existence	 of	
these	 extensive	 private	 infrastructures	 (pumps,	 tanks,	 filters)	 at	 the	 user	 end	 of	 the	
network,	 and	 the	 challenges	 they	 raise	 for	 reform	 projects.	 	 We	 return	 to	 this	 issue	 in	
Chapter	Seven	in	the	context	of	Delhi’s	PPP	water	reform	projects.				
	
A	particular	challenge	 in	 India	 is	 that	house-holds	have	made	such	 large	personal	
investments	 in	 ‘coping	 with	 poor	 public	 services’.	 This	 has	 not	 worked	 badly—a	
middle-class	 family	 in	 any	of	 the	major	 cities	 actually	 gets	water	 24	hours	 a	day,	
even	though	the	water	from	the	utility	comes	for	just	an	hour	or	two.	Middle-class	
families	have	done	this	by	making	large	investments	to	cope.	But	the	existence	of	
these	‘sunk	costs’	poses	a	particular	challenge,	because	these	users	would	actually	
benefit	little	in	the	short	run	from	more	reliable	supplies.	This	means	that,	again	in	
the	 short	 run,	 they	 would	 oppose	 higher	 user	 charges,	 even	 if	 service	 quality	
improved	(as	is	evident	in	Delhi	in	2005).	[…]		An	additional	factor	that	needs	to	be	
factored	 into	 the	 design	 of	 tariff	 reform	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 status	 quo	 is	 quite	
satisfactory	 to	many	 in	 the	 public	 agencies	 who	 profit	 from	 the	 discretion	which	
they	exercise.	This	is	[…]	a	central,	perhaps	the	central	challenge	for	a	progressive	
government.	(Briscoe	&	Malik,	2006,	p.	57	my	italics)	
	
	
INTERCESSION	
As	the	quote	above	suggests,	the	dependence	of	‘unauthorised’	areas	of	the	city	on	ad-hoc	
service	 provision,	 often	 in	 response	 to	 political	 lobbying	 leads	 to	 a	 conflict	 of	 interest	 in	
which	 area	 representatives	 may	 derived	 political	 capital	 from	 delivering	 service	
improvements	 but	 would	 render	 themselves	 redundant	 if	 these	 improvements	 were	
permanent.		This	phenomenon	is	commonly	known	in	India	as	‘vote	bank	politics’.						
	
Suptendu	 Biswas	 shows	 how	 even	 within	 the	 formal	 areas	 of	 South	 Delhi	 discretionary	
political	 spending	distorts	water	distribution	norms	and	practice	 (Biswas,	2015).	 	Augustin	
Maria	 told	 me	 that	 ‘there	 is	 no	 one	 rule’	 for	 how	 water	 is	 accessed64.	 	 Patrick	 Heller,	
describing	the	results	of	a	 large	multi-site	research	project,	similarly,	stated	that	the	team	
had	 found	 ‘two	 hundred	 different	 negotiated	 settlements’65.	 	 Aman	 Sethi,	 the	 writer,	
                                                            
64	Personal	communication,	Augustin	Maria,	Janpath,	Delhi,	September	2013	
65	Urban	Transformations	in	India	conference,	India	International	Centre,	Delhi,	26/08/15	
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described	people’s	water	access	strategies	as	 ‘a	mishmash’,	a	 ‘combination	of	all	different	
things’66.		In	conversation	with	the	DJB	too,	the	ambiguity	was	apparent.		There	were	smiles	
and	hesitation	when	 I	 asked	about	unplanned	areas	 in	an	 interview	at	Head	Office.	 	 "The	
issue	is	complex,	gets	complicated.		Water	is	a	right.		Tankers	are	used”.		Sunil	says	"people	
must	get	water",	but	Gaurav	stops	him	and	says	"I	would	not	go	that	far".			It	seems	to	be	a	
grey	area	but	they	do	not	want	to	discuss	details	(Personal	communication,	Chief	Engineer	
Planning	and	assistant,	DJB	offices,	Jhandewalan,	Delhi,	10	April	2015,	fn51).			
	
I	 observed	many	 intercessions	made	by	MLAs,	 party	workers,	 agency	 staff	 and	pradhans.		
My	fieldnotes	record	many	requests	for	interventions,	described	by	residents	themselves,	or	
witnessed	during	 time	 I	 spent	at	agency	worksites	and	political	offices.	 	 The	notes	below,	
describe	several	requests	for	intercessions	at	the	DJB	head	offices	over	the	course	of	a	few	
hours	one	afternoon.		My	notes	from	other	offices	record	many	other	such	incidents.			
	
Some	people	came	in	from	[an	area	in	South	Delhi]	with	the	media	guy,	Pradeep.		It	
seemed	that	they	live	in	an	urban	village	and	that	they	have	not	been	given	water	
connections	despite	being	100m	from	the	mainline,	even	as	water	in	the	mainline	is	
being	given	to	new	colonies	that	have	come	up	more	recently67.	 	Pradeep	brought	
these	people	to	talk	to	the	Minister	on	a	personal	level,	even	though	he	was	here	
for	a	film.		The	Minister	listened	to	them,	then	he	was	like,	ok,	we	should	be	able	to	
sort	that	out.		Send	me	a	letter	saying	please	act	on	this	urgently,	etc	[…]	
	
A	very	tall	Muslim	Afghani	looking	young	guy	came	in	with	his	father.		He	seemed	
like	a	politician	and	he	was	complaining	and	saying	that	he	did	not	want	tankers	he	
wanted	proper	piped	supply.		[…]							
	
Some	 other	 people	 came	 in	 from	 Chhattarpur	 with	 a	 female	 politician	 who	
everyone	 knew.	 	She	 had	 come	 because	 they	were	 not	 getting	 piped	 supply	 and	
there	was	a	problem	with	the	tanker	supply.			
(Observations,	MLA’s	Office,	DJB	HQ,	Jhandewalan,	06/05/15,	fn68)	
	
	
Water	provision	varies	across	the	city,	however	for	those	 living	 in	areas	not	 in	accordance	
with	the	city	masterplan,	water	provision	is	subject	to	a	much	greater	degree	of	idiosyncrasy	
and	discretion.		In	areas	without	piped	supply	already,	interventions	generally	are	quite	ad	
                                                            
66	Personal	communication,	Aman	Sethi,	journalist,	South	Delhi,	02/06/15,	fn86.		Borthakur	describes	
this	in	Bangalore	(Borthakur,	2015,	p.	13).	
67	There	has	been	extensive	media	coverage	of	this	case		
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hoc	 and	 personalised.	 	 If	 the	 resident	 is	 unable	 to	 obtain	 official	 supply	 landlords	 may	
arrange	for	water	provision68.		If	the	residents	are	able	to	prove	that	government	is	failing	to	
supply,	 groundwater	 extraction	 is	 legal,	 however	 evidencing	 the	 proof	 is	 something	 of	 a	
legal	nicety69.		For	tubewells,	as	we	will	see	in	Chapter	5,	the	MLA	has	the	power	to	approve	
or	 ignore	 proposals	 for	 new	 tubewells,	 as	 well	 as	 influence	 the	 speed	 and	 site	 of	
installation70.					
	
This	personalised	 intervention	can	 lead	to	positive	outcomes	such	as	 the	centrally	 located	
slums	which	get	piped	water	for	free	(discussed	further	in	Chapter	6,	PPP).		Rani	Camp	is	a	
recognised	 slum,	 settled	 around	 1971	 by	migrants	 of	 various	 states	 and	 religions.	 	 It	was	
cited	by	residents	in	a	west	Delhi	slum	relocation	site	as	an	example	of	good	development	
following	political	intervention.					
	
Have	you	ever	been	to	[Rani	Camp]?		Behind	Malviya	Nagar?		[…]	the	minister	there	
placed	everybody	in	a	line	[plotted	development]	and	then	left	lanes	and	roads	in	
between.	 	 He	 got	water	 installed.	 	 Then	 the	 camp	was	 passed	 [regularized],	 and	
they	got	freedom	to	stay	there		(Datta,	2012,	p.	173).	
	
At	Rani	Camp,	people	there	told	me	they	do	not	have	a	problem	with	water,	which	comes	
through	self-laid	pipes.		The	MLA	arranges	it	for	them,	both	the	current	and	previous	MLAs	
names	are	mentioned	(AAP	and	Congress).		They	drink	the	water	straight	from	the	pipes;	no	
one	 uses	 filters	 or	 buys	 bottled	 water.	 	Sometimes	 dirty	 water	 comes	 out	 of	 the	 pipes,	
probably	 because	 they	 are	 broken	 under	 the	 ground.	 	People	 use	 motors	 to	 pump	 the	
water.		They	do	not	get	any	bills	for	water.		If	they	have	a	problem	with	a	pipe	line	they	call	
a	local	plumber	to	fix	it.		Tankers	do	not	come	-	they	do	not	need	them.		They	ask	the	MLA	if	
they	need	something.		All	parties	are	there.		[We	could	see	three	party	offices	from	where	
we	were	standing...]		Different	parties	can	do	work,	if	one	does	not	they	can	ask	another.			If	
one	 person	 complains	 no-one	 listens	 but	 if	 ten,	 hundred	 people	 complain	 they	 have	 to	
                                                            
68	Personal	communication,	Dunu	Roy,	south	Delhi,	21/08/14,	fn4	
69	Personal	communication,	Chief	Engineer	Planning	(mid	50’s,	male),	DJB	HQ,	Jhandewalan,	Delhi,	
10/04/15,	fn51	–	cf	(Ghertner,	2017)	where	the	argument	partly	hinges	on	a	misinterpretation	of	the	
legal	status	of	groundwater.			
70	Personal	communication,	BJP	leaders	(mid	20s,	mid	30s,	male),	Sangam	Vihar	27/11/14,	fn125	
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listen.		So	when	they	have	a	complaint	they	would	make	a	phone	call	or	send	a	letter	with	
everyone’s	signatures	on	it71.			
	
Electricity	was	free	before	but	now	we	pay	-	since	2006-200772.		Now	we	get	bills	of	
10k,	 20k,	 5k.	 	We	 do	 not	 know	how	 the	 bills	 are	made.	 	Everyone	 has	 electricity	
meters.	 	If	 the	 bills	 are	 too	 high	 we	 phone	 and	 complain	 and	 the	 bills	 can	 be	
lowered.	
(Personal	 communication,	 residents,	 slum	 colony,	 28/01/16	 (my	 translation	 and	
emphasis),	fn128)	
	
As	more	 than	 one	 respondent	 told	me,	 and	 I	 observed	myself	 at	 water	 supply	 and	MLA	
offices73,	 a	 large	 number	 of	 petitioners	 are	 a	 persuasive	 element	 of	 a	 request:	 ‘When	we	
have	 a	 problem	we	go	 to	 the	office	with	 20	men	 to	 get	 the	work	done’74.	 	However,	 not	
everyone	 can	 successfully	 access	 the	 state	 in	 this	way.	 	 Some	 confidence	 and	 status	 is	 a	
prerequisite,	if	a	personal	relationship	does	not	exist.			
	
The	 areas	 that	 get	 water	 every	 other	 day	 rely	 on	 tankers.	 	To	 supplement	 their	
regular	 tankers	 they	 call	 Asad	 [the	MLA’s	 staff	 member	 seconded	 to	 the	 tanker	
station].	 	Some	 people	 came	 to	 the	 office	 in	 person	 to	 request	 a	 tanker.	 	Asad	
seemed	to	know	some	of	them	quite	well	-	e.g.	one	older	man,	who	I	had	initially	
thought	 was	 a	 colleague	 because	 of	 their	 easy	 rapport.	 	The	 older	 woman	 who	
came	on	the	other	hand	was	waiting	for	some	time	while	everyone	ignored	her.			
(Observations,	 Chhattarpur	 Booster	 Pumping	 /	 Tanker	 Filling	 Station,	 14/05/15,	
fn72)	
	
Ritesh	says	that	there	a	road	is	blocked	and	for	this	reason	some	people's	tankers	
are	not	arriving.		He	says	the	same	thing	to	the	smart	looking	man	who	comes	in	
later.		The	man	says	‘we	have	asked	for	a	tanker	but	it	hasn't	come	and	they	just	
say	“we’ll	send,	we’ll	send”’.		Ritesh	asks	the	man	to	sit	outside.		He	is	still	sitting	
outside	when	I	leave	about	half	an	hour	later.		Why	does	this	guy	have	to	wait	for	
half	an	hour	but	the	women	were	sorted	out	straight	away?		(Observations,	MLA	
office,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/06/15,	fn88)	
	
In	addition	to	MLAs	and	other	official	politicians,	a	wide	range	of	people	can	attempt	to	‘get	
work	done’.		Resident’s	Welfare	Associations	(RWA)	are	organisations	partly	formed	for	this	
                                                            
71	Personal	communication,	residents,	slum	colony,	28/01/16,	Hindi,	fn128	
72	Delhi’s	electricity	distribution	was	privatised	in	2005.		In	2003	the	Delhi	government	decided	to	
connect	all	squatter	settlements	to	electricity	(Datta,	2012,	p.	99)	
73	Observations	of	protest,	Malviya	Nagar	Water	Services,	19/09/14,	fn6;	Observations	of	complaints,	
MLA	office,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	fn82	
74	Personal	communication,	pradhan,	Sangam	Vihar,	03/7/15,	Hindi,	fn91	
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purpose	 –	 either	 to	 maintain	 the	 upkeep	 of	 their	 area,	 or	 in	 the	 case	 of	 unauthorised	
colonies	 or	 urban	 villages	 to	 apply	 for	 regularisation	 or	 petition	 for	 better	 services.	 	 The	
extension	of	the	RWA	system	was	described	to	me	as	an	attempt	by	the	Congress	party	to	
tap	into	the	BJP’s	constituents.			
	
“There	are	two	types	of	RWAs;	registered	and	unregistered.		It	can	be	hard	to	know	
which	is	which.		Anyone	can	get	people	together	in	a	lane	and	say	I'm	the	boss	and	
print	 a	 letterhead	 and	 be	 an	 RWA.		RWAs	 have	 to	 be	 registered	 with	 the	 [Delhi	
Municipal	Corporation].		Bagidari	came	afterwards.		The	Congress	felt	that	the	BJP	
was	getting	 too	much	 influence	 through	RWAs	with	 the	DMC	so	 they	started	 the	
Bagidari	 to	 be	 able	 to	 compete	 with	 them.	 	Each	 MLA	 has	 four	 wards	 under	
them.	 	The	 wards	 each	 have	 a	 councillor.	 	In	 each	 ward	 there	 is	 a	 'convenor	 of	
RWAs'	 appointed	 by	 the	 [Municipal	 Counsellor].	 	I	 don't	 know	how	efficient	 they	
are.		Because	the	councillor	appoints	them	so	they	may	not	know	all	the	RWAs	and	
some	 of	 the	 RWAs	 may	 say	 "I	 don't	 know	 this	 convenor	 I	 will	 go	 to	 the	 MLA	
separately".		This	Convenor	has	quite	a	lot	of	influence.		This	system	is	not	written	
anywhere.		It	is	unwritten	rule.		I	had	to	sit	with	the	Convenor	of	RWAs	to	get	him	
to	explain	it	to	me.		It	is	all	over	Delhi.”			
(Personal	 communication,	 Public	 Relations	 Officer,	 PPP	 Offices,	 South	 Delhi,	
21/04/15,	fn55)	
	
Some	 RWAs	 from	 urban	 villages	 and	 unauthorised	 colonies	 appear	 quite	 different	 to	 the	
‘bourgeois	 environmentalists’	 discussed	 by	 other	 researchers	 (Baviskar,	 2003;	 Ghertner,	
2012).		The	development	of	Bagidari	as	an	electoral	strategy	to	weaken	Congress	support	is	
also	 not	 mentioned	 in	 the	 literature.	 	 Hafiz	 is	 the	 stocky,	 muscular	 and	 enterprising	
president	 of	 an	 RWA	 for	 a	 Muslim	 urban	 village.	 	 In	 his	 late	 twenties,	 he	 rides	 a	 loud	
motorbike	and	wears	a	leather	jacket.		He	has	nine	brothers	and	his	father	had	six	brothers.		
His	 father	 was	 powerful	 in	 the	 village.	 	 Hafiz	 appears	 to	 have	 inherited	 his	 position	 of	
authority	and	maintains	owns	many	properties	in	the	village,	in	addition	to	a	new	venture	in	
education	for	standardised	tests.		He	has	a	law	degree	and	several	tough-looking	young	men	
at	his	beck	and	call.		I	was	taken	to	visit	Hafiz	at	his	office	by	some	young	men	who	seemed	
to	work	for	him.		People	in	the	neighbourhood	were	surprised	that	I	was	asking	for	him.		‘He	
owns	all	the	property	around	here’,	one	told	me.		His	office	was	new,	clean	and	shiny	and	
situated	in	a	nearby	planned	area.		Hafiz	explained	how	the	RWA	started:			
	
‘See	this	city	is	built	on	the	village	lands,	it	belongs	to	the	village	people.		Every	area	
is	like	this,	he	says.		There	will	be	two	small	groups	of	people	that	are	benefitting.		
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There	 are	 two	 groups	 because	 there	 are	 two	 parties.”	 	 (Hafiz	 draws	 a	 picture	 to	
illustrate	 this,	 it	 is	 a	big	 square	with	 two	 small	 circles	 at	opposite	ends).	 	 “I	 have	
started	working	for	the	people	not	as	part	of	this	system	[of	the	two	groups]”,	he	
says.		(I	speculate	to	myself	that	it	is	also	good	for	his	property	business.)		In	[this	
ward],	[the	formal	area]	is	the	small	unit	which	the	politicians	are	working	for,	and	
[the	villages	and	unauthorised	colonies]	are	 left	 to	get	on	with	 it	and	given	small	
things	 now	and	 then.	 	 The	politicians	 like	 to	 deal	with	 things	 on	 individual	 basis.		
They	 like	 to	 do	 individual's	work,	 like	 school	 admissions	 and	 pensions.	 It’s	 easier	
and	 much	 cheaper.	 	 It	 extends	 patronage	 which	 reduces	 the	 chances	 of	 people	
complaining	 against	 them.	 	 The	 head	 offices	 [of	 DJB	 and	 other	 government	
agencies]	are	good.		The	MLA	and	counsellors	are	zero’.		
(Personal	 communication,	 RWA	 President,	 urban	 village,	 South	 Delhi,	 10/03/15,	
fn28)	
	
At	a	lower	level	of	‘formality’	the	pradhan	(local	leaders)	system	also	operates	(Datta,	2012,	
pp.	 88–91).	 	While	 RWAs	may	 be	 ‘registered	 or	 unregistered’	 the	 pradhan	 system	 is	 not	
supposed	to	exist	in	Delhi,	and	appears	to	be	a	continuation	of	earlier	practices.		The	Hindi	
word	literally	translates	as	‘head’,	‘prime’	or	‘chief’.		Several	people,	including	Hafiz,	told	me	
that	 it	was	a	 rural	 thing	and	not	current	 in	Delhi75.	 	However,	 it	 clearly	continues	 in	some	
areas.	 	 In	addition	to	urban	villages,	pradhans	are	also	prevalent	 in	bastis	/	 jhuggi	 jhompri	
clusters	 and	 some	 unauthorised	 colonies.	 	 For	 example,	 Jha	 et	 al,	working	 for	 the	World	
Bank,	discuss	 the	politics	of	water	 supply	 in	 informal	 (‘slum’)	 settlements,	and	 the	 role	of	
pradhans	 in	facilitating	or	obstructing	access	(Jha	et	al.,	2007).		In	some	areas	there	seems	
to	be	an	overlap	between	people’s	who	would	have	been	pradhans,	RWA	presidents	and	
municipal	counsellors76.									
	
In	 villages	 you	 still	 have	 a	 panchayat	 (council	 of	 five),	 pradhan	 system	 that	 was	
there	before.		This	is	our	Indian	system.		[…]		The	MLA	will	know	[who	the	pradhans	
are],	you	will	go	to	meet	the	MLA	and	the	pradhans	will	be	there.		The	MLA	will	call	
you	and	the	pradhans	will	tell	their	problems.		The	MLAs	do	most	of	their	work	for	
the	urban	villages	because	 they	 [the	villages]	are	vote	banks.	 	The	villages	mostly	
communicate	through	MLAs	and	pradhans.	
(Personal	communication,	Public	Relations	Officer	(PRO),	PPP	Offices,	South	Delhi,	
21/04/15,	fn55)	
	
                                                            
75	Personal	communication,	pradhan	and	ex-municipal	counsellor,	Kapasevra,	Delhi,	2015,	fn33	
76	Personal	communication,	pradhan	and	ex-municipal	counsellor,	Kapasevra,	Delhi,	2015,	fn33;	Focus	
group	with	local	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn24;	Discussion	with	kholenwala,	residents	and	
pradhan	(female),	Sangam	Vihar,	11/11/14,	fn11.				
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I	 met	many	 pradhans	 in	 unauthorised	 colonies	 and	 urban	 villages,	 often	 connected	 with	
water	business.	 	They	are	often	the	wealthiest	people	 in	 the	area	 (Datta,	2012,	p.	89).	 	 In	
Sangam	Vihar,	I	met	Viraj,	Ram	Kumar	(p.136),	Shiv	(p.157),	and	Meena	(a	female	pradhan77,	
page	159),	while	 in	Malviya	Nagar,	Hafiz	(page	134	above),	and	Mr	Chaudhri.	 	When	I	was	
introduced	to	Viraj,	I	had	already	met	Shiv,	who	I	remembered	as	a	‘water	dealer’.		Viraj	was	
sitting	on	a	plastic	chair	 in	the	lane	in	front	of	his	office	(cf	Berenschot,	2010b).		A	woman	
was	 squatting	 next	 to	 him	 asking	 for	 his	 help	 with	 a	 pension	 form.		 My	 friend	 Aasha	
introduced	me	to	him.		(I	find	out	later	he	is	also	known	as	Viraj	‘panni	walla’	[water	guy].)		
[…]	 	 He	 didn’t	 really	 want	 to	 talk	 but	 said	 he	 helps	 people	 with	 getting	 their	 Public	
Distribution	 System78	 cards	 and	 other	 documents.		 He	 said	 that	 water	 and	 roads	 are	 big	
problems	in	the	area	and	that	lots	of	people	use	water	tankers.		He	had	been	doing	the	job	
of	pradhan	for	around	six	years.		His	house	is	opposite	his	office.		It	is	easily	the	nicest	house	
in	the	street,	four	stories,	newly	painted	with	balconies	and	lots	of	potted	plants79.	
	
Bhalli,	 a	 local	 AAP	 volunteer,	 introduced	 me	 another	 pradhan,	 Ram	 Kumar.	 	 Ram	 was	
wearing	the	white	kurta	pajamas	associated	with	respectable	men	and	politicians	with	a	red	
tilak	on	his	head.		After	chatting	at	his	construction	materials	business,	he	caught	up	with	us	
in	the	street	and	suggested	I	take	some	rest,	gesturing	towards	some	big	but	fairly	ordinary	
looking	 gates.	 	Inside	 was	 a	 palatial	 hall	 done	 in	 marble	 with	 saffron	 cream	 walls	 and	
turquoise	ceiling.		There	were	gold	lion's	heads	on	the	sides	of	the	double	staircase	leading	
down	 from	 a	more	 private	 room	 at	 the	 top.	 	There	was	 a	 black	 and	white	 picture	 of	 his	
father,	also	a	pradhan,	garlanded	with	marigolds	in	front	of	the	doors	to	the	upper	room.		A	
boy	is	sleeping	on	a	charpoy	near	the	front	of	the	hall.		A	round	table	is	in	the	centre	of	the	
hall	 with	 three	 chairs	 around	 it.	 	I	 am	 impressed,	 awed.	 	The	 hall	 would	 be	 impressive	
anywhere	but	it	was	so	different	to	anything	else	I	had	seen	in	Sangam	Vihar.		You	could	fit	
two	or	three	cars	in	the	room.		It	was	cool	and	quiet.		We	sit	and	drink	tea	with	Ram	and	I	
ask	 him	 and	 Bhalli	 questions	 about	 the	 history	 of	 the	 area,	 pradhanship	 and,	 obviously,	
water.			
                                                            
77	While	in	Datta’s	fieldsite,	the	‘exclusion	and	invisibility	of	women’	among	the	pradhan	model	of	
leadership	was	striking,	in	other	sites	female	pradhans	are	present,	although	undeniably	less	common	
(Datta,	2012,	p.	90;	cf	Srivastava,	2015).			
78	India’s	Public	Distribution	System	provides	subsidised	food	grains	for	Below	Poverty	Line	households	
(see	Masiero,	2015;	Sekhri	&	Nagavarapu,	2014).			
79	Observations,	Sangam	Vihar,	10/11/14,	fn12	
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While	many	pradhans	seemed	to	have	an	authoritarian	rule	over	their	area,	in	some	cases	
elections	are	held	for	the	role80	(Datta,	2012,	p.	100).		In	others	it	has	been	abolished.		Rani	
Camp	 residents	 (mentioned	 above)	 were	 proud	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 had	 removed	 the	
pradhan	who	was	 extracting	money	 from	 them,	 telling	me:	 ‘We	do	 not	 have	 any	 kind	 of	
pradhan	 -	before	there	was	but	he	was	collecting	₹5,000	for	festivals	and	keeping	₹1,000!		
Now	all	 the	boys	are	together’.	 	I	asked	them	how	they	stopped	it.	 	They	say	 ‘We	showed	
him	the	name	of	God!’	and	start	laughing81.		Similarly,	Datta	describes	the	decline	of	older,	
non-performing	pradhans	in	her	Delhi	field	site	(Datta,	2012,	pp.	90–91).				
	
For	effective	representation,	whether	MLA,	RWA,	NGO	or	pradhan,	skills	must	be	learnt	and	
relationships	 developed	 (the	 contrasting	 ability	 to	 get	 work	 done	 of	 Sangam	 Vihar’s	 two	
MLAs	 is	discussed	on	page	153).	 	Hafiz,	 the	RWA	president	 introduced	above,	had	a	 lot	of	
papers	relating	to	his	area.	 	 ‘I	will	 show	you	all	 the	documents,’	he	says.	 	He	has	a	plastic	
folder	 about	 the	 thickness	 of	my	 fist,	 full	 of	 letters	 to	 the	MCD,	DJB,	 Delhi	 Development	
Authority	(DDA),	MLAs,	municipal	counsellors,	he	also	has	an	envelope	full	of	receipts	that	
register	the	delivery.		He	flips	through	the	file	quickly.		There	is	a	letter	regarding	the	park	
near	 [the	 Hospital]	 which	 says	 it	 has	 been	 acquired	 by	 the	 DDA.	 	 Another	 is	 concerning	
sewage.		He	has	all	the	issues	tracked	on	a	spreadsheet	and	uses	email	to	communicate	with	
the	departments.		“Now	I	just	shoot	of	10	emails	at	once",	he	says,	"to	all	the	departments	
at	several	 levels".	 	“They	won't	do	work	without	some	pressure	from	their	bosses”82.	 	The	
ability	to	intercede	like	this,	once	acquired,	is	valuable	political	capital.		Hafiz,	described	his	
campaign	for	better	services	in	his	area	as	provoking	a	response	from	the	local	counsellor:			
	
I	started	this	work	about	three	years	ago.		Most	people	are	not	educated,	they	do	
not	 know	 what	 their	 rights	 are.	 	 But	 I	 have	 a	 law	 degree.	 	 I	 have	 a	 real	 estate	
business	and	now	I	am	into	education	[…]	 I	started	and	discovered	that	 I	had	this	
power	of	writing	 letters.	 	When	 I	 first	 started	 [to	 seek	better	public	 services]	 the	
counsellor	came.		He	threatened	when	I	started,	he	was	afraid	that	he	would	lose	
votes.		There	was	tension.		I	said	let	me	do	my	work	and	you	do	your	work.		There	is	
not	[a]	problem,	it	could	even	be	good	for	you.		But	he	didn't	like	it,	he	was	afraid	
                                                            
80	Observations,	South	Delhi	JJ	Cluster,	23/08/14,	fn139	
81	Personal	communication,	residents,	slum	colony,	28/01/16	(Hindi),	fn128	
82	Personal	communication	RWA	President,	urban	village	(Muslim),	South	Delhi,	10/03/15,	fn28	
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that	it	would	eat	into	his	votes.		Things	are	better	now.		But	still,	the	local	officials	
come	under	some	powerful	people.			
(Personal	 communication,	 RWA	 President,	 urban	 village	 (Muslim),	 South	 Delhi,	
10/03/15,	fn28)	
	
As	 further	 illustration,	 an	 AAP	 party	 worker	 from	 a	 neighbouring	 area	 described	 how	
politicians	at	different	levels	of	the	government	will	‘steal’	work	from	each	other	in	order	to	
claim	the	credit	(more	discussion	of	competitive	credit	in	Chapter	Seven	PPP	‘	Sign	Wars’).			
	
MCs	[municipal	counsellors]	are	loyal	to	[Congress]	so	they	deny	projects.		Let	me	
give	you	a	‘live	example’.		One	man	wanted	street	lights.		The	MLA	put	the	request	
in	but	department	told	him	‘we	have	no	lights	-	they	have	run	out,	and	anyway	you	
must	 release	 funds	 before	we	 can	do	 anything'.	 	 Then	 the	MLA	 got	 a	 phone	 call	
from	the	man	saying	‘a	light	has	been	put	in	by	the	[counsellor]	but	I	never	spoke	to	
the	[counsellor]'.		In	this	way	the	departments	alert	them	[the	counsellors]	to	work	
that	needs	doing	and	 the	 [counsellors]	 ‘steal’	 it	 to	get	 the	credit.	 	Votes	are	very	
important.		Of	course	they	will	regard	their	people	and	their	caste.		DJB	and	other	
agencies	 used	 to	working	with	 corruption	 and	 reputation	or	 patronage.	 	 If	 try	 to	
work	outside	of	this	nothing	gets	done.			
(Personal	communication,	party	worker,	South	Delhi,	21/10/14,	fn9)	
	
In	government	at	city	level,	the	AAP	government	has	continued	political	concessions	to	core	
constituencies,	albeit	 in	a	progressive	manner,	 through	 lifeline	 free	water	 (for	 low	 income	
consumers),	 waiving	 of	 arrears	 (for	 the	 lower	middle	 class),	 and	 connection	 of	 unserved	
areas	irrespective	of	land-tenure.	
	
CONCLUSIONS	
This	 chapter	 builds	 an	 argument	 in	 response	 to	 the	 question	 of	 how	Delhi’s	 public	water	
supply	is	governed,	and	why	it	appears	to	be	so	uneven,	unreliable	and	unequal.		I	suggest	
that	 a	 range	 of	 informalities,	 understood	 as	 practices	 outside	 official	 guidelines,	 both	
physical	and	administrative,	are	widely	present	in	Delhi’s	public	water	supply	at	a	number	of	
geographic	and	temporal	scales.			
	
The	creation	of	Delhi’s	water	board	in	1998	followed	significant	input	from	the	World	Bank	
advocating	 water	 supply	 reform	 and	 liberalisation.	 	 The	 allegations	 of	 informal	 influence	
from	PriceWaterHouseCoopers	and	the	World	Bank	in	the	privatisation	process	were	a	key	
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criticism	by	anti-privatisation	campaigners	(Independent	People’s	Tribunal	on	World	Bank	in	
India,	2007;	Kejriwal	&	Bhaduri,	2005).		It	is	notable	that	while	the	DJB	was	intended	to	be	a	
political	 autonomous	 commercial	 model,	 it	 appears	 to	 have	 remained	 susceptible	 to	
political	 interference,	 a	 matter	 the	 Chief	 Minister	 herself	 noted.	 	 Influence	 over	 DJB	
processes	 is	 noticeable	 at	 both	 city	 scale,	 in	 low	 tariffs,	 and	 household	 scale,	 in	 dubious	
meter	 readings	 and	 ‘average	 bills’.	 	 Other	 studies	 of	 parastatal	 utilities	 and	 regulatory	
independence	 in	 India	 have	 noted	 similar	 situations.	 	 Dubash	 describes	 the	 political	
influence	over	Bangalore’s	electricity	 regulation	agency,	while	Wagle	et	al	 	and	Warghade	
discusses	 Maharashtra’s	 Bulk	 Water	 Regulatory	 Authority	 as	 an	 instance	 of	 incomplete	
institutional	transfer	that	was	subject	to	political	capture	(Dubash,	2013;	Wagle,	Warghade,	
&	Sathe,	2012;	Warghade,	2016).			
	
Water	tariffs	in	Delhi	were	detached	from	political	oversight	and	raised	before	privatisation	
as	 the	 World	 Bank	 recommends.	 	 High	 water	 charges	 and	 inadequate	 supply	 were	 key	
campaign	 issues.	 	The	Delhi	Election	Commissioner	suggests	 that	 the	raising	of	 tariffs	may	
have	 lost	 the	Congress	party	control	of	 the	city.	 	This	would	be	a	case	of	 the	government	
being	changed	rather	than	the	more	common	situation	of	 the	privatisation	contract	being	
renegotiated.			
	
Delhi’s	 water	 distribution	 and	 revenue	 zoning	 arrangements	 are	 highly	 complex	 and	
unsystematic.	 	 The	 hydraulic,	 administrative	 and	 political	 boundaries	 overlap	 in	 such	 a	
varied	manner	that	water	distribution,	revenue	and	political	accountability	are	impossible	to	
track.		Even	these	official	infrastructures	are	hard	to	understand	for	state	agencies	(cf	Scott,	
1998).		The	unevenness	of	water	supply	across	different	areas	of	Delhi	is	compounded	by	an	
inability	to	correlate	water	and	revenue	following	an	increased	number	of	revenue	zones	in	
2003.		Curiously,	administrative	reforms	have	led	to	the	inability	of	the	water	department	to	
track	their	own	water.			
	
According	 to	 the	 DJB	 themselves,	 as	well	 as	 independent	 researchers,	 a	 large	 amount	 of	
water,	 perhaps	 40	 or	 50	 percent	 is	 lost	 and	 private	 groundwater	 supplies	 make	 up	 the	
shortfall.	 	These	figures	are	disputed	and	maybe	due	to	revenue	losses	rather	than	leaking	
water.		However,	as	the	water	distribution	is	not	accurately	measureable,	it	is	impossible	to	
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say	how	much	water	is	lost	to	leaks	or	non-payment.		This	makes	it	hard	to	measure	DJB	(or	
other	 operator’s)	 efficiency	 –	which	 in	 turn	makes	 private	management	 complicated	 and	
unappealing	 to	 bidders.	 	 As	 an	 example	 of	 state-instituted	 opacity	 the	 zone	 redefinition	
appears	 to	 support	 the	 idea	 of	 informality	 as	 a	 state-led	 technique	 of	 deregulation	 (Roy,	
2009b).			
	
Water	 supply	 per	 head	 is	 highly	 uneven.	 	 Official	 norms	 allow	 deviation	 according	 to	
planning	 status,	 but	 academic	 research	 shows	 that	 even	 with	 planned	 areas,	 supply	
quantities	 differ.	 	 Across	 settlement	 types	 the	 high	 level	 of	 variation	 in	 supply	 quantity,	
timing,	 quality	 and	mode	 is	 sufficiently	 large	 as	 to	 appear	 idiosyncratic.	 	 Consequently,	 a	
simple	 metric	 of	 connected	 or	 not,	 does	 little	 to	 explain	 water	 supply	 patterns	 among	
neighbourhoods.	 	 This	 is	 unlike	 a	 homogenous	 network	 model	 where	 connected	 or	
unconnected,	 formal	or	 informal,	are	 the	main	parameters	 (Bakker,	2003;	Kooy	&	Bakker,	
2015).	 	 This	 suggests	 that	 beyond	 a	 formal-informal	 binary,	 more	 specific	 and	 situated	
concepts	are	necessary	(Gandhi,	2012;	Guha-Khasnobis	et	al.,	2006).			
	
For	 inhabitants	 of	 unauthorised	 settlements,	 unofficial	 ‘informal’	 means	 are	 extensively	
used	to	obtain	government	water,	or	in	the	absence	of	adequate	official	supply.		Across	all	
settlement	types,	 inhabitants	have	invested	in	private	 infrastructures	some	of	which	mesh	
into	 the	 public	 network	 (motors,	 tanks)	 while	 some	 are	 independent	 of	 it	 (tubewells).		
Private	 supplementary	 infrastructures	 such	 as	 pumps,	 storage	 tanks,	 and	 filters	 are	 very	
widely	 used.	 	 Further	 types	 of	 physical	 change,	 are	 more	 invasive	 modifications	 such	 as	
meter	 bypasses,	 illegal	 connections,	 or	 unauthorised	modifications	 to	 the	 piped	 network.		
Practically,	 these	 effective	 strategies	 for	 coping	 with	 low	 quality,	 intermittent	 supply	
generate	 user	 resistance	 to	 reforms	 (Briscoe	 &	 Malik,	 2006,	 p.	 57;	 Marie-Hélène	 Zérah,	
1998).		Theoretically,	these	modifications	illustrate	the	‘co-production’	of	water	access,	and	
the	 blurry	 boundary	 between	 private	 and	 public	 infrastructure,	 or	 formal	 or	 informal	
systems	(Ahlers	et	al.,	2014;	Button,	2016;	A.	Joshi	&	Moore,	2004).			
	
These	 private	 infrastructures	 on	 the	 public	 network	 lead	 to	 a	 zero	 sum	 situation	 where	
those	with	more	money	install	bigger	tanks	and	motors	or	even	reroute	the	piped	network	
to	the	detriment	of	nearby	users.		In	some	areas,	unauthorised	connections	have	a	limited	
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life-span	 after	 which	 new	 connections	 must	 be	 taken	 on	 further	 ‘upstream’	 on	 the	
distribution	pipe.		A	similar	situation	is	played	out	with	respect	to	groundwater	use,	at	larger	
physical	 and	 temporal	 scales,	 depending	 on	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 aquifer	 and	 time	 of	 year.		
Deeper	wells	and	bigger	motors	mean	more	water	for	those	who	can	afford	them,	and	less	
for	others.		As	the	water	level	declines	tubewells	require	more	frequent	re-boring	or	reach	
the	limit	of	extraction.	
	
In	 ‘informal	areas’	 like	unauthorised	colonies,	political	 influence	may	be	 the	only	 route	 to	
obtain	 services.	 	 Residents	 and	 their	 representatives	 (MLAs,	 RWAs,	 pradhans)	 use	
intercession	with	the	authorities	instrumentally	in	order	to	acquire	improvements	to	urban	
services	both	within	and	outside	of	the	formal	frameworks	for	supply.		This	has	been	widely	
discussed	in	studies	of	Indian	statehood	(e.g.	Chatterjee,	2008).	 	The	ability	to	intercede	is	
unevenly	distributed	and	although	some	elements	can	be	learnt,	appears	to	vary	according	
to	area	and	individual	background.		The	power	to	deliver	improvements	to	constituencies	is	
highly	prized,	to	extent	that	representatives	will	compete	with	each	other	to	claim	credit.			
	
Lobbying	for	improvements,	in	response	to	unreliable	supply,	creates	space	for	political	(and	
commercial)	entrepreneurship	(N.	Anand,	2011;	Björkman,	2015;	Contractor,	2012).		People	
may	become	dependent	on	mediation	to	the	point	where	political	intercession	is	the	normal	
way	 to	 interact	 with	 state	 agencies	 (cf	 Berenschot,	 2013,	 p.	 80).	 	 Researcher’s	 however,	
caution	 that	 this	 should	 not	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 exchange	 of	 water	 for	 votes,	 but	 rather	 that	
provision	of	services	is	a	demonstrative	performance	of	political	power	offering	the	promise	
of	effective	office	(Björkman,	2015,	p.	204	pp.;	Vaishnav,	2017,	p.	117	pp.).		This	intercession	
from	 public	 representatives	 in	 order	 to	 expedite	 works	 further	 increases	 network	
unevenness	and	opacity.			
	
These	 intercessions	 and	 private	 infrastructures	 are	 central	 challenges	 for	 private	 sector	
water	management	 initiatives	 in	Delhi	which	we	return	to	 in	Chapter	Six.	 	 In	the	following	
chapter	I	examine	informal	water	supply	in	greater	detail	through	discussion	of	non-network	
water	and	groundwater	use	in	unauthorised	colonies.			
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CHAPTER	5.		
‘OFF-GRID’	SUPPLY:	WATER	UNDERGROUND		
	
This	 chapter	 responds	 to	 the	questions	 ‘How	do	people	access	water	outside	of	 the	piped	
network?’	and	 ‘What	role	does	groundwater	play?’	 	The	chapter	describes	water	supply	 in	
Sangam	Vihar,	a	large	low-income	area,	urbanised	without	planning	permission	and	said	to	
be	 Delhi’s	 largest	 cluster	 of	 unauthorised	 colonies.	 	 Like	many	 of	 the	 city’s	 unauthorised	
neighbourhoods,	 the	 area	 had	 no	 connection	 to	 the	 government	 network	 until	 the	 Aam	
Aadmi	Party	(AAP)	government	began	introducing	one	in	2015.	 	At	time	of	research	it	was	
dependent	 on	 tankers	 and	 tubewells,	 making	 it	 an	 excellent	 ‘limit	 case’	 to	 understand	
alternatives	 to	municipal	 piped	water	 supply.	 	 Sangam	Vihar	 is	 a	 corner	of	 the	 city	which	
often	features	in	media	and	policy	reports	covering	the	‘water	mafia’,	an	assumed	shadowy	
nexus	 of	 politicians,	 officials,	 water	 dealers	 and	 gangsters	 (Indian	 Express,	 2014;	 Sethi,	
2015).	 	 Just	 as	 ‘privatisation’	 (see	 following	 Chapter)	 is	 vulnerable	 to	 exaggerated	
characterisations,	the	‘water	mafia’	is	a	well-established	trope	in	representations	of	Delhi’s	
water.			
	
Sangam	Vihar’s	water	network	 in	 the	wide	sense	 is	highly	 fragmented	and	exists	as	much	
outside	 the	purview	of	 state	agencies	as	within	 it.	 	 There	are	a	 range	of	modes	of	 supply	
used	as	 alternatives	 (or	 supplements	 in	other	 areas)	 to	piped	network	water.	 	Household	
water	is	supplied	from	a	spectrum	of	public-privatised-private	tubewell	networks,	public	and	
private	tankers,	and	household	tubewells.	 	For	those	who	can	afford	 it,	packaged	drinking	
water	 is	also	available	from	private	suppliers.	 	These	modes	of	 ‘off-grid’	water	supply	vary	
considerably	from	one	another,	having	different	topologies	and	temporalities	and	each	lead	
to	particular	governance	dynamics.		The	modes	I	discuss	in	this	chapter	(tubewells,	tankers	
and	 bottled	 water)	 are	 more	 decentralised	 than	 network	 supply	 and	more	 personalised,	
allowing	 greater	 discretion	 from	 key	 actors.	 	 Consequently,	 compared	 to	 network	 supply,	
these	 modes	 are	 also	 more	 susceptible	 to	 diversion	 and	 capture,	 and	 present	 more	
opportunities	 for	 patronage,	 bias	 and	 rent-seeking.	 	 Tankers,	 tubewells	 and	 (local/illegal)	
bottled	water	factories	are	largely	dependent	on	informal	or	unregulated	groundwater	use	
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and	are	prevalent	 in	unauthorised	areas.	 	 In	my	study	site,	 it	appears	 that	 the	historically	
dominant	land-owning	castes’	control	over	informal	land	and	real	estate	has	led	to	influence	
in	politics	 and	water	 supply.	 	 Tankers,	 tubewell	 and	water	 factories,	 as	 decentralised	 and	
either	mobile	or	inconspicuous	operations,	are	socially	and	politically	embedded	and	harder	
to	regulate	and	reform	than	networked	water	supply.		The	informal	capture	of	tankers	and	
tubewells	is	not	a	consequence	of	informality	as	state-led	deregulation,	but	of	state	inability	
to	regulate,	and	political	unwillingness,	at	least	until	recently,	to	provide	alternatives.		This	
informality	 is	 co-constituted	 by	 the	 actions	 of	 many	 actors,	 with	 uneven	 benefits.		
Informality	 functions	 differently	 across	 water	 supply	 modes,	 and	 differently	 again	 to	
informality	in	other	areas	of	informality	such	as	land	and	labour.					
	
This	 chapter	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 	 The	 first	 section	 introduces	 the	 neighbourhood	 of	
Sangam	Vihar	and	its	politics.		The	second	section	describes	the	fixed	water	infrastructure	of	
tubewell	networks.		The	third	section	describes	the	mobile	water	infrastructure	of	tankers,	
while	the	fourth	discusses	water	‘cans’	and	illegal	bottling	factories.		The	chapter	closes	with	
a	summary	argument	from	the	empirical	data.			
	
	
Street	scenes,	Sangam	Vihar.		Water	on	the	right	is	overflow	from	clogged	drains	after	rainfall	
	
UNRULY	WATER	POLITICS	
There	has	been	a	water	mafia	in	Sangam	Vihar	for	20	years.		In	the	49	days	[of	the	
first	AAP	government]	we	forcefully	removed	them	-	we	try	to	get	people	to	engage	
with	the	water	distribution	-	we	made	certain	groups	of	people	into	committees	to	
manage	borewells.	 	We	enlisted	people	to	work.	 	They	got	control	of	all	 that	was	
under	the	water	mafia	before.		These	were	15-21	people,	from	the	general	public,	
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we	engaged	them	by	asking	people	to	contact	us	if	they	were	interested.		There	are	
two	 types	 of	 water	mafia;	 tankers	 and	 tubewells	 are	 captured	 by	 people.	 	 They	
capture	the	tubewells	and	have	private	networks.		People	depend	on	the	tubewells	
for	water	 -	people	must	give	however	much	money	 they	ask	 [jitne	paise	mangne	
logon	ko	dene	padega].		It’s	a	bit	political	but	it	won’t	be	supported.			
(Personal	communication,	Member	of	Legislative	[State]	Assembly	(MLA),	Delhi	Jal	
Board	Head	Office,	24/08/2015	–	English	and	Hindi,	fn117)	
	
On	 January	 8th	 2014,	 11	 days	 into	 the	 Aam	 Aadmi	 Party’s	 first	 government	 in	 Delhi,	 a	
‘special	 taskforce’	 from	 the	Delhi	 Jal	 Board	 (DJB)	 began	 ‘a	massive	 combing	operation’	 in	
Sangam	Vihar	and	Deoli.	 	The	unit,	combining	DJB,	District	Commissioner	staff	and	‘a	large	
police	force…	deployed	to	manage	the	situation’,	was	briefed	to	‘takeover	illegal	borewells	
involved	 in	 the	extraction	of	ground	water	 for	 their	commercial	 interests’	 (Indian	Express,	
2014).	 	 Sangam	 Vihar	 has	 become	 notorious	 for	 limited	 water	 availability	 and	 the	 AAP	
government	launched	its	operation	against	the	water	mafia	in	a	symbolic	location.		From	an	
estimated	 total	 of	 165	 government	 tubewells	 and	 200	 private	 tubewells83,	 around	 35	
tubewells	were	transferred	into	new	management84	with	private	security.			
	
Sangam	 Vihar	 is	 a	 large	 cluster	 of	 unauthorised	 colonies	 at	 the	 southern/south-eastern	
periphery	of	Delhi’s	 state	boundary.	 	 The	area	 is	 a	 vibrant,	 lively	 locality	with	many	 small	
businesses,	 proliferating	 range	 of	 housing	 types,	 often	 clean	 and	 nicely	 painted,	 and	 a	
feeling	 that	 rules	are	 relaxed,	as	well	 as	a	 certain	 reputation	 for	 crime,	even	 ‘gangwar’	 in	
popular	media85	(Indian	Express,	2013,	2015c,	Manral,	2015a,	2015b;	News	24,	2015;	Times	
of	 India,	 2016b).	 	 Many	 people	 in	 Sangam	 Vihar	 have	 obvious	 scars,	 particularly	 those	
involved	 in	 politics,	 and	 the	 area	 has	 a	 ‘street’	 feel	 to	 it.	 	 During	 research,	 a	 number	 of	
people	told	me	“be	careful	you	are	in	Sangam	Vihar	now”;	however	the	atmosphere	of	the	
area	during	daytime	 is	quite	pleasant	 in	comparison	with	more	central	and	higher	density	
low-income	urban	neighbourhoods.		Fear	of	criminality	in	Sangam	Vihar,	while	related	to	its	
low	 level	of	state	presence,	also	revives	 the	British	registration	of	 local	Gujjar	people	as	a	
‘criminal	tribe’,	‘addicted	to	cattle-lifting’	(Machonachie,	1884,	p.	85)86.			
                                                            
83	Personal	communication,	senior	local	BJP	representatives,	Sangam	Vihar,	27/11/14,	fieldnote	125	
(fnX	hereafter);	cf	figures	in	(Sheik,	Banda,	et	al.,	2015)	
84	Personal	communication,	party	workers,	Ratiya	Marg,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	fn81;	Personal	
communication,	tanker	owner	and	real	estate	dealers,	Bandh	Road,	Sangam	Vihar,	19/08/15,	fn133;		
85	https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=sangam+vihar	
86	Historical	work	on	water	in	Delhi	is	outside	the	scope	of	the	thesis	but	forthcoming	from	the	author	
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The	land	on	which	Sangam	Vihar	is	built	previously	belonged	to	Gujjar	landlords	from	village	
of	 Tughlakabad	 and	 Jaat	 villagers	 from	 Deoli87.	 	 The	 villages	 of	 Deoli	 and	 Tughlakabad’s	
‘Goojargaon’	can	be	seen	on	19th	Century	maps	of	the	area	(Burgess,	1866).		The	land	was	
sold	off	and	developed	in	the	early	1980s.			
	
[The	villager	who	owned	the	land]	divided	up	the	fields	and	people	bought	them	in	
a	 'chain	 system',	 then	 sold	 them	 on.	 	So	 one	 person	 might	 buy	 and	 big	 plot	
(subdivided	 from	a	 field)	 and	 then	divide	 further	and	 sell	 on,	 and	 so	on.	 	At	 that	
time	 the	 houses	were	 built	 of	mud	 and	painted,	 there	were	 no	 roads,	 electricity	
and	 water	 was	 from	 hand	 pumps.	 	The	 government	 would	 come	 and	 break	 the	
houses.	
Personal	communication,	resident,	Sangam	Vihar	(Deoli	side),	17	June	2015	(Hindi),	
fieldnote	/	fn87)					
	
Sangam	Vihar	houses	around	a	million	people,	the	majority	on	low	incomes,	and	very	many	
families	 from	 outside	 Delhi88.	 	 The	 area’s	 exemplary	 status	 as	 a	 very	 large	 area	 bereft	 of	
adequate	 public	 services,	means	 that	 it	 is	 unusually	 closely	 fought	 in	 state	 elections	 and	
seen	 as	 something	 of	 a	 barometer	 of	 the	 city	mood89.	 	 Because	many	 people	 in	 Sangam	
Vihar	are	migrants	 from	other	states,	 they	 face	difficulties	 in	getting	voting	 identity	cards.		
Despite	the	small	percentage	of	Sangam	Vihar	residents	that	are	registered	voters	(13.7%)	
voter	turnout	in	the	area	is	very	high;	around	60%	in	201290.		In	2014,	the	AAP	won	a	narrow	
victory	 in	 both	 the	 Sangam	 Vihar	 and	 Deoli	 constituencies,	 which	 had	 seen	 rule	 by	 both	
Bharatiya	Janata	Party	(BJP)	and	Congress	(INC)	politicians	during	previous	terms,	but	little	
change	on	the	ground.		The	new	government’s	attempts	to	transform	services	at	a	city	level,	
and	 locally,	 within	 the	 colony,	 offer	 further	 insights	 into	 the	 functioning	 of	 water	
governance	in	the	area.		
	
                                                            
87	Personal	communication,	party	worker,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	fn83;	Personal	communication,	local	
resident,	Sangam	Vihar	(Deoli	side),	17/06/15	(Hindi),	fn87;		Personal	communication,	water	supplier	
and	real	estate	dealers,	Sangam	Vihar,	19/08/15,	fn133;	Personal	communication,	real	estate	dealers,	
Sangam	Vihar,	06/02/15,	Hindi,	fn17.		On	spatial	distribution	of	castes,	personal	communication	with	
researchers	working	on	caste	and	land	use	in	Delhi	-	Tom	Cowan,	Kings	University	London;	Swastee	
Ranjan,	Jawaharlal	University;	Tarini	Manchanda,	South	Asia	University.			
88	(Sheik,	Banda,	et	al.,	2015)	
89	(A.	Bhardwaj,	2014,	2015a,	2015b,	2015c)	
90	Personal	communication,	Ashish	Bhardwaj,	Sangam	Vihar,	3/02/15,	fn8	
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The	 dominant	 Gujjar	 caste	 from	 Tughlakabad	 village	 have	 been	 influential	 in	 local	 south	
Delhi	 politics	 since	 the	 State	 Assembly	 was	 created.	 	 The	 South	 Delhi	 MP	 (Member	 of	
Parliament)	is	a	Gujjar	from	Tughlakabad	village	as	are	other	political	players	and	real	estate	
dealers91.		The	MP,	a	BJP	member,	is	credited	with	originating	plans	for	better	water	supply	
to	 the	area,	 as	well	 as	 tubewell	 installation,	 and	 is	 said	 to	have	done	 ‘lots	 for	 the	village,	
electricity,	roads,	water’	(Sharma,	2008)92.		He	has	been	the	area	candidate	for	the	BJP	since	
1993,	winning	 the	MLA	 seat	 for	 Tughlakabad	 in	 three	 consecutive	 elections	 (2003,	 2008,	
2013)	before	becoming	the	BJP	MP	for	South	Delhi	Constituency	in	201493.		The	MP	is	a	well	
known	 in	 Sangam	Vihar	and	 said	 to	have	made	his	money	 ‘in	water’.	 	 Three	 relatives	are	
MLAs	or	MLA	Candidates	in	south	east	Delhi	(Indian	Express,	2015b).	 	His	predecessor	and	
long-time	 rival,	 from	 the	Congress	party,	 the	 Tughlakabad	MLA	 from	1993-2003,	 is	 also	 a	
Gujjar	 from	 the	 same	 sub-caste.	 	 This	 kind	 of	 caste	 dominance	 is	 not	 uncommon.	 	 The	
Chhattarpur	 MLA	 seat	 in	 south	 Delhi	 has	 rotated	 between	 close	 relatives	 working	 for	
different	 parties	 since	 2008.	 	 The	 current	 Chhattarpur	 AAP	 MLA,	 (described	 as	 ‘Delhi’s	
richest	 candidate’	 –	 I	 saw	 eight	 luxury	 cars	 and	 a	 tractor	 in	 the	 drive	 to	 his	 opulent	
farmhouse	in	Fatepur	Beri),	had	worked	as	a	Delhi	Jal	Board	Junior	Engineer	until	2005,	and	
previously	 been	 a	 representative	 and	 candidate	 for	 other	 parties.	 	 In	 addition	 to	 their	
prominence	in	local	politics	and	real	estate	in	the	Sangam	Vihar	area,	Gujjar	and	Jaat	people	
are	 said	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 water	 supply	 businesses	 serving	 the	 area’s	 more	 recent	
residents94.			
	
All	 the	politicians	 are	 talking	 about	water,	 electricity,	 streets,	 drains,	 but	 they	do	
not	give	details	they	just	say	“give	us	your	vote	and	we’ll	give	you	water	[vote	do	
aur	paani	denge]”.	
(Personal	 communication,	 Aasha95,	 Non-Governmental	 Organisation	 (NGO)	
Manager,	resident,	BJP-supporter	(female,	late-20s),	Sangam	Vihar,	16/01/15,	Hindi	
and	English,	fn13)			
                                                            
91	Personal	communication,	real	estate	dealer,	from	Tughlakabad	village	and	related	to	the	MP,	Sangam	
Vihar	(Tughlakabad	side),	06/02/15,	Hindi,	fn17.		As	on	Delhi’s	south	western	border	Yadav’s	are	also	a	
presence	in	real	estate	circles.		Personal	communication,	Tom	Cowan,	PhD	researcher,	Kings	University	
London,	November	2015	
92	Personal	communication,	urban	researcher	working	in	Badarpur	area,	15/01/16,	fn126.		Personal	
communication,	real	estate	dealers,	including	relative	of	Bidhuri’s,	Sangam	Vihar,	06/02/15,	fn17			
93	Ramesh	Bidhuri	leading	protest	against	AAP	water	mafia	-	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zl8yYNPEuIA	
94	Personal	communication,	party	worker,	Sangam	Vihar,	9/07/15,	fn93;	personal	communication	
tanker	owner	and	SV	resident,	Saket,	16/08/15,	fn115	
95	All	names	have	been	changed	except	journalists,	researchers	and	politicians	of	MLA	level	and	above	
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Water	was	a	major	element	of	the	AAP	election	campaigns,	and	‘the	water	mafia’	a	foil	of	
both	the	AAP	and	the	previous	Sheila	Dikshit-led	Congress	government.		Dramatic	incidents	
involving	water,	like	the	tubewell	taskforce,	are	fairly	common	(Sakorkar,	2014;	The	Pioneer,	
2013;	Zee	News,	2015).		In	May	2014,	the	AAP	MLA	for	Deoli	led	a	dharna	[peaceful	sitting	
protests]	 outside	 DJB	 offices	 over	 lack	 of	 water	 supply	 for	 his	 constituency	 (The	 Hindu,	
2014).		Later	in	the	year,	the	AAP	MLA	for	Sangam	Vihar	was	slapped	by	an	irate	woman	in	
response	 to	 his	 enquiries	 about	water.	 	 The	 South	 Delhi	MP	 has	 also	 led	 public	 protests	
against	‘the	AAP	water	mafia’.		At	time	of	writing,	the	AAP	MLA	for	Sangam	Vihar	had	been	
jailed	 for	 a	 separate	 complaint,	 provoking	 Delhi’s	 AAP	 Chief	Minister,	 Arvind	 Kejriwal,	 to	
accuse	Narendra	Modi’s	BJP	Union	government	of	interference.		Both	Sangam	Vihar’s	MLAs	
are	Members	on	the	DJB’s	Board	of	Directors,	however	their	strengths	on	the	ground	differ	
(see	Tubewells	section	below).	 	The	MLA	for	one	constituency	 is	older,	and	has	a	stronger	
crew	with	ward	 level	 ‘youth	 leaders’	 (youth	does	not	 seem	 to	be	a	 requisite)	 and	a	 large	
number	of	young	men	working	for	him	at	his	constituency	office.		These	local	party	workers	
seem	 to	be	quite	 close	 to	pradhans	 and	BJP	workers	–	established	neighbourhood	power	
centres.	 	 The	 local	 AAP	 party	 has	 split	 amid	 accusations	 that	 MLAs	 are	 themselves	
continuing	 the	 ‘water	mafia’	 rent-seeking	and	patronage	of	 their	predecessors	 from	other	
parties.		Allegations	of	corruption	in	water	supply	have	led	to	spectacular	break-ups	within	
the	party	at	a	city-level	also	(see	page	18,	footnote	9).			
	
Until	recently,	the	DJB	supplied	water	to	Sangam	Vihar	through	tubewells	and	tankers	only.		
This	 lack	 of	 piped	 supply	 left	 residents	 relying	 on	 a	 range	 of	 alternative	 supplementary	
sources,	including	the	informal	water	economy	associated	with	‘the	water	mafia’.			
	
‘Mafia’	here	 is	not	 like	 in	your	Western	movies.		 It’s	not	 like	 in	 the	Godfather!		 It	
means	 people	 that	 control	 the	market.	 	With	 tubewells	 this	means	 people	 have	
captured	 the	wells	and	control	 the	prices.		With	 tankers	you	need	connections	 in	
the	DJB	 to	 get	 them	delivered.		With	 private	 tankers	 it	means	 that	 these	 people	
control	the	trade.		
(Personal	 communication,	Ashish	Bhardwaj,	 Ratiya	Marg,	 Sangam	Vihar,	 3/02/15,	
fn15)		
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A	 friend,	Asha,	 quoted	 above,	 told	me	 that	 the	 reason	her	 area	 could	 not	 get	water	was	
because	of	‘corruption’.	 	 ‘People	have	been	to	ask	the	DJB	guy	about	it’,	she	said.		‘He	has	
bought	 ten	 machines	 but	 he	 only	 uses	 five	 of	 them.		 When	 people	 asked,	 he	 asked	 for	
money	 to	 use	 the	 other	 five’96.		 In	 a	 conversation	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 Sangam	 Vihar,	 a	
pradhan,	Ram	Kumar,	and	his	friend	also	gave	a	story	of	corruption	as	behind	the	reason	for	
the	 lack	of	authorisation	for	water	supply.	 	They	said	 ‘corruption	 in	the	water	supply’	was	
why	 ‘the	previous	MLA	didn't	get	the	authorisation	to	extend	DJB	water	to	the	area.	 	This	
was	 because	 the	 DJB	 was	 taking	 money,	 and	 the	 MLA	 and	 the	 [Sub-Divisional	 Officer]	
also’97.		 ‘Just	 like	 the	 DJB	 [staff]	 might	 ask	 for	 money	 [as	 a	 side	 payment]	 for	 a	 new	
connection,	 this	 was	 [a	 larger	 amount	 for]	 connecting	 a	 whole	 new	 area’.	 	‘Tanker	
businesses	are	also	there’,	they	added	significantly98.		Returning	to	the	topic	of	why	Sangam	
Vihar	couldn’t	get	piped	water	from	the	DJB	later	in	the	conversation,	Ram	Kumar	says	that	
it	 was	 not	 that	 the	 previous	 guy	 didn't	 do	 the	 work	 but	 that	 it	 just	 took	 a	 long	
time.		‘Actually	the	MP	started	the	work	ten	years	ago,’	he	said.	 	This	refers	to	the	current	
MP	 while	 he	 was	 still	 an	 MLA.	 	 They	 both	 say	 that	 the	 previous	 BJP	 MLA	 ‘didn't	 do	
work’.		Ram	Kumar,	whose	father	was	also	a	pradhan,	told	me	that	there	used	to	be	an	NGO	
working	there	in	his	father's	time	that	‘made	improvements	to	the	roads	and	the	electricity	
and	water	and	did	education	for	children’.		
		
When	the	[Congress	party]	politician	came	in	[mentioned	on	p143	above],	the	NGO	
had	to	go	because	they	were	doing	people's	work	for	free	and	the	politician	would	
say	if	you	want	work	done	you	must	give	me	money.			
(Personal	communication,	pradhan,	Sangam	Vihar,	03/07/15,	originally	Hindi,	fn91)	
	
Suspending	judgement	as	to	the	truth	of	the	allegations,	 I	quote	the	excerpts	above	as	an	
example	of	popular	perceptions	around	water	supply	in	Sangam	Vihar.		Formally,	the	lack	of	
piped	 supply	 is	 determined	 at	 a	 higher	 level	 by	 a	 partially	 laid	 pipe	 network	 as	much	 as	
administrative	 regulations.	 	 However,	 many	 residents	 felt	 that	 personal	 partiality	 of	 key	
politicians	 and	 officials,	 led	 to	 biased	 allocation	 of	 services.	 	 For	 example,	 in	 2013,	
dissatisfied	 residents	 reported	 that	as	Deoli	had	elected	an	MLA	 from	the	 ruling	Congress	
                                                            
96	Personal	communication,	local	resident,	Sangam	Vihar,	6/11/14,	Hindi	and	English,	fn11	
97	Another	respondent	in	a	different	site	also	said	that	the	SDO	was	involved	in	corruption	in	water	
provision,	personal	communication,	resident	(male	c.45),	urban	village	(Hindu),	south	Delhi,	21/01/15,	
fn14	
98	Personal	communication,	pradhan,	Sangam	Vihar,	03/07/15,	Hindi,	fn91	
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party,	they	had	been	provided	infrastructure	but	that	as	the	Sangam	Vihar	MLA	was	BJP	he	
was	unable	to	get	work	done99.		The	MLA	for	Sangam	Vihar	at	that	time	was	described	to	me	
as	‘water	mafia’	by	AAP	workers100.		Similarly,	a	volunteer,	Ravi,	described	the	discretionary	
allocation	of	water	by	party	workers:			
	
Before	us	the	MLA	was	BJP	[…]	He	did	some	work,	I	will	not	say	he	did	nothing,	but	
on	water	 issues	he	placed	his	people	on	the	water	sources.	 	They	consume	water	
and	sell	water.		They	were	making	money	from	water	sources.		If	you	are	living	in	
Sangam	Vihar	you	require	water	so	pay	me.		It	was	black	[money],	₹100	per	month.		
If	there	is	shortage,	then	water	must	be	arranged	from	somewhere	–	you	can't	live	
without.		Price	could	be	₹500-1000	for	some	reasons.		[They	would	give	or	not	give]	
–	this	one	is	BJP	person,	this	one	is	not.		They	would	have	people	on	the	pipelines,	
they	 are	 strong	people	in	 fighting	mode	 so	 even	 if	 one	 [person]	 gets	 good	water	
and	other	gets	none	 they	will	not	say	anything	because	 [they	 feel]	 ‘he's	our	neta	
[leader]’.		It	was	like	this	in	the	whole	MLA	area.			
(Personal	 communication,	 AAP	 party	worker,	 Sangam	Vihar,	 18/05/15,	 Hindi	 and	
English,	fn81)	
	
MLA	staff	said	that	water	is	the	most	common	reason	for	visiting	the	office,101	and	almost	all	
the	residents	who	came	during	the	many	times	I	was	there	were	indeed	asking	for	water	or	
complaining	that	there	was	a	problem	with	their	water102.		Both	water	tankers	and	tubewells	
are	said	to	be	closely	related	to	the	economy	of	party	politics.		Control	over	tankers	is	seen	
as	one	of	the	perks	of	MLA	office,	which	is	commonly	used	as	a	source	of	income	or	means	
of	dispensing	patronage	to	constituents.		Patronage	is	also	involved	in	the	siting	and	speed	
of	approval	of	tubewell	requests	by	the	MLA103.			
	
The	‘renationalisation’	of	the	35	tubewells	under	the	AAP	MLA	during	the	’49	days’	brought	
tubewell	 network	prices	down,	 in	 those	 areas	where	 the	AAP	had	enough	 strength	 to	be	
able	to	do	it.		This	helped	contribute	to	people’s	nostalgia	and	support	for	the	AAP.		Some	
people	 also	 said	 that	 the	 AAP	 people	 running	 the	 tubewells	 were	 discriminating	 against	
them	 and	 that	 this	 is	 why	 the	 AAP	MLA	 got	 slapped104.	 	 The	MLA	 himself	 described	 the	
incident	 as	 negative	 publicity	 deliberately	 generated	 by	 ‘water	 mafia’	 (Akram,	 2014;	
                                                            
99	(‘Deoli	(Delhi	Assembly	constituency)’,	2015;	Vyawahare	&	Bearak,	2013)	
100	Personal	communication,	AAP	workers,	Ratiya	Marg,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/05/15,	fn81	
101	Personal	communication,	senior	party	worker,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	fn81	
102	cf	Meeting	with	Chhattarpur	MLA,	15/05/15,	fn74.			
103	Personal	communication,	senior	local	BJP	representatives,	Sangam	Vihar,	27/11/14,	Hindi,	fn125.			
104	Personal	communication,	national	journalist,	Ratiya	Marg,	Sangam	Vihar,	3/02/15,	fn8	
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Firstpost,	2014)105.	 	This	 incident	has	continued	 to	dog	him,	and	at	 time	of	writing	he	had	
been	jailed	in	response.		These	sort	of	accusations	and	counter-accusations	are	described	as	
‘playing	politics’	in	India,	or	simply	‘politics’,	as	in	the	MLA’s	quote	at	the	start	of	the	section	
(cf	 D.	 Singh,	 2016;	 Times	 of	 India,	 2016a;	 Daily	 News	 and	 Analysis,	 2016).	 	 Differences	
between	 AAP	 workers	 and	 volunteers,	 and	 ongoing	 conversations	 amongst	 participants	
about	the	direction	of	the	Aam	Aadmi	movement/party	were	obvious	during	my	fieldwork.	
Residents	 have	 described	 tubewell	 capture	 as	 linked	 to	 the	MLA’s	 office	 (under	 previous	
governments)	to	other	researchers	also	(A.	Bhardwaj,	2015b;	Sheik,	Banda,	et	al.,	2015).			
	
	 	
Sign	on	right	reads:	In	ward	no.	177	Sonia	Vihar	water	pipe	line	joining	work	by	DJB	courtesy	of	Aam	
Aadmi	Party’s	popular	MLA			
		
Just	as	there	can	be	competition	to	show	up	rivals,	demonstrations	of	public	work	are	also	
competitive	and	claimed	by	politicians	to	ensure	that	the	public	 is	aware	of	who	has	been	
responsible.	 	 Signs,	banners	and	posters	 in	Sangam	Vihar	and	Malviya	Nagar	proclaim	the	
advent	of	new	‘Sonia	Vihar’	water	lines	with	credit	due	to	the	MLA.		This	competition	to	be	
seen	to	be	doing	public	service	induces	political	representatives	to	operate	outside	the	legal	
framework	if	 it	 is	 in	their	constituents’	 interests.	 	While	spending	time	in	the	AAP	office	in	
Sangam	Vihar,	a	senior	worker,	Kamal,	who	usually	works	 in	a	different	office,	but	 lives	 in	
Sangam	 Vihar,	 showed	 me	 photos	 on	 his	 phone	 of	 a	 crowd	 and	 some	 people	 wearing	
marigold	garlands	and	pipes.		He	told	me	it	was	a	new	water	supply	inaugurated	yesterday	
                                                            
105	Cf	claims	that	both	parties	are	selling	water	(Abhimanyu	Singh,	2016)	
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in	 a	 different	 area.	 	I	 ask	 about	 the	 tubewell	 and	 he	 says	 “No,	 I	 broke	 the	 pipes	 to	 give	
people	water.		It	is	illegal	but	I	did	it	anyway	for	the	people.		I	can	go	to	jail	it	doesn't	matter	
it	will	make	 a	name”.	 	He	 takes	 a	 connection	 from	 the	mains	pipe	 illegally	 and	 then	 runs	
smaller	lane	pipes	off	this.		He	says	he	has	done	four	or	five	of	these106.			
		
Although	the	water	situation	 in	Sangam	Vihar	was	different	 in	different	 lanes,	households	
use	four	to	five	different	sources	of	water.		For	a	household	of	five,	water	bills	of	over	3,000	
rupees	(£30)	a	month	is	quite	likely	across	DJB	and	private	tubewells,	topped	up	with	tanker	
water	 and	 20	 litre	 cans	 for	 drinking	 for	 those	 who	 can	 afford	 them.	 	 As	 the	 monthly	
household	 income	of	the	one	 in	six	of	Delhi’s	population	who	are	Below	Poverty	Line	was	
3,060	rupees	in	2005,	it	 is	 likely	that	many	people	consume	untreated	water	(Government	
of	NCT	of	Delhi,	2009,	p.	239).			
	
Tankers	 are	 supposed	 to	 give	 drinking	 water	 -	 this	 is	 how	 DJB	 justifies	 giving	
tubewell	water	 -	 because	 it's	not	 for	drinking.	 	Borewells	 are	 for	everything	else.		
(Personal	communication,	Aman	Sethi,	journalist,	Defence	Colony,	Delhi,	02/06/15,	
fn86).			
	
Tubewells,	 private	 tankers	 and	 illegal	 water	 factories	 all	 use	 groundwater.	 	 Extraction	 is	
cheap	and	hard	to	detect.	 	These	private	sector	suppliers	also	sometimes	overlap	with	the	
public	 sector	 tankers	 and	 tubewells,	 meaning	 reduced	 water	 availability	 for	 low-income	
users	who	must	 rely	on	public	sources.	 	Tubewell	networks	are	valued	over	 tanker	supply	
only107,	 although	 many	 residents	 still	 require	 tankers	 to	 supplement	 inadequate	 supply.		
Groundwater	 is	 a	 sub-optimal	 solution;	 unclean,	 untreated	 (except	 in	 factories)	 and	
seasonally	 variable.	 	 Further,	 water	 levels	 are	 declining	 due	 to	 high	 extraction	 rates,	
resulting	 in	 lower	 quality	 water,	 and	 increased	 need	 for	 well	 re-drilling	 and	 pump	 repair	
(Kulkarni	 &	 Shah,	 2015;	 Kulkarni	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 	 I	 first	 discuss	 tubewells	 (also	 known	 as	
borewells),	then	tankers,	last	bottled	or	‘canned’	water.				
	
                                                            
106	Personal	communication,	senior	local	party	worker,	MLA	office,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	Hindi,	fn81	
107	Focus	group,	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	Hindi,	fn24	
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TUBEWELL	TERRITORIES	
The	 first	 government	 tubewells	 in	 Sangam	 Vihar	 were	 installed	 by	 the	 DJB	 ‘after	 1991’	
(Kacker	&	Joshi,	2016,	p.	260).		In	subsequent	years	residents	petitioned	the	area	MLAs	for	
more	 tubewells.	 	 In	2013,	 the	DJB	 listed	82	 tubewells	 for	 the	Sangam	Vihar	 constituency,	
and	74	for	Deoli.		The	quantity	varied	considerably	across	blocks,	with	just	one	reported	in	J-
2,	J-3	(Sangam	Vihar)	and	M-1	(Deoli)	and	11	in	H	(Sangam	Vihar)	and	15	in	L	(Deoli)	(Sheik,	
Banda,	et	al.,	2015,	p.	5).			
	
A	tubewell	is	obtained	by	writing	a	letter	signed	by	local	residents	to	the	MLA,	who	will	then	
forward	the	request	on	to	the	DJB108.		This	introduces	an	element	of	discretion	on	the	part	of	
the	MLA,	speed	of	responding/	forwarding	the	request	and	the	siting	of	the	tubewell	being	
the	 main	 parameters	 where	 variability	 of	 outcome	 is	 possible109.	 	 I	 was	 told	 that	 these	
requests	as	with	other	requests	to	the	MLA	could	sometimes	require	several	visits	from	the	
petitioner,	and	might	not	be	forwarded	from	the	MLA’s	office	depending	on	the	petitioner’s	
relationship	with	him.		‘Getting	the	signatures	is	not	hard,	but	getting	the	MLA	to	accept	the	
letter	 is	 hard’110.	 	 (Similar	 things	 were	 said	 about	 voter	 registration	 for	 slum	 dwellers	 in	
Malviya	Nagar.)	 	 I	was	unable	 to	 find	out	why	 the	MLA	accepting	 the	 letter	was	difficult.		
When	the	MLA	changes,	 the	paperwork,	 for	 tankers,	 tubewells,	 roads,	pensions,	voter	 IDs	
etc,	is	abandoned	and	the	process	must	begin	again.	
	
The	MLA	 is	not	 the	only	power-holder	 in	 the	process	of	 tubewell	 (or	piped	water)	supply.		
Network	water	pipes	were	laid	in	Sangam	Vihar	in	2008,	although	it	was	another	eight	years	
before	network	water	could	be	supplied111.	 	To	take	another	example,	for	tubewells,	a	No-
Objection	Certificate	(NOC)	is	also	required	from	the	Sub-Divisional	Magistrate	(SDM)	and	it	
is	DJB	 Junior	Engineers	and	staff	 that	will	actually	arrange	and	do	the	work.	 	The	MLA	for	
one	 side	 of	 Sangam	 Vihar	 told	 us	 that	 he	 had	 not	 been	 able	 to	 spend	 his	 discretionary	
budget	of	 forty	million	 rupees	 for	 that	year,	plus	 thirty	million	unspent	 from	the	previous	
office	 holder,	 as	 he	 had	 difficulty	 both	 in	 persuading	 the	 DJB	 to	 do	 his	 work,	 and	 with	
                                                            
108	Personal	communication,	party	workers	at	MLA	office,	18/05/15,	fn81;	Personal	communication,	
pradhan	and	ex-municipal	counsellor,	Kapasevra,	Delhi,	2015,	Hindi,	fn33			
109	Personal	communication,	senior	local	party	leaders,	Sangam	Vihar	L1st,	27/11/14,	fn125	
110	Personal	communication,	NGO	manager,	Sangam	Vihar,	17/06/15,	fn87	
111	Personal	communication,	Aman	Sethi,	journalist,	Defence	Colony,	Delhi,	02/06/15,	fn86			
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popular	support	(‘strength	on	the	ground’)	to	get	it	done.		He	had	managed	to	install	only	six	
new	tubewells	during	the	49	days.		In	contrast	the	MLA	for	the	other	side	got	18	new	or	re-
bored	 tubewells	 done	 in	 the	 49	 days	 across	 six	 blocks112.	 	 However,	 the	 MLA’s	 fortunes	
appeared	to	have	reversed	over	the	following	years	(see	pages	147,	165).					
	
Commonly,	general	domestic	water	is	sourced	from	tubewell	networks	(public	/	private)	and	
tankers.	 	Many	 households	 use	 both	DJB	 and	 private	 tubewell	 networks.	 	 For	 a	 tubewell	
network,	a	submersible	pump	is	sunk	at	depths	from	350-600	feet,	connected	to	electricity	
and	an	operating	terminal	and	pipelines	are	laid	from	the	above	ground	unit	into	different	
lanes	and	houses.		The	DJB	installed	tubewell	networks	usually	cover	three	to	five	lanes	of	
100-200	households	each,	but	users	 and	operators	 I	 spoke	described	networks	 ranging	 in	
size	 from	 20	 to	 ‘300-500	 [houses]	 minimum’113.	 	 The	 network	 owners	 may	 also	 add	
additional	households	onto	the	network;	for	example,	if	houses	are	extended	vertically	with	
an	 extra	 floor	 for	 rent.	 	 The	 pump	 is	 operated	 as	 often	 as	 necessary	 to	 supply	 water	 to	
connected	houses	for	a	fee.			
	
In	some	blocks	government	tubewell	networks	supplied	water	to	each	house	for	an	hour	a	
day114.	 	 However,	 most	 networks	 are	 oversubscribed,	 and	 many	 people	 said	 that	 the	
government	 tubewells	 gave	 them	water	 once	 or	 twice	 a	month115.	 	 In	 areas	 towards	 the	
edge	of	the	colony,	supply	was	less	frequent	and	people	might	get	water	once	in	five	to	six	
weeks	or	two	months116.	 	For	oversubscribed	networks,	pumps	will	be	running	twenty-four	
hours	a	day	but	water	 is	 still	 insufficient117.	 	As	Tej,	a	 local	 resident,	 told	me,	people	cope	
                                                            
112	Personal	communication,	MLA,	10/11/14,	fn12;	Personal	communication,	senior	local	party	worker	
at	MLAs	office,	18/05/15,	fn81	
113	Personal	communication,	local	residents,	NGO	office,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/14,	fn21;	Personal	
communication,	pradhan	and	kholnewala,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn48;	Personal	communication,	
AAP	party	workers,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	fn81	
114	Personal	communication,	former	party	worker,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/12/15,	fn132		
115	Personal	communication,	resident	(female,	c.55),	6/11/14,	fn11b;	Personal	communication,	Ashish	
Bhardwaj,	Sangam	Vihar,	3/02/15,	fn15;	Personal	communication,	residents	(male,	c.20	&25),	
04/02/15,	fn16b;	Personal	communication,	real	estate	broker,	(male,	c.40),	Sangam	Vihar,	06/02/15	
fnF17a;	Focus	group,	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn24;	Personal	communication,	resident	
(female,	c.30),	Sangam	Vihar,	October	14,	fn47;	personal	communication,	health	worker	and	resident	
(male,	c.25),	Private	Hospital,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/05/15	fnF75;	Personal	communication,	AAP	party	
workers,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	fn81		
116	Focus	group,	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn24;	Personal	communication,	tanker	owner,	
Sangam	Vihar	resident,	Saket,	16/08/15,	Hindi,	fn115	
117	Personal	communication,	kholnewali,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	Hindi,	fn23	
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with	little	water	by	using	less,	‘they	bathe	once	in	two	days,	if	water	doesn’t	come,	maybe	
once	 in	 two	 or	 four	 days’118.	 	 Supply	 frequencies	 depends	 on	 the	 number	 of	 connected	
households,	 the	power	of	 the	pump,	 the	depth	of	 the	well,	and	any	additional	use	by	the	
tubewell	 owners	 (for	 example,	 filling	 tankers	 for	 sale,	 see	 section	 on	 Tankers	 page	 163	
below).				
	
In	 2016,	 there	were	 165	 government	 tubewells	 in	 Sangam	 Vihar.	 	 Using	 population	 data	
from	(A.	Bhardwaj,	2015a)	this	averages	one	tubewell	for	every	6,000	residents.		Tubewells	
in	the	Sangam	Vihar	area	can	yield	over	four	thousand	litres	an	hour,	or	100	thousand	litres	
a	day	 (Centre	 for	Science	and	Environment,	2010).	 	Using	 these	yields	 (Centre	 for	Science	
and	Environment,	2010,	pp.	4–5),	if	all	wells	were	running	24	hours	a	day	this	would	give	36	
litres	per	person	per	day	–	below	WHO	minimum	household	requirements	(Gleick,	2000,	p.	
11).			
	
When	the	area	was	first	settled,	residents	could	find	water	at	thirty	feet	with	hand	pumps,	
however	 now	 borings	 at	 least	 650	 feet	 deep	 are	 required119.	 	 Several	 interviewees	
mentioned	the	declining	groundwater	level120.		In	some	areas	people	said	that	the	increase	
in	population	had	led	to	lower	water	availability121.		Declining	groundwater	levels	means	that	
households	connected	to	a	tubewell	network	have	to	share	a	decreasing	amount	of	water.		
As	the	tubewell	motors	are	running	24	hours	a	day	there	is	an	absolute	limit	on	the	quantity	
of	water	available122.			
		
In	 many	 parts	 of	 Sangam	 Vihar	 groundwater	 levels	 have	 reached	 the	 limit	 of	 viable	
extraction.	 	 What	 remains	 is	 increasingly	 ‘hard’123	 and	 not	 worth	 drinking.	 	 Network	
managers	recognise	that	the	water	table	is	falling	and	is	causing	problems	for	the	tubewell	
                                                            
118	Personal	communication,	party	volunteer,	Sangam	Vihar,	9/07/15,	Hindi,	fn93		
119	Personal	communication,	local	party	worker	at	MLAs	office,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	fn81;	Personal	
communication,	senior	local	BJP	representatives,	Sangam	Vihar,	27/11/14,	Hindi,	fn125	
120	Personal	communication,	residents	(male,	c.20	&25),	04/02/15,	fn16b;	Personal	communication,	
private	tubewell	owners,	Sangam	Vihar,	04/02/15	fn16c;	Personal	communication,	pradhan	and	
kholnewala,	Sangam	Vihar,	03/07/15,	fnF91;		
121	Focus	group,	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn24;	Personal	communication,	pradhan	and	
kholnewala,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn48	
122	Personal	communication,	kholnewali,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn23;	Personal	communication,	
pradhan	and	kholnewala,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn48		
123	khada	-	hard	/	bitter	
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supply124.	 	 This	 kind	 of	 water	 is	 also	 damaging	 for	 submersible	 motors,	 as	 it	 is	 heavily	
saturated	 with	 sand	 and	 gritty	 particles	 which	 erode	 the	 blades	 of	 the	 pump,	 ‘like	
sandpaper’125.		This	dramatically	shortens	the	lifespan	of	a	submersible	pump	(from	2-3	years	
to	 maybe	 six	 months),	 consequently	 repairing	 government	 tubewell	 pumps	 which	 have	
broken	is	a	daily	activity	for	municipal	subcontractors126.		This	diminishing	quantity	of	water	
also	leads	to	quality	issues.		I	vividly	remember	being	shown	some	water	that	had	been	left	
standing	 for	 two	days	 and	had	 ‘gone	bad’	 [kharab	ho	gaya].	 	 It	 had	 light	 brown	particles	
floating	 in	 it.	 	They	 looked	 like	 feathery	 shit127.	 	 The	decline	 in	water	 tables	also	 increases	
pressure	on	the	network	managers	who	must	distribute	water	among,	and	collect	payment	
from,	 households.	 	 One	 manager	 I	 spoke	 to	 had	 quit	 the	 job	 as	 complaints	 over	 the	
decreasing	amount	and	quality	of	water	were	more	than	she	could	stand128.			
	
Households	pay	monthly	 fees	 for	a	connection	to	a	government	tubewell	network.	 	These	
are	officially	50	rupees,	but	up	to	200	may	be	charged	by	the	network	manager129.		Private	
networks	charge	more;	some	people	said	they	only	paid	₹50,	but	more	commonly	amounts	
of	₹250-700	were	quoted.		As	the	tubewell	water	is	not	treated	for	drinking,	everyone	who	
can	afford	to	buys	20	 litre	plastic	cans	of	drinking	water	 (see	section	on	Bottles,	Cans	and	
Factories,	page	117).			
	
The	 quantity	 and	 pressure	 of	 tubewell	 water	 is	 limited,	 and	 the	 water	 is	 supplied	 in	 a	
rotating	 fashion,	described	as	 ‘serial’,	 to	 the	pipes	 for	different	 lanes	and	houses.	 	 This	 is	
common	 in	 rural	 tubewell	 use	 (e.g.	 T.	 Shah,	 2008,	 p.	 11).	 	 However,	while	 rural	 tubewell	
rotations	 are	 said	 to	provide	 ‘timely’	water	 supply	 ‘discipline’,	 urban	 tubewell	 supply	was	
frequently	described	to	me	as	random	and	unpredictable	(Dubash,	2001,	pp.	190,	218).		The	
                                                            
124	Personal	communication,	pradhan,	03/07/15,	Sangam	Vihar,	fn91	
125	Personal	communication,	Water	Pump	Dealer,	Malviya	Nagar,	21/08/15,	fn135	
126	Personal	communication,	workers	re-boring	tubewell,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn19	
127	Observations,	transect	walk	with	local	resident,	Sangam	Vihar,	6th	November	2014,	fn11			
128	Personal	communication,	kholnewala,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/02/15,	fn23	
129	Timings	and	prices	from:	Transect	walk	and	conversations	with	local	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	6th	
November	2014,	fn11;	transect	walk	and	conversations	with	local	resident,	Sangam	Vihar,	04/02/15,	fn16;		
Personal	communication,	local	residents,	NGO	office,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/14,	fn21;	Personal	communication,	
kholnewali,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	Hindi,	fn23;	Focus	group	with	local	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	
fn24;	Personal	communication,	resident	(female,	c.30),	Sangam	Vihar,	October	14,	fn47;	Personal	
communication,	pradhan	and	kholnewala,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn48;	Personal	communication,	resident	
(female,	c.30),	BJP	supporter,	17/06/15,	fn87 
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rotational	 tubewell	 supply	 	 requires	manual	 intervention	 to	 open	 and	 close	 the	 valves	 to	
different	 pipes.	 	 The	 person	 responsible	 for	 opening	 the	 valves	 for	 different	 lanes	 and	
houses	is	called	the	paani	kholnewala	(‘water	opener’)130.		This	person	was	also	referred	to	
as	the	paani	malik	(‘water	owner’).		Drinking	Mountain	Dew	in	their	small	party	office,	Ravi	
and	other	AAP	party	volunteers	described	the	kholnewala	system	to	me:	’Fifty	to	a	hundred	
rupees	is	collected	for	the	water	by	a	local	person.		One	bore	is	for	minimum	three	to	five	
hundred	homes.		Two	persons	may	do	the	kholnewala	work	also.		They	make	about	eight	or	
seven	thousand	rupees	a	month,	which	includes	maintenance’.		I	did	some	maths;	500	x	100	
=	50,000	per	month!		‘Water	might	come	once	in	ten	days,	fifteen	days,	once	a	month.		The	
problem	is	not	only	where	to	store	enough	water	for	two	weeks	or	a	month	-	people	don't	
have	enough	space	-	but	also	that	it	will	‘go	bad’	[kharab	ho	jaega]131.		So	for	drinking	they	
purchase	[English	word	used]	20	litre	cans	for	₹20-25’132.			
	
I	met	several	kholnewalas.	 	They	often	had	a	connection	to	the	area	pradhan,	an	 informal	
local	leader,	if	they	were	not	themselves	a	pradhan	(see	p77).		The	role	gives	operators	who	
are	socially	powerful	control	over	the	network	and	the	ability	to	divert	water	for	personal	
use,	 patronage	 or	 profit	 as	 well	 as	 generating	 a	 considerable	 income133.	 	 While	 some	
pradhans	(like	Shiv	below),	were	themselves	kholnewalas,	in	other	areas,	the	pradhan	might	
own	the	well	(like	Viraj	and	Ram	Kumar),	but	the	job	had	been	subcontracted	to	others134.		
In	some	areas	it	seemed	that	the	kholnewala	post	and	tubewell	rates	were	connected	to	the	
pradhan	 sabha	 [pradhan’s	meeting]	 and	 its	 ‘members’	 to	which	other	 residents	were	not	
                                                            
130	Personal	communication,	resident	(female,	c.55),	6/11/14,	fn11b;	personal	communication,	
residents	(male,	c.20	&25),	04/02/15,	fn16b;	personal	communication,	former	kholnewala,	18/02/15,	
fn23;	Focus	group	with	local	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn24;	Personal	communication,	
kholnewala	and	pradhan,	16/02/15,	fn24b;	personal	communication,	residents	(female,	35,45,55),	
2/05/15,	fn66;	Personal	communication,	AAP	party	workers,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	fn81;	Personal	
communication,	resident	(female,	c.30),	BJP	supporter,	17/06/15,	fn87	
131	As	in	the	three	days	old	water	with	things	growing	in	it!		Fieldnote	11,	page	102	above			
132	Personal	communication,	local	party	worker	at	MLAs	office,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	fn81	
133	Similarly,	in	another	site,	Datta	describes	a	conversation	with	residents	who	describe	the	local	
people	subcontracted	to	manage	the	privatised	electricity	distribution	as	‘ruffians’	who	‘ask	for	bribes	
and	terrorize	the	people’	(Datta,	2012,	p.	103).		For	discussion	of	this	informal	electricity	connection	
subcontracting	in	Sangam	Vihar	see	(Das	Gupta	&	Puri,	2005).	
134	Personal	communication,	local	resident,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn22;	Personal	communication,	
kholnewali,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn23;	Personal	communication,	kholnewala,	Sangam	Vihar,	
16/02/15,	fn24:	Personal	communication,	pradhan,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn48;	Personal	
communication,	kholnewali’s	relative,	17/02/15,	fn26;	Personal	communication,	AAP	party	workers,	
Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	fn81;	Personal	communication,	NGO	manager,	Sangam	Vihar,	17/06/15,	fn87	
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always	welcome135.	 	 Tubewell	managers	are	also	often	associated	with	a	political	party	or	
have	 party	 connections,	 but	 as	more	 than	 one	 of	my	 informants	 told	me:	 “everyone	 has	
some	political	connections,	contacts.		That	doesn’t	mean	they	are	partisan.		It’s	just	that	you	
need	political	connections	to	get	by’136.	
	
Sangam	Vihar	streets	
			
	
I	 sat	 with	 Ram	 Kumar,	 a	 pradhan,	 in	 his	 marble	 hall	 (Chapter	 Four)	 with	 Bhalli,	 an	 AAP	
volunteer,	drinking	tea	and	Mountain	Dew	(again)	and	asking	about	local	history	and	water	
in	his	part	of	Sangam	Vihar.			
	
Most	people	are	on	private	borewell	networks	as	DJB	water	doesn't	come.		These	
cost	 around	6-700	 rupees	per	month.	 	The	water	 is	 not	 for	 drinking	 just	washing	
clothes	and	cleaning	etc		For	drinking	most	people	buy	the	20	litre	cans.		The	water	
from	the	ground	is	very	hard.		DJB	tankers	do	come.	[…]	The	water	is	800	feet	deep,	
tubewells	 a	 thousand.	 	But	 the	 water	 is	 still	 not	 good.	 	It	 has	 little	 things	 in	 it	 -	
stones,	dust	and	dirt	[Ram	Kumar	and	Bhalli	agree	enthusiastically	when	I	suggest	
dhool,	the	Hindi	word	for	dust].		This	gives	people	kidney	problems.		It	also	breaks	
the	electrical	parts	 in	RO	 [reverse	osmosis]	 filters	because	 it	 is	 salty.	 	So	 they	will	
last	about	a	year,	maybe	only	six	months.		It	is	a	negotiation,	a	compromise	[English	
words	used]	[…]	the	water	is	going	down	every	day.		
(Personal	communication,	pradhan	and	tubewell	owner,	Sangam	Vihar,	03/07/15,	
Hindi,	fn91)						
	
I	met	 Shiv,	 a	kholnewala	 and	pradhan,	 outside	 his	 house	 in	 an	 area	 near	 the	 far	 edge	of	
Sangam	Vihar.		He	looked	in	good	form	and	seemed	about	40,	fit,	with	well-groomed	short	
                                                            
135	Focus	group	with	local	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn24.		A	young	girl	in	red	mentioned	a	
pradhan	sabha	meeting	that	they	were	not	allowed	to	go	to,	but	the	older	people	present	hushed	her.		
Discussion	with	kholenwala,	residents	and	pradhan	(female),	Sangam	Vihar,	11/11/14,	fn11.				
136	Personal	communication,	Ashish	Bhardwaj,	Sangam	Vihar,	3/02/15,	fn15	cf	(Manish,	2013)	
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hair	 and	mustache,	 and	wearing	 a	 clean,	white	 shirt	 and	 slacks.		We	 sat	 on	 the	 bench	 in	
front	of	his	house,	which	had	a	curtain	across	the	doorway	and	some	potted	plants	in	front.		
This	 area	 was	 pleasant,	 on	 a	 slope	 and	 quite	 breezy,	 not	 too	 built	 up,	 with	 nice,	 varied	
houses	and	some	other	plants	around.		It	was	not	too	busy	and	had	a	relaxed	feel	to	it.		Shiv	
said	he	has	been	 the	valve	guy	 since	 the	well	got	put	 in.		He	 told	me	 that	 ‘In	other	areas	
government	 men	 would	 do	 this	 work	 but	 they	 cannot	 in	 Sangam	 Vihar’	 (cf	 Ghertner,	
2017)137.		He	said	he	collects	50	 rupees	 from	each	house	 for	his	 salary.	 	He	supplies	 three	
hundred	houses	so	 this	makes	15	 thousand	rupees	a	month,	a	good	salary.	 	The	 tubewell	
has	 a	 ‘light	 box’	 nearby	 which	 he	 has	 the	 key	 to.		 Inside	 is	 a	 big	 on	 button	 and	 off	
button.		There	 is	also	an	electricity	meter	which	didn’t	seem	to	be	working.		Shiv	said	that	
this	was	a	‘prepay’	meter	and	that	the	DJB	controlled	it	somehow.		I	asked	if	he	had	to	give	
money	 to	 the	 DJB	 or	 anything,	 but	 he	 said	 ‘no’.		 The	 main	 thing	 was	 the	 on	 and	 off	
switch.		 The	 tubewell	 had	 six	 pipes	 coming	off	 it	 and	 there	were	 small	 rectangular	 valves	
which	could	be	opened	or	closed	with	an	allen	key.		These	main	valves	would	give	the	water	
to	the	different	lanes	–	there	is	one	for	each	lane.		Then	the	lanes	also	have	valves	for	each	
group	 of	 six	 houses.		 Shiv	 would	 open	 and	 close	 the	 valves	 to	 give	 water	 to	 the	 whole	
area.		He	got	the	job	because	his	father	has	some	government	job	and	heard	about	 it	and	
they	went	to	see	the	DJB	and	some	leader/	politician	(‘neta’]	and	then	the	DJB	again.		Then	
when	 they	 got	 a	 tubewell	 he	 got	 the	 job	 of	 looking	 after	 it.		 I	 asked	 if	 people	 ever	
complained	to	him	about	the	water	because	I	had	heard	people	say	that	in	other	areas	they	
complained	about	the	valve	people	but	he	said	no,	they	didn’t.		There	was	enough	water	for	
their	 area	 so	 it	 wasn’t	 an	 issue	 here138.		 Other	 kholnewalas	 also	 said	 that	 people	 did	 not	
complain	(see	Kacker	&	Joshi,	2012)	(F24b,	48).	 	 Indeed,	asking	after	the	kholnewala	could	
turn	 unhappy	 stories	 of	 bad	 water	 and	 neglect	 into	 firm	 assertions	 that	 there	 was	 no	
problem	 with	 the	 water	 (F66).	 	 In	 other	 areas,	 even	 the	 idea	 of	 complaining	 to	 the	
kholnewala	was	something	quite	novel:			
	
                                                            
137	Ghertner	describes	the	situation	of	government	kholnewala’s	performing	apparently	illegal	
groundwater	extraction.		However,	groundwater	extraction	is	not	illegal	is	the	government	has	
demonstrated	a	failure	to	provide.		The	metaphor	of	a	Mobius	strip	where	actions	are	simultaneously	
inside	and	outside	of	the	state,	is	therefore	misapplied.		The	kholnewala’s	Ghertner	describes	are	
acting	within	government	mandate,	just	as	the	kholnewala	role	in	Sangam	Vihar	has	been	outsourced	
to	local	people	(and	may	have	been	captured	also)	
138	Personal	communication,	kholnewala,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/16,	fn24	
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I	 asked	 the	 ladies	 if	 they	 could	 talk	 to	 the	 'water	managers’	 [paani	maliks]	when	
there	was	a	problem	and	it	was	kind	of	awkward	and	I	looked	at	Aasha	and	she	said	
'no,	no	it's	not	like	that'.		Again	when	I	asked	who	they	could	go	to	for	help	when	
there	was	a	problem	the	same	thing	happened.		One	lady	said	that	they	would	sort	
it	out	by	themselves	collect	the	money	and	get	the	work	done,	repairs	to	the	pump	
or	 whatever	 it	 was.		 […]	 	 Later	 we	met	Meena,	 the	 pradhan	 of	 the	 road	 by	 the	
mosque.		She	has	been	working	 for	 the	community	 for	30	years	she	says	and	the	
BJP	the	same	time.		When	she	heard	about	the	guy	asking	rs150	for	the	rs50	DJB	
charges	she	said	"let's	go	there	now	and	talk	to	him".		When	we	arrived	a	group	of	
women,	 mainly	 those	 who	 had	 been	 in	 the	 temple	 before,	 came	 up.		 The	 guy	
looked	sheepish.		He	was	saying	"It’s	not	me,	the	members	set	the	rates".		But	the	
women	 were	 saying	 “It's	 not	 right!”		 Meena	 was	 saying	 "It's	 my	 name	 on	 the	
pump".		We	arranged	to	meet	the	MLA	to	discuss	it	later.		Meena	clearly	outranked	
him	and	everyone	knew	it.		[…]	The	women	were	all	telling	him	off	and	complaining	
at	him	and	he	was	saying	”what	can	I	do?"139		I	did	some	sums	and	realised	if	there	
are	100	houses	each	paying	₹100	a	month	that	makes	₹10,000	[£100]	-	quite	a	lot	
of	money	in	India	and	enough	for	the	guy	to	live	on.		[…]		The	women	in	the	temple	
and	 the	 BJP	 pradhan,	 Meena,	 agreed	 that	 leaders	 and	 politicians	 are	 only	
interested	when	 it	 comes	 to	 elections	 -	 then	 they	 say	 "give	 votes	 and	we’ll	 give	
water".			
Observations,	Sangam	Vihar,	6/11/14,	fn11			
	
Other	residents	also	told	me	they	have	to	collect	the	expenses	for	repairs	themselves.		The	
amount	 of	 water	 received	 from	 these	 public	 tubewells	 varies,	 depending	 on	 how	 many	
houses	are	connected	to	the	network,	depth	of	the	bore	and	quality	of	the	well,	as	well	as	
the	 time	of	 year	 (whether	aquifers	 are	depleted	or	 recharging),	 electricity	 availability	 and	
whether	 the	water	 is	 being	used	 for	 any	other	purpose	 -	 such	as	 filling	water	 tankers	 for	
private	sale.		People	typically	say	that	water	comes	between	once	in	two	weeks	to	once	in	
six	weeks	 in	the	summers	for	between	twenty	minutes	to	two	hours	at	a	time140.	 	Timings	
are	not	predictable,	although	in	some	areas	the	kholnewalas	may	let	the	street	know	when	
they	are	turning	the	water	on.	 	Sangam	Vihar’s	quartzite	geology,	which	makes	well	yields	
unpredictable	 and	 much	 lower	 than	 areas	 above	 alluvial	 aquifers,	 is	 corroborated	 by	
residents.		Tej,	a	party	worker,	who	lives	in	the	‘Bihari	Camp’141	area	on	forest	land	told	me	
                                                            
139	Cf	female	kholnewala	unable	to	respond	to	residents’	complaints	also		
140	Personal	communication	and	focus	group	discussion,	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn24			
141	Rajasthani	Camp	
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that	 it	was	only	possible	 to	dig	 for	water	up	 to	 a	 certain	depth,	 after	 that	 ‘black	 stone	 is	
there	and	you	can’t	get	water	underneath	it’142.			
	
Kholnewalas	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 pragmatic	 solution	 at	 the	 edge	 of	 the	 formal	 utility.		
Kholnewalas	described	 themselves	as	employees	of	 the	DJB	 Junior	Engineer	and	said	 that	
the	DJB	paid	for	the	electricity	but	did	not	collect	revenues	(F24b,	48).		This	pragmatism	may	
be	 related	 to	 the	 ‘capture’	 (kabza)	of	government	 tubewells	by	powerful	people	 (F15,	81,	
117)143.		As	described	above,	some	people	said	this	was	done	by	the	dominant	castes	in	the	
villages	who	had	owned	 the	 land,	 and	are	now	well	 represented	 in	 local	 politics	 and	 real	
estate	(Kacker	&	Joshi,	2012,	p.	31)144.					
	
[Capture]	of	tubewells	is	by	[villagers]	they	sell	it	to	[people	from	outside],	from	UP	
[Uttar	Pradesh],	Bihar,	Rajasthan,	Bengal.	 	The	migrants	cannot	say	anything.	 	The	
tubewell	people	are	 charging	500-600	a	month	 	 […]	 	 The	 tubewell	people	have	a	
committee	 'R[esidents]	W[elfare]	 type'	headed	by	the	pradhan	 [leader]	so	people	
cannot	say	anything,	cannot	complain.		They	pay	500-600	a	month.		Eventually	[it]	
all	boils	down	to	money	-	what's	the	other	incentive?			
(Personal	communication,	 tanker	owner,	Sangam	Vihar	 resident,	Saket,	16/08/15,	
Hindi,	fn115)				
	
Kholnewalas	 in	 a	 less	 stable	 social	 position	 may	 find	 themselves	 facing	 dissatisfied	
customers.		I	interviewed	another	(female)	kholnewala	at	a	friend’s	house,	at	her	home	and	
over	the	phone.		She	described	her	network	to	me	like	this:			
	
The	pump	[…]	is	running	24	hours.		[…]		It	must	give	6,000	rupees	a	month,	so	₹200	
a	day.	 	Before	 I	 took	 it	over	 it	was	 run	by	eleven	men.	 	 […]	 	The	water	 is	not	 for	
drinking	but	manual	/	daily	wage	workers	[mazdoor]	do	[drink	it].		The	wells	are	450	
feet	 deep.	 	 People	 need	 clean	water.	 	 […]	 	 Now	 they	 buy	 [cans]	 from	 shops	 for	
twenty	rupees.		These	come	from	Faridabad.		[…]		I	am	getting	too	many	complaints	
the	water	is	late,	so	now	I	have	given	the	job	and	keys	to	someone	else.		This	is	to	
                                                            
142	Personal	communication,	party	worker,	9/07/15,	Hindi,	fn84.		This	area	also	described	as	stony	and	
hard	to	bore	for	water	by	another	respondent	(Personal	communication,	pradhan,	Sangam	Vihar,	
03/07/15,	Hindi,	fn91)	
143	Personal	communication,	Dunu	Roy,	Hazards	Centre,	Munirka,	21/08/14,	fn4;	Personal	
communication,	resident	(female,	c.	30),	BJP	supporter,	16/01/15,	fn13;	personal	communication,	
property	dealer,	RTI	activist	(male,	c.45),	Khirki	Gaon,	21/01/15,	fn14b;	personal	communication,	
residents	(female	c.	18,	25,	35),	MLA	office,	18/06/15,	fn82;	personal	communication,	AAP	volunteer	
(male,	c.21),	18/05/15,	fnF83	
144	Personal	communication,	party	worker,	Sangam	Vihar,	9/07/15,	fn93				
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show	that	it	 is	not	because	I	was	late	to	open	the	water	but	because	the	water	is	
going	down.		
(Personal	communication,	kholnewali,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	Hindi,	fn23)	
	
Tubewell	water	 is	 clearly	 less	 than	 ideal,	 and	many	people	 told	me	 that	 they	needed	and	
should	have	‘Sonia	Vihar	water’,	meaning	treated	network	water.		The	fact	that	Delhi’s	only	
Water	Treatment	Plant	built	 through	a	Public	Private	Partnership	 (PPP)	model	 is	 the	most	
commonly	used	phrase	to	refer	to	treated	network	water	is	a	curious	side-point.			
In	addition	to	the	government	tubewell	networks,	Sangam	Vihar	 is	also	well	supplied	with	
private	 tubewell	 networks.	 	 Although	 in	 some	 areas	 people	 do	 have	 private	 household	
tubewells,	most	people	 in	Sangam	Vihar	don't	have	tubewells	 in	their	houses.	 	A	tubewell	
inside	a	house	could	make	it	very	hard	to	fit	or	to	repair	the	submersible	pump	or	make	the	
well	 deeper	 as	 the	 house	 would	 get	 in	 the	 way	 of	 the	 tripod145.	 	 People	 used	 to	 have	
tubewells	in	their	houses	but	the	water	ran	out	at	that	level.			
	
[Around	1993]	 there	were	bores	 in	 some	houses,	 but	 those	old	bores,	 the	water	
quantity	got	over.	 	The	water	 level	has	gone	down	now.	 	Mostly	bores	are	 in	 the	
street.		Some	of	the	older	bores	may	be	in	people’s	houses	or	courtyards	but	they	
have	mostly	run	out.		The	water	table	is	at	650-700	feet	so	the	water	is	finished.			
Personal	communication,	AAP	party	workers,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	Hindi,	fn81	
	
As	mentioned	above,	some	people	with	bigger	plots	have	wells	inside	their	courtyard	from	
which	they	supply	neighbouring	houses	-	I	met	a	wealthy	friend	of	a	BJP	politician	on	Ratiya	
Marg	 who	 does	 this146.	 	 Private	 tubewell	 networks	may	 serve	 just	 a	 few	 houses,	 or	may	
cover	several	lanes	and	hundreds	of	households.		Most	of	those	I	have	seen	tend	to	be	the	
larger	kind.		However,	most	often	in	Sangam	Vihar,	'private	wells'	are	government	wells	that	
have	been	'captured'	by	local	power	holders147	(see	p81	above).		Fees	charged	by	captured	
networks	are	much	higher,	anywhere	from	₹150-500-800	per	month,	although	the	quantity	
                                                            
145	See	photographs	of	tubewell	reboring	(conversation,	NGO	Manager,	Sangam	Vihar,	DATE?).		
However,	there	may	be	other	methods	of	reboring:	‘I	have	been	in	a	house	when	one	was	being	
rebored.		Tubewells	can	be	rebored	inside	a	house,	they	are	always	being	rebored.		Because	the	water	
level	is	going	down	all	the	time’	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	21/04/15,	fn55	
146	(Conversation,	businessman,	Ratiya	Marg,	Sangam	Vihar,	DATE?)	
147	Personal	communication,	NGO	Manager,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/01/15,	fn13.			
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and	quality	of	water	is	just	as	bad	as	the	public	networks148.		Amongst	residents,	there	seems	
to	 be	 ambiguity	 over	whether	 specific	 bores	 are	 public	 or	 private	 -	 people	 could	 tell	 you	
whose	bore	it	was,	but	not	whether	it	was	‘public’	or	‘private’149.		Public	bores	are	‘captured’	
by	local	people	and	then	operated	as	private	bores	(cf	the	water	mafia	in	previous	section).		
Private	and	government	tubewells	can	be	distinguished	by	their	government	serial	numbers.		
AAP	can	locate	[talash]	them	because	‘AAP	has	so	many	volunteers	-	they	give	us	info,	bores	
are	in	the	roads,	in	the	streets’150.			
	
There	are	an	estimated	200	private	tubewells	in	the	Sangam	Vihar	and	Deoli	area151.	 	They	
are	 more	 expensive	 than	 government	 tubewells,	 but	 do	 not	 supply	 water	 any	 more	
regularly;	again	from	once	in	10-12	days	to	once	in	six	weeks152.		Many	residents	I	spoke	to	
were	 connected	 to	 both	 government	 and	 private	 networks.	 	 Prices	 for	 private	 networks	
varied	from	five	to	eight	hundred	rupees	a	month153.	 	Other	research	has	found	confusion	
over	whether	tubewells	are	DJB	or	private,	and	some	interviewees	also	described	‘private’	
wells	 as	 those	 that	 had	 been	 captured154.	 	 However	 the	 operators	 charge	 different	 prices	
(50-200	 rupees	 for	 DJB,	 500-800	 for	 private)	 and	 DJB	 tubewells	 have	 an	 identification	
number	in	the	control	box	(cf	Kacker	&	Joshi,	2012;	Sheik,	Banda,	et	al.,	2015)155.			
	
Interestingly,	one	 respondent	described	 tubewells	 as	being	part	of	 real	 estate	 investment	
strategies	in	Sangam	Vihar.		Sangam	Vihar’s	land	prices	are	artificially	inflated	and	used	as	a	
destination	for	black	money	generated	throughout	the	city.			
	
                                                            
148	Sheik	et	al	give	a	much	higher	figure	of	₹1,000-1,500	per	month.		Prices,	quality	and	quantity	of	
water	are	likely	to	vary	depending	on	who	is	managing	the	tubewell.			(Sheik,	Banda,	et	al.,	2015,	p.	5)	
149	cf	(Sheik,	Banda,	et	al.,	2015,	p.	5).			
150	Personal	communication,	party	worker,	Sangm	Vihar,	18/05/15,	Hindi,	fn81.				
151	Personal	communication,	senior	local	BJP	representatives,	Sangam	Vihar,	27/11/14,	fn125	
152	Transect	walk	and	conversations	with	local	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	6th	November	2014,	fn11;	transect	
walk	and	conversations	with	local	resident,	Sangam	Vihar,	04/02/15,	fn16;	Personal	communication,	
kholnewali,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	Hindi,	fn23;	Focus	group	with	local	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	
fn24;	Personal	communication,	pradhan	and	kholnewala,	Sangam	Vihar,	3/07/15,	fn91;	Personal	
communication,	tanker	owner,	Sangam	Vihar	resident,	Saket,	16/08/15,	Hindi,	fn115	
153	Personal	communications,	local	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	06/11/14,	fn11;	Personal	communication,	
residents	(male,	c.20	&25),	04/02/15,	fn16b;	Personal	communication,	local	residents,	03/07/15,	fn91;	
Personal	communication	tanker	owner	and	SV	resident,	Saket,	16/08/15,	fn115	
154	Personal	communication,	resident	(female,	c.	30),	BJP	supporter,	16/01/15,	fn13;	Personal	
communication,	Ashish	Bhardwaj,	Sangam	Vihar,	3/02/15,	fn15	
155	Personal	communication,	AAP	party	worker,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	fn81	
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‘Agrawal	 alleges	 that	 sale	 and	 purchase	 takes	 place	mostly	 among	 “big	 fish”	 for	
whom	it	is	an	avenue	“to	conceal	black	money”.	“You	cannot	keep	crores156	in	cash	
at	home,”	he	explains.	“Once	the	colony	is	authorised,	their	land	and	black	money	
would	 be	 automatically	 legalised.	 They	 are	 waiting	 for	 that	 moment.”’	 	 (A.	
Bhardwaj,	2015c)	
	
As	land	values	fluctuate	depending	on	the	likelihood	of	regularisation,	investors	were	said	to	
play	land	investments	in	Sangam	Vihar	‘like	a	stock	market’157.		My	friend	Sanjay	and	I	met	a	
tubewell	manager	who	 took	 us	 to	meet	 other	water	 suppliers	working	 in	 a	 small	 tailors’	
workshop	with	large,	locked,	water	plastic	water	tanks	outside,	at	the	end	of	a	small	lane	of	
old,	 low-rise	buildings	deep	inside	the	block.	 	Sanjay	told	me	that	 ‘the	[tubewell	manager]	
works	for	a	real	estate	broker.		He	manages	the	water	for	him.		He	was	nervous	because	he	
didn’t	want	to	say	anything.		The	real	estate	brokers	control	tubewells	and	they	buy	and	sell	
the	wells	amongst	each	other.		It	is	a	sort	of	game,	a	monopoly	game’158.		This	conversation	
after	meeting	with	water	suppliers	and	several	other	residents	in	the	block,	hints	at	overlap	
between	networks	in	real	estate	and	water,	possibly	(Gujjar)	caste-based.			
	
Tej	says	 that	 ‘the	BJP	capture	the	bore	wells	and	sell	 the	water,	 it’s	a	mafia’.	 	He	
also	 says	 that	 Gujjar	 people	 (and	 Jaat	 -	 but	 when	 pressed,	 Gujjar)	 are	 the	 ones	
selling	water.	 	I	 ask	what	will	happen	 -	what	 they	will	do	when	 the	Sonia	Vihar159	
water	comes	because	they	won't	be	able	to	take	money	for	this	anymore.		He	says	
they	will	sell	milk	or	property.	
(Transect	walk	with	AAP	party	worker,	Sangam	Vihar,	9/07/15,	Hindi,	fn93)		
	
Both	local	party	workers	and	residents	described	how	the	AAP	‘renationalisation’	campaign	
had	only	a	limited	life	and	bores	moved	back	into	‘private’	hands,	with	the	difference	that	
the	 electricity	 costs	 of	 pumping	 the	 water	 were	 now	 being	 paid	 by	 the	 government160.		
Echoing	Ravi’s	disclosure	that	the	tubewell	had	been	‘recaptured’,	a	tanker	owner	and	local	
resident	also	commented	on	the	resilience	of	these	local	power	dynamics.			
	
                                                            
156	A	crore	is	ten	million	
157	Personal	communication,	real	estate	dealers,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/05/15,	fn76	
158	Fieldnotes,	transect	walk	with	resident,	Sangam	Vihar,	04/02/15,	fn16	
159	Sonia	Vihar	is	the	Water	Treatment	Plant	constructed	by	Degremont	under	a	PPP	mode	for	the	DJB.		
People	are	very	familiar	with	the	name	and	the	term	‘Sonia	Vihar	paanii’	is	often	used	as	a	synonym	for	
‘piped,	treated	DJB	water’.		For	its	relationship	to	the	PPP	projects	in	water	distribution	see	Chapter	6.	
160	Personal	communication,	AAP	party	workers	and	local	residents,	30/05/15,	fn85;	Personal	
communication,	tanker	owner,	Sangam	Vihar	resident,	Saket,	16/08/15,	Hindi,	fn115	
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There	 was	 a	 big	 fuss	 about	 AAP	 capturing	 tubewells	 -	 33	 of	 them	 -	 in	 the	 49	
days.	 	They	brought	DJB	vehicles	and	 the	police	 so	people	were	afraid	but	 slowly	
slowly	 it	went	back	 to	 the	 same	people	 and	now	 it	 is	 the	 same	except	 that	 now	
they	get	free	electricity!		Before	the	people	were	paying	for	the	tubewell	electricity	
themselves,	but	 they	 installed	meters	 so	 that	 the	government	 could	pay,	 so	now	
they	get	free	electricity!		
(Personal	communication,	 tanker	owner,	Sangam	Vihar	 resident,	Saket,	16/08/15,	
Hindi,	fn115)					
	
A	young	AAP	volunteer,	Ravi,	took	me	to	his	street	to	see	his	house	and	the	tubewell	in	his	
lane	he	was	talking	about.		When	we	arrive	in	his	lane	he	shows	me	the	bore	which	is	buried	
under	a	square	metal	 lid	 in	the	street.	 	It	 is	a	submersible	and	the	wire	takes	electricity	to	
it.		The	box	is	a	little	way	away,	around	the	corner.		There	are	about	six	large	pipes	coming	
off	the	junction	and	a	slightly	smaller	one	on	the	end.		Ravi	says	‘You	asked	earlier	if	people	
that	were	party	supporters	got	better	water…		That	end	pipe	goes	to	this	one	house	only	-	it	
is	a	BJP	 supporter's	house’.	 	 There	are	 four	pipes,	each	 supplying	a	 lane	of	houses,	and	a	
fifth	 pipe	 leading	 to	 the	 BJP	 supporter’s	 house.	 	 He	 gestures	 towards	 a	 large	 four	 storey	
house	 taking	 up	 an	 entire	 plot.	 	 Ravi’s	 house	 is	 diagonally	 opposite,	 two	 storeys	 with	
exposed	brickwork.		His	mum	is	doing	some	washing	on	the	roof.		‘The	BJP	guy	was	earlier	
doing	the	kholnewala.	 	These	kholnewala's	are	just	gangsters’,	Ravi	says.	 	‘The	people	with	
power	will	take	the	job,	but	we	took	over	in	the	49	days.		Now	he	is	doing	it	again	but	in	3-4	
days	 I	 will	 be	 doing	 this	 job	 [..]	 	 There	 are	many	 pradhans.	 	 You	 could	 even	 say	 I	 am	 a	
pradhan!		There	will	be	one	for	each	party	in	an	area’161.		I	wasn’t	convinced	that	the	young	
volunteer,	 Ravi,	 would	 be	 able	 to	 dislodge	 the	 BJP	 kholnewala	 from	 the	 role	 in	 the	 next	
‘three	 [or]	 four	 days’,	 especially	 after	 being	 told	 that	 while	 campaigning,	 he	 had	 been	
attacked	by	BJP	workers	‘in	fighting	mode’162.		Violent	incidents	are	not	uncommon	and	two	
friends	of	mine	have	been	attacked	by	BJP	workers.	 	 In	 January	2015,	 the	AAP	released	a	
video	which	shows	BJP	workers	(including	one	of	my	interviewees)	and	relatives	of	the	MP,	
attacking	AAP	supporters	with	sticks	and	metal	bars	during	filming	of	a	TV	show	in	a	 local	
park	(Aam	Aadmi	Party	Faridabad,	2015;	Indian	Express,	2015a;	Times	of	India,	2015).			
	
Control	over	tubewells	was	used	as	an	income	source	by	placing	lower	level	party	workers	in	
charge	 of	 collecting	 fees	 over	 the	 mandated	 ₹50	 that	 the	 DJB	 stipulates.	 	 After	 a	 small	
                                                            
161	Transect	walk	with	local	AAP	volunteer,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/0515,	fn83	
162	Personal	communication,	party	worker,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/0615,	fn83		
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deduction	of	around	ten	percent	as	a	‘salary’	the	money	collected,	which	could	be	from	fifty	
thousand	to	two	hundred	thousand	rupees	per	month163,	was	sent	to	higher	party	workers	
to	cover	the	costs	of	elections164.		The	amount	deducted	as	a	salary	matches	the	wages	that	
kholnewalas	 in	 other	 blocks	 of	 Sangam	 Vihar	 have	 said	 they	 are	 paid.	 	 Ritesh,	 who	 was	
working	closely	with	AAP	in	Sangam	Vihar	said	that	while	management	(including	collecting	
fees)	by	party	workers	continued	under	the	AAP	government	it	was	‘much	less’	than	before.		
This	 accusation	 of	 continuing	 extraction	 of	 rents	 through	 water	 has	 also	 been	 made	 by	
another	party	worker	and	led	to	a	split	within	Sangam	Vihar	AAP	(Abhimanyu	Singh,	2016).			
	
	 	
'Captured'	tubewells,	Sangam	Vihar.		The	well	on	the	right	has	pipes	for	four	lanes	and	a	personal	connection	
for	a	local	party	worker's	house	
	
	
ROAMING	WATER	TANKERS	
The	relationship	between	tubewells	and	tankers	was	revealed	most	forcefully	one	day	when	
I	was	 talking	about	bore	well	capture	 (kabza)	with	my	 friend	Aasha	 in	her	office.	 	 ‘Private	
wells	 are	 wells	 that	 have	 been	 captured’,	 she	 says.		 ‘For	 example,	 the	 well	 outside	 the	
building	 is	the	organisation's	well’.	 	There	 is	a	tanker	filling	up	from	this	well	as	we	speak.		
‘But	Viraj	owns	the	well	now,’	Aasha	continues.		Viraj	is	the	area	pradhan	we	met	on	page	
136.	 	 Aasha	 makes	 a	 brief,	 slight,	 slightly	 humorous	 facial	 expression	 of	 unhappiness	
(meaning	 ’but	what	 can	you	do?’)	when	she	 says	 this.	 	Viraj,	 the	pradhan,	 lives	 in	a	 large	
                                                            
163	300-500	houses	paying	₹150-500	each	
164	Personal	communication,	former	party	worker,	18/12/15,	fn132	
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house	 diagonally	 opposite	 the	 building	 we	 are	 in	 and	 has	 a	 small	 office	 across	 from	 his	
house.		Aasha	 lowers	her	voice,	 ‘the	tankers	that	you	have	seen	outside	are	not	emptying	
sewage,	they	are	filling	[up	with]	water	from	the	well’.		We	are	talking	fairly	freely	while	the	
tanker	is	filling	and	the	tanker	driver	comes	into	the	office	once	or	twice,	I	think	to	get	a	key	
for	the	well	and	put	it	back.		I	have	seen	these	10,000	litre	tankers	on	most	visits165.			
	
This	situation	demonstrates	some	of	the	overlap	between	the	tubewell	economy	and	tanker	
businesses.		Because	the	water	supplied	from	tubewell	networks	is	limited	residents	will	use	
both	 public	 and	 private	 tankers.	 	 In	 the	 same	 conversation	 I	 was	 told	 that	 during	 the	
summer	the	problem	is	greater	as	there	is	less	water	in	the	ground	and	so	nothing	is	left	for	
residents	after	tankers	have	been	filled.			
	
Two	 types	of	 tankers	ply	 in	Delhi;	public	 and	private.	 	 Public	 tankers	are	operated	by	 the	
DJB,	 although	 the	 vehicles	 and	 their	 drivers	 are	 hired	 in	 from	 three	 large	 companies	
(Lalchandani,	2015a;	The	Indian	Express,	2017a).		DJB	tankers	supply	treated	water	from	DJB	
filling	 stations.	 	 They	 come	 in	 two	 varieties;	 ‘scheduled’	 (or	 regular)	 and	 ‘emergency’	 (or	
‘point’).	 	Private	 tankers	are	owned	and	operated	by	small	companies,	of	which	 there	are	
hundreds	 in	 the	 city;	 in	2002	 the	Water	Tanker	Owners	Association	 suggested	250	 (Daga,	
2003,	p.	176).		In	2011,	Centre	for	Science	and	Environment	estimated	that	there	were	over	
2,000	 small	 private	 sector	businesses	 involved	 in	Delhi	water	 supply	with	an	approximate	
turnover	of	four	billion	rupees	(Narain,	2011,	p.	55).	 	Private	tankers	almost	always	have	a	
phone	number	on	the	side,	and	will	deliver	water	for	domestic	use	on	order.	 	The	Central	
Ground	 Water	 Board	 has	 ‘banned’	 the	 sale	 of	 water	 through	 private	 tankers	 (Delhi	 Jal	
Board,	2000,	p.	27,	Resolution	No.	693,	 Item	700).	 	According	to	common	belief,	although	
the	 transport	and	commercial	 sale	of	water	 is	not	 illegal,	 the	methods	used	 for	obtaining	
water	are	very	likely	to	be	illegal.	 	 It	 is	possible	that	the	water	is	groundwater	from	out	of	
state,	indeed	this	is	what	drivers	often	say166,	however,	the	distances	involved	would	make	
this	commercially	unviable167.		
                                                            
165	Observations,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/01/15,	fn13	
166	Personal	communication,	tanker	driver,	16/10/15,	Hindi,	fn119;	prices	from	transect	walk	and	
conversations	with	local	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	6th	November	2014,	fn11;	Personal	communication,	local	
resident,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/01/15,	fn13;	Transect	walk	and	conversations	with	local	resident,	Sangam	Vihar,	
04/02/15,	fn16;		
BIRKINSHAW: MURKY WATERS   CHAPTER 5: OFF-GRID 
 
165 
	
	
Tankers	can	frequently	be	seen	driving,	or	being	pulled	by	tractor,	through	the	narrow	lanes	
(causing	 traffic	 jams),	 parked	outside	of	 houses	making	deliveries,	 or	 simply	 standing	 idle	
waiting	 for	 an	 order.	 	 This	 makes	 them	 more	 obvious	 than	 tubewells.	 	 (Indeed,	 one	
academic	who	claimed	to	have	been	working	in	the	area	for	18	months	was	not	aware	that	
Sangam	Vihar	used	 tubewell	water.)	 	Many	 tankers,	 public	 and	private,	 are	often	parked,	
along	with	septic	(or	’safety	tank’)	trucks	on	the	main	road	between	Deoli	and	Sangam	Vihar	
(10-15	 total	 including	 DJB	 and	 private	 on	 any	 given	 day)	 and	 on	 the	 main	 road	 outside	
Sangam	Vihar.			
	
At	time	of	writing,	the	DJB	runs	a	tanker	fleet	of	957	vehicles.		407	are	stainless	steel	tankers	
fitted	with	Geographic	Positioning	System	(GPS)	location	monitoring,	250	are	stainless	steel	
purchased	in	2016	and	deployed	in	the	areas	of	the	PPP	pilots,	and	300	are	older	mild	steel	
vehicles	(Halder,	2017a).		The	GPS	monitoring	system	is	run	by	Delhi	Integrated	Multi-Modal	
Transit	System	(DIMTS).		However,	DIMTS	only	provides	the	information	to	the	DJB	and	the	
DJB	does	not	 employ	 the	 tanker	drivers.	 	DJB	 tankers	 are	hired	 in	 (with	 staff)	 from	 three	
large	 companies	 –	 the	 source	 of	 ongoing	 corruption	 allegations	 (Lalchandani,	 2015a;	 The	
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Personal	communication,	local	residents,	NGO	office,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/14,	fn21;	Personal	communication,	
kholnewali,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	Hindi,	fn23;	Focus	group	with	local	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	
fn24;	Personal	communication,	resident	(female,	c.30),	Sangam	Vihar,	October	14,	fn47;	Personal	
communication,	pradhan	and	kholnewala,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn48;	Personal	communication,	resident	
(female,	c.30),	BJP	supporter,	17/06/15,	fn87 
167	Personal	communication,	Aman	Sethi,	journalist,	South	Delhi,	2/6/15,	fn86	
Water	tanker,	private Water	tanker,	DJB	hired 
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Indian	Express,	 2017a).	 	 Pursuing	 complaints	 against	 individual	 staff	would	be	difficult	 for	
the	 DJB	 whose	 leverage	 with	 the	 tanker	 companies	 would	 only	 be	 available	 on	 the	
renegotiation	 of	 the	 contracts.	 	 The	 AAP	 government	 took	 the	 important	 step	 of	making	
tanker	GPS	 information	 available	 to	 the	 public	 online	 in	 2015	 (The	 Indian	 Express,	 2015).		
However,	for	Sangam	Vihar,	the	point	is	moot	as	no	GPS-equipped	tankers	ply	in	the	area.			
	
DJB	tankers	do	deliver	to	Sangam	Vihar,	but	are	not	reliable.	Researchers	at	the	Centre	For	
Policy	Research	state	in	an	article	on	Sangam	Vihar	that	they	have	never	seen	a	DJB	tanker	
in	Sangam	Vihar	(Sheik,	Banda,	et	al.,	2015,	p.	5).		While	private	tankers	are	more	numerous	
DJB	tankers	do	also	ply	and	I	have	seen	them	often.		In	discussion	with	residents	from	across	
different	streets	(also	religions	and	income	levels)	in	the	block	it	became	apparent	how	wide	
differences	are	in	water	availability.		While	residents	from	one	street	said	that	tankers	came	
twice	a	day	 from	 the	DJB	 to	 ‘outside	 the	house	only’,	 another	 street	 said	 that	 they	 came	
once	a	week	and	gave	200	litres	per	person,	while	Church	colony	residents	said	that	tankers	
would	not	come168.		DJB	tankers	don’t	ask	for	money	but	residents	give	the	drivers	₹10-20	as	
a	chai-panni	[tea	and	water]	tip.			
	
The	process	to	get	a	water	tanker	delivered	–	either	scheduled	(‘point’)	or	emergency	–	 is	
that	residents	must	write	a	letter	requesting	a	tanker.		They	can	get	different	size	tankers	at	
different	frequencies	depending	on	how	many	residents	sign	the	letter.		‘A	1000	litre	tanker	
should	supply	10	houses	-	if	there	are	more	houses	more	tankers	are	required	from	the	DJB.		
This	 is	not	exactly	a	niyam	 [rule	or	policy]	but	 like	a	rule	of	thumb’169.	 	The	 letter	must	be	
taken	to	the	MLA’s	office	to	be	stamped	or	signed	before	it	can	be	passed	on	to	the	DJB.	
	
Once	 ordered,	 ‘the	 DJB	 tankers	 do	 not	 always	 come.	 	 They	 take	 the	water	 and	 sell	 it	 to	
someone	else	they	have	a	setting	or	acquaintance	[jaan-pehchaan]	with’170.		Residents	have	
said	that	a	connection	with	the	MLA	or	DJB	is	needed	to	get	tankers	to	arrive171.		People	feel	
that	without	a	connection,	the	treated	DJB	water	is	sold	off	to	wealthy	private	buyers	who	
                                                            
168	Personal	communication,	local	residents,	NGO	office,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/14,	fn21	
169	Personal	communication,	party	worker,	Sangam	Vihar,	9/07/15,	fn93				
170	Personal	communication,	NGO	manager,	Sangam	Vihar,	17/06/15,	fn87;		
171	Personal	communication,	local	residents,	NGO	office,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/14,	fn21;	(Sheik,	Banda,	
et	al.,	2015,	p.	5);	‘settings’	required	for	DJB	tankers	in	Sangam	Vihar	also	reported	in	(Halder,	2017a)	
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have	an	understanding	with	the	driver	or	DJB	office	and	that,	 if	 it	arrives	at	all,	the	tanker	
will	be	refilled	with	untreated	water	from	a	tubewell.			
	
‘Deoli	and	the	neighbouring	Ambedkar	Nagar	and	Sangam	Vihar	constituencies	are	
largely	made	of	unauthorised	colonies	which	have	no	access	 to	piped	water.	 The	
DJB	provides	tankers	which,	the	residents	claim,	are	scant	and	unreliable.		
“Very	often	the	DJB	officials	say	 they	have	 lost	 the	cards	 that	allow	them	to	take	
water	from	filling	points	or	that	the	tanker	has	a	puncture.	They	find	any	excuse	not	
to	deliver	water	to	the	people	who	need	it	as	they	then	sell	it	for	double	the	rate	in	
the	market,”	alleged	Mr.	Prakash.		
While	 raising	 slogans,	 the	 residents	 said	 they	were	being	neglected	as	 they	were	
economically	 weak.	 “The	 driver	 who	 was	 beaten	 in	 Sangam	 Vihar	 was	 actually	
selling	the	water	for	₹2,000.	Seven	tankers	leave	from	here	with	our	names	on	it,	
but	only	one	or	two	reach,”	said	another	Tigri	resident	Ravi.		
The	protesters	blamed	collusion	between	 the	DJB	officials	and	 the	private	 tanker	
mafia	for	the	problem.		
“They	 leave	 us	with	 no	 option	 so	we	 have	 to	 buy	 from	 the	 private	 tankers.	 It	 is	
basically	extortion,”	added	Ravi.’		
(The	Hindu,	2014)	
	
One	of	the	Sangam	Vihar	MLAs	has	two	offices	in	the	constituency,	a	public	office	where	he	
himself	sits	three	days	a	week,	and	a	‘back	office’	with	no	sign	on	the	street	where	his	staff	
hang	out	 and	 complaints	 about	 tankers	 and	other	 issues	 can	be	handled.	 	 In	 talking	with	
party	workers	from	four	constituencies	across	south	Delhi,	it	became	apparent	that	there	is	
an	unwritten	division	of	responsibilities	for	tanker	service	between	the	MLAs	and	the	DJB.		
In	Chhattarpur	and	the	Sangam	Vihar	Constituencies	this	means	that	the	MLA’s	staff	have	
responsibility	 for	 emergency	 tankers	while	 DJB	 staff	 retain	 control	 of	 the	 ‘point’	 tankers,	
which	are	supposed	to	visit	specific	places	on	a	set	schedule.	In	some	areas	it	was	seen	to	be	
one	of	the	perks	of	an	MLA	seat	that	there	would	be	a	certain	number	of	water	tankers	(I	
was	quoted	40)	under	the	MLAs	direct	control	which	could	be	disposed	of	as	desired	-	either	
for	private	sale,	or	to	favoured	constituents.			
	
The	 MLAs	 offices	 have	 regular	 interaction	 with	 the	 DJB	 over	 water	 tankers,	 which	 is	 an	
indication	of	tankers’	importance	and	unreliability.		During	my	research	period,	I	met	Ritesh,	
who	were	was	working	full	time	for	one	of	Sangam	Vihar’s	MLAs	to	record	complaints	over	
tankers	that	have	not	arrived	and	to	make	enquiries	with	the	drivers	and	the	DJB.		‘The	main	
argument	 from	drivers	and	 the	DJB’,	Ritesh	 tells	me,	 ‘is	 that	 the	 tanker	has	broken	down	
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and	 cannot	 reach	 the	 delivery	 point’.	 	 ‘If	 there	 are	 five	 tankers	 allocated	 daily,	 this	 can	
happen	once-or-twice	a	day.		We	have	caught	them,	knowing	they	have	sold	the	tanker	in	
black	but	the	DJB	protects	the	drivers’172.	 	As	the	drivers	do	not	inform	Ritesh	if	they	have	
broken-down	part	 of	 his	 job	 is	 to	 send	 people	 to	 check	 if	 the	 tankers	 have	 really	 broken	
down	or	if	they	are	‘just	pranking’.		Ritesh	described	some	of	the	challenges	of	this	role:		
	
‘My	name	is	blacklisted	in	DJB	and	private	tankers	fear	of	my	name	because	of	my	
putting	 their	 earning	 down.	 	 I	 have	 been	 offered	 money,	 wine,	 many	 things.	 	 I	
refuse.		I	finish	three	years	in	this	party	for	corruption-free	India	and	this	party	[…]		
They	are	offering	everything.		In	my	personal	opinion	corruption	is	in	those	things	
which	 have	 ‘settings’	 [illicit	 arrangements	 /	 understandings].	 	 Dalals	 [brokers	 /	
dealers	 /	 pimps]	 were	 doing	 setting	 in	 bigha	 [a	 unit	 of	 land],	 now	 is	 ‘setting’	 of	
water.		When	we	will	not	have	things	like	this,	so	automatically	the	share	of	these	
pimps	will	shrink.	I	will	do	everything	if	I	need	water,	even	I	don’t	have	for	drinking.		
If	home	has	water	then	automatically	I	will	pay	you.		The	DJB	officials	don’t	know’.	
Personal	 communication,	 party	 worker,	 Sangam	 Vihar,	 18/05/2015,	 Hindi	 and	
English,	fn81				
	
To	monitor	tanker	arrivals,	the	AAP	party	in	the	constituency	has	a	network	of	 lookouts	in	
different	 streets,	 usually	 young	 boys,	 whose	 responsibility	 it	 is	 to	 report	 if	 tankers	 have	
arrived173.		Tankers	often	fail	to	arrive,	and	everyday	people	come	to	the	office	to	complain	
about	this.			
	
Two	other	women	come	in	-	they	are	allowed	to	come	into	the	inner	office.		They	
seem	more	friendly,	more	confident	and	are	smiling	a	little	bit.		They	say	that	their	
tanker	hasn't	arrived.		Ritesh	is	busy	looking	at	his	phone	and	takes	a	long	time	to	
acknowledge	them.	They	are	berating	him	but	he	says	“Look,	what	can	we	do?		Ok,	
I'll	give	you	a	number”.		He	writes	a	number	on	a	slip	of	paper	and	gives	it	to	them:	
“This	 is	our	boy	 in	your	 lane,	 go	and	 talk	 to	him	about	 it”.	 	 The	women	say	 “Ok,	
we'll	 call	 him	 but	 if	 we	 have	 a	 problem	 we'll	 come	 back	 to	 you”.	 	 Ritesh	 looks	
resigned.	 	 I	ask	him	about	 it	and	he	says	 that	 they	have	a	boy	 in	 the	 lane	who	 is	
watching	out	for	tankers…			
	
He	also	promises	a	number	to	the	smart	looking	man,	wearing	a	shirt	and	glasses,	
who	comes	in	later.		The	man	says	“we	have	asked	for	a	tanker	but	it	hasn't	come	
and	they	just	say	“we’ll	send,	we’ll	send”.		Ritesh	asks	the	man	to	sit	outside.		He	is	
still	 sitting	outside	when	 I	 leave	about	half	an	hour	 later.	 	It	seems	that	there	are	
party	 volunteers	 working	 for	 Ritesh	 spread	 out	 over	 Sangam	 Vihar	 to	 check	
whether	tankers	have	arrived	or	not.				
                                                            
172	Personal	communication,	party	worker,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	fn81	
173	‘Young	male	children	[…]	scour	the	camp	for	news	and	updates	about	water’	(Datta,	2012,	p.	137)	
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Observations,	MLA	office,	Sangam	Vihar	18	June	2015,	Hindi,	fn88					
	
Since	the	AAP	government	came	to	power,	drivers	have	been	fined	for	not	arriving.		Ritesh	
explained	the	costs	to	me.		Tankers	get	paid	₹1,000	per	day	for	five	trips.		This	₹900-1000	a	
day	would	go	to	the	owner	and	he	would	pay	the	drivers	salary	from	it.		So	in	a	month,	the	
tanker	owners	could	receive	₹30,000,	of	which	₹8,000	to	₹10,000	would	go	to	the	drivers,	
and	₹20,000	the	owners	could	keep.		I	asked	about	the	‘tanker	companies’:						
	
There	are	not	companies	-	tankers	are	[owned	by]	private	individuals.		If	you	have	
money	 you	 can	 buy	 a	 tanker	 and	 rent	 it	 out	 to	 the	 DJB.	 	 If	 the	 tanker	 is	 not	
delivered	on	time	they	will	charge	₹5,000	for	one	missing	trip.	 	 If	two	trips	in	one	
day	 are	 missed	 you	 will	 have	 to	 pay	 10k.	 	 It’s	 to	 create	 fear.	 But	 everybody	 is	
shaking	hands	–	the	DJB,	tanker	owners	and	drivers.		This	is	my	personal	view.		This	
is	the	main	problem.		The	owners	make	money	and	give	the	DJB	a	cut.	
Personal	communication,	party	worker,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	fn81			
	
In	Chhattarpur	I	met	Asad,	who	was	a	member	of	the	MLAs	office,	seconded	to	the	tanker	
filling	 station	with	 responsibility	 for	 ‘emergency	 tankers’.	 	 Similar	 to	Ritesh,	he	seemed	 to	
have	some	difficulty	in	controlling	all	deliveries.		Asad	was	often	shouting	instructions	to	the	
drivers	and	telling	them	to	be	sure	to	go	to	the	right	person.		There	was	a	problem	where	a	
driver	 seemed	 to	 have	 not	 delivered	 to	 the	 right	 place,	 and	 Asad	 was	 checking	 his	
sheet.		The	driver	was	saying	'look	it's	signed',	while	Asad	looked	unhappy	but	unable	to	do	
anything174.	 	Observations	from	the	AAP	office	in	Sangam	Vihar	also	suggest	that	there	are	
challenges	in	addressing	tanker	(and	tubewell)	capture.			
	
A	 large	 group	 of	 women	 has	 come	 to	 the	 office	 to	 complain.	 	 They	 exchange	
greetings	with	 Ritesh.	 	A	 girl	with	 glasses	 says	 “We	need	water”	 and	 gives	 him	 a	
neatly	hand	written	letter	in	Hindi	signed	on	the	back	by	a	list	of	names.		Two	girls,	
maybe	16	and	18,	are	acting	as	the	main	speakers,	and	about	seven	older	women,	
who	are	also	not	afraid	to	chip	in.		They	want	a	regular	water	tanker	as	they	are	not	
getting	water	from	the	local	tubewell.		It	is	not	coming	and	when	it	is	someone	else	
is	taking	it.		They	say	that	the	water	is	captured	by	the	powerful	people	-	both	from	
the	tubewell	and	the	tankers.	 	Someone	who	 lives	near	a	Beauty	Parlour	–	Ritesh	
knows	who	they	mean.		[…]			When	I	ask	them	how	they	have	been	getting	water	
they	say	“fighting	-	with	the	people	that	are	capturing	it”.			They	also	say	that	they	
are	having	to	go	to	other	places	and	bring	water	back	in	buckets.			[…]		Afterwards	
in	 the	 inner	 office	 there	 is	 a	 loud	 discussion	 among	 the	 volunteers	 about	 this	
                                                            
174	Observations	at	Chhattarpur	Booster	Pumping	/	Tanker	Filling	Station,	14/05/15,	fn72	
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situation.		Ritesh	is	saying	we	should	do	something,	but	Prakhar	is	saying	“No,	you	
don’t	know	who	those	Beauty	Parlour	people	are”.			
(Observations,	MLA	office,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	Hindi,	fn82)	
	
Public	tanker	supply	is	valued	over	more	expensive	alternatives,	in	so	far	as	it	is	low	cost	or	
free175,	 although	 it	 also	 imposes	 household	 costs	 in	 terms	 of	 waiting	 and	 uncertainty176.		
Private	 tanker	 supply	 is	 valued	 for	 greater	 reliability	 although	 it	 comes	 at	 a	 substantial	
cost177.		Typically,	a	street	will	club	together	to	pay	the	fees	and	then	each	household	will	fill	
its	storage	tanks.	 	A	whole	tanker	of	four	thousand	litres	costs	from	eight	hundred	to	two	
thousand	rupees,	depending	on	the	supplier,	client	and	time	of	year178.	 	The	many	parked	
tankers	at	main	road	point	to	the	presence	of	tanker	operators	in	the	area.	 	However,	the	
tanker	owners	and	staff	around	main	road	that	 I	spoke	to	were	on	the	whole	not	keen	to	
talk	 once	 I	 disclosed	 that	 I	was	 not	 a	 potential	 customer	 but	was	 doing	 research.	 	 These	
tanker	 owners	were	 usually	 placed	within	 another	 nearby	 business,	 such	 as	 construction	
materials,	 mechanical	 repairs	 or	 real	 estate,	 although	 some	 operated	 from	 residential	
premises.		The	drivers,	generally	say	it	is	easy	work,	although	sometimes	in	summers	it	is	so	
busy	 that	 they	work	 two	shifts,	with	one	sleeping	while	 the	other	drives.	 	A	 full	 tanker	of	
water	sells	for	around	₹800-1,500	depending	on	the	area	and	the	time	of	year,	as	business	
goes	quiet	in	the	winter.		Sometimes	take	water	from	the	river	or	nearby,	sometimes	from	
industrial	areas	in	Haryana,	Badarpur,	Meethapur179	(where	it	is	well	known	that	the	water	
table	is	higher	and	there	are	many	water	bottling	factories),	sometimes	from	tubewells	(DJB	
                                                            
175	Personal	communication,	former	private	sector	water	supplier,	22	April	2015,	fn57;	Observation	and	
discussion	at	Savda	Ghedra	Water	ATM	plant	with	Development	Alternatives,	November	2014	
176	Personal	communication,	Renu	Khosla,	NGO	Manager,	Hauz	Khas,	21/10/14,	fn134	
177	Personal	communication,	local	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn21;	Personal	communication,	
resident,	17/06/15,	fn87;	Personal	communication,	local	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn24;	
Personal	communication,	local	party	worker,	Sangam	Vihar,	9/07/15,	fn93	
178	Personal	communication,	private	tubewell	owners,	Sangam	Vihar,	04/02/15	fn16b;	Personal	
communication,	local	residents,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn24;	Personal	communication,	tanker	driver,	
16/11/15,	fn119;	Personal	communication,	AAP	party	workers,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/05/15,	Hindi	and	
English,	fn81;	Personal	communication,	resident	(female,	c.30),	BJP	supporter,	17/06/15,	fn87;	
Personal	communication,	local	party	volunteer,	Sangam	Vihar,	9/07/15,	Hindi,	fn93;	Personal	
communication,	tanker	owner,	Sangam	Vihar	resident,	Saket,	16/08/15,	Hindi,	fn115		
179	Personal	communication,	jar	delivery	driver,	Bandh	Road,	16/02/15,	fn20;	Personal	communication,	
real	estate	dealers,	Ratiya	Marg,	Sangam	Vihar,	6	February	2015,	fn17;	Personal	communication,	NGO	
manager,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/01/15,	fn13	
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and	private),	sometimes	from	DJB	filling	stations,	sometimes	from	rural	farmers.		Both	DJB	
and	private	tankers	have	a	target	of	five	trips	per	day180.			
	
Unlike	reports	from	other	research,	in	Sangam	Vihar,	there	is	competition	between	private	
tankers	 and	 they	 do	 not	 have	 set	 territories	 (cf	 Borthakur,	 2015;	 Kjellén	&	McGranahan,	
2006;	Rai,	2012;	Ranganathan,	2014)	(F16,	115).	 	Private	tankers	fill	from	both	private	and	
public	tubewells	within	Sangam	Vihar,	as	well	as	outside	(F115).		As	Aasha	explained	to	me:	
	
‘There	 is	 not	 [enough]	 water	 in	 the	 [tubewell]	 pipes	 but	 the	 private	 tankers	 are	
selling	it181.		They	take	it	and	sell	it	anywhere.		The	people	then	have	to	buy	private	
tankers	 or	 cans	 or	 boil	water.	 	 You	 remember	 Shiv	 at	Masjid	Mohalla?	 	 There	 is	
water	 in	his	borewell	but	he	does	not	 give	 it	 to	 the	people	 in	 the	 lane	at	Masjid	
Mohalla:	 it	 is	 for	 his	 people	 only.	 […]	 	 So	 there	 is	 no	water	 in	 the	 pipes	 for	 the	
people	paying	100	rupees.		At	this	time	there	is	no	water,	it	is	difficult.’			
(Personal	communication,	resident	(female,	c.30),	BJP	supporter,	17/06/15,	fn87)	
	
Aasha	went	on	to	say	that	the	tanker	owned	by	Viraj,	the	area	pradhan,	and	managed	by	a	
friend	of	hers,	Gopal,	fills	from	a	tubewell	captured	by	the	pradhan,	and	has	a	target	of	five	
tanker	trips	a	day.		I	have	never	heard	private	tanker	staff	describe	a	daily	target	to	me,	but	
DJB	tankers	do	have	a	target	of	five	trips	a	day	(F81).	 	The	suspicion	is	that	the	tanker	has	
been	subcontracted	to	the	DJB,	is	using	tubewell	water	for	official	(nominally	free)	deliveries	
and	selling	the	treated	DJB	water	to	higher	paying	customers.		Tubewells	and	tankers,	public	
and	private,	bleed	into	one	another	in	fluid	combinations	(Mol	&	Law,	1994).			
	
As	 mentioned	 above,	 conversations	 with	 tanker	 owners	 suggest	 that	 there	 is	 lively	
competition	 in	 the	water	market.	 	 I	was	 at	 Aasha’s	 place	when	 I	 first	met	 Shiv,	 the	 area	
pradhan	(see	page	158).		He	seemed	sharp,	business-like	and	a	bit	reserved,	but	knew	Aasha	
well	enough	to	hang	out	and	chat	for	a	bit,	even	after	conversation	had	dried	up.		 I	didn’t	
know	he	 also	 sold	water	 as	 a	kholnewala,	 and	 asked	him	about	 tankers.		He	 said	 tankers	
were	run	by	"criminal	types"	[using	the	English]	and	“badmash"	[troublemakers	/rogues].		I	
asked	if	the	tanker	owners	talked	to	each	other	and	were	organised	but	he	said	‘They	are	all	
                                                            
180	Personal	communication,	senior	party	worker,	18/05/15,	fn81;	Personal	communication,	local	
resident,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/01/15,	fn13.	
181	Also	reported	in	(Sheik,	Banda,	et	al.,	2015,	p.	5)	
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separate.	 	 There	 are	 lots	 of	 different	 companies’	 working	 in	 overlapping	 areas182.	 	 Other	
interviewees	 also	made	 this	 observation,	 including	 Bibek,	 tanker	 owner	 and	 (BJP-aligned)	
activist.			
	
Bibek:	 There	 are	 30-40	 tanker	 businesses	 in	 Sangam	 Vihar,	 maybe	 over	 one	
hundred	tankers.		The	tanker	business	people	know	each	other.				
	
Researcher:	Do	you	talk	to	each	other?			
	
Bibek:	We	talk	to	everyone!		Competition	is	there	but	it	is	driven	by	demand	not	a	
desire	to	compete	with	each	other.		In	winter	season	demand	goes	down,	so	prices	
will	also	go	down,	so	competition	is	there.			
(Personal	communication,	Sangam	Vihar	tanker	owner,	16/08/15,	Hindi,	fn115)	
	
The	tanker	owners	I	have	spoken	to	in	Sangam	Vihar	have	tended	to	run	small	businesses	of	
between	one	and	five	tankers183.		Even	a	small	one	tanker	business	running	four-five	trips	a	
day	could	 turn	over	₹60,000	a	month	at	a	 conservative	estimate.	 	Owners	however	 claim	
that	after	paying	for	the	water	(₹100	per	tanker	in	rural	Haryana),	petrol	and	salaries	they	
make	much	less.		I	was	quoted	₹100	per	trip	as	net	profit	-	more	like	₹12,000	a	month	for	a	
one	tanker	business.		I	met	Bibek	on	Independence	Day	at	a	fancy	mall.		He	offered	to	come	
to	 meet	 me,	 which	 was	 unusual.	 	 He	 said	 he	 had	 interests	 in	 several	 other	 businesses	
including	property	 and	a	 small	NGO.	 	Bibek	had	 just	one	4,000	 litre	 tanker,	which	he	 fills	
from	a	farmer’s	tubewell	in	Haryana.		He	pays	the	farmer	₹200,	it	costs	about	200₹	for	gas,	
and	about	₹200	for	staff.		A	tanker	of	water	costs	about	₹800-1,000	to	buy.		So	he	doesn't	
make	 that	much	money	 from	 it,	he	 implied.	 	Tankers	 themselves	cost	around	 four	 to	 five	
hundred	thousand	rupees,	as	do	the	tractors	used	to	pull	them.		This	cost	structure	is	very	
similar,	 although	 slightly	 higher,	 to	 that	 found	 in	 research	 ten	 years	 earlier	 (Das	Gupta	&	
Puri,	2005).		In	Sangam	Vihar	it	seems	that	most	tankers	fill	from	someone	else’s	tubewell	or	
captured	tubewells;	this	 is	unlike	the	situation	 in	Bangalore	described	by	Borthakur	where	
tanker	businesses	also	owned	tubewells	(Borthakur,	2015).			
	
                                                            
182	Personal	communication,	pradhan,	Sangam	Vihar,	6/11/14,	Hindi,	fn11				
183	For	two	interviews	with	larger	and	more	profitable	tanker	business	owners	in	Bangalore	see	
(Borthakur,	2015,	pp.	25–26)	
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Bibek	has	two	people	that	work	for	him	on	the	tankers.		When	an	order	comes	they	go	and	
get	 the	 water.	 	 He	 says	 he	 runs	 tankers	 ‘as	 social	 service,	 not	 to	 profit	 from	 others	
problems’184.	 	 A	 tanker	 owner	 interviewed	 by	 Malini	 Ranganathan	 in	 Bengaluru	 also	
‘identified	 himself	 as	 a	 social	 activist’	 (Ranganathan,	 2014a,	 p.	 90).	 	 Bibek	 showed	 me	
photographs	on	his	phone	of	dharnas	he	had	organised	over	lack	of	water	to	Sangam	Vihar.		
When	I	went	to	visit	 ‘his	NGO’,	Bibek	actually	took	me	to	his	friend’s	real	estate	office.	 	A	
subsequent	internet	search	revealed	that	Bibek	has	links	to	the	local	branch	of	the	BJP.			
	
Because	tanker	owners	are	also	 in	other	businesses	 like	security	or	auto-rickshaws	or	 real	
estate,	 they	 are	 not	 concerned	 about	 government	moves	 to	 shut	 down	 illegal	 bores	 and	
bring	piped	water	–	we	have	other	businesses	they	say.		Bibek,	had	shown	me	photographs	
of	 his	 dharna	 demanding	 piped	 water	 for	 Sangam	 Vihar,	 and	 told	me	 that:	 ‘I	 know	 that	
business	 not	 a	 long-term	 thing.	 	No	 problem	 -	 it	 will	 be	 a	 good	 thing	 when	 piped	water	
comes’185.		Similarly,	when	I	asked	Tej,	the	AAP	activist	what	the	tanker	owners	will	do	when	
the	Sonia	Vihar	water	comes	and	they	can’t	make	from	tankers	anymore	(above	p97-98),	he	
said	simply,	that	they	‘will	sell	milk	or	property’186.			
	
                                                            
184	Personal	communication,	tanker	owner,	16/08/15,	Hindi,	fn115	
185	Personal	communication,	tanker	owner,	16/08/15,	Hindi,	fn115	
186	Personal	communication,	resident	and	AAP	party	worker,	Sangam	Vihar,	9/07/15,	fn93	
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30,000	litre	private	water	tanker	delivers	to	an	expensive	shopping	mall	in	South	Delhi	
	
There	 is	 also	 a	 high-end	 of	 the	 tanker	 market,	 which	 supplies	 to	 expensive	 hotels	 and	
shopping	malls	(see	following	Chapter).		I	contacted	these	larger	companies	many	times,	but	
their	representatives	declined	to	talk	to	me.		The	large,	expensive	malls	outside	one	urban	
village	I	lived	in	received	regular	deliveries	from	30,000	litre	tankers.		One	night	I	witnessed	
12	deliver	back-to-back	in	the	space	of	an	hour.		They	supply	every	night	and	during	the	day	
the	company’s	tankers	are	parked	behind	the	mall.		The	drivers,	who	are	usually	from	out	of	
state,	 say	 the	water	 is	 from	Haryana,	which	 is	 a	Central	Ground	Water	Board	 ‘black	 spot’	
hence	extraction	there	is	illegal.		A	journalist	working	on	Delhi’s	water	mafia	expressed	it	to	
me	this	way:	‘they	would	not	be	able	to	bring	it	from	anywhere	legal	without	their	transport	
costs	 becoming	 prohibitive’187.	 	 The	 high	 visibility	 of	 large	 tanker	 deliveries	 to	 wealthy	
commercial	properties	contributes	to	a	feeling	among	lower-income	residents	that	the	rich	
are	well	serviced	by	both	the	public	and	private	sector,	while	other	groups	are	neglected188.			
	
Tankers	 illustrate	 the	 fluid	nature	of	 the	 formal/informal	divide	–	 the	 location	of	a	 tanker	
may	be	all	that	determines	its	legality	or	illegality.		A	private	tanker	may	carry	DJB	water,	a	
                                                            
187	Personal	communication,	Aman	Sethi,	2/06/15,	fn86	
188	Personal	communication,	resident	and	AAP	party	worker,	Chirag	Delhi,	December	2015,	fn35	
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DJB	 tanker	may	 carry	water	 from	a	private	well,	 a	DJB	 tanker	may	 carry	DJB	water	 to	 an	
unauthorised	client	and	private	tankers	may	carry	water	from	private	wells	(illegal	if	water	
comes	from	Delhi	state	or	other	critical	groundwater	zone,	also	 if	water	 is	sold	for	human	
consumption	without	requisite	certifications).	 	This	variation	and	complexity	highlights	the	
importance	 of	 specificity	when	 discussing	 ‘urban	 informality’	 in	 the	 abstract.	 	 Just	within	
water,	 it	 should	 be	 apparent	 from	my	 empirical	 work	 just	 how	 different	 informalities	 in	
piped	supply,	tanker	provision	and	tubewell	management	are.		The	differential	quantities	of	
water	supply	observed	in	Chapter	Four	are	further	differentiated	by	the	different	qualities	
of	 specific	modes	 of	 supply.	 Consequently,	 any	 general	 theory	 of	 ‘urban	 informality’	 as	 a	
‘mode’	is	likely	to	be	very	thinly	stretched	and	over-generalised.			
	
BOTTLES,	‘CANS’	AND	ILLEGAL	FACTORIES	
DJB	piped	water	supply	quality	differs	in	different	neighbourhoods	(see	Appendix	WQ,	page	
288)	 and	 in	 some	 areas	 of	 the	 city	 people	 are	 content	 to	 drink	 directly	 from	 the	 tap.		
However,	in	Sangam	Vihar,	people	who	absolutely	cannot	afford	anything	else	will	use	bore	
or	tanker	water	for	drinking,	boiling	it	before	drinking.	 	Households	with	more	income	will	
use	reverse	osmosis	(RO)	filters,	however	the	prices	for	these	start	at	around	₹3,000	so	are	
too	expensive	for	most	people.		Shops	that	that	sell	RO	filters	in	Sangam	Vihar	say	they	do	
not	sell	more	than	one	or	two	a	month.		In	between	these	two	extremes	most	people	in	the	
area,	as	well	as	Malviya	Nagar	and	many	other	areas	of	Delhi,	drink	‘bottled	water’	supplied	
by	small	private	companies	 in	 large	plastic	20	 litre	 ‘water-cooler’	 jars.	 	The	water	cans	are	
similarly	priced	across	the	city,	and	cost	from	rs100	for	branded	water	like	Bisleri189	to	₹20-
40	 for	 ‘local’	 produced	water	 sold	 in	 Sangam	Vihar	 (and	 ₹10	 futher	 east190).	 	 This	 private	
drinking	 water	 supply	 is	 trusted	 to	 be	 cleaner	 to	 drink	 than	 any	 other	 available	 options,	
which	have	a	high	chance	of	containing	bacterial	pollutants191.			
	
The	piped	water	 is	not	 for	drinking.	 	People	use	₹20	 ‘bisleri’	 cans,	about	one	per	
house	 per	 day.	 	 These	 local	 cans	 are	 borewell	 water	 put	 through	 an	 RO.	 	 The	
(branded)	Bisleri	ones	are	too	costly,	so	they	take	the	cheap	(₹20)	ones.				
                                                            
189	Personal	communication,	resident	(male,	c.28),	Greater	Kailash,	11/07/15,	fn145	
190	Personal	communication,	Lucy	Dubochet,	20/01/17	
191	Personal	communication,	Khirki	resident,	7/08/15,	fn109;	personal	experience	
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(Personal	 communication,	 local	 party	 volunteer,	 Sangam	 Vihar,	 9/07/15,	 Hindi,	
fn93)		
	
Large	households	might	use	two	or	three	jars	a	day	in	the	summer192.		This	costs	over	₹2,000	
a	 month.	 	 Even	 migrant	 workers,	 recycling	 plastic	 waste	 and	 rags	 and	 living	 in	 crowded	
tarpaulin	 shacks,	 buy	 drinking	 water	 in	 these	 plastic	 cans.	 	 Sanjay	 and	 I	 sat	 with	 these	
workers	outside	one	of	their	tents.	 	They	were	from	West	Bengal,	Muslims	and	Christians.		
They	told	us	that	their	boss	[thekedar]	sent	a	tanker	of	water	for	them	once	a	week	but	they	
only	use	the	water	in	the	tanker	for	bathing	and	washing	clothes.		The	tanker	costs	₹300	per	
person	per	month	which	their	boss	deducts	from	their	wages.		They	told	us	that	if	they	drink	
the	tanker	water	they	get	sick	and	have	strong	pain	[mota	dard].	 	So	for	drinking	they	buy	
the	20	 litres	 jars	 for	 ₹20	 a	 jar.	 	 They	use	one	per	day	 for	 a	 family	 of	 four	or	 five	people.		
Adults	get	paid	around	1,000	rupees	per	month,	children	less.		They	pay	₹600	per	month	for	
drinking	water	and	₹300	for	household	water	on	a	household	income	of	5,000	rupees.		This	
is	 slightly	 under	 twenty	 percent193.	 	 	 Similarly,	 in	 another	 large	 low-income	 area	 of	 Delhi	
further	east,	all	but	the	very	poorest	purchased	drinking	water	from	illegal	factories,	either	
in	these	20	litre	jars	or	in	buckets	from	the	factory	itself194.			Again,	in	a	higher-income	area	
further	west	(Dwarka):		
	
In	my	area	there	was	no	water	earlier	so	we	used	to	call	tankers	from	the	DJB	but	it	
was	not	for	drinking	-	people	are	still	relying	on	bottled	water.	 	Nowadays	people	
don't	 call	 tankers.	 	Some	 people	 rely	 on	 DJB	 [tankers]	 but	most	 don't	 drink	 DJB.		
Bottle	 water	 is	 now	 used	 instead	 of	 tankers.	 	1	 year	 ago	 till	 few	 months	 back	
Dwarka	 was	 bone	 dry,	 no	 nothing.	 	 1k	 litres	 RS4-500	 but	 90%	 of	 people	 would	
never	use	tankers	for	drinking	purposes.	 	 In	Dwarka	a	 lot	of	private	tubewells	are	
dug	-	by	 influential	people	and	no	one	says	anything.	 	New	private	tube	wells	are	
illegal	but	if	it	happens	money	is	given	to	police.			
(Personal	communication,	Dwarka	resident,	Saket,	16/08/15,	fn115)					
	
Alankar,	 in	his	PhD	thesis	notes	the	rise	of	 ‘flourishing	business	 involving	private	suppliers	
selling	bottled	water	in	different	quality	containers	(in	majority	of	cases	20	litre	plastic	jars)’.		
He	 states	 the	 need	 for	 information	 on	 ‘on	 how	 the	 private	 suppliers	 get	 to	 procure	 such	
huge	amounts	of	water’	 (Alankar,	2009,	p.	111).		While	Alankar	suggests	that	bottle	water	
                                                            
192	Personal	communications	and	focus	group	discussion,	Sangam	Vihar,	16/02/15,	fn24			
193	Personal	communications,	recycling	workers	camp,	Sangam	Vihar,	2/05/15,	Hindi,	fn63.			
194	Personal	communication,	Lucy	Dubochet,	London,	17/01/17,	fn137	
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comes	from	‘DJB	sources’,	in	my	research,	answers	to	the	question	of	where	‘bottled’	water	
comes	 from	 varied,	 however	 it	was	 very	 often	 groundwater.	 	 A	 local	pradhan	 in	 an	 area	
where	cans	are	commonly	used	said	the	water	comes	from	the	edges	of,	or	outside	of,	Delhi	
state.			
	
“The	 canned	 bottles	 of	mineral	water	 are	 for	 drinking.	 	 They	 come	 from	outside	
from	Badarpur	 or	 outside	Delhi”.	 	 “Haryana”,	 Bhalli	 is	 keen	 to	point	 out.	 	“Shops	
distribute	them	door	to	door.		The	can	distributers	are	separate	from	the	tubewell	
people	there	is	no	overlap”.		
Personal	communication,	pradhan,	Sangam	Vihar,	03/07/15,	Hindi,	fn91	
	
Not	 all	 bottled	 water	 comes	 from	 across	 the	 border;	 sometimes,	 if	 not	 the	 same	
neighbourhood,	 it	 is	from	the	next	one	over.	 	Sainik	Farms,	adjacent	to	Sangam	Vihar,	 is	a	
wealthy	neighbourhood	of	‘farmhouses’	(luxury	villas	constructed	on	agricultural	land).		Like	
Sangam	 Vihar,	 it	 was	 also	 constructed	without	 planning	 permission	 and	 is	 dependent	 on	
groundwater.	 	 However,	 unlike	 Sangam	 Vihar,	 residents	 are	 able	 to	 install	 personal	
tubewells.		I	met	a	truck	driver	delivering	20	litre	cans	of	water	to	the	Deoli	side	of	Sangam	
Vihar	who	told	me	that	the	water	was	from	Sainik	Farms195.		Other	interviewees	confirmed	
that	this	was	part	of	a	broader	pattern.			
	
“Sainik	 Farms	 is	 a	different	model.		 People	have	bores	 in	 their	homes	and	 sell	 or	
rent	the	water.”			
Personal	communication,	real	estate	dealer,	Sangam	Vihar,	06/02/15,	Hindi,	fn17		
	
The	 following	note	 from	a	conversation	with	a	water	dealer	 in	another	peri-urban	area	of	
Delhi	gives	some	more	information	about	the	production	of	canned	water:	
	
[I	sell	about]	50	[20	litre]	cans	a	day.		Proper	original	Bisleri	[a	bottled	water	brand]	
is	₹70	per	can.		Local	 is	₹30.		 It	doesn't	come	from	a	 factory	 just	someone	with	a	
tubewell	 and	 an	 RO	 [reverse	 osmosis	 filter]	who	 fills	 up	 cans.		 Nothing	 special	 is	
needed	to	do	this	work.		The	branded	labelled	cans	come	from	factories.		It's	illegal	
but	the	police	and	[water	guys],	PWB	[Public	Works	Board],	MCD	[etc]	can	be	given	
money	 and	 they	 will	 turn	 a	 blind	 eye.	 		 The	 amount	 depends	 on	 the	 settings	
[relationships,	 understandings]	 it	 might	 be	 ₹500	 a	 week	 or	 month	 for	 the	 cops,	
₹2,000	for	the	DJB.			
Personal	communication,	water	seller,	Kapasevra,	22/01/15,	Hindi,	fn89	
                                                            
195	Transect	walk	with	local	resident,	Sangam	Vihar,	6/11/14,	fn11				
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Private	water	treatment	plant	(left),	canned	water	delivery	worker	(right)	
		
In	more	central	areas,	water	factories	are	low	key,	small-scale	affairs.		A	contact	in	Sangam	
Vihar	who	is	a	partner,	with	the	area	pradhan,	in	a	tanker	business	which	gets	water	from	a	
gali	 tubewell,	also	has	an	RO	plant	on	the	top	floor	of	an	under	construction	building	 in	a	
nearby	 unauthorised	 colony.	 	 He	 says	 that	 his	 business	 that	 uses	 the	 RO	 plant	 has	 four	
tankers	and	six	employees	on	bicycle	carts	who	take	can	to	shops.		This	business	generates	
around	rs30,000	per	month,	however	like	other	tanker	owners	I’ve	spoken	with	in	Sangam	
Vihar,	the	water	business	is	a	supplementary	source	of	income	and	his	main	business,	which	
his	 father	 also	 does,	 is	 real	 estate.	 	 Khirki	 Extension’s	 local	 water	 brand	 ‘Delhi	 Gold’	 is	
located	 in	the	extension.	 	Their	bottles	provide	an	email	address	and	phone	number.	 	The	
phone	number	on	their	bottles	connects	the	caller	to	Delhi	Police	Control	Room.		They	are	
said	 to	 be	 linked	 to	 a	 local	 official,	 who	 has	 a	 track	 record	 of	 complaints	 against	 her196.		
Prosecution	of	an	official	 in	the	same	position	at	Malviyar	Nagar	for	demanding	money	to	
allow	bore	well	operation	is	reported	three	years	previously	(Seghal,	2012;	The	Hindu,	2004;	
Zee	News,	2004).			
	
The	drinking	water	business	seems	to	be	a	fairly	safe	investment	destination	and	generator	
of	employment	in	underserved	areas.		Those	that	I	visited	were	almost	always	staffed	by	a	
crew	of	young	men.		During	my	fieldwork	period,	one	of	the	young	men	working	at	the	NGO	
                                                            
196	Personal	communication,	local	resident	and	RTI	activist,	urban	village	(Hindu/dalit),	south	Delhi,	
21/01/15,	fn14	
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helping	 with	 my	 fieldwork	 gave	 up	 volunteering	 to	 work	 in	 a	 water	 business	 with	 his	
brother.	 	This	was	helped	by	connections	 to	 the	other	water	 sellers	operating	around	 the	
NGO.		I	could	only	interview	one	factory	owner	inside	my	research	sites	but	I	am	aware	of	
three	 other	 informal	 factories.	 	 More,	 and	 larger,	 drinking	 water	 factories	 are	 situated	
further	 south	 east	 and	 east	 towards	 Okhla,	 Badarpur,	 Noida	 and	 Ghaziabad	 –	 the	 more	
corporate	 branded	 drinking	 water	 cans	 have	 addresses	 on	 their	 labels,	 which	 I	 check	 at	
every	opportunity!197		The	water	table	is	higher	in	these	areas,	and	there	are	large	industrial	
areas.		A	researcher	working	in	the	Okhla	area	reports	27	illegal	bottling	plants	in	her	field	
site198.			
	
Technically	abstraction	of	groundwater	for	commercial	purpose	is	illegal	under	the	Delhi	Jal	
Board	 Act	 (1987).	 	 The	 Central	 Groundwater	 Board’s	 recently	 released	 Guidelines	 on	
Groundwater	 Abstraction	 clearly	 state	 that	 abstraction	 for	 industrial	 /	 commercial	 use	 in	
over-exploited	areas	is	not	permitted.		Although	reluctant	at	first	to	discuss	it,	a	senior	Delhi	
Jal	 Board	 officer	 I	 spoke	 to	 was	 insistent	 that	 this	 bottled	 water	 or	 ‘canned’	 water	 is	
groundwater.	 	On	 the	question	of	whether	 this	 is	 legal	or	 illegal	he	said	 "let's	not	go	 into	
that".		Later	in	the	conversation	he	does	discuss	the	legality,	partly	as	a	way	of	avoiding	my	
question	about	the	quality	of	groundwater	supplied	by	the	DJB	to	unconnected	areas.			
	
“Groundwater	 extraction	 is	 possible	 if	 the	 government	 is	 failing	 to	 supply.		
Groundwater	 is	 still	 governed	by	 the	 Indian	 Easements	Act	 of	 1892,	 a	 British	 Era	
law,	which	 states	 that	groundwater	 is	 the	property	of	 the	 landowner.	 	So	 for	 the	
government	to	regulate	groundwater	would	be	to	deprive	the	 landowner	of	 their	
property.		It	actually	becomes	a	legal	nicety	depending	on	whether	the	landowner	/	
government	can	prove	failure	to	supply	or	not.”			
Personal	communication,	Chief	Engineer	Planning,	DJB	offices,	Jhandewalan,	Delhi,	
10/04/15,	fn51)			
	
                                                            
197		Factory	locations	also	mentioned	in	Personal	communication,	NGO	manager,	16/01/15,	fn13;	
Personal	communication,	real	estate	dealers	on	Ratiya	Marg,	0602/15,	fn17;	Personal	communication,	
bottle	delivery	driver,	Bandh	Road,	16/02/15,	fn20;	Personal	communication,	pradhan	and	kholnewala,	
Sangam	Vihar,	3/07/15,	fn91;	Personal	communication,	tanker	owner	and	real	estate	dealers,	Bandh	
Road,	Sangam	Vihar,	18/08/15,	fn135	
198	Personal	communication,	Lucy	Dubochet,	London,	17/01/17,	fn137	
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CONCLUSIONS	
Previous	 researchers	emphasise	 the	 importance	of	disaggregation	of	 ‘water	 supply’	 in	 the	
abstract	(Ahlers	et	al.,	2014;	Marie-Hélène	Zérah,	2000a).		Studies	of	public	network	water	
have	also	emphasised	the	importance	of	materiality	(Björkman,	2015)	and	called	for	greater	
attention	to	the	‘the	manner	in	which	the	peculiar	materialities	of	technologies	matter’	(N.	
Anand,	 2017,	 p.	 11).	 	 The	 different	 supply	 modes	 I	 describe	 also	 present	 different	
possibilities	 for	 politics,	 patronage,	 rent-seeking	 and	 capture.	 	 Different	 modes	 have	
different	 topologies	 and	 temporalities	 –	 network,	 region,	 intermittent,	 fluid	 (Mol	 &	 Law,	
1994)	–	and	consequently	different	visibilities.			
	
While	 public	 and	 private	 tubewell	 networks	 (and	 we	 have	 seen	 the	 distinction	 between	
them	 is	 often	 ambiguous	 in	 practice)	 operate	 over	 an	 exclusive	 territory	 defined	 by	 the	
infrastructure,	 private	 tanker	 supply	 appears	 to	 work	 much	 like	 any	 other	 grey-market	
business	 (cf	 Ranganathan,	 Anand,	 Graham	 et	 al).	 	 The	 suggestions	 of	 a	 nexus	 involving	
overlapping	 interest	groups	of	party	workers,	politicians,	caste	representatives,	real	estate	
brokers	 and	 investors,	 private	 sector	water	 suppliers,	 and	water	 board	workers	 intimates	
that	the	distinction	between	public	and	private	actors	for	the	water	system	as	a	whole	may	
be	misleading.		Control	over,	even	investment	in,	water	and	land	are	related	and	there	are	
indications	 that	 both	 are	 managed	 by	 historically	 dominant	 local	 (caste)	 groups,	 at	 the	
expense	of	newer	residents.		Water,	land	and	politics	are	closely	related	spheres	of	informal	
influence,	however	their	dynamics	differ	to	each	other	in	ways	that	caution	us	against	using	
‘informality’	in	the	abstract	(cf	McFarlane	and	Waibel).			
	
In	relation	to	water	and	India’s	‘porous’	state,	the	work	of	Anand,	Björkman,	Contractor	and	
Jha	et	al	echo	my	findings	of	the	role	of	discretion,	patronage	and	political	representation	
(N.	 Anand,	 2011,	 2012;	 Bawa,	 2011;	 Björkman,	 2015;	 Contractor,	 2012;	 Jha	 et	 al.,	 2007).		
However,	the	impact	of	groundwater	on	the	nexus	of	informal	water,	land	use	and	politics	is	
not	extensively	 studied	 (Desai	&	Sanghvi,	 2017;	Kacker	&	 Joshi,	 2016).	 	 In	one	of	 the	 few	
papers	 explicitly	 discussing	 tubewell	 networks	 in	 Sangam	 Vihar,	 Kacker	 and	 Joshi	
characterise	the	tubewell	networks	as	being	initially	captured	DJB	bores	or	private	networks	
and	being	replaced	by	RWA	managed	networks	with	MLA	support.		Kacker	and	Johshi	spoke	
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to	RWA	members	in	B	and	D	blocks,	at	the	northern	edge	of	Sangam	Vihar	nearest	the	city.		
My	interviews	were	with	residents	from	eight	blocks,	primarily	those	at	the	less-developed	
fringes	of	Sangam	Vihar.	 	To	 reiterate	 the	point	about	variation	and	specificity,	 it	appears	
that	the	situation	is	different	across	blocks.		Further,	I	show	that	both	formations	continue	
in	 parallel.	 	 This	 indicates	 that	 initiatives	 to	 ‘reform’	 or	 ‘renationalise’	 private	 tubewell	
supply	 in	 Sangam	Vihar	have	previously	been	attempted,	 and	 failed,	under	BJP	MLAs	and	
Congress	state	assembly	(Kacker	&	Joshi,	2016,	pp.	263–267).			Rather	than	see	the	tubewell	
supply	in	Sangam	Vihar	as	‘illegal’	operations	filling	‘the	gaps	in	public	services’,	my	findings	
seem	 to	 suggest	 that	 they	 negotiate	 the	 porous	 edges	 of	 the	 local	 state	 in	 this	 context	
(Kacker	&	 Joshi,	 2016).	 	 Instead	of	proposing	 a	 trajectory	of	 civil	 society	mobilisation	and	
formalisation	 of	 small-scale	 local	 providers	 in	 an	 example	 of	 the	 co-production	 of	 urban	
services,	 my	 research	 suggests	 that	 local	 civil	 society	 groups,	 informal	 enterprises,	 and	
political	representation	are	problematic	and	resilient	in	the	face	of	disruption.		This	view	is	
more	 in	 line	 with	 Malini	 Ranganathan’s	 argument	 about	 water	 tanker	 businesses	 in	
Bengaluru,	 that	 they	 ‘strategically	 blur	 the	 boundaries	 between	 state	 and	 society’	
(Ranganathan,	2014a,	p.	91).			
	
A	 similar	 situation	 to	 the	 borewell	 capture	 that	 I	 describe,	 is	 municipal	 tap	 capture	 by	
criminal	 groups	 described	 in	work	 on	Mumbai	 (Bapat	&	Agarwal,	 2003,	 p.	 82;	Weinstein,	
2008,	p.	26).		Tap	capture	by	local	groups,	along	caste	or	communal	lines,	is	also	described	
in	Patna	 (Rodgers	&	Satija,	2012,	p.	4).	 	The	connection	 I	 find	between	water	 tankers	and	
tubewells	 is	also,	cursorily	mentioned	by	Graham	et	al	 in	work	on	Mumbai:	 ‘private	water	
tankers	 also	 obtained	 water	 from	 bore	 wells,	 pointing	 to	 profits	 being	 made	 through	
excessive	and	often	unregulated	groundwater	extraction’	(Graham	et	al.,	2013,	p.	135).	
	
Other	 work	 on	 water	 tankers	 has	 suggested	 that	 they	 operate	 as	 a	 cartel	 with	 a	 spatial	
monopoly	(Borthakur,	2015;	Kjellén	&	McGranahan,	2006;	Ranganathan,	2014a)	and	‘state-
like’	public	authority	(Ranganathan,	2014a).		However,	in	my	research	this	has	not	been	the	
case,	and	tanker	firms	operate	as	informal	private	businesses.		Tubewells,	however,	do	have	
spatial	monopoly	and	are	‘state-like’,	connected	to	locally	powerful	groups,	patronage	and	
rent-seeking	 for	 election	 expenses	 by	 political	 parties.	 	 The	 dynamics	 of	 these	 forms	 of	
water	 supply	 are	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 their	 respective	 (technical	 and	 ecological)	
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materialities;	 tankers	 are	 mobile	 and	 intermittently	 present	 across	 a	 network	 of	 points,	
tubewell	 networks	 continuously	 occupy	 territories	 (albeit	 with	 fluid	 and	 sometimes	
overlapping	edges)	remote	from	state	agencies.			
	
The	availability	of	ground	water	as	a	 supplementary	external	 input	dilutes	public	anger	at	
partial	government	supply.		As	groundwater	provision	through	tubewells	and	tankers	allows	
greater	 discretion	 for	 local	 politicians,	 it	 offers	 the	 possibility	 to	 affirm	 relationships	with	
local	constituents	as	well	as	to	accrue	financial	gain	for	personal	and	party	funds.		However,	
at	 the	 same	 time,	 water,	 in	 this	 case	 groundwater,	 ‘exceeds	 politics	 and	 destabilizes	 its	
distribution	regimes’	(N.	Anand,	2011).		The	‘vote	bank	politics’	that	leaves	the	populations	
of	unauthorised	colonies	reliant	on	ad	hoc	interventions	from	politicians	for	urban	services	
and	decreasing	amounts	and	qualities	of	groundwater,	has	led	to	an	electoral	backlash.		The	
AAP	 campaign,	 promising	 to	 end	 this	 type	 of	 politics,	 was	 helped	 by	 the	water	 situation	
(groundwater	decline	and	price	rise).				
	
The	 government	 supply	 through	 tubewells	 and	 tankers	 in	 Sangam	 Vihar	 magnifies	 the	
unevenness	 present	 in	 official	 network	 water	 supply.	 	 The	 provision	 of	 off-grid	 and	
decentralised	 infrastructures	 like	 tubewells	 and	 tankers	 in	 place	 of	 a	 network	 connection	
allows	 for	greater	discretion	by	agency	and	political	workers	and	appears	more	porous	 to	
external	influence,	patronage	and	capture	than	is	possible	with	piped	network	supply.		Small	
private	sector	water	suppliers	operate	as	unregulated	for-profit	businesses	with	sub-optimal	
(higher	 cost,	 less	 reliable)	 outcomes	 for	 consumers.	 	 These	 combinations	 lead	 to	 water	
governance	 formations	which	are	highly	varied	and	 localised	down	to	street	or	household	
level.	 	 While	 some	 areas	 benefit	 from	 low	 cost	 water	 at	 convenient	 times,	 most	 often	
outcomes	are	sub-optimal,	and	households	must	spend	a	high	proportion	of	their	income	on	
securing	 potable	 water	 from	 the	 private	 sector.	 	 This	 leaves	 water	 users	 feeling	
disenfranchised	 and	exploited	but	with	 little	 recourse	 for	 complaints.	 	 It	 should	be	noted	
that	water	provision	appears	to	be	seen	as	a	female	responsibility,	and	the	vast	majority	of	
‘water	 users’	 I	 spoke	 to	 at	 a	 street	 level	 were	 female.	 	 Visitors	 to	 the	MLA	 offices	 with	
complaints	of	 inadequate	supply	were	both	male	and	female.	 	With	the	exceptions	of	one	
kholenewali	 and	 one	 pradhan,	 tubewell	 managers,	 local	 politicians	 and	 MLA	 staff	 were	
entirely	male.		
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The	decentralised	informal	 infrastructures	 in	this	chapter	are	less	visible	and	more	socially	
embedded	than	piped	network	supply.	 	The	 ‘informal	political	economies’	of	water	supply	
here,	within	and	outside	state	provision,	appear	to	be	linked	to	city	politics	and	embedded	
in	local	economies	of	caste,	land	and	real	estate	where	powerful	actors	have	some	degree	
of	 state	 and/or	 social	 power.	 	 This	 makes	 them	 harder	 to	 reform	 towards	 greater	
transparency,	 accountability,	 or	 equity.	 	 This	 also	 brings	 unregulated	 environmental	
consequences	in	the	form	of	unchecked,	unmonitored	groundwater	depletion,	and	pollution	
as	a	result	of	discharge	from	treatment	facilities.		These	decentralised	modes,	because	they	
are	more	localised	and	susceptible	to	local	control,	are	also	hard	to	reform,	for	the	AAP	and	
others.	 	 The	 DJB	 is	 unable	 to	 use	 their	 own	men	 as	 kholnewalas	 in	 Sangam	 Vihar	 unlike	
other	areas	(cf	Ghertner,	2017).	 	This	 informality,	 is	not	generated	by	state	power,	as	Roy	
suggests,	 but	 by	 state	 weakness.	 	 AAP	 reforms	 in	 Sangam	 Vihar	 appear	 to	 have	
underestimated	the	extent	and	resilience	of	local	control	over	non-network	sources,	which	
has	 led	 to	 the	 AAP’s	 longer	 term	 strategy	 of	 removing	 non-network	 sources	 as	 far	 as	
possible.			
	
There	 are	 important	 connections	 between	 these	 different	 informalities.	 	 Informal	 tenure	
leads	 to	 denial	 of	 services,	 which	 in	 turn	 leads	 to	 informal	 provision	 secured	 through	
informal	 intercession	and	politics.	 	Control	over	 land	has	 led	to	 influence	over	politics	and	
water	for	the	locally	dominant	caste	and	the	exploitation	of	migrant	settlers.		Ranganathan	
also	 highlights	 the	 links	 between	 informal	 water	 and	 informal	 land	 development	
(Ranganathan,	 2014a,	 p.	 91).	 	 In	work	 on	water	 in	 other	 cities,	 religious	 discrimination	 is	
observed	(N.	Anand,	2012;	Contractor,	2012),	but	caste	is	not	mentioned.		Researchers	have	
also	found	that	conversely,	knowledge	and	control	of	water	has	allowed	individuals	to	move	
into	 politics	 (Björkman,	 2015;	 Contractor,	 2012)	 and	 control	 over	 land	 (Cooper,	 2011).		
However,	 while	 informalities	 in	 land,	 residential	 status,	 employment	 arrangements,	 state	
access,	political	patronage,	 and	urban	 services	are	 related,	 they	are	not	 the	 same.	 	 These	
cases,	 then,	 complicate	 thinking	with	 a	 general	 theory	 of	 ‘urban	 informality’	 drawn	 from	
empirical	 research	 on	 land	or	 labour	 (AlSayyad,	 2004;	 Benjamin,	 2004;	 Kudva,	 2009;	 Roy,	
2005),	 and	 suggests	 the	difficulties	of	 thinking	 across	 infrastructure	modes	 (Marie-Hélène	
Zérah,	 2008).	 	 Informal	 land	 settlement	 can	 allow	 the	 establishment	 of	 economically	
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productive	 neighbourhoods	 by	 providing	 lower-cost,	 more	 flexible,	 better	 located,	
residential,	industrial,	commercial	and	community	spaces	than	would	otherwise	be	available	
to	low-income	people	(Benjamin,	2004).		For	example,	while	informal	land	use	may	support	
mixed-use	 clusters	with	benefits	 for	 low-income	 residents,	 informal	water	use	 appears	 to	
primarily	be	of	benefit	in	allowing	the	formal	network	to	save	the	costs	of	expansion,	local	
representatives	 to	 trade	 piecemeal	 improvements	 for	 political	 loyalty	 and	 local	
entrepreneurs	 to	 generate	 income	and	a	 small	 amount	of	 informal	 low-skill	 employment.		
Informal	water	supply	then	appears	less	beneficial	and	is	primarily	valued	in	the	absence	of	
any	alternative.			
	
In	 the	 next	 chapter	 I	 add	 an	 additional	 layer	 of	 complexity	 to	 this	 picture	 of	 water	
governance	 arrangements	 in	 South	 Delhi;	 reforms	 under	 a	 Public-Private-Partnership	 for	
commercial	 water	 management.	 	 This	 project	 has	 to	 negotiate	 not	 only	 the	 vagaries	 of	
government	water	 described	 in	 Chapter	 Four,	 but	 also	 the	 informal	 systems	 described	 in	
this	 chapter.	 	 Although	 less	 extensive	 in	 the	 Project	 zone,	 private	 networks,	 tubewell	
capture	and	unauthorised	connections	to	the	government	network	are	very	much	present.		
As	well	as	responding	to	these	informalities	and	the	politics	of	water	that	they	lead	to,	the	
Project	also	generates	 its	own	forms	of	 informality	and	politics.	 	The	complex	 interactions	
this	gives	rise	to	are	the	subject	of	our	next	chapter.			
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CHAPTER	6.	PUBLIC	PRIVATE	PARTNERSHIP:		
MODELS	AND	MUD	
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 address	 the	 third	 research	question	 ‘What	are	 the	 relationships	between	
informality,	groundwater	and	water	governance	reform	initiatives?’		To	do	this	I	describe	the	
progress	of	a	Public	Private	Partnership	(PPP)	for	urban	water	supply	in	Delhi.		This	builds	on	
my	analysis	of	informality	and	groundwater	use	in	previous	chapters	and	introduces	the	PPP	
Project	as	an	additional	layer	of	urban	water	governance.			
	
The	 transfer	 of	 water	 network	 management	 to	 a	 private	 operator	 under	 a	 PPP	 contract	
provides	 a	 unique	 diagnostic	 event	 through	 which	 to	 investigate	 the	 social	 and	 political	
dynamics	around	water	supply	and	access	arrangements	 in	South	Delhi.	 	At	a	policy	 level,	
private	 sector	 involvement	 is	 heavily	 promoted	 by	 Central	 Government,	 multilateral	 and	
bilateral	 agencies	 as	 a	 means	 to	 leverage	 finance,	 expertise	 and	 technology	 for	 urban	
infrastructure	 and	 services	 in	 Indian	 cities.	 	My	 discussion	 of	 a	 project	 in	 a	 complex	 and	
dynamic	 area	 of	 Delhi,	 ‘the	most	 favoured	 city’,	 provides	 a	 limit	 case	 of	 what	 should	 be	
highly	favourable	conditions	for	private	sector	involvement	(Sivaramakrishnan,	2011).		After	
examining	 the	project	aims,	 rationale,	 location	and	environment,	 I	will	 consider	 two	main	
aspects:	a	pilot	initiative	for	24-hour	continuous	water	supply	in	a	wealthy	neighbourhood,	
and	network	rehabilitation	in	unplanned	areas.			
	
This	 chapter	 illustrates	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 physical	 and	 governance	 environment	 that	
urban	PPPs	for	water	distribution	must	engage	with	in	India.		I	make	several	points.		The	first	
concerns	 the	 interplay	 between	 international	 agencies	 and	 local	 actors	 in	 influence	 over	
Delhi’s	water	supply	arrangements	and	policy.		In	this	case,	unlike	the	standard	narrative	of	
powerful	 international	 organisations	 exploiting	 the	 local	 public	 sector,	 the	 Multinational	
partner	 (‘the	 Multinational’)	 in	 the	 PPP	 project	 (‘the	 Project’)	 appears	 to	 have	 been	
insufficiently	 diligent	 to	 the	 advantage	of	 the	Delhi	 government.	 	 The	 tendering	 outcome	
also	 appears	 to	 have	 favoured	 the	 ‘Local	 Partner’	 infrastructure	 company	 involved	 in	 the	
joint	venture.	 	The	Project	has	innovative	features	in	scope,	connection	targets	and	tariffs,	
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which	mark	 an	 evolution	 in	 approach	 from	 earlier	 generations	 of	 privatisation	 initiatives;	
however,	the	existing	levels	of	physical	and	administrative	informality	in	water	supply	have	
meant	that	the	joint	venture	(‘the	Operator’)	has	found	it	difficult	to	understand	and	map	
the	water	supply	network	they	are	managing.		As	in	previous	chapters,	power	and	influence	
structure	relationships	to	infrastructure;	however	these	elements	of	the	Project	context	are	
outside	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 Operator’s	 expertise.	 	 While	 the	 Project	 was	 heavily	 oriented	
towards	 demonstrating	 24/7	 continuous	 water	 supply,	 this	 was	 not	 necessarily	 cost-
effective	or	appreciated	by	consumers.		As	described	in	the	previous	chapter,	groundwater	
is	 used	 as	 an	 external	 supplement	 to	 support	 the	 formal	 network.	 	 The	 role	 of	 personal	
intercession,	 heavily	 informalised	 physical	 and	 administrative	 systems,	 and	 uneven	
provision	of	services	across	areas	and	by	class,	caste	and	religion	should	also	be	apparent.		
My	 research	 suggests	 that	 despite	 enthusiasm	 to	 learn	how	 to	work	 in	 this	 environment,	
these	complexities	and	challenges	are	still	underestimated	by	corporate	actors.			
	
The	 Chapter	 is	 structured	 in	 three	 parts:	 an	 outline	 of	 the	 history	 and	 evolution	 of	 the	
privatisation	project	in	Malviya	Nagar;	a	discussion	of	the	24/7	continuous	supply	initiative	
in	a	wealthy	neighbourhood;	an	outline	of	 the	progress	of	 the	Project	 in	unplanned,	 low-
income	 neighbourhoods;	 and	 a	 discussion	 of	 communication	 and	 public	 relations	
challenges.					
	
	
	
PPP	promotional	video	stills	of	location	and	site	offices	
This image has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
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PRIVATISATION	IN	MALVIYA	NAGAR	
“…here	we	have	more	surprises	than	anywhere…”	
Personal	communication,	Project	Manager,	Malviya	Nagar,	21	April	2015,	fieldnote	56	
	
The	commercialisation	of	the	Delhi’s	water	has	been	under	consideration	since	the	Delhi	Jal	
Board	 (DJB)	 was	 constituted	 in	 1998	 (Government	 of	 National	 Capital	 Territory	 of	 Delhi,	
1998	 -	 see	 Chapter	 Four).	 	 In	 2002	 the	 DJB	 commissioned	 a	 preparatory	 study	 into	 the	
technical	 and	 institutional	 factors	 to	 be	 addressed	 with	 a	 view	 to	 undertaking	
comprehensive	reforms	in	water	and	waste	water	management.		Following	this,	on	May	21	
and	 22,	 2004,	 a	 workshop	 was	 held	 for	 the	 Delhi	 Urban	 Water	 and	 Sewerage	 Supply	
Improvement	 Project	 (DUWSSIP)	where	DJB	 officials	were	 joined	 by	 representatives	 from	
the	 Union	 Urban	 and	 Water	 Ministries,	 Public	 Health	 Board	 and	 Ground	 Water	 Board,	
officials	 from	 Delhi	 municipal	 and	 state	 government,	 representatives	 of	 the	World	 Bank,	
Water	 and	 Sanitation	 Programme,	 and	 other	 international	 agencies.	 	 The	 workshop	 was	
moderated	by	PriceWaterhouseCoopers	(PWC),	but	they	were	not	named	on	the	participant	
list.	 	 The	World	 Bank	 was	 later	 accused	 of	 unfairly	 intervening	 in	 the	 tender	 process	 in	
favour	of	PWC	(IPTsecretariat,	2007;	Ramesh,	2005;	Sampat	&	Koonan,	2012;	World	Bank,	
2005,	2009).		Additionally,	members	of	several	Indian	water	boards	(Bangalore,	Hyderabad,	
Chennai,	 Mumbai	 and	 Jamshedpur)	 as	 well	 as	 staff	 from	 both	 Manila	 Water	 and	
Johannesburg	 Water,	 a	 joint	 venture	 with	 Suez	 Environment	 made	 presentations	 on	
transition	 to	 private	 sector	 involvement	 (Delhi	 Jal	 Board,	 2004c,	 p.	 10).	 	 In	 2005,	 four	
companies,	Manila	Water,	Degremont	(a	Suez	subsidiary),	Veolia	and	Saur	were	shortlisted	
to	run	PPP	distribution	projects	in	South	Delhi	(V.	Asthana,	2009,	p.	93).			
	
In	late	2004,	following	the	reform	workshop,	the	DJB	announcement	a	water	tariff	increase	
(Maria,	 2008,	 p.	 12).	 	 This	 was	met	 with	 a	 concerted	 response	 from	 activists,	 NGOs	 and	
citizen’s	groups	(Shiva,	Vandana,	2006,	p.	12;	Avjeet	Singh,	2008,	p.	421)199.	 	Public	 feeling	
was	 partly	 built	 on	 dissatisfaction	 following	 electricity	 privatisation	 in	 Delhi200.	 	 In	 this	
movement	 against	 the	 privatisation	 of	 Delhi’s	 water,	 the	 current	 Chief	 Minister,	 Arvind	
Kejriwal,	 was	 a	 key	 figure.	 	 This	 curtailed	 the	 proposed	 project	 (Gulati,	 2015;	 Kejriwal	 &	
                                                            
199	For	more	on	this	period	see	(V.	Asthana,	2009;	Maria,	2007)		
200	Personal	communication,	Awadhendra	Sharan,	Centre	for	Study	of	Developing	Societies,	Delhi,	
20/08/14,	fieldnote3	(fnX	subsequently)	
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Bhaduri,	 2005)	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 even	 some	 water	 researchers	 continued	 to	 regard	
privatisation	at	 ‘stalled’201.	 	Nevertheless,	 in	2012	projects	 in	 three	areas	of	 the	 city	were	
launched,	with	little	fanfare,	as	projects	‘in	the	PPP	mode’.		These	three	PPPs	are	operated	
by	 Suez,	 Veolia	 and	 SPML	 Infra;	 as	 noted	 above,	 two	 of	 these	 companies	 shortlisted	
previously	for	involvement	in	private	sector	water	management	in	Delhi.		The	DJB	declines	
to	 comment	on	 the	 continuity	of	 the	 current	 PPP	water	projects	 in	Delhi	with	 the	earlier	
DUWSSIP	project	 (Sampat	&	Koonan,	 2012).	 	 Persistent	opposition	 to	water	privatisation,	
however,	has	continued.		While	many	activists	have	exceptional	grasp	of	detail	and	scope,	in	
addition	to	an	exemplary	commitment	to	social	 justice,	the	most	vocal	activists	opponents	
of	water	privatisation	are	not	always	the	best	 informed202.	 	Less	dogmatic	advocates	point	
out	that	if	the	poor	are	not	getting	water	from	the	state	anyway,	and	are	already	paying	a	
premium	for	private	sector	supply,	they	will	probably	not	care	who	runs	the	service	if	it	does	
improve203.			
	
The	 original	 DUWSSIP	 proposal	 stated	 that	 private	 operators	 would	 be	 brought	 in	 to	
manage	selected	zones,	at	first	on	a	competitive	basis,	with	the	intention	of	testing	if	they	
were	able	to	improve	supply	in	a	complex	and	dense	urban	environment,	and	with	the	aim	
of	scaling	up	successful	pilots	to	cover	the	city	as	a	whole.204	 	 In	response	to	a	question	 in	
India’s	Rajya	Sabha	(House	of	Lords)	on	the	14th	August	2015,	the	Minister	of	State	for	Home	
Affairs,	Kiren	Rijuju,	observed	that	‘in	future	these	water	supply	improvement	projects	can	
be	undertaken	by	DJB	through	its	own	staff	having	gained	experience	and	expertise’205.		This	
demonstrates	 the	 idea	at	 the	City	and	National	 level	 that	 the	public	utility	can	 learn	 from	
the	private	sector	and	then	bring	 this	knowledge	back	 into	 their	own	management	of	 the	
network	when	 the	 contracts	 expire.	 	 These	 PPP	 projects	 are	 thus	 presented	 as	 a	way	 to	
assess	 and	 develop	 private	 sector	 competencies	 at	 working	 in	 the	 Indian	 urban	 water	
                                                            
201	Personal	communication,	Awadhendra	Sharan,	Centre	for	Study	of	Developing	Societies,	Delhi,	
20/08/14,	fn3	
202	I	have	attended	meetings	on	water	with	ActionAid,	International	Environmental	Law	Centre,	Jan	
Pehel	(Madhya	Pradesh),	Manthan	Adhyayan	Kendra	(Madhya	Pradesh),	National	Platform	
Against	Water	Privatisation	and	People's	Campaign	on	Right	to	Water	(Karnataka);	Citizen’s	Front	for	
Water	Democracy;	Delhi	National	Law	University;	Development	Alternatives;	Himdhara;	Jal	Samvaad;	
Namada	Bachao	Andolan;	National	Campaign	Against	Water	Privatisation;	WaterAid.					
203	Personal	communication,	Dunu	Roy,	Hazards	Centre,	Delhi,	21/08/14,	fn4	
204	Interview	with	senior	urban	researcher,	Delhi,	August	2015,	fn44	
205	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs	2014,	online:	(V.	Asthana,	2009,	p.	93)			
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context,	with	an	eye	on	the	future	rollout	of	urban	water	networks	in	the	future206;	 ‘if	you	
have	 all	 these	 areas	 and	 system	 is	 not	working	 very	well,	why	not	 try	 out	what	 could	be	
improved	in	a	couple	of	places?'207.			
	
Can	 Delhi’s	 water	 service	 be	 reformed	 and	 modernised	 along	 more	 commercially,	 and	
ecologically,	efficient	and	sustainable	lines	by	following	technical	expertise	from	multilateral	
and	bilateral	agencies	and	multinational	corporations?		This	would	function	as	a	‘test	bed’	or	
‘poster	 child’	 for	 good	 public	 sector	 governance	 and	 creditworthiness	 for	 both	 Delhi	 and	
India	as	a	whole.		The	Delhi	Metro	would	be	an	example	of	a	successful	project	of	this	type	
(Bon,	 2015;	 Siemiatycki,	 2006).	 	 Consider,	 for	 example,	 this	 description	of	 a	water	 PPP	 in	
Delhi:		
	
‘The	 New	 Delhi	 contract	 confirms	 our	 position	 as	 the	 leading	 company	 on	 the	
Indian	market.	 In	addition	to	being	a	symbolic	victory	in	one	of	the	most	dynamic	
capitals	in	Asia,	it	also	testifies	to	our	ability	for	form	partnerships	with	the	leading	
local	 firms	 and	 to	 stand	 out	 for	 the	 excellent	 services	 provided	 and	 our	 social	
responsibility.	 It	 also,	 and	above	all,	 reflects	 the	 trust	 the	 Indian	authorities	have	
placed	in	us	for	the	long	term’	(Veolia,	2012).	
	
Given	 this	 symbolic	 value,	 Delhi	 is	 the	 site	 of	 a	 proliferation	 of	 experiments	 in	 water	
treatment,	 distribution	 and	 reuse.	 	 Closely	 involved	 participants	 in	 Delhi’s	 water	 sector	
mention	that:		
	
‘DJB	was	originally	talking	about	reforms	with	the	idea	that	private	could	come	in	in	
the	south	and	that	DJB	could	do	reform	pilot	under	own	management	in	north	-	but	
there	were	other	reasons	why	private	sector	was	brought	in	everywhere’208.	
	
The	PPP	at	Malviya	Nagar	 (Malviya	Nagar	Water	Services,	 ‘the	Project’)	officially	began	 in	
2011-2012.	 	 Malviya	 Nagar	 Water	 Services	 is	 a	 joint	 venture	 (‘the	 Operator’)	 created	
between	 a	 Multinational	 Water	 Company209	 (‘the	 MNC’)	 and	 an	 Indian	 infrastructure	
                                                            
206	Personal	communication,	senior	manager,	Project	Offices,	Delhi,	19/09/14,	fn6	
207	Personal	communication,	Senior	Urban	Researcher,	Centre	for	Policy	Research,	Delhi,	August	2014,	
fn44	
208	Expert	roundtable	on	water	management,	Development	Alternatives,	November	2014,	fn38	
209	Suez	Environment.		It	might	be	advisable	to	keep	them	anonymous.	
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company210	 (‘the	Local	Partner’)	 for	 the	zone	of	 the	PPP.	 	 In	1947,	 the	Malviya	Nagar	area	
was	 largely	 village	 farmland	 on	 the	 edges	 of	 urbanised	 Delhi.	 	 In	 1948,	 land	 for	 refugee	
colonies	 in	 the	 south,	 at	 first	Malviya	Nagar	 and	neighbouring	 Kalkaji,	was	 selected.	 	 The	
agricultural	 land,	 growing	 ‘rows	 and	 rows	 of	 vegetables’,	 was	 purchased	 for	 a	 ‘pittance’	
from	the	farmers	by	the	district	board	as	well	as	private	developers	(Sengupta,	2007,	p.	80).		
Many	other	South	Delhi	neighbourhoods	also	came	into	existence	as	refugee	colonies.			
	
Today,	 Malviya	 Nagar	 is	 well-placed	 in	 South	 Delhi.	 	 Despite	 its	 associations	 as	 a	 fairly	
wealthy	 (certainly	 solidly	middle	 class)	 area	 of	 Delhi,	 the	 PPP	 zone	 is	 substantially	 larger	
than	 simply	Malviya	Nagar	 colony	 and	 covers	 a	 diverse	 range	 of	 settlement	 types	with	 a	
population	of	around	400,000	(Delhi	Jal	Board,	2017).		This	includes	very	affluent	areas	(for	
example,	 Geetanjali	 Enclave),	 less	 ostentatious	 but	 still	 comfortable	 Delhi	 Development	
Authority	 (DDA)-built	 areas,	 a	 very	 large	 area	 of	 government	 housing	 (which	 has	 its	 own	
arrangements	 with	 the	 DJB	 as	 well	 as	 extensive	 tubewell	 supply),	 a	 large	 cluster	 of	
unauthorised	colonies	 (including	Khirki	Extension	and	Hauz	Rani	Extension),	urban	villages	
up	to	a	thousand	years	old	(including	Hauz	Rani,	Khirki	and	Begumpur),	a	small	number	of	
recognised	slums,	and	a	few	jhuggi	jhompri	clusters	or	unrecognised	slums.		There	are	also	
significant	 commercial	 sites	 including	 run-down	 public	 hospitals	 and	 luxurious	 private	
hospitals,	 five	star	hotels,	and	high-end	shopping	malls.	 	The	PPP	zone,	which	 is	T-shaped,	
can	be	divided	into	four	bands,	north	to	south	(see	Figure	13,	page	79).		The	top	15%	of	the	
zone	 is	 richer	 and	planned,	 the	next	 10%	 composed	more	of	DDA	 flats	 and	unauthorised	
colonies,	 the	 next	 10%	 is	 mainly	 malls	 and	 hospitals,	 the	 last	 65%	 is	 peri-urban	 and	
unauthorised	colonies	(e.g.	Dakshin	Vihar)	and	‘farmhouse’	villas.		This	mix	of	land-use	gives	
a	more	varied	and	challenging	environment	for	the	operator.	
	
In	 conversation,	 the	 member	 of	 staff	 responsible	 for	 Non-Revenue	Water	 (NRW),	 Arjun,	
disagreed	with	my	suggestion	that	Malviya	Nagar	is	a	rich	area	and	an	easy	place	to	do	the	
project.		Some	parts	are	wealthy,	he	agreed,	but	the	unplanned	neighbourhoods	and	urban	
villages	 are	 not.		 He	 described	 the	 project	 as	 'very	 difficult,	 very	 challenging,	 very	
interesting,	 very	 stressful'211.	 	 The	 zone	 of	 operations	 for	 the	 Project	 itself	 has	 been	
                                                            
210	SPML.		It	might	be	advisable	to	keep	the	anonymous.			
211	Personal	communication,	project	staff,	Project	Offices,	Delhi,	19/09/14,	fn6	
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artificially	constructed	across	DJB	zones	(it	is	broadly	within	South	II),	Member	of	Legislative	
Assembly	(MLA)	constituencies	and	a	mix	of	 land	use	types.	 	There	would	be	an	argument	
for	creating	an	administratively	artificial	zone	if	 it	could	be	hydrologically	 isolated,	but	this	
does	not	seem	to	be	the	case	(see	description	of	‘irrational’	zoning	in	Chapter	Four).		After	
four	years	of	work	Project	staff	have	‘nearly’	identified	all	the	places	where	water	enters	in	
bulk	from	the	main	network	(‘inlets’)	but	there	are	still	‘one	or	two	we	are	not	sure	about,	
maybe	they	exist’212.	The	process	by	which	Project	zones	were	chosen	would	repay	further	
research.				
	
The	PPP	is	an	operations	and	management	contract	in	which	the	Operator	will	manage	the	
assets	and	service	for	12	years.		Operations	and	management	contracts	are	considered	the	
‘lightest’	form	of	PPP,	as	the	public	sector	retains	ownership	of	the	assets.		The	contract	is	
for	 2+10	 years;	 a	 two	 year	 period	 is	 given	 for	 ‘rehabilitation’	 of	 the	 physical	 network	
(including	reducing	leaks	and	laying	new	pipes)	and	the	Operator	has	ten	years	after	this	to	
manage	the	network	and	recoup	their	investment.		After	12	years,	the	network	assets	and	
management	will	either	be	passed	back	to	the	Delhi	Jal	Board,	the	contract	will	be	renewed	
or	 another	 operator	 may	 come	 in.	 	 The	 project	 aims	 to	 turn	 a	 section	 of	 Delhi’s	 water	
network	 into	 a	 financially	 viable	 commercial	 venture,	 with	 more	 people	 receiving	 water	
from	the	utility	and	less	water	and	money	wasted.			
	
The	consortium	is	required	to	increase	coverage	of	water	supply	(from	84%	to	100%),	bring	
down	 the	 per	 capita	 supply	 (from	 286lpcd	 to	 150),	 increase	 supply	 hours	 (to	 24/7	 from	
current	3-8),	increase	metering	of	water	connections	(from	41%	to	100%),	bring	down	non-
revenue	water	(from	65-70%	to	15%),	increase	cost	recovery	of	operations	(from	61.4%	to	
100%),	increase	collection	efficiency	(from	81%	to	90%),	increase	quality	of	water	supplied,		
and	increase	efficiency	in	addressing	complaints213.		
	
As	a	service	contract,	Operator	profits	are	independent	of	income	from	tariffs	which	are	set	
by	 the	 DJB.	 	 As	 the	 Delhi	 Jal	 Board	 is	 essentially	 paying	 the	 Operator	 for	 the	 service	 of	
providing	 water	 to	 users	 in	 the	 zone	 the	 DJB	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 the	 real	 consumer.		
                                                            
212	Personal	communication,	Project	manager,	Project	Offices,	South	Delhi,	21/04/15,	fn56	
213	Malviya	Nagar	PPP	Detailed	Project	Report,	Contract.		Copy	with	author.			
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Remember	 the	World	 Bank	 ‘best	 practice’	 automatic	 tariff	 increases	 from	 Chapter	 Four?		
Basic	 services	 and	 price	 increase	 (mahengai	 –	 inflation)	were	 key	 issues	 in	 the	 2014	 and	
2015	elections.		Delhi’s	Election	Commissioner	suggested	that	the	rise	in	the	water	tariff	was	
partly	responsible	for	the	previous	Congress	Party	Delhi	government’s	collapse.214			
	
The	 most	 positive	 thing	 about	 this	 PPP	 is	 the	 claim	 from	 the	 Operator	 is	 that	 they	 are	
working	to	100%	connection	in	the	project	area215,	a	markedly	different	approach	from	the	
DJB’s	differentiated	supply	modes.			
	
“We	 are	 clear	 that	 […]	 the	 hydraulic	 model,	 implementation	 plan,	 masterplan	
whatever	you	want	to	call	it,	is	based	on	providing	water	to	everybody,	authorised,	
unauthorised.”			
(Personal	communication,	senior	manager,	21	April	2015,	PPP	Offices,	South	Delhi,	
fn56)	
	
However,	this	is	subject	to	DJB	approval	in	unauthorised	colonies	and	there	is	no	contractual	
obligation	to	supply	to	areas	(like	recognised	slums)	that	are	‘outside	of	DJB	scope’216.		As	Mr	
Levé,	 quoted	 above,	 explained,	MNC	 staff	 were	 not	 initially	 aware	 of	 the	 restrictions	 on	
supply	 to	unauthorised	areas,	 and	 this	 has	delayed	 the	project.	 	Additionally,	 approval	 to	
replace	 pipes	 is	 case	 by	 case	 for	 different	 areas,	 and	 ‘there	 are	 different	 cases	 even	 by	
DJB’217.	 	Further,	contractual	penalties	related	to	this	objective	only	apply	within	40	metres	
(a	maximum	distance	of	100	metres	is	allowed	in	unspecified	circumstances)	of	where	the	
network	is	laid,	and	unauthorised	colonies	are	an	‘allowed	exclusion’	(Delhi	Jal	Board,	2012,	
pp.	1992–1993).	 	 This	 appears	 to	 continue	 the	approach	of	 supplying	only	 to	 the	edge	of	
unauthorised	 areas	 and	 allowing	 self-laid	 pipes	 internally.	 	 This	 is	 certainly	 an	 issue	 that	
project	staff	are	now	aware	of.		These	will	also	be	metered	connections,	an	option	which	is	
not	popular	with	local	residents	(Delhi	Jal	Board,	2012,	p.	2115)218.		The	terms	and	conditions	
of	these	connections	then	become	the	terrain	over	which	the	extent	and	quality	of	service	is	
negotiated.			
                                                            
214	Personal	communication,	Delhi	Election	Commissioner	15/09/14,	fn45	
215	Personal	communication,	PPP	Project	Manager,	21/04/15,	fn56	
216	Slums	are	supplied	water	by	a	different	agency	
217	Personal	communication,	PPP	Project	Manager,	21/04/15,	fn56	
218	Personal	communication,	local	politician,	Hauz	Rani	Ext,	September	2014,	fn49;	Personal	
communication,	Khirki	Gaon	RWA	president,	21/01/15,	fn14;	see	Appendix	MR,	page	290	
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The	 Operator	 won	 the	 contract	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 low	 price	 of	 water	 per	 connection	
including	technical	and	commercial	losses.		This	means	that	their	profit	margin	is	based	on	
missing	water.		The	Project	is	premised	on	the	idea	that	since	water	losses	in	the	system	are	
very	 high	 (70%	 according	 to	 the	 Detailed	 Project	 Report),	 the	Operator	 can	 save	 enough	
water	 to	 increase	 the	 hours	 and	 coverage	 of	 network	 supply.	 	 The	 increases	 in	 network	
efficiency	 are	 intended	 to	 cover	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 contract	 –	 that	 is	 the	 increases	 in	water	
saved	and	income	generated	will	cover	the	cost	of	the	Operator’s	 	profits,	and	will	still	be	
cheaper	than	if	the	DJB	was	running	the	zone219.		The	DJB	suggests	that,	after	accounting	for	
spending	 on	 assets,	 the	Operator	will	 break-even	 if	 they	 generate	 over	 15%	 profit	 (Delhi	
Government,	 n.d.).	 	 The	 ‘missing	 water’	 is	 broken	 into	 two	 kinds:	 a)	 technical	 losses	 or	
‘unaccounted	for	water’	due	to	leaks	or	unknown	areas	of	the	network;	and	b)	commercial	
losses	or	‘non-revenue	water’	due	to	non-payment	or	theft	(note	the	Arrears	column	in	the	
table	on	Water	Used	and	Billed	at	Appendix	WU,	page	289).	
	
Arjun,	the	member	of	staff	responsible	for	Non-Revenue	Water	(NRW),	explained	that	in	
unplanned	areas	the	network	has	been	laid	by	residents	themselves.		This	makes	almost	all	
connections	in	these	areas	illegal,	as	DJB	norms	are	that	100	millimetre	pipes	must	be	used	
and	there	may	not	be	more	than	ten	metres	between	the	pipe	and	the	house	connection.		It	
also	means	that	there	is	very	little	institutional	knowledge	of	these	parts	of	the	network.		
"Every	extra	foot	we	dig	down	we	find	more	pipes,"	Arjun	says.		The	project	is	"politically,	
socially	challenging,	not	just	technically".		He	tells	me	that	protests	are	quite	common	
(about	once	a	month)	but:	“This	is	nothing	compared	to	Nagpur	and	Bangalore!		There	
people	get	beaten,	their	heads	shaved,	garlanded	with	shoes	and	their	face	blackened220	and	
made	to	walk	in	the	streets.”			
	
                                                            
219	Personal	communication,	Delhi	Election	Commissioner	15/09/14,	fn45	
220	These	are	traditional	forms	of	disrespect	–	like	‘tarring	and	feathering’	in	the	USA.			
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Unauthorised	colonies	in	the	Project	zone	
Map	showing	Demand	Management	Areas	in	wealthy	planned	areas	used	to	provide	indicative	data	for	the	
PPP	contract.	(Detailed	Project	Report,	Appendices	and	DMA	Report,	2011,	P272)	
	
A	map	from	a	pre-project	report	for	the	PPP	(shown	above,	Figure	27)	locates	the	sites	used	
to	 collect	network	diagnostics	 for	 the	contract.	 	 They	are	 in	 some	of	 the	 zone's	wealthier	
planned	 areas	 and	 highly	 unrepresentative	 of	 the	 network.	 	 In	 fact,	 a	 pre-project	 report	
states	 that	 these	 areas	were	 chosen	 as	 the	 only	 areas	where	 it	was	possible	 to	measure	
network	pressure	and	water	quality	(Detailed	Project	Report,	Appendices	and	DMA	Report,	
2011).	 	 Even	 in	 these	 areas,	 network	 water	 was	 found	 to	 be	 polluted	 and	 mixed	 with	
tubewell	water.		The	data	(‘diagnostics’)	on	which	the	tender	bid	was	based	were	prepared	
by	external	consultants221.		Unfortunately,	these	pre-tender	network	diagnostics	were	done	
in	 a	 manner	 which	 left	 the	 operator	 needing	 to	 redo	 the	 work	 once	 the	 contract	 had	
started.				
	
Two	years	to	do	all	that	work	we	are	supposed	to	do	is	too	small.		It's	too	ambitious	
[…]	 	 The	 contract	 in	 this	 way	 it	 was	 ideal.	 	 I	 mean,	 it	 was	 saying	 that	 we	 know	
everything,	we	have	all	the	permits	[…]	underground	there	is	no	problem,	we	can	
                                                            
221	http://dra.net.in/project/reduction-in-nrwufw-with-improvement-in-level-of-setvice-to-the-water-
consumers-and-improvement-of-un-interrupted-water-supply-under-the-command-area-of-grlbps-
malviya-nagar/	
This image has been removed as the copyright is 
owned by another organisation. 
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lay	pipe,	whatever	[…]	very	weird	 that	 in	two	years	you	can	 lay	200	kilometres	of	
pipe,	 you	 can	 change	 50,000	 house	 service	 connections,	 it’s	 too	 small.	 	 It's	 too	
ambitious.”	
(Personal	 communication,	 senior	 manager,	 21/04/15,	 PPP	 Offices,	 South	 Delhi,	
fn56,	my	italics)	
	
The	 exact	 number	 of	 connections	 and	 their	 authorisation	 status	 is	 an	 area	 where	 the	
operator	 is	 currently	 establishing	 data.	 	 The	MNC	now	 also	 has	 a	 policy	 to	 do	 a	 site	 test	
before	bidding.			
	
Levé:	<pause>	at	the	beginning,	the	process	is	that	we	should	have	done	a	network	
survey	to	know	what	is	underground	and	we	didn't	do	it	because	we	were	thinking	
that	 the	 bidding	 documents	 were	 correct.		 Bidding	 documents	 was	 given	 by	 er,	
um...	<1	sec	pause>	the	consultant	who	prepared	the	tender.	
		
Researcher:	and	[your	company]	employed	the	consultants?		
	
Levé:	No	it	was	DJB	took	a	consultant,	[name	removed].		They	took	a	consultant	to	
prepare	the	bidding	documents.	
(Personal	 communication,	 senior	 manager,	 21/04/15,	 PPP	 Offices,	 South	 Delhi,	
fn56,	my	italics)	
	
Another	project	employee	spoke	about	the	lack	of	reliable	data	they	were	working	with:			
	
[We]	don’t	have	 it…	don’t	have	digital	elevation	model,	nothing.	So	we	are	 there	
struck	from	scratch,	trying	to	get	spot	heights	out	of	google	earth	and	then	create	a	
digital	elevation	map.		It’s	just	that’s	loads	of	work.	That	is	months	and	months	of	
work	in	there	trying	to	…	you	can	create	these	maps	but	you	have	to	verify	them	as	
well,	 so	 you	 have	 to	 send	 these	 surveyors	 out	 to	 verify	 them	 to	make	 sure	 that	
certain	things	are	in	a	certain	place.		(Perczel,	2016,	p.	36)	
	
A	former	project	manager	described	the	situation	to	me	this	way:		
	
There	is	a	syndicate,	a	mafia.		The	tanker	people	are	in	on	it,	the	DJB	is	in	on	it	and	
the	politicians	are	in	on	it.		[…]		When	you	are	setting	things	up	you	work	at	the	top	
so	 that	 your	 company	will	 be	 the	 one	 that	 gets	 the	 tender.	 	There	 are	 different	
teams	 that	 do	 strategy,	 planning,	 design,	 implementation,	 operations	 etc	 -	 it's	 a	
complete	process.			
	
The	same	consultants	also	provided	input	for	one	of	Delhi’s	other	water	PPP	projects.		The	
Operator	for	this	zone	observed	dryly	that	the	data	they	were	working	from	was	‘historical’.		
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The	consultants	are	from	Nagpur,	known	for	its	PPP	in	urban	water	(Nair,	2015),	and	as	well	
as	the	Nagpur	contract	have	also	been	involved	in	water	PPPs	in	Ahmedabad,	Chennai	and	
Pimpri-Chinchwad	(for	Pimpri,	again,	see	Birkinshaw,	2016).	 	Nagpur	is	the	constituency	of	
former	Bharatiya	Janata	Party	(BJP)	President	and	current	Highways	Minister,	Nitin	Gadkari,	
and	recent	national	level	urban	frameworks	(JNNURM	and	Smart	Cities	in	particular)	allow	a	
powerful	role	for	national	and	 international	consulting	firms	 in	project	design	(Birkinshaw,	
2016;	P.	B.	Mehta,	2013).		Difficulties	with	data	have	also	been	found	in	Maharashtra	where	
consultants	 have	 been	 used	 in	 the	 preparation	 of	 PPP	 bids	 (Birkinshaw,	 2016,	 p.	 58;	 also	
Björkman,	2013).			
	
The	Project	staff	at	Malviya	Nagar	also	told	me	that	the	motivation	for	the	MNC	was	gaining	
experience	 in	 this	 kind	 of	 dense	 urban	 environment	 with	 a	 view	 to	 rising	 future	 Indian	
demand.		A	number	of	Project	staff	I	interviewed	said	that	India	was	much	more	challenging	
than	other	operating	environments	 that	 the	Multinational	had	worked	 in	previously222.	 	 In	
Malviya	 Nagar,	 neither	 the	 Multinational	 (who	 had	 mostly	 been	 involved	 in	 standalone	
infrastructure,	like	water	treatment	plants	and	sewage	treatment	plants,	in	India	previously)	
nor	 the	 Local	Partner	 (who	had	mainly	been	 involved	 in	 rural	 infrastructure	projects)	had	
done	this	kind	of	work	before.	 	 Ironically,	the	local	partner	is	supposed	to	be	employed	to	
help	foreign	organisations	work	in	an	environment	they	are	not	familiar	with,	however	‘both	
of	 them	are	doing	 it	 for	 the	 first	 time	…	since	 they	don't	know	 it	 they	are	both	having	 to	
learn	as	 they	go	along’223.	 	Project	 staff	described	 their	 local	partner	as	having	 insufficient	
expertise	for	urban	water	network	rehabilitation,	resulting	in	problems	for	the	Project	from	
government	agencies.		‘They	do	such	a	bad	job	that	they	are	now	given	only	the	easy	works	
and	anything	sensitive	like	in	a	high	traffic	or	residential	area	is	given	to	[our]	own	team	so	
that	[they]	don't	mess	it	up’224.		I	was	told	that	the	Local	Partner’s	Delhi	team	had	been	put	
together	for	the	PPP	work	and	had	been	hiring	DJB	staff225.			
	
                                                            
222	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	Malviya	Nagar,	19/09/14,	fn6;	Personal	communication,	PPP	
staff,	Malviya	Nagar,	9/08/15,	fn110	
223	Personal	communication,	Project	staff,	South	Delhi,	23/06/15,	fn90	
224	Personal	communication,	Project	staff,	South	Delhi,	23/06/15,	fn90	
225	Personal	communication,	Dunu	Roy,	Hazards	Centre,	Delhi	21/08/14,	fn4	
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Project	staff	also	mentioned	that	the	Local	Partner	had	political	connections	and	that	they	
were	 unsure	 how	 they	 had	 won	 the	 contract.	 	 The	 Local	 Partner	 in	 the	 PPP	 has	 been	
implicated	 in	 the	 Delhi	 Tanker	 Scam,	 which	 appears	 to	 have	 recently	 cost	 the	 Water	
Minister	 his	 job	 (Lalchandani,	 2015a;	 The	 Indian	 Express,	 2017a,	 2017b).	 	 Allegations	 of	
corruption	 were	 first	 brought	 several	 years	 earlier	 by	 the	 Water,	 Sewage	 and	 Sewage	
Disposal	 Union	 that	 the	 DJB	 had	 mismanaged	 the	 tendering	 process	 for	 ‘Water	 Tanker	
distribution	 service	 in	 South	 and	 South	 West	 Delhi’.	 	 The	 union	 ‘accused	 the	 DJB	 of	
preconception	 in	the	bidding	process’	 	 to	grant	the	contract	to	a	blacklisted	and	debarred	
firm	called	 [the	Local	Partner]	 for	 five	years’	(Jafri,	2011).	 	This	same	firm	was	named	 in	a	
2013	 report	 listing	 major	 cases	 of	 corruption	 in	 Rajasthan.	 	 The	 report	 alleged	 that	 the	
owners	of	this	firm	were	close	friends	of	Rajasthan’s	Chief	Minister.		The	close	connections	
between	 the	 Chief	Minister	 and	 two	 business	 families	were	 seen	 as	 assisting	 the	 firm	 to	
acquire	 large	 infrastructure	 projects	 including	 a	 dam,	 irrigation,	 water	 supply	 and	 road	
construction	 work	 (Parihar	 &	 Rahman,	 2011).	 	 Despite	 a	 change	 of	 government,	 from	
Congress	to	BJP,	this	company	has	continued	to	be	favoured	in	Rajasthan.		A	lawyer	working	
on	the	corruption	case	stated	‘The	BJP	had	accused	[the	firm]	of	gross	corruption	[…]	but	in	
the	last	two	years,	all	major	projects	have	been	given	to	this	company’	(Bohra,	2016).		This	
company	is	the	Operator	for	one	of	the	three	Delhi	PPP	projects	and	the	Local	Partner	for	
another.		The	project	for	which	they	have	the	sole	responsibility	has	the	shortest	length	of	
pipeline	to	be	rehabilitated	(SPML,	2016).			
	
Despite	these	challenges,	the	Project	has	been	successful	at	realising	a	key	goal.		One	of	the	
main	 objectives,	 indeed	 ‘an	 obsession’	 for	 the	 Multinational,	 was	 the	 introduction	 of	
continuous	pressure	service,	or	24/7	as	it	is	known	in	India.		It	is	to	this	aspect	of	the	project	
that	we	now	turn.			
	
TWENTY	FOUR	SEVEN	‘OBSESSION’	
The	American	 origins	 of	 the	 24/7	 ideal	 can	 be	 felt	 in	 the	 translation	 to	 ‘24	 by	 7’,	 as	 it	 is	
known	in	Indian	English.		The	term	means	24	hours	a	day,	seven	days	a	week.		The	distance	
from	the	ordinary	realities	of	many	cities	can	be	heard	in	the	question	from	a	resident	to	a	
consultant	 whether	 this	 improvement	 would	 mean	 seven	 hours	 in	 24	 days.	 	 24/7	 is	
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essentially	 shorthand	 for	 a	 move	 from	 intermittent	 to	 consistent	 pressurised	 supply.	 	 A	
model	of	‘rationed’	or	intermittent	supply	is	the	norm	across	Asia.		As	water	is	pumped	from	
larger	 (‘transmission’)	 pipes	 to	 medium	 (‘distribution’)	 pipes,	 to	 small	 (‘tertiary’)	 pipes	
(known	 as	 ‘ferrules’),	 at	 neighbourhood	 level	 pressure	 fluctuates	 depending	 on	 quantity	
released,	 proximity	 to	 pumps,	 interaction	 with	 other	 flows	 which	 may	 be	 coming	 from	
different	inlets,	slopes,	pipe	diameter,	turbidity	and	other	factors.		At	neighbourhood	level	
some	amount	of	pressure	 is	directed	 to	a	particular	neighbourhood	or	 street	 for	 times	of	
between	 30	 minutes	 and	 four	 hours.	 	 Low-level	 workers	 control	 the	 water	 timings,	 by	
opening	and	closing	valves	and	operating	booster	pumping	stations	and	tubewell	motors	at	
certain	 times.	 	 The	 water	 timings	 rotate	 unequally	 across	 neighbourhoods	 in	 order	 to	
distribute	water	between	 them	 (see	analysis	 of	water	 timings	data	 in	Chapter	4).	 	During	
these	 times	 water	 is	 available	 in	 the	 pipes.	 	 However,	 in	 reality	 the	 pressure	 is	 usually	
insufficient	 to	 reach	households,	 especially	 above	 ground	 level.	 	 For	 this	 reason	 all	water	
users,	 including	 the	 Project	 and	 DJB	 offices,	 use	 booster	 pumps,	 known	 as	 ‘motors’,	 to	
increase	pressure226.	 	A	continuous	pressure	system	would	smooth	out	the	 irregularities	 in	
the	pressure	at	zonal	level	and	supply	water	to	the	household	at	a	higher	constant	pressure.			
	
24/7	 water	 has	 been	widely	 promoted	 as	 an	 advance	model	 of	 water	management	 that	
public	 utilities	 in	 India	 should	 move	 towards.	 	 It	 is	 now	 a	 Service	 Level	 Benchmark	
(normative	target)	of	 the	 Indian	Government	and	 is	often	promised	when	reform	projects	
are	initiated	(V.	Asthana,	2013;	Kamath	et	al.,	2009;	Sangameswaran	et	al.,	2008,	p.	7;	Vyas,	
2009).	 	Several	advantages	are	claimed	for	continuous	pressure	supply	 (World	Bank,	n.d.),	
not	least	the	ability	to	calculate	the	amount	of	water	sold,	stolen	and	lost.		By	using	thinner	
diameter	 pipes	 the	 same	 amount	 of	water	 can	 be	 distributed	 at	 higher	 pressure	 and	 for	
more	hours227.	 	This	would	help	 to	address	 the	Project	objectives	 for	 increasing	per	capita	
supply	 and	 supply	 hours.	 	 Replacing	 the	 pipes	 and	 increasing	 the	 pressure	 should	 also	
improve	non-revenue	water	(by	reducing	leaks)	and	quality	of	water	(by	reducing	ingress).		
Constant	pressure	prevents	ingress	from	surrounding	soil	during	low	pressure.	 	This	is	said	
to	be	a	common	reason	for	 low	water	quality,	although	some	people	claim	that	the	water	
                                                            
226	Personal	communication,	PRO,	PPP	Offices,	Delhi,	21/04/15,	fn55	
227	Personal	communication,	Partha	Mukhopadhyay,	Centre	for	Policy	Research,	Delhi	06/08/15,	fn124;	
Personal	communication,	Project	worker,	November	2015	
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from	the	treatment	plants	 is	 insufficiently	clean	‘so	fixing	the	distribution	network	will	not	
help’228.	 	 Continuous	 pressure	 is	 also	 said	 to	 prolong	 the	 life	 of	 the	 pipes,	 as	 the	 water	
‘hitting’	 valves	 and	 junctions	 as	 pressure	 comes	 on	 and	 off	 causes	 them	 to	 break.	 	 A	
dependable	continuous	pressure	supply	would	also	mean,	in	theory,	that	consumers	could	
dispense	with	suction	pumps	and	water	storage	which	often	 leads	to	wasted	water.	 	 	The	
manager	of	one	of	Delhi’s	other	PPPs	stated	to	a	meeting	of	experts	that	in	their	24/7	pilot	
zone	 consumers	 had	 started	 to	 abandon	 storage	 tanks	 and	motors,	 but	 in	 both	Malviya	
Nagar	 and	 in	 Karnataka,	 this	 has	 not	 been	 the	 case	 after	 continuous	 supply	 has	 been	
arranged	(Burt	&	Ray,	2014).					
	
From	 the	 operator	 side,	 continuous	 pressure	 is	 needed	 to	 be	 able	 to	 perform	 hydraulic	
modelling,	which	is	contractually	required	(Delhi	Jal	Board,	2012,	p.	1937).		The	application	
of	 sophisticated	 information-based	 techniques	 like	 this	 to	 the	 network	 is	 the	 area	 that	
foreign	companies	can	offer	additional	expertise	in.		In	conversation	with	staff	working	with	
the	multinational	 partner	 in	 the	 project	 in	 France	 and	Delhi,	 it	 appears	 that	 24/7	was	 an	
important	 element	 for	 the	 higher	 levels	 of	 management	 –	 an	 ‘obsession’229	 –	 at	 least	 in	
France.	 	 In	 the	 US	 and	 Europe,	 an	 intensive	 engineering	 approach	 to	 advanced	 public	
networks	 has	 allowed	 business	 improvements	 for	 utilities	 managed	 with	 a	 high-level	 of	
technical	know-how.			
	
‘in	this	scope	of	24/7,	transition	to	24/7,	we	had	thought	that	it's	an	obsession	of	
[the	 MNC]	 and	 it's	 a	 cultural	 thing	 that	 [the	 MNC]	 all	 over	 the	 world	 is	
implementing	24/7	so	they	cannot	find	the	business	model	in	intermittent	supply,	
that's	why	they	push	24/7	because	it's	the	only	thing	they	know		[…]	finally	what	we	
understood	is	that	seriously	they	have	a	perfectly	clear	idea	engineering-wise	what	
is	going	on,	 they	have	a	very	clear	 idea	how	much	better	continuous	supply	 is	 to	
intermittent	 supply	 […]	 	 They	 are	 a	 very	 engineering-driven	 company,	 they	 know	
what's	 going	 on,	 they	 have	 expertise,	 they	 know	 about	 hydraulic	 models,	 they	
know	everything...’	
Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	Delhi,	9/08/15,	fn110		
	
                                                            
228	Personal	communication,	Dunu	Roy,	Hazards	Centre,	Delhi	21/08/14,	fn4	
229	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	Malviya	Nagar,	23/06/15,	fn90	
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However,	while	the	approach	had	worked	in	some	other	contexts,	with	Algiers	and	Jeddah	
being	best	case	examples	to	follow,	the	context	in	India	is	very	different,	‘the	most	difficult	
environment	to	work	in’.230			
	
‘so	they	had	seen	[24/7]	and	then	they	had	lost	it,	and	in	Algiers	there	was	24/7	
and	because	it	was	going	it	was	intermittent	supply	and	then	[the	MNC]	brought	
back	continuous	supply,	so	they	were	asking	for	that,	and	here	it	wasn't	like	that,	
and	neither	the	population	neither	the	local	politicians,	like	at	least	in	[names	a	
large	Indian	city],	there	is	a	team	of	the	municipality	in	charge	of	supervising	[the	
MNC]	work	and	they	are	not	really	convinced	that	it's	useful’	<laughs>	
Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	Delhi,	9/08/15,	fn110		
	
	
	
DJB	map	of	Zone	43.		My	red	circles	indicate	the	unplanned	areas.		(DJB	2008,	Copy	with	author)	
	
Twenty	four	hour	continuity	of	supply	is	stated	as	a	Performance	Target	in	the	PPP	Contract;	
however,	operator	fees	are	attached	to	pressure	during	scheduled	supply	hours,	not	literally	
twenty	 four	 hour	 supply	 (Delhi	 Jal	 Board,	 2012,	 pp.	 1989,	 1997).	 	 The	 contract	 at	 least	
recognises	 the	 considerable	 difficulties	 in	 engineering	 around-the-clock	 uninterrupted	
supply.					
	
                                                            
230	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	Malviya	Nagar,	23/06/15,	fn90	
This image has been removed as the copyright is owned by another 
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To	calculate	pressure	and	water	distribution,	the	Operator	needs	to	know	the	network,	not	
just	in	one	neighbourhood	but	across	the	zone.		As	mentioned	earlier,	this	an	area	in	which	
the	MNC	 found	 themselves	 underprepared	 by	 the	 pre-tender	 information	 that	 they	 had.		
The	 land	use	mix	 in	 the	Project	 zone	 is	 not	 felt	 to	 have	been	easy	 for	 the	Operator;	 it	 is	
regarded	as	overly	 challenging	and	 stressful231.	 	A	number	of	 interviewees	 referred	 to	 the	
creation	of	the	zone	as	a	‘test’	for	the	private	contractor	set	by	the	DJB.		After	four	years	of	
work,	they	are	still	unable	to	locate	all	the	points	at	which	water	enters	their	section	of	the	
network.	 	 They	 have	 found	 eight	 but	 there	 are	 others	 they	 have	 not	 located232.	 	 It	 is	
noticeable	that	the	DJB	maps	of	the	zone	have	large	blank	spaces	where	the	unauthorised	
colonies,	urban	villages	and	slums	are	(see	map	page	199).			
	
“Nobody	 knows	 how	 much	 demand	 is	 there.	 	It	 is	 an	 unknown	 demand.	 	 The	
number	of	units	and	people	per	dwelling	[are	unknown].		You	could	be	wrong	by	a	
factor	of	100,	200!”			
(Personal	 communication,	 Public	 Relations	 Officer	 (PRO),	 PPP	 Offices,	 Delhi,	
21/04/15,	fn55)		
	
[DJB]	gave	us	census	data	and	that	was	it.	Census	data	was	also	old	by	then.	It	was	
2011	 census	data	and	 this	was	working	 in	2015.	Now	 this	 is	Delhi	between	2011	
and	 2015,	 is	 a	 big	 difference.	 So	 we	 […]	 tried	 to	 do	 their	 own	 survey	 sending	
surveyors	out	on	 the	ground	sending	surveyors	out	 the	houses	 to	note	down	the	
number	of	people,	note	down	the	number	of	floors	in	the	building.	Just	basic	stuff	
like	that.	Unfortunately,	even	these	surveyors,	either	they	weren’t	well	trained	or	
they	weren’t	well	supervised.	Cause	they’d	go	and	count	the	number	of	floors	and	
make	 an	 abstract	 total	 of	 what	 number	 of	 people	 they	 think	 could	 live	 in	 the	
building	and	come	back	with	it.		(Project	staff	quoted	in	Perczel,	2016,	p.	38)	
	
Pipes	connected	to	the	network	have	not	necessarily	been	 laid	with	the	awareness	of	 the	
DJB,	 and	 are	 likely	 to	 have	 been	 re-laid	 several	 times	 and,	 again,	 modified	 piecemeal.		
People	lay	pipes	themselves	in	both	unauthorised	and	authorised	areas,	and	‘plumbers’	will	
dig	 up	 the	 roads	 routinely	 in	 unauthorised	 areas	 where	 ‘no-one	 cares	 what	 you	 do’.233		
Private	plumbers	digging	up	roads	to	work	on	water	or	sewer	connections,	often	under	the	
supervision	 of	 a	 shopkeeper,	 householder,	 or	 Residents	 Welfare	 Association	 (RWA)	
member,	are	a	fairly	common	site	in	urban	villages	and	unauthorised	colonies	in	the	zone.		
                                                            
231	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	19	September	2014,	21	April	2015,	fieldnote	56	
232	Personal	communication,	PPP	Project	Manager,	21/04/15,	fn56	
233	Personal	communication,	local	residents,	Khirki	Extension,	11	July	2015	
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In	some	areas	there	are	also	public	tubewell	networks,	which	the	PPP	staff	have	no	control	
over.234		The	tubewell	networks,	using	untreated	groundwater,	are	in	some	places	connected	
to	the	treated	water	network	pipes.		These	kind	of	amendments	means	that	knowledge	of	
the	network	is	highly	fragmented	at	best.			
	
‘in	some	areas	we	don't	know	what	is	underground	perfectly	so	when	we	do	some	
works	then	we	have	to	stop	because	we	found	out	that	there	is	a	drain	or	there	is	a	
sewer	coming	on	the	way	so	you	have	to	stop’			
Personal	communication,	senior	manager,	21/04/15,	PPP	Offices,	South	Delhi,	fn56	
	
Zonal	inlets,	outlets,	junctions	and	valves	are	the	most	important	parts	of	the	network	that	
can	be	difficult	to	locate.		Valves	in	places	where	they	are	not	anticipated	can	lead	to	breaks	
and	 leaks.	 	At	one	spot	 in	 the	zone,	 the	operator’s	 staff	had	 found	a	valve	 that	had	been	
buried	underground	(as	was	common	practice	under	the	old	system)	and	lost.		As	the	valve	
had	 been	 closed	 this	 had	 meant	 that	 a	 section	 of	 houses	 nearby	 had	 not	 been	 getting	
government	water	for	many	years	but	no-one	had	been	able	to	tell	them	why.235			
	
Although	a	 focus	on	higher	 income	areas	 is	not	 specified,	pragmatically	 this	has	been	 the	
case	 with	 project	 ‘priorities’	 in	 order	 ‘to	 make	 progress’;	 and	 while	 low-income	
unauthorised	areas	were	chosen	 for	NRW	reduction,	wealthy	planned	areas	were	used	 to	
pilot	 continuous	 supply236.	 	 Given	 the	 large	 and	 complex	 zone,	 the	 Project	 staff	 chose	 to	
focus	their	24/7	pilot	on	one	of	Delhi’s	wealthier	neighbourhoods,	across	the	road	from	the	
PPP	offices.		Interestingly,	DJB	schematics	of	the	area	appear	to	show	a	direct	dedicated	line	
for	 this	 neighbourhood	 from	Delhi’s	 new	PPP	 built	Water	 Treatment	 Plant.	 	 In	 this	 gated	
enclave	of	palatial	 residences	and	 leafy	parks,	 complete	with	a	club	house	and	 lawns,	 the	
operator	has	been	able	to	 isolate	and	comprehensively	map	the	pipe	network	and	deliver	
24/7	 supply.237	 	 However,	 even	 in	 this	 elite	 planned	 area,	 the	 water	 network	 had	 been	
modified,	significantly	in	some	cases.238		The	area	is	triangular.		Unfortunately	for	one	of	the	
                                                            
234	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff	21/04/15,	fn56;	19/09/14,	fn7;	Personal	communication,	Khirki	
Gaon	RWA	president,	21/01/15,	fn14;	Personal	communication,	local	resident,	Khirki	Extension,	
5/03/15,	fn27	
235	Personal	communication,	PPP	Project	Manager,	22/07/15,	fn98	
236	Personal	communication,	PPP	Project	Manager,	21/04/15,	fn56	
237	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	Malviya	Nagar,	19/09/14,	fn6	
238	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	Malviya	Nagar,	9/08/15,	fn110	
BIRKINSHAW: MURKY WATERS  CHAPTER 6: PPP 
 
203 
area’s	more	influential	figures,	his	residence	was	in	the	corner	of	the	triangle.		As	pipes	were	
laid	in	a	branched	network,	this	house	was	at	the	tail	end	and	received	the	lowest	pressure	
in	 the	area	 (for	branched	and	 loop	networks	see	Swamee	&	Sharma,	2008,	p.	65).	 	When	
Project	staff	were	preparing	the	area,	they	found	that	the	network	had	been	converted	to	a	
loop	system	outside	this	house,	in	order	to	raise	the	pressure239.			
	
	
	
Cars	at	the	24/7	pilot	get	their	daily	bath	(left)	(Image	courtesy	Juli	Perczel);	Promotional	video	for	24/7	pilot	
(right)	
	
	
The	 transition	 to	 continuous	 pressured	 supply	 has	 led	 to	 a	 number	 of	 complaints	 in	 the	
areas	where	 it	 has	 been	 trialled.	 	 Households	 in	 this	 area	were	 not	well-informed	 of	 the	
move	 to	 a	 continuous	 pressure	 supply,	 and	 were	 used	 to	 obtaining	 intermittent	 supply.		
Water	use	in	this	area	was	extensive,	and	wealthy	residents	would	have	their	expensive	cars	
washed	daily.	 	Consequently,	the	transition	to	24/7	or	‘continuous	pressure’	supply,	which	
delivered	more	water	at	higher	pressure	for	continuous	hours,	 led	to	a	high	level	of	water	
being	wasted	 through	 leaks	and	 taps	 left	open.	 	As	consumers’	bills	were	generated	 from	
meters	readings	of	their	water	supply	this	led	to	some	very	high	bills	(₹5,000,	₹8,000	-	£50,	
£80	 a	 month)	 and	 a	 large	 number	 of	 complaints	 (around	 60	 ‘serious’)	 from	 surprised	
residents.240		An	irate	elderly	resident	in	an	urban	village	showed	me	a	bill	for	₹30,000	(£300	
at	time	of	research)	for	the	year241.		The	World	Bank	recommends	sending	‘dummy	bills’	to	
                                                            
239	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	9/08/15,	fn110	
240	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	Malviya	Nagar,	9/08/15,	fn110	
241	Personal	communication,	RWA	president,	urban	village	(Hindu	/	dalit),	south	Delhi,	21/01/15,	fn14	
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raise	 consumer	 awareness	 of	 their	 usage	 and	 liabilities	 under	 a	 volumetric	 system242.		
However,	the	operator	did	not	communicate	with	the	residents	in	advance	of	the	change,	so	
the	first	residents	were	aware	of	it	was	when	their	bills	arrived.		Limited	communication	in	
response	to	the	complaints	did	little	to	mollify	residents.	
	
“One	guy	had	a	₹60,000	[£600]	bill.	 	The	internal	audit	took	around	three	months	
to	 get	 back	 to	 him,	 in	 this	 time	 he	 received	 another	 bill.	 	He	 hit	 the	 [Project]	
workers.		He	is	about	80!”	
Personal	communication,	Project	staff,	10/07/15,	Delhi,	fn94						
	
Subsequent	to	these	kind	of	reactions,	the	operator	has	reduced	the	supply	hours	to	sixteen	
and	is	trying	to	redress	wastage	by	free	leak	audits	‘after	the	supply	point’	and	provision	of	
‘float	valves’	(an	inexpensive	mechanism	which	closes	the	inlet	to	a	full	water	tank).243		The	
leak	 audits	 ‘after	 supply	 point’	 are	 on	 the	 consumers	 property,	 which	 is	 not	 the	
responsibility	 of	 the	 operator,	 but	 they	 are	 offering	 the	 service	 as	 an	 indication	 of	 good	
faith.	 	 Unfortunately,	 there	 has	 been	 little	 take-up	 for	 either	 audits	 or	 valves.	 	 Estimates	
from	the	Bengaluru	water	board	suggest	that	60-80%	of	leakage	is	on	customer	connections	
before	 the	meter	–	on	 the	 ferrule	and	 the	 connecting	pipe	 (Delhi	 Jal	Board,	2004b,	p.	 9).		
However,	residents	were	quite	happy	with	their	water	supply	before	and	do	not	appreciate	
the	changes	or	even	want	to	think	about	them.244			
	
Mr	Levé:	From	four	hours	per	day	we	came	up	to	sixteen	hours,	yeah.		But,	but,	but	
in	Geetanjali	I	came	down	to	12	hours	a	day	and	[Colony	Name]	to	six	hours	a	day.		
[…]		Why?		[rhetorical]		It’s	because	for	the	time	being	the	people	are	not	aware	of	
this	 improvement,	ok.	 	They	don't	see	that	they	have	water	all	 the	time,	because	
the	water	is	going	to	their	underground	tank,	and	after	that	they	pump	when	they	
used	to	pump.		So	they	don't	see	that	they	have	water	24	hours	because	the	water	
is	not	going	directly	to	the	tap.		It's	all	one	system	of	underground	tank	-	overhead	
tank.	 	 So,	 it’s	 the	 buffer	 that	 prevents	 people	 to	 see	 that	 if	 they	 take	 the	water	
directly	 from	the	pipe,	 they	can	open	 the	 tap	any	 time	and	 they	will	have	water.		
They	don't	see	 it.	 	Secondly,	 the	point	 is	 that	putting	more	water	24	hours	 in	the	
pipe,	I	saw	that	I	had	some	high	NRW	in	our	pipe.		So	we	are	repairing	a	lot	of	leaks	
and	a	lot	of	leaks	after	the	meter,	in	the	premises	of	the	customer	-	because	their	
                                                            
242	Expert	roundtable	on	innovation	in	water	and	sanitation	services,	Development	Alternatives,	
November	2014,	Chatham	House	rules,	fn38	
243	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	Malviya	Nagar,	23/06/15,	fn90	
244	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	Malviya	Nagar,	23/06/15,	fn90	
BIRKINSHAW: MURKY WATERS  CHAPTER 6: PPP 
 
205 
underground	 tank	 were	 leaky…	 because	 their	 internal	 plumbing	 were	 leaky…	
because	their	overhead	tank	was	overflowing…	so	they	had	a	very	high	bill		
	
Matt:	So	[…]	the	bill	is	high	because	they're	wasting	water?	
	
Mr	 Levé:	 Exactly,	 but	 they	 never	 accepted	 that.	 	 They	 saw	only	 the	 high	bill	 and	
they	 said	 that	 the	 high	 bill	 comes	 because	 of	 new	 meters.	 	 So	 they	 put	 the	
responsibility	on	our	new	meter	 instead	of	their	own	uh,	 internal	 leakage.	 	Ok,	so	
they	were	more	focused	on	not	paying	the	bill,	 finding	excuses	not	to	pay	the	bill	
than	tackling	their	own	problem.	
Personal	communication,	senior	manager,	Project	offices,	Delhi,	21/04/15,	fn56	
	
DJB	 data	 on	 water	 consumption	 after	 meter	 replacement	 shows	 that	 consumption	 in	
Geetanjali,	 the	wealthy	enclave	where	 the	24/7	pilot	 is,	doubled	after	meter	 replacement	
suggesting	 that	 these	were	 indeed	 high	 consuming	 households	who	 had	 previously	 been	
getting	average	bills	(see	Appendix	MR,	page	290).			
	
Remember	 the	Project	 staff	 getting	 a	 slap	 from	 the	elderly	 gentleman	with	 a	 £600	water	
bill?		Project	staff	had	been	working	with	the	project	to	understand	consumer	complaints	in	
the	 24/7	 pilot	 area.	 	 They	 explained	 that	 ’70-80%’	 of	 users	were	 happy	with	 a	 switch	 to	
metered	bills,	 ‘when	we	shifted	to	meters	 they	paid	 less’,	because	their	consumption	was	
below	 average.	 	 However,	 a	 small	 number	 of	 households	 faced	 very	 large	 bills	 after	 the	
switch	 due	 to	 leaks	 and	 heavy	water	 use.	 	 Consequently,	when	moving	 from	 an	 all-Delhi	
average	bill	to	their	actual	use,	their	bills	soared.		These	households	had	‘built	strong	habits’	
of	 water	 use,	 ‘like	 gardening,	 which	means	 they	 are	 high	 society’.	 	 The	 high	 consuming,	
wealthy	households	were	able	to	make	their	complaints	‘really	noisy’,	because	‘they	know	
people	[…]	which	means	political	pressure’245.			
	
Unfortunately,	 the	 technical	 and	 social	 challenges	meant	 that	 the	Multinational	 expertise	
was	underutilised.	 	 The	environment	was	described	as	 an	 ‘immature	market’.	 	 The	highly	
technically	specialised	foreign	staff	were	too	expensive	relative	to	the	returns	they	might	be	
able	to	deliver,	as	the	network	was	too	unstable	(and	unknown)	to	be	able	to	benefit	from	
their	 skills.246	 	 The	 PPP	 staff	 I	 spoke	 to	 suggested	 that	 they	 were	 not	 worried	 about	
significant	financial	losses	-	for	example	from	the	AAP	600k	free	water	scheme	described	in	
                                                            
245	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	Malviya	Nagar,	9/08/15,	fn110	
246	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	Malviya	Nagar,	9/08/15,	fn110	
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Chapter	 3.	 	While	 they	 were	 confident	 they	 would	 get	 paid	 for	 one	 way	 or	 another,	 by	
bringing	 in	 lawyers	 if	 necessary,	 they	 seemed	 to	 feel	 it	 unlikely	 the	 Project	 would	make	
substantial	 profits	 and	 described	 its	 value	 to	 the	 company	 as	 being	 more	 about	 gaining	
experience	and	reputation	in	the	Indian	environment	where	demand	was	sure	to	rise247.			
	
For	knowledge	of	water	flows	and	increased	revenue,	meters	on	customer	connections	are	
essential.	 	 However,	 we	 have	 seen	 here	 how	 the	 transition	 to	 metered	 supply	 and	
volumetric	billing	 is	not	popular,	 even	 in	 the	wealthiest	and	most	and	 technically	 feasible	
areas.		This	aspect	of	the	Project	has	been	a	source	of	further	challenges	across	the	zone	as	
a	whole,	especially	in	unplanned	areas.				
	
UNPLANNED	AREAS	
Unplanned	areas	have	higher	population	and	built	up	density	than	surrounding	areas,	as	can	
be	seen	from	the	DJBs	own	data	(see	Appendix	PD,	page	291).	 	 	For	 laying	pipes,	checking	
connections	and	installing	meters,	unplanned	areas	are	considerably	more	challenging.		For	
residents	also,	water	is	a	problem.		After	my	first	few	months	living	in	a	high-density	urban	
village	with	irregular	water	connections,	my	fieldnotes	record	that	my	neighbours	and	other	
residents	‘are	always	shouting	and	often	talk,	argue	about	water	-	like	“paani	lao”	[bring	the	
water	 here],	 “paani	 kahaan	 hai?”	 [where	 is	 the	 water],	 “paani	 aa	 raha	 hai”	 [water	 is	
coming]’248.			
	
Researcher:	What	is	the	plan?	
Mr	Levé:	There	is	no	plan!		People	are	always	making	pressure.		They	want	more	
hours,	want	more	water.		But	they	are	motivated	by	politicians.	
(Personal	communication,	senior	manager	(male	45),	Malviya	Nagar,	19/09/14,	fn6)	
	
Unplanned	 areas	 have	 historically	 been	 neglected	 by	 the	 Delhi	 Jal	 Board,	 with	 water	
pipelines	either	laid	at	residents’	expense	or	in	some	cases	through	discretionary	funds	from	
the	MLA	or	local	counsellors.		There	appears	to	be	a	process	of	‘formalisation’.		Initially,	no	
water	 is	given.	 	Then	government	hand	pumps	or	 tubewells	may	be	provided.	 	Pipes	may	
                                                            
247	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	Malviya	Nagar,	19/09/14,	fn6	
248	Notes,	urban	village,	south	Delhi,	8/09/14,	fn5	
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also	be	 self-laid	 from	tubewells	or	neighbouring	areas.	 	 Local	politicians	often	 finance	 the	
construction	of	infrastructure	from	their	discretionary	budgets.		These	processes	are	highly	
contingent.			
	
	
Unauthorised	colonies	in	project	zone	
	
Tasleem:	All	water	[in	our	area]	is	from	tubewells.		The	TDS	[total	dissolved	solids,	a	
salinity	and	pollution	measure]	 is	1200.	 	We	should	get	 treated	water;	Hauz	Rani	
Extension	doesn’t	but	Khirki	Extension	does.						
Researcher:	Khirki	gets	it	but	not	Hauz	Rani!		Why?		
Tasleem:	Just	like	that,	no	reason		
Researcher:	What	does	the	government	say?	
Tasleem:	Nothing,	they	are	all	sleeping.	
Personal	 communication,	 local	 politician	 (male,	 45),	 Urban	 Village	 Extension	
(Muslim),	South	Delhi,	September	2014,	Hindi,	fn49	
	
Tasleem’s	concern	 is	well-placed;	DJB	chemical	analysis	of	water	 from	24	tubewells	 in	 the	
PPP	zone	found	only	three	supplying	water	fit	for	drinking	(DRA	Consultants	Pvt.	Ltd.	&	Shah	
Technical	Consultants	Pvt.	Ltd.,	2011a,	pp.	192–194).			
	
Because	 of	 this	 official	 neglect,	 unplanned	 areas	 are	 hot	 spots	 for	 unauthorised	 or	 illegal	
connections.		The	map	below	is	taken	from	the	Detailed	Project	Report	(DPR).		A	large	copy	
was	placed	on	the	wall	opposite	the	project	manager’s	desk	and	was	being	used	to	prepare	
a	 quick	 shortlist	 of	 places	 to	 target	 for	 NRW	 reduction;	 urban	 villages	 and	 unauthorised	
colonies249.	 	 The	map	 shows	 connection	 status,	 not	 planning	 status.	 	 However,	 familiarity	
                                                            
249	Personal	communication,	senior	manager	(male	45),	PPP	Offices,	Delhi,	21/04/15,	fn56	
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with	 the	 area	 has	 allowed	 me	 to	 annotate	 it	 to	 highlight	 that	 the	 concentrations	 of	
unauthorised	connections	are	also	unplanned	areas.				
	
	
Map	 showing	 project	 zone.	 	 Illegal	 connections	 in	 red,	 unknown	 yellow,	 bulk	 pink,	 authorised	 green.	 	 My	
annotations.		Source:	PPP	DPR,	copy	with	author.			
	
To	date,	the	Project	objective	of	increasing	the	number	of	metered	connections	has	proved	
a	challenge	as	customers	without	a	meter	do	not	want	to	move	to	metered	consumption.		
Installation	of	water	meters	has	particularly	been	an	issue	in	villages,	unauthorised	colonies	
and	 slums.	 	 DJB	 online	 progress	 reports	 suggest	 that	 meter	 replacement	 is	 proving	
unpopular	stating	that	work	 is	making	 ‘slow	progress	due	to	resistance	from	public’	 (Delhi	
Jal	 Board,	 2014a).	 	 Pre-Project	 data	 from	 the	 DJB	 also	 indicates	 problems	 with	 meter	
installation	 and	 replacement,	 especially	 in	 unplanned	 areas.	 	 The	 table	 at	 Appendix	MR,	
page	290,	shows	that	only	one	meter	was	able	to	be	replaced	in	Hauz	Rani	and	only	34	in	
Khirki.	 	 DJB	 data	 (at	 Appendices	WU	and	PD,	 pages	 289	 and	 291)	 describes	Hauz	 Rani	 as	
having	 14,426	 residents	 and	 937	 consumers.	 	 The	 same	 data	 describes	 Khirki	 village	 and	
extension	 as	 having	 2834	 consumers	 and	 43,567	 residents.	 	 The	 low	 number	 of	 official	
connections	 was	 supported	 by	 conversations	 with	 residents.	 	 In	 one	 dense	 low-income	
neighbourhood	 in	 the	Project	 zone,	 I	was	 told	 that	people	are	not	using	meters	and	 they	
won’t	accept	them.			
This image has been removed as the 
copyright is owned by another 
organisation. 
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Tasleem:	 If	 there	 are	 a	 thousand	homes,	 then	50	have	meters	 and	 the	 rest	have	
unauthorised	 connections.	 	 But	 that	 new	 company	 says	 that	 if	 you	 have	meters	
then	Sonia	Vihar	(e.g.	treated)	water	will	come,	if	not	then	it	won’t.			
Researcher:	 	 So	 this	 means	 that	 those	 other	 people	 will	 still	 be	 getting	 normal	
water,	groundwater?			
Tasleem:	Yes			
Personal	communication,	 local	politician,	Urban	Village	Extension	 (Muslim),	South	
Delhi,	September	2014,	Hindi,	fn49	
	
However,	if	residents	are	unwilling	to	accept	a	meter	from	the	Operator	they	will	be	left	on	
the	old	network	or	relying	on	alternative	sources.			
	
Levé:	 …our	 idea,	 and	 of	 course	 for	 them,	 of	 course	 they	 want	 to	 switch	 to	 the	
surface	water	because	the	tubewell	water,	the	hardness	is	very	high,	sometimes	it’s	
contaminated,	they	can't	drink	it	and	it's	[an]	energy	cost	also,	so	for	them	phasing	
out	the	tubewells	it’s	a	saving	and	it’s	a,	improving	the	quality	of	the	water	
(Personal	 communication,	 senior	 manager,	 PPP	 Offices,	 South	 Delhi,	 21/04/15,	
fn56)	
	
It	 is	 also	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 tubewells	 supplying	 groundwater	 to	 unauthorised	 areas	
within	 the	 project	 site	 remained	 the	 responsibility	 of	 DJB	 staff	 under	 the	 PPP	 contract.		
Capture	of	tubewells	by	 local	residents	and	diversion	for	their	personal	use	was	remarked	
on	by	respondents	and	observed	in	the	PPP	site	as	well	as	other	areas	of	Delhi	(see	Chapter	
Six).					
	
“There	are	1,	2,	3,	4,	5	tube	wells	 in	this	area	[points	 in	various	directions,	an	arc	
going	 south	 to	 north	 east].		 I	 cannot	 show	 you	 for	 my	 own	 safety.		 These	 are	
government	tubewells,	but	they	get	captured”	
(Personal	 communication,	 real	 estate	 dealer,	 urban	 village	 (Hindu),	 South	 Delhi,	
21/01/15,	fn14)	
	
“Tubewell	people	will	just	come	anytime	and	the	key	will	be	kept	with	local	people.		
They	turn	it	on	when	they	feel	like	and	maybe	tell	their	friends.”			
(Personal	 communication,	 RWA	 President,	 urban	 village	 (Muslim),	 South	 Delhi	
10/03/15,	fn28)	
	
The	Project	contract	stipulates	that	they	must	phase	out	tubewell	supply.		However,	Project	
staff	said	that	the	phasing	out	of	tubewells	was	unlikely	to	be	successful	as	the	project	was	
not	receiving	sufficient	bulk	water	from	the	DJB.		Curious	about	the	relationship	of	tubewell	
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water	and	treated	supply,	 I	asked	the	project	manager	whether	the	tubewells	and	treated	
water	were	supplied	through	the	same	network,	or	parallel	pipes.			
	
Researcher:	 Are	 [the	 supply	 from	 tubewells	 and	 the	 treated	 supply]	 in	 the	 same	
pipes	or	is	it	separate	pipes?		
Levé:	Haan...	[Hindi	–	‘yes’]	today,	they	are	separate	pipes,	but	er	<3	second	pause>	
in	some	area	we	know	that	 they	are	connected	to	 the	existing	network.	 		 [Pause.		
Interviewee	becomes	very	hesitant	here]		It	will	be	case	by	case	but	what	I	can	tell	
you	is	that	since	the	beginning	we	arrive	we	phased	out	60	tubewells.		[…]		Here	is	
the	 big	 question	mark	we	 are	 needing	 to	 discuss	with	 DJB,	 that	 as	 they	 are	 not	
providing	the	contractual	volume	that	they	are	supposed	to	give	us,	like	83	[million	
litres	a	day,	MLD],	so	we	have	today	we	have	seven	MLD	er	difference.		So	we	will	
have	probably	to	still	use	some	tubewells	for	a	couple	of	time	to	satisfy	the	demand	
of	the	customer.”		[…]	
(Personal	communication,	senior	manager	(male	45),	PPP	Offices,	Delhi,	21/04	/15,	
fn56)	
	
It	 seems	 that	 insufficient	water	was	being	 supplied	 from	the	Sonia	Vihar	 treatment	plant,	
also	a	PPP	project	 (in	 fact	by	 the	same	company).	 	Sonia	Vihar,	was	originally	 intended	to	
give	dedicated	supply	to	the	PPP	pilots.		However,	Sonia	Vihar	is	not	providing	the	quantity	
originally	 intended,	and	that	too	is	being	distributed	to	all	of	south	Delhi,	not	 just	the	PPP	
zones.	 	 Other	 researchers,	 however,	 told	me	 that	 Sonia	 Vihar	was	 not	 producing	 enough	
bulk	 water.	 	 This	 was	 attributed	 to	 insufficient	 bulk	 water	 being	 generated	 by	 the	 Sonia	
Vihar	treatment	plant,	also	a	PPP	project,	in	fact	by	the	same	company	(InKhabar,	2013)250.		
From	 conversations	 with	 project	 staff	 it	 sounded	 like	 water	 from	 Sonia	 Vihar	 had	 been	
allocated	 to	other	areas,	and	 the	Project	was	 receiving	water	partly	 from	Sonia	Vihar	and	
partly	from	the	Haiderpur	Water	Treatment	Plant.		Mr	Levé	agreed	that	that	the	insufficient	
bulk	water	would	 impact	 the	project	profit	margin,	 but	 also	 said	 that	 this	was	 something	
they	 could	 ‘negotiate’.	 	 He	 also	 suggested	 that	 the	 Project	 was	 contractually	 protected	
against	financial	impacts	of	the	AAP’s	free	water	scheme.		
	
Across	the	road	from	the	urban	villages	and	unauthorised	colonies	I	have	been	describing	is	
a	complex	of	three	expensive	shopping	malls.		The	malls	are	not	DJB	or	Project	customers,	
and	arrange	their	own	supply	through	tankers	and	tubewells.		This	puts	a	lot	of	stress	on	the	
                                                            
250	Afsar	Jafri,	Focus	on	the	Global	South,	meeting	August	2013	(Jafri	cited	for	same	point	in	V.	Asthana,	
2009,	p.	159)	
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aquifer.		Directly	opposite	the	mall	is	land	zoned	for	a	public	park	but	never	developed.		It	
provides	living	space	for	pavement	dwellers	and	buffalo	herders,	who	store	water	in	plastic	
containers.		A	squat	grey	structure	near	the	edge	is	a	defunct	tubewell.		A	Project	manager	
described	the	malls’	water	supply	like	this:			
	
Levé:	Shopping	Malls	 […]	are	not	our	customer[…]	They	get	water	from	tubewells	
and	 water	 tankers.	 	[…]	 They're	 personal	 uh	 [he	 says	 this	 in	 a	 voice	 like	Marlon	
Brando	in	The	Godfather]	
(Personal	communication,	senior	manager,	Project	offices,	Delhi,	21/04/15,	fn56)	
	
The	malls	 are	 heavy	 groundwater	 users,	 and	 Project	 staff	 are	 aware	 of	 this.	 	 The	 loss	 of	
revenue	potential	from	such	large	consumers	is	perhaps	balanced	by	the	lack	of	additional	
demand	 on	 the	 Project’s	 total	 water,	 which	 is	 already	 in	 deficit.	 	 There	 is	 an	 additional	
advantage	 to	 the	 project,	 in	 that	 any	 Project	 customers	 in	 the	 area	 that	 are	 left	 on	
groundwater	supply	will	be	those	that	have	refused	to	take	a	meter,	and	therefore	a	falling	
water	 table	 will	 only	 be	 an	 incentive	 for	 them	 to	 take	 a	 metered	 connection	 with	 the	
Operator.		The	PPP	seems	designed	to	avoid	conflict	with	existing	high-income	groundwater	
users	while	reducing	use	by	low-income	users,	such	as	households	in	Hauz	Rani	and	Khirki,	
who	use	private	 tubewells	or	 consume	drinking	water	 from	 illegal	bottling	plants.	 	At	 the	
same	 time,	 the	 PPP	 project	 itself	was	 actively	working	 to	 limit	 or	 remove	 informal	water	
economies	by	replacing	metal	pipes	with	PVC	which	cannot	be	drilled	to	install	a	provide	an	
illegal	pipeline,	cutting	illegal	house	connections,	installing	meters	(preventing	‘average	use	
billing’	as	well	as	commercial	resale),	and	phasing	out	of	tubewells.			
	
	
Undeveloped	park	with	buffalo	herders,	pavement	dwellers	and	defunct	tubewell	(left)	
Mall	directly	opposite	(right)		
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For	 work	 in	 unplanned	 areas,	 urban	 villages,	 unauthorised	 colonies,	 and	 jhuggi	 jhompri	
clusters,	 the	 Operator	 also	 faces	 obstacles	 from	 state	 agencies.	 	 The	 Operator	 needs	 to	
obtain	 a	 No-Objection	 Certificate	 from	 the	 Urban	 Development	 Department	 before	
connecting	 these	 areas,	 a	 fact	 Project	 staff	 were	 not	 aware	 of	 when	 they	 started	 the	
contract.		So	the	people	from	the	multinational	were	bidding	on	a	contract	to	supply	water	
to	a	population,	unaware	 that	30-50%	of	connections	were	 illegal	and	that	many	areas	of	
the	network	would	 require	 legal	 permissions	 from	 the	 government	before	 they	would	be	
able	to	extend	service	to	these	areas.			
	
Levé:	 Ok,	 one	 other	 thing	 that	 I	 forgot	 to	 tell	 you	 earlier	 is	 that	 today	 what	 is	
slowing	down	the	project	is	that	today	we	have	some	pockets,	or	colonies,	or	sub-
colonies,	which	are	unauthorised	by	 the	UD,	 I	 think	 it's	 the	Urban	Department.	 	 I	
think	so.		So	we	have	some	pockets	where	we	should	not	lay	any	pipe...	and	we	did	
it	already	unfortunately!		Because	at	the	beginning	we	didn't	have	the	information.		
So	 in	 some	 areas	 we	 are	 not	 able	 to	 go.	 	 This	 is	 the	 map	 of	 this	 unauthorised	
colonies.		So	we	have	all	the	lists	and	some	of	them,	like	[Dakshin	Vihar]	you	were	
saying,	is	here,	so	this	one	we	should	not	do	any	works	over	there	except	changing	
PVC	pipes.			
	
Researcher:	Oh,	okay,	so	if	its	internal	pipes	and	they're	PVC,	like	people	have	laid	
them	themselves,	you	can	improve	that	you	can	fix	that?			
	
Levé:	Yes,	in	this	case,	yes.		So	there	are	different	cases	even	by	DJB.	
Personal	communication,	senior	manager	 (male	45),	PPP	Offices,	Delhi,	21/04/15,	
fn56	
	
An	 example	 of	 this	 lack	 of	 relationship	 between	 the	 ‘on	 ground’	 realities,	 administrative	
regulations	 and	 knowledge	 is	 the	 differing	 statuses	 of	 Khirki	 Village	 and	 Khirki	 Extension,	
which	come	under	different	MLA	constituencies251.		Most	of	Khirki	village,	including	Chauhan	
Bagh,	falls	under	Greater	Kailash	Constituency,	while	most	of	Khirki	Extension	(and	the	Saini	
Mohalla	area	of	the	village)	is	under	Malviya	Nagar	Constituency252.			
                                                            
251	Personal	communication,	PPP	manager,	Khirki,	Delhi,	22/07/15,	fn98	
252	
http://ceodelhi.gov.in/WriteReadData/AssemblyConstituency/MALVIYA%20NAGAR%20Model%20(1).p
df	
http://ceodelhi.gov.in/WriteReadData/AssemblyConstituency/GREATER%20KALASH%20Model%20(1).p
df	
BIRKINSHAW: MURKY WATERS  CHAPTER 6: PPP 
 
213 
	
M.S.	 Sharma:	 Khirki	 Extension	 is	 unauthorised	 but	 it	 gets	water!	 	Khirki	 Village	 is	
authorised	but	it	doesn't	get	water!		Khirki	Extension	gets	water	because	there	is	a	
pipeline	running	through	it.		So	people	have	taken	connections.		
Researcher:	This	was	before	under	DJB?			
M.S.	Sharma:	Some	DJB	or	some	MLA.			
(Personal	communication,	Project	PRO	(male	45),	South	Delhi,	21/04/15,	fn55)	
	
The	Operator	 is	planning	 to	make	 it	harder	 to	 tap	pipes	 illegally	by	using	a	 type	of	plastic	
that	will	crack	on	impact.		During	my	research,	they	were	doing	this	already	around	Chirag	
Dilli,	an	old	urban	village	with	a	population	of	around	150,000	people253.		The	tubewell	water	
in	Chirag	Dilli	 is	 not	potable	 as,	 like	 the	water	 in	Hauz	Rani	 and	Khirki,	 it	 is	 polluted	with	
sewage.	 	 This	means	 that	 households	 spend	 around	 ₹30	 per	 day	 on	 bottled	water,	while	
groundwater	is	only	used	for	washing	and	cleaning254.		The	move	to	PVC	pipes	will	also	affect	
people	 living	 in	 bastis	 at	 Mandir	 Camp	 and	 Pagardi	 Camp255,	 who	 access	 water	 from	
connections	illegally	drilled	directly	into	the	mains	pipes	(Pagardi	have	their	own	connection	
and	Mandir	camp	buys	 from	others,	possibly	Pagardi	people)256.	 	Another	research	project	
has	described	protests	from	basti	residents	against	the	new	plastic	pipes,	and	concern	from	
PPP	staff	 (Perczel,	2016,	p.	32).	 	On	the	other	hand,	remember	the	young	men	 in	Chapter	
Four	who	showed	their	pradhan	‘the	name	of	god’?		They	had	no	problem	with	water,	and	
the	 larger	and	more	 central	bastis	 at	Rani	Camp	and	Khanamqila257	 received	piped	 supply	
free,	courtesy	of	various	area	MLAs258.			
	
Long	 term	presence	 in	 an	 area	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 the	 best	way	 to	 understand	 these	 localised	
modifications;	 however,	 the	 older	 DJB	 workers,	 who	 would	 be	 most	 likely	 to	 have	 this	
knowledge,	are	no	longer	working	for	the	PPP	operator.		The	project	manager	said	that	he	
had	 started	 with	 as	 many	 new	 staff	 as	 possible	 in	 order	 to	 try	 and	 mark	 a	 break	 with	
practices	common	in	the	DJB	(such	as	always	agreeing	to	do	work	in	response	to	a	complaint	
                                                            
253	Personal	communication,	senior	manager	(male	45),	PPP	Offices,	Delhi,	21/04/15,	fn56	
254	Personal	communication,	local	resident	(male,	30),	Chirag	Dilli,	December	2015,	fn35	
255	Names	changed	
256	Personal	communication,	residents	at	Pagardi	Camp,	June	2015,	fn143;	Personal	communication,	
residents	at	Mandir	Camp,	July	2015,	fn144.	
257	Names	changed	
258	Personal	communication,	young	men	at	Begumpur	basti,	January	2016,	fn136;	Personal	
communication,	young	man	at	Rani	Camp,	August	2015,	fn141;	Personal	communication,	researcher	at	
Delhi	National	Law	University,	21/06/14,	fn142	
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even	if	this	was	unrealistic)	and	introduce	a	new	work	culture259.		Locating	elements	of	the	
network,	such	as	 junctions,	valves	and	inlets,	 is	a	key	aspect	of	the	project.	 	 I	would	often	
meet	 Project	 workers	 in	 my	 neighbourhood	 digging	 up	 the	 road.	 	 I	 met	 one	 supervisor	
staring	stoically	into	a	large	hole	which	showed	only	pipe.		His	team	was	trying	to	locate	a	
valve	said	to	be	‘where	the	Hanuman	Temple	pipe	joins	the	main	pipe’,	they	knew	roughly	
where	 it	was	 from	pressure	 readings.	 	 I	 asked	 how	 they	would	 find	 it.	 	 He	 said	 that	 ‘the	
problem	is	all	the	old	DJB	staff	do	not	work	here	anymore	so	no-one	knows	the	system.		We	
just	have	to	ask	local	people’260.			
	
	
Appears	to	be	a	private	water	business	in	a	centrally	located	basti	with	free	municipal	supply	
	
	
An	example	of	the	way	localised	power	relations	affect	water	distribution	is	the	role	of	caste	
and	religion.	 	The	 interview	with	Tasleem,	above,	mentioned	that	 the	Hindu	unauthorised	
colony	got	piped	water	while	 the	Muslim	unauthorised	colony	did	not.	 	The	caste	of	area	
                                                            
259	Personal	communication,	PPP	Project	Manager,	19/09/14,	fn6	
260	Personal	communication,	Khirki	Extension,	Malviya	Nagar,	17/07/15,	Hindi,	fn97	–	cf	missing	valve	
BIRKINSHAW: MURKY WATERS  CHAPTER 6: PPP 
 
215 
residents	is	also	relevant.		Bias	in	water	supply	on	grounds	of	religion	in	urban	settings	has	
been	 described	 by	 other	 researchers	 (e.g.	 N.	 Anand,	 2012;	 Contractor,	 2012).	 	 Published	
work	on	caste	in	urban	water	provision	is	rare;	however,	some	of	my	interviews	suggest	it	is	
a	factor.			
M.S.	Sharma:	This	caste	system	was	there	before.		In	a	[rural]	village	different,	what	
is	 the	 word	 [I	 think	 he	 wants	 biradari	 ‘communities’]	 would	 live	 in	 different	
areas.	 	There	 would	 be	 pandits	 [Brahmins,	 the	 highest	 caste]	 and	 others,	
shopkeepers	and	 the	 lower	castes,	maybe	 leather	workers.	 	The	well	would	be	 in	
the	 pandit	 area	 and	 the	 lower	 castes	 would	 not	 be	 allowed	 near	 it	 [laughs	 –	
meaning	this	 is	silly].	 	It	 is	still	 like	that.	 	Only	now	[in	urban	areas]	 instead	of	 the	
well,	 it	 is	 the	 line	 [pipe]!	 	If	 you	 try	 to	 touch	 it	 they	 will	 say	 "don't	 touch	 my	
line".		They	will	want	the	line	to	go	to	their	community	only	and	not	to	give	water	
to	the	other	community.			
	
Me:	So	you	would	need	all	different	lines	for	different	communities?			
	
M.S.	 Sharma:	 That	 is	 there	 already,	 they	 already	 have	 from	 before.	 	 You	 won't	
know,	because	people	whose	water	is	good	won’t	say,	but	people	whose	water	is	
bad	will	say	'they	are	getting	water,	they	have	a	line'	
(Personal	communication,	Project	PRO,	South	Delhi,	21/04/15,	fn55)	
	
	
	
(left)	Sub-contracted	project	workers,	installing	pipes.		The	tubewell	in	the	top	left	corner	has	been	turned	into	
a	private	garden	
(right)	Project	staff	installing	a	new	valve	
	
In	 the	 area	 of	 the	 South	 Delhi	 urban	 village	 in	 the	 Project	 zone,	 where	 I	 stayed	 for	 12	
months,	‘most	people’	are	lower	caste	Dalits.		A	resident	describes	it	to	me	as	‘Valmikis	and	
Jatavs	 mixed.	 	All	 sorts	 of	 SC	 [Scheduled	 Castes]	 are	 there’.	 	 Dalit	 leader,	 Dr.	 B.	 R.	
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Ambedkar’s	 birthday	 is	 celebrated	 with	 a	 community	 organised	 free	 lunch261.	 	 This	 area	
receives	 water	 from	 tubewells.	 	 However,	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 village	 where	 dominant	
caste	(Chauhan)	people	live,	is	connected	to	the	piped	network262.		People	in	other	parts	of	
the	 city	 knew	 of	 the	 dominant	 caste263.	 	 Remember	 the	 ‘lost’	 valve	 mentioned	 earlier?		
Residents	from	this	area	were	further	upset,	as	a	section	of	the	neighbouring	urban	village	
belonging	 the	dominant	 caste	 in	 the	village,	had	been	 receiving	water	 for	 some	 time	and	
were	having	their	pipes	re-laid	at	the	MLAs	expense;	a	resident	from	this	village	volunteers	
with	 the	MLA’s	 political	 party	 and	 runs	 the	 Aadhar	 Card	 Centre	 for	 the	 area264.	 	 Tension	
between	 the	 lower-	and	upper-caste	 sides	of	 the	village	have	been	documented	by	other	
researchers	 in	 the	 context	 of	 land	 dispute.	 	 The	 ‘plumbers	 house’	mentioned	 below	 also	
happens	 to	be	 located	next	 to	 the	 tubewell,	which	has	been	 turned	 into	a	private	garden	
(pictured	above,	Figure	35).			
	
It	 was	 only	 later	 we	 realized	 the	 real	 reason(s)	 why	 they	 wanted	 the	 plumber’s	
house	removed	from	there.		This	had	to	do	with	caste	relations	within	the	village.		
The	 land	 in	 question	 fell	within	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 Saini	Mohalla,	 and	 upper-
class	 enclave	of	 the	 village.	 	 The	plumber	was	 a	man	who	belonged	 to	 the	 Jatav	
caste,	 a	 lower	 caste,	 and	 there	 had	 been	 an	 ongoing	 feud	 between	 him	 and	 his	
neighbours	(J.	Chatterjee,	2015,	p.	25)	
	
	
	
Communications,	street	and	online:	(left)	rare	example	of	project	sign	describing	work	taking	place;		
(right)	project	website	
	
		
                                                            
261	Personal	communication,	resident	and	Ambedkar	Jayanti	organiser,	urban	village,	South	Delhi,	
14/04/15,	fn53	
262	Personal	communication,	Juli	Perczel,	researcher,	London	25/08/16,	fn140	
263	Village	is	described	as	‘Rajput’,	personal	communication,	real	estate	dealer,	(male,	35),	Sangam	
Vihar,	06/02/15,	fn17.		Chauhans	are	a	Rajput	caste.		
264	Personal	communication,	Juli	Perczel,	researcher,	London	25/08/16,	fn140	
This image has been removed as the 
copyright is owned by another organisation. 
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COMMUNICATIONS	
‘At	the	MLAs	office,	complaints	are	the	normal	way	anything	gets	done!’265	
	
It	seems	that	generally,	communication	with	residents	is	an	area	where	the	PPP	has	so	far	
struggled.		Some	interviewees	noted	that	the	MNC	is	well	known	to	be	an	organisation	that	
is	 strong	 in	 engineering	but	not	 so	much	 in	 soft	 skills	 like	 communications	 -	 and	 that	 the	
Malviya	Nagar	Project	 is	 an	example	of	 this.266	 	 Interestingly,	 the	 initial	 pre-project	 report	
remarked	 on	 the	 ‘limited	 confidence	 in	 the	 technical	 feasibility	 and	 financial	 viability	 of	
implementing	 24/7	 water	 supplies	 in	 Delhi	 amongst	 stakeholders	 because	 of	 lack	 of	
communication’.		
	
DJB	shall	 take	 initiative	to	communicate	aggressively	the	advantage	of	projects	to	
stakeholders.	It	is	very	important	because	the	short-term	disadvantages	of	project	
will	be	experienced	ahead	of	long-term	advantages	of	project.	The	implementation	
strategy	should	be	design	and	implemented	to	avoid	the	situation	or	minimise	the	
inconvenience	 to	 stakeholders	 during	 initial	 rehabilitation	 period	 based	 on	 past	
experiences	in	similar	projects	(Nagpur,	Karnataka	etc).		
(DRA	Consultants	Pvt.	Ltd.	&	Shah	Technical	Consultants	Pvt.	Ltd.,	2011b,	p.	15)	
	
Sadly,	very	few	of	the	RWA	members	I	spoke	to	in	the	PPP	zone	(Khirki	DDA	Flats,	Hauz	Rani	
Village,	Hauz	Rani	Ext	and	Khirki	Ext)	had	received	formal	communication	from	the	Project.	
The	 president	 of	 Khirki	 Village	 RWA	 had	 received	 a	 letter.	 	 Although	 the	 Project	 Public	
Relations	Officer	interacts	with	the	established	hierarchy	of	elected	representatives	at	state	
and	 city	 level	 and	 the	 local	 RWAs	 and	pradhans,	 constructive	 engagement	with	 residents	
through	 these	 channels	 has	 been	 limited.267.	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 as	 the	 quote	 below	
illustrates,	customer	complaints	are	an	essential	channel	of	 information	for	the	project	 (cf	
Chapter	Four,	page	110).	
	
Researcher:	On	a	regular	daily	basis,	weekly	basis,	how	do	you	come	to	know	about	
water,	about	the	things	that	are	happening	in	the	project?		
	
Levé:	 To	 know	what	 is	 happening?	 	Today	what	 the	 best	 thing	 that	we	 do	 know	
what	is	happening	is	that	[1	second	pause]	we	put	in	place	a	'call	centre'	[he	says	it	
                                                            
265	Personal	communication,	Juli	Perczel,	researcher,	London	25/08/16,	fn140	
266	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	9/08/15,	fn110	
267	Personal	communication,	PPP	PRO,	South	Delhi,	21/04/15,	fn55	
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hesitantly,	like	it	is	a	strange	and	unusual	thing].		Ok,	since	the	beginning	it	was	by	
contract,	we	have	 to	put	a	 call	 centre	 so	all	 the	 customers	 in	 the	project	area,	 if	
they	have	a	problem	can	call	this	number	and	after	that	we	collect	complaints,	and	
after	that	this	complaint	comes	to	all	the	team	and	we	er…	[1	second	pause]	attend	
and	we	resolve	the	complaints.		So	it's	why	we	know	what	is	going	on	in	the	project	
area,	is	thanks	to	the	complaints	of	these	customer.		So	if	there	is	problem	of	er	no	
water,	 problem	 of	 er	 high	 bills,	 problems	 of	 er	 contamination,	 water	
contamination,	we	know	it	from	the	customers	and	of	course	also	in	operation	ah,	
we	do	some	er,	er,	monitoring	of	what	is	going	on,	so	we	go	to	see	if	the	T	points	
are	working,	we	go	on	the	field	to	take	some	water	samples	for	water	quality,	er,	
we	er	[1	second	pause]	go	on	site	to	take	pressure...		[1	second	pause]	we	do	some	
also	flow	measurements	so	we	are	monitoring	anyway,	we	have	team	to	do	that.			
(Personal	communication,	senior	manager,	PPP	offices,	Delhi,	21/04/15,	fn56)		
	
Other	Malviya	Nagar	Project	staff	described	the	process	for	managing	complaints	as	being	
designed	with	 lots	of	processes	 ‘so	 that	 if	anyone	asks,	solid	process	 [sic]	exists	 to	handle	
complaints’,	 ‘but	 solving	 complaints	 is	 not	 really	 an	 objective’268.	 	 Indeed,	 increased	
efficiency	 in	 resolving	complaints	 is	a	contractually	stipulated	outcome	for	 the	Operator	–	
however	 the	 contractual	 schedules	 only	 specify	 recording	 of	 response	 to	 complaints,	 and	
‘time	and	date	of	resolution’,	 further	 ‘no	water’	and	‘poor	quality	of	water’	are	 ‘allowable	
exceptions’	(Delhi	Jal	Board,	2012,	p.	1995).			
	
Ethnographic	research	on	local	politicians	describes	their	role	in	placing	pressure	on	various	
public	 and	 private	 agencies	 to	 help	 individual	 constituents	 (Berenschot,	 2013;	 Perczel,	
2016).		Anand	observes	that	‘In	their	effort	to	cope	with	[customers’]	demands,	[engineers]	
often	 reallocate	 water	 from	 areas	 of	 low	 political	 pressure	 to	 areas	 of	 higher	 pressure,	
constantly	 making	 adjustments	 until	 people	 stop	 shouting’	 (N.	 Anand,	 2011,	 p.	 553).		
Remember	how	the	Project	PRO	had	attributed	illegal	tapping	of	the	pipes	to	‘some	DJB	or	
some	MLA’	(page	143	above)?		The	precedent	for	interventions	from	local	representatives,	
in	 order	 to	 secure	 waivers	 and	 modifications	 for	 select	 groups	 of	 residents,	 has	 been	 a	
culture	clash	with	the	PPP	staff,	which	has	 led	to	some	tensions.	 	At	the	same	time,	more	
than	one	European	employees	of	the	PPP	raise	the	issue	of	‘Indian	work	culture’,	this	being	
a	tendency	to	avoid	conflict	by	agreeing	to	all	requests,	regardless	of	practicality,	possibility	
                                                            
268	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	South	Delhi,	10/07/15,	fn94	
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or	intention	to	deliver269.		This	was	cited	as	one	of	the	main	reasons	for	replacing	original	DJB	
staff	with	new	hires.		Difficulty	in	hiring	adequately	qualified	staff	was	also	mentioned.			
	
Latent	 hostility	 from	 residents,	 localised	 political	 dynamics,	 the	 legal	 framework	 and	 the	
material	 (‘under-ground’)	 complexity	have	been	a	 steep	 learning	 curve	 for	Project	 staff270.		
During	 my	 research	 period	 at	 least	 two	 significant	 members	 of	 Project	 staff	 left,	 citing	
unrealistic	demands	and	excessive	levels	of	stress	 in	the	job	(at	time	of	writing	a	third	has	
returned	to	France).		A	number	of	respondents	noted	that	PPP	staff	were	‘in	the	front	line’,	
and	were	often	 ‘chased	away’	by	residents	who	did	not	want	them	to	disrupt	the	existing	
water	supply	network	by	digging	in	their	area.		A	PPP	manager	described	the	‘mob’	of	angry	
protestors	 that	 disrupted	 work	 in	 the	 offices	 during	 one	 of	 my	 visits	 as	 ‘motivated	 by	
politicians’271.			
	
‘[Distrust	of	 the	project]	does	affect	us	at	 street	 level,	we	 [in	 the	offices]	are	 the	
second	line	of	fire.		People	will	harass	street	level	staff	-	will	not	let	them	into	area	
because	they	do	not	want	them	to	mess	around	with	the	water.’			
(Personal	communication,	senior	manager,	PPP	offices,	Delhi,	19/09/14,	fn6)			
	
‘One	thing	is	that	they	guys	doing	the	street	works,	who	are	anyway	from	[the	Local	
Partner]	or	 [their]	 sub-contractor,	are	constantly	approached	by	people	and	have	
to	 'pitch	 the	 project'	 to	 them.	 	They	 are	 not	 very	 good	 at	 this	 and	 this	 causes	
tensions.		They	could	easily	put	signs	up	saying	this	work	is	going	on,	this	is	what	it	
will	be	and	how	long	for	and	it	is	for	a	project	to	do	x,	y,	z.		But	they	don't.				
(Personal	communication,	Project	staff,	Delhi,	23/06/15,	fn90)		
	
“Yes	 of	 course,	 sometimes	 […]	 PWD	 [Public	 Works	 Department]	 people	 are	
reluctant	to	let	us	work	because	[…]	we	didn't	restore	the	roads	before,	for	the	part	
that	we	committed	to	dig	and	restore,	we	didn't	do	it,	so	they	say	"Ok	why	we	will	
allow	 you	 to	 have	 a	 new	 permit	 to	 excavate	 again	 if	 you	 didn't	 do	 work	 totally	
before?"	[…]	and	some	people	are	more	reluctant	because	they	are	the	resp-	[cuts	
himself	off],	 they	are	the	y'know	the	boss	of	the	area	so	they	want	to	show	their	
power.		[…]		It's	the	project,	you	know	it's	always	like	this.		[…]		I	don't	know	about	
the	 staffing	 for	 the	 roads	 repairs	 how	 that	 contract	was	 awarded.	 	Maybe	 it	was	
someone	 they	 knew	 earlier	 and	 he	 applied.	 	I	 don't	 know.	 	[…]	 	 The	 budget	 for	
roads,	even	though	 it	 is	half	of	the	overall	budget	 is	very	tight.		 It	 is	costing	more	
                                                            
269	Similarly	multi-tasking	customer	service	representatives	and	‘assertive	queueing’	are	a	cultural	norm	
in	India,	whereas	they	can	cause	anxiety	in	other	contexts	(Gandhi,	2013)	
270	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	19/09/14,	fn6;	21/04/15,	fn56	
271	Personal	communication,	PPP	manager,	Delhi,	19/09/14,	fn6	
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than	we	thought	so	we	are	not	able	to	do	them	to	the	standard	that	[Public	Works	
Department]	wants.”		
(Personal	communication,	senior	manager,	PPP	Offices,	21/04/15,	fn56)	
	
While	the	PPP	model	appears	intended	to	insulate	infrastructure	development	and	services	
from	political	 risk,	 it	becomes	apparent	 in	 this	case,	 that	 it	 is	not	 impervious	 to	pressures	
from	 democratic	 representatives,	 both	 at	 the	 city	 and	ward	 level.	 	 It	 was	 explained	 that	
because	 of	 the	 frequency	 of	 requests	 for	 expedited	 work	 as	 well	 as	 unexpected	 delays,	
project	managers	were	required	to	be	extremely	flexible	and	constantly	changing	the	work	
schedule…				
	
“it's	 very	 challenging	because	 you	have	 a	 lot	 of	 parameters	 that	 are	 going	 inside	
your	planning	y’know,	plus	the	pressure,	the	politician	that	come	to	us	more,	the	
most	um…	[pause]	pushing	politician	he	will	ask	us	 to	put	priority	of	works	 in	his	
area,	to	show	up	etc	so	it's	also	a	parameter	that	come	on	the	way	in	order	to	plan	
the	global	cap-ex	so	it's	you	have	to	manage	all	the	interests	of	everybody”		
(Personal	communication,	senior	manager,	PPP	offices,	Delhi,	21/04/15,	fn53)				
	
The	 Project	 must	 manage	 complicated	 interactions	 with	 both	 state	 agencies,	 elected	
representatives	and	consumers.		A	key	role	of	community	representatives	is	to	lobby	service	
providers	 (or	 more	 powerful	 representatives)	 for	 better	 delivery	 to	 their	 constituencies.		
This	 kind	 of	 pressure	 from	 representatives	 was	 cited	 a	 number	 of	 times	 by	 PPP	 staff	 as	
changing	 the	planning	and	programme	of	works.	 	 Intervention	by	political	 representatives	
was	both	described	by	interviewees	and	witnessed	by	me	on	a	number	of	occasions.		As	the	
DJB	and	the	Operator	are	in	frequent	communication,	interviewees	stated	that	MLAs	would	
be	able	to	‘give	orders’	to	the	DJB	who	would	then	pass	them	on	to	the	Operator.		Although	
the	 relationship	 between	 the	 Operator	 and	 the	 DJB	 was	 governed	 by	 contract	 this	 was	
described	as	‘shady’	and	the	contract	itself	as	something	the	employees	did	not	have	easy	
access	to	as	it	was	‘quite	confidential’272.			
	
Such	is	the	concern	to	be	seen	to	be	doing	work,	that	at	one	time	when	the	PPP	operator	in	
Malviya	Nagar	was	 replacing	 the	pipes	 in	 a	 road	 adjoining	Khirki	 Village,	 the	MLA	 for	 the	
area	 had	pipes	 on	 the	 opposite	 side	 of	 the	 road	 re-laid	 out	 of	 his	 own	 funds	 so	 that	 the	
                                                            
272	Personal	communication,	PPP	staff,	Delhi,	9/08/15,	fn110	
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village	would	not	feel	that	others	were	being	favoured	over	them273.		The	two	photos	below	
(‘Sign	wars’)	were	taken	at	the	same	time,	the	two	signs	are	facing	each	other.		On	the	left:	
PPP	works	attempt	to	pump	leaking	sewer	water	from	pipe	relaying	site.	 	On	the	right:	on	
the	opposite	side	of	the	street,	pipe	relaying	funded	by	the	MLA	for	a	privileged	section	of	
the	 urban	 village.	 	 There	 is	 a	 stark	 difference	 in	 the	 tone	 and	 content	 of	 the	 signs.	 	 The	
MLA’s	is	much	more	conversational	and	includes	an	email	and	phone	number.	
	
	
Sign	Wars	
	
The	discursive	use	of	the	project,	however,	has	been	increasing	and	changing.		As	of	2017,	
the	DJB	has	started	to	publicise	the	Malviya	Nagar	project	as	a	way	to	save	water	for	the	city	
(Alavi,	2017;	Delhi	Jal	Board,	2017).	 	 In	March	2017,	the	DJB	recently	published	a	video	on	
their	Facebook	page	explaining	the	24/7	pilot	in	Geetanjali	and	describing	it	as	an	initiative	
to	 save	 the	 city	 and	 consumers	 water	 and	 money.	 	 The	 video	 ends	 by	 stating	 that	 ‘the	
successful	 model	 is	 now	 ready	 to	 be	 implemented	 in	 other	 areas,	 today	 Malviya	 Nagar	
constituency,	tomorrow	Delhi	state,	in	the	future,	urban	areas	of	the	whole	country’	(Delhi	
Jal	Board,	2017	 [my	translation]).	 	About	a	month	 later,	 the	DJB	CEO	published	an	article,	
which	described	‘market	environmentalism’	as	influential,	but	unpopular	and	consequently	
unsuccessful	 due	 to	 its	 neglect	 of	 social	 equity.	 	 Acknowledging	 that	 water	 ‘has	 largely	
remained	 the	Achilles	heel	 for	 the	private	sector	 in	 India’,	 the	article	closes	by	noting	 the	
importance	of	‘the	country’s	reality’	and	that	the	‘success	of	water	projects	almost	entirely	
depends	 on	 the	 sensitisation	 and	 adoption	 of	 the	 project	 by	 all	 stakeholders’	 (Keshav	
                                                            
273	Cf	‘stealing	work’	story	on	competition	for	political	credit	from	AAP	worker	in	Chapter	Four	
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Chandra,	2017).	 	The	article	reinforces	the	idea	in	the	DJB	promotional	video	that	the	PPP	
project	can	save	water	for	the	city.			
	
Critics	of	PPP	projects	of	Delhi	must	understand	 that	 the	cost	of	projects	 to	 save	
water	 in	 the	 present	 system	 shouldn’t	 be	 compared	 to	 the	 current	 rate	 of	
production	 of	 water.	 Availability	 of	 additional	 water	 in	 Delhi	 is	 only	 possible	 at	
enormous	financial	and	environmental	costs,	after	setting	up	three	dams—Renuka,	
Lakhvar	Vyasi	and	Kishau—on	the	upper	tributaries	of	Yamuna.	The	cost	of	water	
saved	through	PPP	projects	is	minuscule	as	compared	to	water	augmented	through	
these	 dams	 	 (Keshav	 Chandra,	 2017;	 for	 the	 economic	 inefficiency	 of	 large	 dams	
see	Ansar	et	al.,	2014).			
	
In	May,	 the	MLA	 for	Malviya	Nagar	has	published	a	video	showing	him	 in	a	meeting	with	
private	 sector	 consultants	where	 he	 is	 briefing	 them	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 initiate	 continuous	
pressure	flow	(as	in	the	PPP)	for	his	whole	constituency	(Adv.	Somnath	Bharti,	2017).		In	this	
way,	the	PPP	has	influenced	aspirations	for	the	wider	public	sector	supply	(albeit	within	one	
constituency).		A	few	days	later,	the	AAP	government	announced	that	the	PPP’s	24/7	pilot	is	
now	being	extended	to	Navjeevan	Vihar,	a	neighbouring	area	of	similar	size	within	the	PPP	
zone	 (Alavi,	 2017).	 	 It	 appears	 that	despite	 a	 challenging	 start,	 the	PPP	 initiative	 in	 South	
Delhi	has	been	able	to	attract	support	 from	the	DJB	and	AAP	politicians	and	 is	now	set	to	
spread	further.								
	
	
CONCLUSIONS	
As	in	Chapter	Four,	international	agencies	and	norms	can	be	seen	to	have	had	an	influence	
over	Delhi’s	water	supply	arrangements	and	policy.		Numerous	scholars	have	noticed	similar	
influence	 (e.g.	Gilbert,	2007b;	Goldman,	2007).	 	Unlike	the	standard	narrative	of	powerful	
international	organisations	exploiting	the	local	public	sector,	in	this	case,	the	Multinational	
partner	in	the	PPP	project	appears	to	have	been	insufficiently	diligent	before	accepting	the	
tender	resulting	 in	an	unrealistically	 low	bid.	 	 In	this	case,	the	Operator	appears	unable	to	
re-negotiate	 and	 will	 be	 forced	 to	 honour	 its	 commitments.	 	 In	 fact,	 the	 tariff	 increases	
implemented	 before	 the	 projects	 started	 were	 cited	 as	 a	 factor	 in	 the	 defeat	 of	 the	
incumbent	government	and	 the	 rise	of	 the	AAP,	headed	by	anti-privatisation	campaigner,	
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Kejriwal.	 	 If	 so,	 this	 would	 be	 a	 case	 of	 popular	 dissatisfaction	 leading	 to	 a	 change	 of	
government	rather	than	contract	renegotiation.				
	
This	 private	 sector	 reform	projects	 appear	 to	 have	underestimated	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	
physical	 network	 and	 the	 resistance	 of	 local	 populations.	 	 Unlike	 in	 OECD	 countries,	 the	
water	 network	 has	 been	 physically	 modified	 extensively.	 	 This	 includes	 both	 private	
infrastructures	(mentioned	in	Chapter	Four)	installed	at	consumer	end	such	as	leaky	pipes,	
overflowing	 tanks,	 and	 malfunctioning	 meters,	 and	 modified	 and	 self-laid	 networks	 in	
unauthorised	 areas	 (such	 as	 those	 in	 Chapters	 Four	 and	 Five).	 	 These	 personalised	
infrastructures	cause	problems	with	 flows	of	both	water	and	data.	 	 Further,	 residents	are	
now	 quite	 protective	 of	 these	 arrangements	 and	 resent,	 and	 intervene	 physically	 and	
politically,	 to	 stop	 any	 attempt	 to	 re-engineer	 them.	 	 Delhi	 is	 more	 planned,	 and	 much	
wealthier,	 than	 most	 Indian	 cities.	 	 However,	 even	 in	 this	 environment,	 the	 level	 of	
complexity	 of	 the	 physical	 water	 networks	 is	 a	 formidable	 challenge	 and	 the	 project	 has	
made	slower	progress	than	anticipated.		Three	years	in,	this	work	is	still	ongoing,	with	even	
the	water	coming	in	to	zone	not	completely	understood.	Privatisation,	reform,	and	network	
rehabilitation	projects	 in	this	context	are	clearly	very	different	propositions	to	experiences	
in	 places	where	 the	 network	 is	 already	 complete	 and	 known	 to	 the	 operator	 (N.	 Anand,	
2015,	2017,	Björkman,	2011,	2015),	and	 this	blurring	of	public	and	private	 (or	 formal	and	
informal)	 infrastructures	 again	 makes	 privatisation	 more	 complicated	 (Briscoe	 &	 Malik,	
2006,	p.	57;	Burt	&	Ray,	2014;	Button,	2016).	As	the	project	profit	structure	and	the	added	
value	of	international	expertise	is	dependent	on	accurately	being	able	to	map	the	network	
this	raises	serious	questions	over	viability.			
	
In	the	neighbourhood	of	the	PPP	pilot,	the	network	has	become	informally	modified	under	
the	influence	of	powerful	households,	even	in	planned	areas.	 	As	many	of	the	original	DJB	
staff	 for	the	zone	were	replaced,	knowledge	of	the	network	 is	 limited	and	workers	had	to	
ask	 local	 residents	 in	 the	hope	of	 finding	 important	 components	 buried	underground.	 	 In	
these	ways,	the	Project	not	only	seeks	to	alter	the	distribution	of	water;	information	is	a	key	
area	 of	 work.	 	 Information	 that	 was	 previously	 unavailable	 or	 highly	 decentralised	 with	
different	agency	workers	and	private	households	 is	 to	be,	according	 to	Project	objectives,	
collected	 and	 centralised	with	 the	Operator	 (cf	Mitchell,	 2002).	 	 If	 completed,	 this	would	
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have	the	effect	of	relocating	information	to	a	centralised	agency;	if	not	‘the	state’,	then	one	
with	 a	 contractual	 relationship	 to	 them.	 It	 would	 also	 remove	 information	 on	 the	 water	
network	from	more	locally	embedded	individuals.			
	
The	PPP	project	studied	appears	to	be	part	of	a	‘second	wave’	of	private	sector	involvement	
in	water	 supply	 (Smith,	 2004).	 	 Earlier	 private	 sector	 initiatives	were	 observed	 to	 ‘cherry	
pick’	only	 the	most	profitable	 sites	 for	 involvement	 (Bakker,	 2010;	Budds	&	McGranahan,	
2003).	 	While	Delhi	 is	 very	wealthy	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 India	 average,	 and	 two	of	 three	
Delhi	 PPP	 zones	 include	wealthy	 parts	 of	 Delhi,	 the	 PPP	 zones	 do	 not	 only	 include	 high-
income	areas.	 	The	Delhi	PPP	zone	studied	 is	a	deliberately	diverse	mix	of	areas,	 including	
unplanned	as	well	as	very	wealthy	areas,	to	‘test’	the	operator,	and	suggests	and	willingness	
on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 government	 and	 the	 private	 sector	 to	 learn	 how	 to	 work	 in	 these	
environments.	 	Additionally,	there	is	a	project	objective	for	the	operator	to	extend	service	
to	100%	of	residents	in	the	project	zone,	rather	than	cut-back	to	higher	paying	areas.		This	
element	of	the	project	is	similar	to	Gopakumar’s	findings	in	Bengaluru,	where	he	regards	a	
PPP	 intention	 to	 include	 slum	 settlements	 as	 territorialisation,	 intending	 to	 integrate	 the	
archipelagos	of	service	provision	into	a	larger	island	(Gopakumar,	2014,	p.	404).		This	model	
of	 mixed-income	 pilot	 zones	 was	 also	 employed	 in	 the	 Hubli-Dharwad	 PPP	 in	 Karnataka	
(Burt	&	Ray,	2014,	p.	112).		However,	in	Delhi,	unlike	the	Hubli-Dharwad	pilot	zones,	the	PPP	
zones	are	not	easily	hydraulically	isolated	from	the	rest	of	the	water	network.		It	should	also	
be	 noted,	 however,	 that	 while	 100%	 connection	 is	 a	 stated	 objective	 of	 the	 project,	 the	
Operator	 is	 contractually	 obliged	 to	 extend	 connections	 only	 to	 areas	 that	 the	 DJB	 has	
approved,	and	there	is	no	stipulation	for	the	percentage	of	population	to	be	served	in	the	
schedule	 of	 contractual	 financial	 penalties.	 	 As	 the	 project	 is	 currently	 incomplete,	 the	
effects	on	equitable	and	accountable	water	distribution	are	unknown.			
	
Although	a	 focus	on	higher	 income	areas	 is	not	 specified,	pragmatically	 this	has	been	 the	
case	 with	 project	 ‘priorities’	 in	 order	 ‘to	 make	 progress’,	 with	 wealthy	 areas,	 easier	 to	
hydraulically	isolate,	chosen	as	sites	for	continuous	supply	and	low-income	areas	chosen	as	
targets	 for	 NRW	 reduction	 through	 closing	 unauthorised	 connections.	 	While	 the	 Project	
was	 heavily	 oriented	 towards	 demonstrating	 24/7	 continuous	water	 supply,	 this	 was	 not	
necessarily	cost-effective	or	appreciated	by	consumers.		Although	attempts	to	develop	24/7	
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water	were	 successful	 in	meeting	 technical	 difficulties,	 the	 initiative	 faced	obstacles	 after	
providing	 continuous	pressure	 supply	due	 to	 a	 combination	of	 leakage	and	 inefficiency	 in	
private	 household	 networks	 (after	 the	 meter)	 and	 patterns	 of	 water	 use	 from	 powerful	
wealthy	 consumers	 unwilling	 to	 change	 their	 behaviours.	 	 At	 time	 of	 research,	 as	 these	
influential	 people	 ‘did	 not	 notice	 the	 difference’	 the	 Project	 had	 reduced	 the	 hours	 of	
continuous	supply	in	two	pilot	areas	in	response	to	consumer	complaints.		My	findings	here	
are	 similar	 to	 a	 much	 larger	 survey	 conducted	 in	 South	 India	 which	 also	 found	 that	
informalities	continued	after	continuous	supply	was	implemented	(Burt	&	Ray,	2014).			
	
The	design	of	the	project	also	allows	government	to	retain	control	of	tariffs.	 	Water	tariffs	
for	 Delhi	 were	 set	 prior	 to	 project	 implementation	 with	 built-in	 over-time	 rises.	 	 Water	
pricing	remains	under	control	of	the	Delhi	government.	 	The	AAP	government’s	free	600kl	
water	policy	is	a	later	layer	of	policy	change	that	the	Project	must	incorporate.	 	Combined	
with	a	progressive	ruling	party	in	the	city,	this	marks	a	departure	from	earlier	privatisation	
attempts	as	affordability	concerns	are	met	by	free	lifeline	water	in	Delhi.		As	the	PPP	doesn’t	
set	prices,	 if	the	government	can	design	subsidies	effectively	 it	should	enable	extension	of	
the	network	to	unserved	areas	and	reduce	poor	people’s	bills.		In	this	case,	the	particularly	
history	of	 popular	protest	 against	 privatisation,	 combined	with	 the	presence	of	 vocal	 and	
powerful	 residents	 and	 a	 populist	 ruling	 party,	 has	 given	 rise	 to	 a	 tightly	 controlled	 PPP	
model	 which	 could	 give	 more	 redistributive	 outcomes	 to	 the	 earlier	 unsuccessful	 and	
unpopular	 privatisations	 initiatives.	 	 However,	 these	 conditions	 are	 exceptional	 and	 this	
model	 would	 be	 hard	 to	 transfer	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 country	 (in	 the	 absence	 of	 popular	
movements,	 political	 support,	 investor	 interest,	 informed	 and	 active	 civil	 society	 groups,	
possibility	of	financially	viable	return,	etc).				
	
In	 the	 more	 mundane	 areas	 where	 a	 majority	 of	 the	 population	 lives,	 municipal	 water	
supply	 is	 either	 low-quality	 ground	 water,	 or	 accessed	 through	 the	 intercessions	 and	
discretionary	spending	of	political	representatives,	or	tapped	from	municipal	pipes	illegally.		
Drinking	 water	 for	 those	 who	 can	 afford	 it	 is	 from	 private	 suppliers	 of	 20	 litre	 jars	 (as	
described	 in	 Chapter	 Five).	 	 Given	 the	 resistance	 to	 introducing	metering	 in	 these	 areas,	
attempts	to	realise	user	charges	cause	an	issue	for	the	financial	viability	of	projects	like	this.				
The	Project	objective	of	reducing	Non-Revenue	Water	(NRW)	is	being	attempted	by	cutting	
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off	illegal	connections	and	requiring	all	customers	to	use	a	meter.		In	this	case,	it	seems	that	
those	 who	 do	 not	 register	 their	 connections	 and	 accept	 meters	 will	 be	 left	 using	
groundwater.	 	 This	 is	 likely	 to	 primarily	 affect	 low	 income	 households	 in	 unauthorised	
settlements	who	 cannot	 afford	 a	meter,	 do	 not	 have	 documents	 or	money	 for	 bribes	 to	
obtain	a	legal	connection,	and	have	limited	budgets.		Here,	as	in	Chapter	Five,	we	see	again	
groundwater	functioning	as	a	supplement	to	network	supply.		However,	while	for	the	DJB	in	
Sangam	Vihar	it	mitigates	the	effects	of	uneven	and	unreliable	supply,	for	the	Project	zone	it	
cushions	the	impacts	of	increased	efficiency.		Groundwater	has	an	additional	function	in	the	
Project	zone,	which	is	to	top-up	bulk	water	supply.		Bulk	water	supplied	to	the	zone	(from	a	
PPP	WTP	run	by	the	same	MNC)	is	insufficient	for	the	population.		The	shortfall	 is	likely	to	
lead	to	continued	reliance	on	groundwater.	 	As	treated	water	 is	 insufficient	 for	 the	whole	
population,	 if	 some	 (low	 income	 and	minority	 group)	 consumers	 refuse	 to	 accept	meters	
and	 are	 left	 reliant	 on	 groundwater,	 as	 suggested	 above,	 it	 will	 be	 advantageous	 to	 the	
project’s	overall	water	and	 financial	balance.	 	Heavy	bulk	water	 consumers,	 like	 the	 large	
shopping	 malls	 in	 the	 zone,	 also	 rely	 on	 private	 groundwater	 and	 do	 not	 use	 network	
supply.	 	 Thus	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 of	 leaving	 low-income	 consumers	 reliant	 on	 poor	 quality	
groundwater	which	is	also	being	rapidly	depleted	by	large	private	sector	users	and	wealthy	
households.			
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CHAPTER	7.	CONCLUSIONS	
Urban	water	 in	 India,	particularly	groundwater	use,	 is	a	 critically	 important	area	of	 future	
concern,	largely	neglected	by	policy	and	social	science	research.		This	thesis	has	attempted	
to	contribute	a	rich	empirical	analysis	of	urban	water	 in	Delhi,	with	particular	attention	to	
informality,	groundwater	and	reforms.		I	use	informal	infrastructures	as	a	focus	to	follow	the	
neat	models	of	reform	initiatives	 into	the	murky	epistemological	and	ethical	complexity	of	
material	 and	 social	 realities.	 	 The	 thesis	 makes	 several	 original	 research	 contributions.		
Empirically,	 I	 add	 to	 work	 on	 the	 informal	 political	 economy	 of	 urban	 groundwater	 use,	
‘second	wave’	private	sector	water	management	through	Public-Private	Partnerships	(PPPs),	
and	 the	 relationships	between	urban	groundwater	 and	 reforms.	 	 The	 thesis	 analyses	of	 a	
range	 of	 common	 features	 of	 urban	 water	 in	 India	 –	 informal	 groundwater	 use,	
decentralised	 infrastructures	 (such	 as	 tubewells	 and	 tankers),	 and	 private	 sector	 network	
management	–	and	their	relation	to	urban	governance	and	politics.		In	this	respect	I	build	on	
empirical	 lacunae	in	earlier	research	on	urban	water,	and	urban	water	reforms,	 in	 India.	 	 I	
also	contribute	to	research	on	governance	and	urban	services	in	unauthorised	colonies	and	
urban	 villages.	 	 Conceptually,	 I	 introduce	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘informal	 infrastructures’	 as	 a	
theoretical	 frame	and	methodological	 approach	which	 connects	my	 fieldwork	 across	 sites	
and	scales.		Practically,	my	project	studies	how	the	interactions	of	reform	initiatives	with	the	
complexities	of	the	existing	water	governance	environment	shape	the	possibilities	for	better	
water	access	and	management.			
	
This	concluding	chapter	 is	structured	 in	 four	sections	addressing	the	themes	of	the	thesis:	
informality;	governance;	groundwater;	reforms.		I	close	with	indications	for	future	work.			
	
INFORMALITY		
The	initial	broad	research	question	I	asked	was:	‘How	is	water	governed	in	Delhi?’,	and	more	
specifically,	 ‘What	 are	 the	 politics	 of	 Delhi’s	 water,	 and	 the	 hydraulics	 of	 Delhi	 politics?’		
Gaps	in	the	academic	literature	led	to	three	main	sub-questions:		
1. How	is	public	water	supply	governed?			
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2. What	role	does	groundwater	play,	and	why?			
3. How	do	water	reform	initiatives	relate	to	groundwater	and	government	supply?		
	
The	 idea	 of	 informal	 infrastructures	 or	 infrastructural	 informality	 connects	 my	 empirical	
research	across	different	sites	and	scales.		Bringing	ideas	from	the	literature	on	informality	
and	 infrastructures	 together	 under	 this	 framing	 offers	 modifications	 to	 the	 ways	 that	
‘informality’	and	‘infrastructures’	are	often	used.			
	
I	 suggest	 that	 both	 informality	 and	 infrastructures	 should	 be	 understood	 relationally:	 as	
terms	which	must	be	defined	in	context.		Thus	informal	infrastructures	include	both	urban	
services	 at	 a	 distance	 from	 official	 regulation	 (such	 as	 private	 water	 tankers,	 private	
tubewells	and	illegal	bottled	water	factories)	and	 informalised	official	 infrastructures	(such	
as	diverted	public	water	tankers,	captured	government	tubewells	and	modifications	to	the	
official	piped	network).			
	
My	suggestion	 is	 that	 research	on	 infrastructure	can	contribute	 to	work	on	 informality	by	
introducing	 different	 dynamics	 to	 work	 on	 spatial	 planning	 and	 livelihoods.	 	 Water	 in	
particular	forces	us	to	think	about	space	through	flows,	mobility	and	networks	rather	than	
static	territories.		Close	studies	of	infrastructure	foreground	complex	material	and	technical	
realities	which	may	be	overlooked	by	more	theoretically	oriented	urban	scholarship.			
	
My	research	on	informal	groundwater	use	and	water	reform	projects	extends	a	focus	on	the	
political	effects	of	materialities	beyond	earlier	work	on	piped	water	supply		(N.	Anand,	2017;	
Björkman,	2015).		Material	aspects	of	the	informal	(and	informalised)	water	infrastructures	I	
study,	such	as	tubewell	depth,	pump	size,	tanker	capacity,	pipe	gradient	and	valve	locations,	
have	very	real	impacts	on	to	ability	access	water.		These	material	characteristics	of	informal	
infrastructures	 shape	 the	 possibilities	 for	 further	 informal	 influence,	 political	 change	 or	
reform.						
	
While	 informality	 is	 often	 thought	 of	 as	 filling	 ‘gaps	 in	 state	 services’,	 many	 informal	
practices,	 such	 as	 urban	 service	 infrastructures,	 are	 also	 imbricated	with	 state	 actors	 and	
agencies	 (e.g.	 Kacker	&	 Joshi,	 2016).	 	 Perhaps	due	 to	 the	
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scope	within	 the	 respective	 disciplinary	 lineages	 of	 engineering	 and	 economics,	 historical	
and	 ethnographic	 studies	 of	 infrastructure	 tend	 to	 have	 a	 more	 mature	 treatment	 of	
‘incompleteness’	 than	 work	 on	 informality.	 	 Consequently,	 detailed	 empirical	 studies	 of	
infrastructural	 systems	 challenge	 uncritical	 uses	 of	 informality	 predicated	 on	 an	 implicit	
dualism	 and	 reification	 of	 the	 state	 that	 would	 be	 rejected	 by	many	 state	 theorists	 (e.g.	
Abrams,	2006;	Brenner,	2004;	Jessop,	2008).			
	
The	 informal	 infrastructures	 of	 interpersonal	 arrangement	 that	 often	 mediate	 access	 to	
urban	 services	 (administratively	 or	 physically),	 that	 others	 have	 called	 ‘people	 as	
infrastructure’,	 ‘zero	 degree’	 or	 ‘invisible’	 infrastructures	 are	 an	 additional	 area	 of	 my	
research	(De	Boeck	&	Plissart,	2004,	p.	235;	Simone,	2004).		Personalisation	and	brokerage	
illustrate	the	porous	boundaries	of	statehood.	 	At	the	same	time,	the	‘absent	presence’	of	
infrastructure	 in	 areas	 of	 Delhi	 like	 Sangam	 Vihar/Deoli	 allows	 alternative	 urban	 service	
formations	 to	arise	 (Boeck	&	Baloji,	 2016).	 	 In	 this	way	 I	 use	 ‘informality	 as	 a	method’	 to	
direct	 attention	 towards	 the	 contingent,	 assembled	and	enacted	nature	of	 infrastructures	
along	the	spectrum	of	official	governance	and	predictability.		
	
This	 thesis	 makes	 an	 empirical	 contribution	 to	 infrastructure	 studies	 by	 focussing	 on	
informality	in	infrastructures,	small	technologies,	and	the	global	south.		Govind	Gopakumar	
has	done	excellent	analysis	of	the	progress	of	reforms	among	Indian	water	utilities	using	an	
actor-network	view	of	the	state	and	socio-technical	understanding	of	change	(Gopakumar,	
2011).	 	 Similarly,	 Vicky	Walters	 and	 Vandana	 Asthana	 have	 analysed	 policy	 processes	 at	
government	level	(Asthana	2009,	Walters	2013).	 	 I	seek	to	add	to	this	work	by	introducing	
informal	infrastructures	and	processes	within	changing	urban	water	systems.			
	
When	thinking	of	reform	initiatives,	infrastructural	informality	is	a	central,	and	challenging,	
issue,	 yet	 little	 mentioned	 and	 subsumed	 under	 technical	 components	 (such	 as	 ‘non-
revenue	 water’)	 without	 the	 understandings	 of	 statehood,	 politics	 and	 social	 dynamics	
which	 an	 informality	 lens	 connotes.	 	My	empirical	work	 shows	 that	materiality	 structures	
and	mediates	the	opportunities	 for	 informalities,	politics	and	reform	among	various	forms	
of	 water	 infrastructure.	 	 Some	 implementation	 of	 political	 agendas	 through	 technical	
decisions	 (‘technopolitics’)	 is	 evident,	 for	 example	 in	 tubewell	 or	 booster	 pump	 siting	 or	
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water	tariff	structures.		However,	water	supply	is	as	much	a	product	of	human	as	technical	
relationships,	particularly	where	the	infrastructures	are	more	provisional.		Here	there	is	a	far	
more	overt	politics	of	water	access;	tubewells	are	captured	by	strongmen,	water	tankers	are	
diverted	by	side	payments,	and	administrative	processes	are	waived	–	even	at	the	level	of	
the	entire	city	–	for	political	expedience.	 	The	possibilities	for	action	over	various	forms	of	
water	distribution	are	shaped,	but	not	determined	by,	the	materialities	of	those	forms.			
	
Conceptually,	 I	 suggest	 that	 attention	 to	 informality	 can	 contribute	 to	 research	 on	
infrastructure	studies,	by	emphasising	the	social,	processual	and	relational	elements	of	large	
technical	systems.		Understanding	infrastructures	as	‘performative’	prompts	a	shift	towards	
viewing	 them	as	malleable,	 contingent	 and	dynamic	networks	or	 ‘assemblages’.	 	 Thinking	
through	informality	forces	us	to	ask	what	is	outside	‘official’	governance	(economy,	politics,	
infrastructure),	 when,	 and	 how?	 	 By	 virtue	 of	 its	 knowing	 relationship	 towards	 these	
boundaries,	informality	is	inherently	tied	up	with	questions	of	power,	to	evade	as	much	as	
enforce.		Thinking	about	informality	leads	us	to	question	the	boundaries	of	concepts	such	as	
‘the	 state’,	 ‘the	 economy’,	 ‘politics’	 and	 ‘infrastructure’	 and	 the	 performative	 ‘boundary	
work’	 necessary	 to	 produce	 these	 entities	 as	 coherent	 effects	 (Star	 &	 Bowker,	 2007;	
Björkman,	2014;	Mitchell,	2006,	2008).			
	
GOVERNANCE	
The	governance	of	Delhi’s	government	water	supply,	provided	by	the	Delhi	Jal	Board	(DJB)	is	
at	first	glance	directed	by	State	Assembly	policy,	the	DJB	Act,	and	decisions	of	the	DJB	CEO	
and	Board	of	Directors.		Written	policy	differentiates	between	communities	on	the	basis	of	
land	 tenure	 and	 formalises	 bias	 –	 in	 the	 amount	 and	 qualities	 and	 methods	 of	 water	
distribution	 –	 in	 favour	 of	 wealthy	 (largely	 upper	 caste,	 largely	 Hindu)	 households.	 	 Put	
another	way,	as	responsibility	for	water	provision	falls	primarily	on	female	members	of	the	
household,	biased	allocation	has	a	negative	effect	on	women	from	less	well-off,	lower	caste	
and	 minority	 religious	 groups.	 	 This	 formally	 ‘differentiated’	 aspect	 of	 Delhi’s	 water	
provision	 is	 unlike	 a	homogenous	network	model	 (Bakker,	 2003;	Kooy	&	Bakker,	 2015)	 in	
that	a	simple	metric	of	connected	or	not	does	little	to	explain	water	supply	patterns	among	
neighbourhoods.		Consequently,	my	work	supports	the	proposal	by	others	to	move	beyond	
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a	 formal-informal	 binary,	 to	 more	 specific	 concepts	 (Gandhi,	 2012;	 McFarlane,	 2012;	
Truelove,	2016).			
	
To	illustrate:	the	DJB	network	of	components	(pipes,	booster	stations,	treatment	plants,	etc)	
is	 represented	 at	 varying	 levels	 of	 accuracy.	 	 However,	 the	 ‘quality’	 of	 this	 network	 is	
unmapped.		Maps	may	record	the	historical	location	of	pipes,	but	the	timings	and	qualities	
of	water	flow	are	not	mapped.		These	temporal	and	qualitative	aspects	of	infrastructure	are	
key,	unobserved	dimensions	(Marie-Hélène	Zérah,	1998).		As	others	have	also	shown,	even	
within	formal	areas	which	should	be	accorded	the	same	level	of	supply,	discrepancies	exist	
(Biswas,	 2015).	 	 Aside	 from	 the	 temporal	 changes	 and	 inaccuracies	 in	 the	mapping,	 large	
areas	 of	 the	 city	where	 pipes	 do	 not	officially	 run	 are	 simply	 blank	 on	 the	 official	maps.		
These	 limitations	 of	 knowledge	 and	 physical	 control	 over	 water	 inputs,	 quality	 and	
distribution	 mean	 that	 at	 the	 delivery	 end	 of	 the	 system,	 outputs	 for	 households	 and	
communities	are	strongly	influenced	by	the	actions	of	locally	powerful	individuals,	including	
elected	representatives,	government	officials	and	community	 leaders,	and	household	 level	
private	infrastructures	such	as	pumps,	tanks	and	filters.		The	boundary	between	official	and	
unofficial	practices	and	infrastructures	in	Delhi’s	government	water	supply	system	is	porous.		
We	 can	 understand	 Delhi’s	 ‘formal’	 water	 supply	 system,	 the	 DJB	 piped	 network,	 as	
‘informalised’	 along	 a	 number	 of	 dimensions.	 	 Additionally,	 the	 private,	 household	 and	
community	 water	 supply	 arrangements	 often	 used	 to	 informally	 supplement	 inadequate	
government	supply	are	highly	varied	and	site-	and	process-	specific.		
	
Informal	influence	over	water	supply	in	Delhi,	while	the	varied	and	differentiated	outcome	
of	a	complex	blend	of	agencies	and	material	factors,	maintains	overall	the	historic	pattern	of	
higher	quality	supply	for	upper	class	residents	as	well	as	pockets	of	better	access	for	other	
politically	 well-connected	 communities.	 	Water	 supply	 in	 contemporary	 Delhi	 is	 far	more	
complex	 than	 during	 Mughal	 rule	 and	 patterns	 of	 inequality	 have	 changed,	 through	 the	
layering	of	processes	during	colonial,	post-independence	and	post-liberalisation	eras.	Today,	
influential	 groups	 from	 historically	 dominant	 castes,	 both	 regionally	 and	 locally,	 newly	
affluent	 groups,	 and	 a	 relatively	 small	 number	 of	marginalised	 communities	with	 political	
access	 are	 able	 to	 capture	 elements	 of	 India’s	 liberalised	 developmental	 state.	 	 Despite	
concern	 over	 privatisation	 in	 Delhi,	 the	 results	 of	 the	 actually	 existing	 combination	 of	
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privilege	and	patronage	in	Delhi’s	water	supply	appear	less	progressive	than	the	attempts	to	
rationalise	 and	 commercialise	 the	 city	 water	 supply	 through	 the	 involvement	 of	
multinational	companies.				
	
In	 fact,	 the	 relatively	 high	 level	 of	 informality	 in	 DJB	 protects	 this	 state	 agency	 from	
efficiency	drives,	whether	in	the	form	of	partial	external	take-overs	(as	in	the	Delhi	Public-
Private	 Partnerships)	 or	 internal	 commercialisation	 reforms.	 	 DJB	 reforms	 to	 water	 and	
revenue	zones	in	2003	intended	to	improve	distributional	equity,	appear	to	have	decreased	
their	ability	to	understand	the	movement	of	water	across	the	city.		This	example	is	indicative	
to	me	of	 the	 class	bias	of	 informal	 influence	which	 can	allow	 reforms	 to	be	 subverted	 to	
undermine	their	intended	objects.		For	example,	in	Malviya	Nagar,	informality	in	the	water	
supply	serves	to	protect	the	state	water	supplier	by	making	it	hard	for	the	private	sector	to	
function.	 	 The	 fragmentation	 of	 governance	 structures	 through	 PPPs	 should	 be	 balanced	
against	what	might	considered	an	earlier	‘privatisation’;	the	actually	existing	fragmentation	
of	governance	 through	 informality	and	discretion	of	politicians	and	agency	workersi.	 	 This	
localised	and	private	knowledge	is	integral	to	the	functioning	of	the	public	water	network,	at	
the	same	time	as	it	impedes	its	overall	efficiency.		
	
The	 bias	 towards	 central,	 wealthier,	 and	 politically	 better-connected	 areas	 of	 the	 city	 in	
distribution	 of	 government	water	 leaves	 other	 areas	 consuming	 large	 amounts	 of	 private	
informal	groundwater.		The	Delhi	government	policy	prior	to	2016	of	not	authorising	private	
water	 connections	 to	urbanised	areas	outside	 the	 city	masterplan	 (unauthorised	colonies,	
urban	villages,	slums,	resettlement	areas,	JJ	clusters)	is	a	deliberate	fragmentation	of	water	
governance	structures	which	knowingly	relegates	informal	and	predominantly	lower-income	
neighbourhoods	to	informal,	ad-hoc	urban	service	solutions.		The	common	understanding	is	
that	 leaving	 areas	 reliant	 on	 informal	 arrangements	maintains	 political	 influence	 through	
‘vote	bank	politics’.		My	research	complicates	this	picture.		In	Sangam	Vihar,	a	key	political	
constituency,	albeit	one	in	which	only	a	minority	of	voters	are	registered	(and	therefore	not	
a	 conventional	 ‘vote	bank’),	 informal	water	management	has	been	used	 to	 support	 party	
politics	financially	but	has	been	a	risky	and	unsustainable	strategy	electorally.			
                                                            
i	The	South	African	social	movement	Abahlali	baseMjondolo	has	long	used	‘privatisation’	in	this	context.			
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The	 Malviya	 Nagar	 case	 adds	 further	 detail.	 	 In	 the	 resettlement	 area	 of	 Begumpur,	
residents	 have	 been	 provided	 network	 water	 through	 political	 discretion	 from	 various	
political	party	intermediaries.		However,	informal	water	is	used	in	much	higher	amounts	in	
surrounding	wealthy	areas	through	a	combination	of	non-metered	billing,	leakage	and	‘after	
the	meter’	waste	in	the	household	network.		While	informal	access	to	water	is	highly	valued	
in	low	income	communities,	the	amounts	used	are	much	less	and	not	a	significant	concern	
for	 the	 PPP	 project.	 	 In	 areas	 of	 Malviya	 Nagar,	 such	 as	 the	 low-income	 ‘informally	
urbanised’	 Muslim	 urban	 village	 and	 unauthorised	 extensions	 of	 Hauz	 Rani,	 where	 the	
population	 dependent	 on	 informal	 water	 management	 is	 not	 significant	 electorally	 or	
financially,	groundwater	use	may	be	viewed	as	a	residual	‘do-it-yourself’	coping	strategy	at	
low	cost	to	government	agencies.		
	
GROUNDWATER	
Delhi’s	 declining	 water	 table	 demonstrates	 the	 importance	 of	 groundwater	 in	 the	 city.		
Groundwater	 is	clearly	essential	 to	many	water	suppliers	and	household	users	 in	Delhi.	 	 It	
contributes	around	10	percent	of	government	water,	particularly	in	areas	outside	of	formal	
land-use	planning.		Much	larger	quantities	are	likely	to	be	consumed	in	unofficial,	and	often	
illegal,	 groundwater	 use	 by	 private	 households	 and	 commercial	 enterprises.	 	 Given	 the	
limited	and	unreliable	timings	and	quality	of	government	supply,	this	informal	use	provides	
an	essential	coping	strategy	for	households	and	communities.	 	 In	so	doing	 it	dilutes	public	
anger	 and	 reduces	 political	 pressure	 on	 government	 to	 provide	 a	 more	 efficient	 and	
equitable	service.		However,	groundwater	is	a	slippery	political	ally.		As	Anand	notes,	in	the	
context	 of	 Mumbai,	 the	 materiality	 of	 water	 ‘exceeds	 politics	 and	 destabilizes	 its	
distribution	 regimes’	 (N.	Anand,	2011).	 	Dependence	on	groundwater	 sources	 for	political	
funding	 and	 local	 influence	 renders	 political	 parties	 vulnerable	 to	 increasingly	 adverse	
environmental	 conditions	 and	 embroils	 them	 in	 the	 murky	 local	 political	 ecologies	 of	
groundwater	control.		
	
Informal	 groundwater	 use	 is	 a	 rivalrous	 use	 of	 a	 common	pool	 resource,	 favouring	 those	
able	to	afford	deeper	wells	and	larger	pumps.		A	consideration	of	these	‘small	technologies’	
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extensively	 used	 in	 the	 global	 south,	 such	 as	 tubewells	 and	 tankers,	 provides	 a	 different	
perspective	 from	 piped	water	 networks	more	 commonly	 studied	 in	 previous	 research	 on	
urban	 water	 in	 India.	 	 Discreet	 and	 discrete,	 the	 technologies	 of	 tubewells,	 tankers	 and	
water	filters	allow	interventions	to	supplement	state	water	supply	(in	quantity	or	quality)	by	
private	actors	for	self-provision	or	profit.		The	anonymous	nature	of	these	technologies,	of	
which	 the	 tubewell	 is	 the	most	 significant,	 leads	 to	 a	 classic	 tragedy	 of	 the	 commons	 in	
which	 as	 the	 common	 pool	 resource	 is	 underground	 and	 withdrawals	 are	 not	 observed,	
except	 in	 aggregate,	 there	 are	 no	 incentives	 for	 restraint	 or	 sanctions	 for	 overuse.	 	 The	
inadequacies	of	government	water	supply	lead	to	a	double	ecological	impact:	an	increasing	
bulk	water	supply	 from	the	hydrological	hinterland	and	a	reduction	 in	groundwater	 in	 the	
urban	region.		The	colonial	legacy	of	groundwater	as	the	private	property	of	the	landowner	
further	 facilitates	 aquifer	 degradation.	 	 Aquifer	 depletion	 reduces	 the	 quality	 of	 water	
available.	 	 As	 groundwater	 levels	 fall,	 the	waterbodies	 and	 streams	 across	 Delhi	 become	
drier,	increasing	the	relative	level	of	pollution.		The	informal	infrastructures	of	groundwater	
use,	whether	coping	or	profit	strategy,	displace	the	costs	of	 inadequate	water	supply	onto	
the	 wider	 environment.	 	 The	 historically	 dominant	 trend	 in	 the	 development	 of	 Delhi’s	
water	network	since	installation	of	a	piped	network	under	British	rule	has	been	to	increase	
bulk	 water	 supply,	 disregarding	 distribution	 and	 efficiency.	 	 This	 has	 resulted	 in	 Delhi	
depending	on	water	from	hundreds	of	kilometres	away.		Groundwater	cannot	be	relied	on	
as	an	‘off-balance	sheet’	solution	to	fill	the	gaps	in	unreliable	and	biased	network	provision.		
Surface	 water	 and	 groundwater	 must	 be	 recognised	 as	 connected,	 at	 the	 urban	 and	
hydrological	scale.			
	
Just	as	the	ability	of	rural	India	to	survive	on	limited	water	provision	allows	Delhi	to	capture	
excessive	quantities	of	water	for	the	city’s	wealthy,	informal	groundwater	use	in	areas	like	
Sangam	Vihar	allows	the	government	water	supplier	to	provide	minimal	amounts	of	water	
enabling	it	to	avoid	redeploying	water	from	other	areas.	 	The	water	supply	modes	used	in	
Sangam	Vihar	 allow	politicians	 and	officials	 to	maintain	personal	 relationships	with	water	
users	 for	political	and	 financial	benefit.	 	 The	 informal	 sector	 in	Sangam	Vihar,	 rather	 than	
being	 created	 through	 government	 action	 (as	 in	 DJB	 informality)	 appears	 to	 be	 partially	
outside	of	government	control.		
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The	 manifest	 complexity	 of	 water	 supply	 modes	 in	 Delhi	 problematises	 a	 simple	 public-
private	distinction	as	well	as	 the	concept	of	 ‘water	governance’.	 	 In	 this	context,	what	we	
are	 seeing	 is	 rarely	 coordination	 among	 multiple	 actors,	 as	 implied	 in	 the	 concept	 of	
governance,	 but	 market	 competition	 supported	 by	 social	 power.	 	 Karen	 Bakker	 has	
described	 the	 contemporary	 challenges	 for	water	 supply	 as	 a	 case	 not	 of	 state	 failure	 or	
market	failure,	but	‘governance	failure’,	which	appears	to	restate	a	normative,	rather	than	
critical,	understanding	of	governance.		
	
The	 governance	 of	 water	 in	 Delhi	 could	 in	 fact	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 unstable,	 and	 ultimately	
temporary,	 ‘success’	 for	 the	 ruling	 party	 and	 city	 bureaucracy.	 	 If	 groundwater	 was	
unavailable	 in	Delhi,	either	bulk	water	supply	would	have	 to	be	 increased	or	water	would	
need	to	be	redistributed	across	the	network.	 	The	high	costs,	political	challenges	and	 long	
lead	 times	 required	 to	 increase	 bulk	 water	 suggest	 redistribution	 as	 a	 solution,	 although	
until	recently	increasing	bulk	supply	has	been	preferred.		In	this	context	forcing	users	to	rely	
on	 supplementary	 groundwater	 allowed	 the	 city’s	 politicians	 and	 water	 board	 to	 avoid	
having	 to	 confront	 the	 political	 challenge	 of	 redistributing	 water	 from	 powerful	 wealthy	
consumers	 to	 poor	 marginalised	 populations.	 	 While	 the	 possibility	 of	 groundwater	 use	
reduces	 the	 public	 dissatisfaction	 resulting	 from	 inadequate	 water	 access,	 this	 is	 an	
unsatisfactory	compromise	for	everyone	which	is	maintained	to	avoid	the	costs	of	change.				
	
Bakker’s	move	beyond	an	‘unhelpful’	public-private	binary	has	also	led	to	interest	in	the	role	
of	 smaller	 providers	 in	 water	 supply.	 	 Vinay	 Gidwani,	 in	 a	 reply	 to	 Bakker,	 suggests	 that	
decentralised	 non-network	 infrastructure	 through	 small-scale	 private	 sector	 actors	 might	
offer	solutions	that	are	not	possible	from	the	international	private	sector	in	water.			
	
How	should	we	understand	the	‘private’?	[…]	 	Are	all	 forms	of	privatization	equally	
troubling	 or	 equally	 unequal?	 Can	 some	 forms	 of	 privatization––say,	 small-scale	
private	 providers	 in	 urban	 informal	 economies––provide	 interim	 solutions	 to	 the	
urban	water	crisis?	(Gidwani,	2015,	p.	1)	
	
I	 respond	 to	 this	 question	 of	 different	 forms	 of	 privatisation	 in	 my	 discussion	 of	
personalisation	 of	 governance	 above,	 and	 the	 Delhi	 PPP	 project	 below.	 	 The	 small-scale	
private	 providers	 I	 have	 observed	 in	my	 research,	 and	decentralised	 infrastructures	more	
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broadly,	state	or	private,	are	not	empowering	for	users:	they	are	problematic	in	a	number	of	
ways.	 	 The	 regular,	 recognised	 contractual	 arrangements	 for	 government	 tubewells	 and	
tankers	are	not	the	‘co-production’	of	Joshi	and	Moore,	but	‘co-production’	as	Ahlers	et	al	
suggest	we	redefine	 it:	unequal,	contested	and	exploitative	(Ahlers	et	al.,	2014;	A.	Joshi	&	
Moore,	 2004).	 	 The	 private	 sector	 alternatives,	 which,	 as	 informal	 infrastructures	
functioning	 outside	 of	 regulation,	 have	 a	 relationship	 with	 state	 agencies	 that	 is	 tacit	 at	
best,	are	more	opaque	and	less	accountable.		
	
My	 research	 shows	 that	 criminal	 networks	 in	 water	 provision	 are	 a	 substantive	 issue,	
contrary	 to	 the	 scepticism	expressed	by	 some	 researchers	 (e.g.	Björkman,	2015,	pp.	180–
189;	Graham	et	 al.,	 2013).	 	 For	 example,	 Björkman	 describes	 talk	 of	 corruption	 in	 tanker	
delivery	of	municipal	water	in	Mumbai	as	more	symptomatic	of	the	complex	public	system	
and	widespread	use	of	brokers	and	side-payments	than	organised	illegal	water	businesses.		
However,	 Mumbai’s	 water	 politics	 primarily	 revolves	 around	 piped	 supply.	 	 In	 Delhi,	
groundwater	use	is	extensive,	which	allows	the	development	of	far	more	substantial	illegal	
water	businesses	independent	from	the	public	network.		Of	course,	there	is	also	corruption	
in	 government	water	 supply,	 and	 they	 are,	 sometimes,	 connected	 (see	 Chapter	 Six,	 page	
165	 ff.).	 	 Numerous	 respondents	 have	 described	 private	 water	 operators	 as	 ‘mafia’	
operating	 outside	 the	 law	 to	 researchers	 and	 journalists	 (Rai,	 2012;	 Sheik,	 Banda,	 et	 al.,	
2015,	p.	5),	although	in	a	south	Asian	context	 ‘mafia’	connotes	assertive	enterprise	with	a	
relaxed	 attitude	 towards	 regulation	 and	 use	 of	 social	 connections	 rather	 than	 the	 crime	
families	depicted	in	western	popular	culture	(see	e.g.	Chapter	Six,	page	141,	145	above).		As	
noted	 earlier,	 the	 use	 of	 ‘mafia’	 as	 a	 criminalising	 term	 often	 directed	 at	 Sangam	 Vihar	
revives	 the	 British	 registration	 of	 pastoral	Gujjar	 people	 as	 a	 ‘criminal	 tribe’,	 ‘addicted	 to	
cattle-lifting’	(Machonachie,	1884,	p.	85)i.		In	addition	to	being	used	as	a	conveniently	loose	
accusation	 (see	 page	 241	 below),	 the	 term	 is	 broadly	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 a	 range	 of	 varying	
informal	and	illegal	activities:	government	tubewell	capture;	private	tubewell	networks;	the	
connections	 needed	 for	 reliable	 tanker	 delivery;	 illegal	 private	 sale	 of	 government	 tanker	
water;	tips	and	facilitation	payments	for	tanker	delivery;	illegal	bottled	water	factories	using	
                                                            
i	Historical	work	on	water	in	Delhi	is	outside	the	scope	of	the	thesis	but	forthcoming	from	the	author	
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both	network	and	groundwater;	and	high-level	corruption	 involving	government	contracts	
for	work	and	services	(Schneider	&	Schneider,	2008).		
	
This	is	where	greater	specificity	may	help.		The	connection	between	illegal	groundwater	use	
and	water	 tankers	 is	 explored	 in	more	 detail	 in	Malini	 Ranganathan’s	 excellent	 paper	 on	
public	 authority	 which	 describes	 tanker	 owners	 as	 ‘politician	 like’	 (Ranganathan,	 2014a).		
The	water	supply	from	tubewells,	tankers	and	the	official	network	differs	considerably.	 	 In	
my	research,	informal	tanker	management	(both	private,	and	public	through	side-payments,	
diversion	and	patronage)	 is	business-like,	 as	Björkman	also	 suggests.	 	However,	 tubewells	
(private	 and	 captured	 public)	 are	 ‘state-like’,	 primarily	 due	 to	 the	 natural	 monopoly	
tendencies	of	fixed	pipes	and	productive	wells.			
	
The	 differential	 quantities	 of	 water	 supply	 are	 further	 differentiated	 by	 the	 different	
qualities	 of	 specific	 modes	 of	 supply.	 	 Different	 modes	 of	 water	 supply	 have	 different	
topologies	 and	 temporalities	 –	 which	 is	 to	 say	 they	 occupy	 space	 in	 different	 ways	 and	
durations	(Mol	&	Law,	1994)	–	and	consequently	different	visibilities.		This	also	gives	rise	to	
different	 possibilities	 for	 politics,	 patronage,	 rent-seeking	 and	 capture.	 	 Tubewells	 are	
spatially	discreet	and	relatively	remote	as	well	as	being	unobtrusive	enough	that	they	may	
be	discretely	located	within	a	private	residence.		Tankers	are	mobile,	with	movements	and	
cargoes	that	are	hard	to	observe	and	verify,	and	are	often	operated	by	external	contractors.		
The	 location	 of	 underground	 pipes	 and	 the	movements	 of	 water	 across	 the	 government	
network	are	hazily	understood	at	best,	as	are	the	relationships	between	user	bills	and	water	
consumed.	 	 	My	 finding	here	adds	empirical	detail	 from	a	particular	 case	 to	Ahlers	et	al’s	
observation	of	the	importance	of	disaggregating	‘water	supply’	in	the	abstract	(Ahlers	et	al.,	
2014).	
	
Informal	 water	 supply	 as	 a	 result	 of	 informal	 urbanisation	 in	 Sangam	 Vihar	 has	 allowed	
dominant	castes	 in	 local	villages	 to	benefit	 from	the	urbanisation	process	 in	ways	 that	do	
not	 appear	 to	 have	 happened	 in	Malviya	Nagar.	 	 In	 trying	 to	 account	 for	 the	 differences	
between	 Sangam	 Vihar	 and	 Malviya	 Nagar,	 it	 appears	 significant	 that	 while	 the	 Malviya	
Nagar	area	was	urbanised	formally,	with	acquisition	of	village	 land	through	the	DDA	for	 ‘a	
pittance’	in	the	1960s	and	70s,	the	informal	urbanisation	of	Sangam	Vihar	appears	to	have	
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benefitted	 historically	 dominant	 caste	 groups	 in	 the	 villages	 of	 Deoli	 and	 Tughlakabad	 to	
which	the	land	belonged.		People	from	these	groups	were	able	to	insert	themselves	into	the	
urbanisation	process	and	accumulate	money	and	power	through	control	of	land	sales,	real	
estate	development,	politics	and	water	at	the	expense	of	more	recent	migrants.		In	Malviya	
Nagar,	this	is	less	obvious.		While	powerful	castes	such	as	the	Chauhans	in	Khirki	still	retain	
privileged	 positions,	 and	 some	 of	 the	 original	 landowners	 have	 become	wealthy	 through	
compensation,	development	of	the	area’s	formal	neighbourhoods	has	allowed	a	new	set	of	
much	wealthier	 and	more	 powerful	 residents	 to	move	 in.	 	 Households	 with	 this	 level	 of	
wealth	and	influence	would	obviously	not	be	interested	in	living	in	the	unauthorised	colony	
of	Sangam	Vihar.		Instead,	the	upper	class	unauthorised	colony	of	Sainik	Farms	has	come	up	
a	 short	 distance	 away.	 	 Here	 wealth	 insulates	 the	 residents	 from	 a	 lack	 of	 government	
services.		Luxury	villas	are	hidden	behind	high	walls	that	run	along	the	colony’s	private	and	
gated	 roads.	 	Households	use	deep	bore	 tubewells	and	 those	 residents	without	 them	can	
easily	afford	private	water	tanker	deliveries.		
	
Informal	tenure	leads	to	limited	access	to,	and	lower	quality,	urban	services,	which	in	turn	
leads	to	informal	provision	secured	through	informal	intercession	and	politics.		Control	over	
land	 has	 led	 to	 influence	 over	 politics	 and	water	 for	 the	 locally	 dominant	 castes	 and	 the	
exploitation	of	migrant	 settlers.	 	My	 research	 in	Delhi	 suggests	 that	 historically	 dominant	
groups	 have	been	 able	 to	 use	 land,	 then	 real	 estate,	 then	politics,	 then	water	 to	 cement	
their	control.	 	The	2017	elections	seem	to	support	my	findings	which	suggest	the	difficulty	
of	using	water	reforms	to	challenge	this	entrenched	resource-based	power,	at	 least	 in	the	
short	term.		
	
While	 informalities	 in	 land,	 residential	 status,	 employment	 arrangements,	 state	 access,	
political	 patronage	 and	 urban	 services	 are	 related,	 they	 are	 not	 the	 same.	 	 Informal	 land	
settlement	 can	 allow	 the	 establishment	 of	 economically	 productive	 neighbourhoods	 by	
providing	 lower-cost,	more	 flexible,	 better	 located,	 residential,	 industrial,	 commercial	 and	
community	 spaces	 than	 would	 otherwise	 be	 available	 to	 low-income	 people	 (Benjamin,	
2004).		For	example,	while	informal	land	use	may	support	mixed-use	clusters	with	benefits	
for	low-income	residents,	informal	water	use	appears	to	primarily	be	of	benefit	in	allowing	
the	formal	network	to	save	the	costs	of	expansion,	local	representatives	to	trade	piecemeal	
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improvements	for	political	 loyalty	and	local	entrepreneurs	to	generate	income	and	a	small	
amount	of	 informal	 low-skill	employment.	 	 Informal	water	 supply	 then	appears	 to	be	 less	
beneficial	than	land	and	primarily	valued	in	the	absence	of	any	alternative.			
	
My	research	focus	on	water	demonstrates	the	difficulties	of	thinking	with	a	general	theory	
of	 ‘urban	 informality’	 drawn	 from	 empirical	 research	 on	 land	 or	 labour	 (AlSayyad,	 2004;	
Benjamin,	 2004;	 Kudva,	 2009;	 Roy,	 2005),	 and	 also	 suggests	 the	 difficulties	 of	 thinking	
across	 infrastructure	modes	 (Marie-Hélène	 Zérah,	 2008).	 	Only	within	water,	 it	 should	 be	
apparent	 from	my	 empirical	work	 just	 how	different	 informalities	 in	 piped	 supply,	 tanker	
provision	 and	 tubewell	 management	 are.	 	 There	 are	 challenges	 for	 generalisation	 across	
sites	as	well	as	 infrastructure	modes;	Björkman’s	work	on	a	 low-income	neighbourhood	in	
Mumbai	leads	her	to	claim	that	talk	of	informality	is	performative	(it	‘produces	the	effects	it	
names’).	 	 In	 my	 case,	 the	 situation	 is	 different,	 and	 the	 naming	 of	 an	 area	 as	 an	
‘unauthorised	colony’	by	residents	is	an	essential	step	in	the	process	of	formalisation.			
	
The	 boundary	 between	 informal	 and	 formal	 blurs	 when	 you	 get	 close	 to	 it,	 rather	 like	
infrastructures	 or	 ‘the	 state’.	 	 In	 response	 to	 characterisations	 of	 infrastructures	 as	
unexamined	 or	 unknown,	 these	 processes	 highlight	 a	 relational	 understanding	 of	
infrastructure	where	what	is	‘formal’	is	simply	a	question	of	scale	and	perspective;	what	is	
proximate,	 accessible	 and	 knowable	 changes	with	different	 actors	 (Star	&	Bowker,	 2007).		
Sundaresan	 makes	 a	 similar	 point	 in	 his	 discussion	 of	 the	 informalised	 bureaucracy	 of	
planning	in	Bangalore	(Sundaresan,	2013,	p.	289).		For	low-income	residents,	the	questions	
raised	by	other	scholars	–	When	are	infrastructures?		Who	is	infrastructure?		Who	and	when	
is	 the	state?	–	rather	 than	rhetorical	questions	or	conceptual	 flourishes,	become	essential	
elements	 of	 a	 viable	 coping	 strategy	 (Star	 &	 Ruhleder,	 1996;	 Simone,	 2004;	 Bawa,	 2011;	
Ferguson	&	Gupta,	2002;	Ghertner,	2017).			
	
REFORMS	
The	uneven	standard	of	water	supply	in	such	a	wealthy	and	powerful	city	as	Delhi	raises	the	
question	of	why	progress	has	been	 so	 limited	over	previous	decades.	 	 The	 series	of	 rapid	
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changes	brought	about	after	the	election	of	the	Aam	Aadmi	Party	government	suggests	that	
lack	of	political	will	by	previous	governments	was	indeed	an	element	impeding	reform.			
	
Forms	of	‘vote	bank	politics’	that	leave	the	populations	of	unauthorised	colonies	reliant	on	
ad	hoc	 interventions	 from	politicians	 for	urban	 services,	 and	 the	decreasing	amounts	 and	
quality	 of	 groundwater	have	 led	 to	 an	electoral	 backlash.	 The	 ‘success’	 of	 the	 strategy	of	
governing	 populations	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 effective	 governance	 of	 both	 network	 and	
underground	water	sources,	was	disrupted	by	the	emergence	of	a	new	political	party	willing	
to	challenge	the	existing	situation.		Voters’	electoral	rejection	of	‘business	as	usual’	politics	
demonstrates	the	instability	inherent	in	the	previous	regime.		
	
However,	the	difficulty	of	establishing	knowledge	and	control	over	water	makes	it	an	ideal	
subject	 for	 ‘playing	 politics’	 –	 there	 are	 accusations	 of	 inefficiency,	 bias	 and	 corruption	
between	rival	political	groups	(Daily	News	and	Analysis,	2016;	Hindustan	Times,	2014;	Times	
of	 India,	 2016a).	 	 The	 Aam	Aadmi	 Party	was	 able	 to	 channel	 dissatisfaction	 at	 unreliable	
expensive	 government	 water,	 and	 the	 low	 quality	 and	 declining	 yield	 of	 groundwater	
sources	 into	 a	 surprise	 electoral	 victory.	 	 Unfortunately,	 water	 is	 difficult	 to	 control;	 it	 is	
both	extensive	in	time	and	space	and	highly	localised.		Relevant	dimensions	include	both	the	
wider	Ganges	basin	and	aquifers,	personal	or	captured	tubewells	and	diverted	tankers,	and	
longer-term	 processes	 which	 have	 transformed	 the	 hydroscapes	 of	 Northern	 India.	 	 The	
poor	performance	of	the	AAP	in	the	Delhi	2017	elections	suggests	that	while	the	party	was	
able	 to	 channel	 dissatisfaction,	 the	 ongoing	work	 of	 sustainable	 improvements	 is	 slower,	
and	less	spectacular.		
	
If	a	party	cannot	ensure	adequate	water	supply,	it	may	be	because	they	have	connections	to	
the	water	mafia,	or	conversely,	because	they	have	no	control	over	the	water	mafia.	 	They	
must	be	either	corrupt	or	weak.		I	heard	both	these	narratives	levelled	against	politicians	in	
power,	and	saw	that	 lack	of	control	 ‘on	the	ground’	was	a	problem	for	AAP	party	workers	
attempting	to	reduce	water	misallocation.		Remember	Kamal	(p91)	who	was	willing	to	‘go	to	
jail’	if	giving	people	water	allowed	him	to	‘make	a	name’	in	politics?		There	is	a	parallel	here	
to	the	 idea	that	criminal	politicians	are	preferred	by	voters	because	of	 their	ability	 to	 ‘get	
work	 done’	 (Berenschot,	 2013,	 p.	 77;	 Vaishnav,	 2017).	 	 The	 promise	 of	 reforming	Delhi’s	
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water	 governance	 relies	 not	 only	 on	 confronting	 powerful	 high-water	 use	 constituencies,	
but	 also	 on	 understanding	 and	 controlling	 the	 state	 water	 bureaucracy,	 informal	
groundwater	use	and	the	connections	between	them.					
	
AAP	 bring	 an	 outsider	 perspective	 to	 government	 and	 a	 willingness	 to	 crowdsource	 and	
curate	policy	innovations.		This	has	included	interest	in	decentralised	infrastructures	such	as	
water	 dispensers	 (‘ATMS’).	 	 However,	 the	 move	 to	 pass	 a	 right	 to	 water	 connection	
regardless	 of	 tenure	 speaks	 to	 the	 AAP	 awareness	 of	 the	 potential	 for	 corruption	 and	
mismanagement	in	decentralised	infrastructures	(Bhan,	2016).		While	there	may	be	positive	
examples	 from	 other	 locations,	 in	 my	 research,	 local	 decentralised	 infrastructures	 like	
tubewells	 and	 tankers	 appear	 to	 have	 greater	 potential	 for	 capture	 and	 diversion.	 	 The	
water	supply	modes	used	in	Sangam	Vihar	are	more	personalised	than	network	supply.		The	
provision	of	off-grid	and	decentralised	infrastructures	like	tubewells	and	tankers	in	lieu	of	a	
network	 connection	 allows	 for	 greater	 discretion	 by	 agency	 and	 political	 workers	 and	
appears	more	 porous	 to	 external	 influence	 than	 network	 supply.	 	 There	 is	 greater	 input	
from	 the	 Members	 of	 Legislative	 Assembly,	 Sub-Divisional	 Magistrates,	 and	 Junior	
Engineers.	 	 Non-network	 sources	 display	 a	 greater	 propensity	 to	 discretionary	 allocation,	
diversion	and	capture	than	network	water,	are	linked	to	city	politics	and	embedded	in	local	
economies	of	caste,	land	and	power.		In	this	case	study,	it	seems	that,	with	the	exception	of	
bottled	water	supply,	small-scale	providers	do	not	provide	a	desirable	alternative	to	a	piped	
network	model.		The	failure	of	governance	is	important	not	only	for	water	users,	but	also	for	
water	suppliers	and	economic	and	political	power	holders.	
	
The	decentralised	modes	of	water	supply	through	tankers,	 tubewells	and	bottles,	because	
they	are	more	localised	and	susceptible	to	local	control,	are	also	hard	to	reform,	for	the	AAP	
and	 others.	 	 Ghertner	 uses	 the	 example	 of	 DJB	 employees	 who	 supply	 groundwater	 in	
Chhattarpur	to	suggest	that	the	state	can	violate	its	own	norms	(operate	as	a	Mobius	strip	in	
his	 topological	 terminology)	 (cf	 Ghertner,	 2017).	 	 However,	 the	 example	 is	 based	 on	 a	
misunderstanding:	 groundwater	 extraction	 is	 not	 illegal	 if	 state	 agencies	 have	 failed	 to	
provide.	 	 In	 fact,	 groundwater	 provision	 by	 the	 DJB	 is	 extensive.	 	 Ghertner’s	 example	
reiterates	Roy’s	assertion	that	informality	is	state	produced.		In	contrast,	I	suggest	that	while	
sometimes,	state	agencies	find	it	convenient	‘not	to	know’,	as	in	the	DJB	zone	misalignment	
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discussed	earlier,	 in	many	other	cases	they	are	unable	 to	know	or	act.	 	For	example,	state	
weakness	 means	 that	 the	 DJB	 is	 unable	 to	 use	 their	 own	 men	 as	 tubewell	 managers	
(‘kholnewalas’)	in	Sangam	Vihar	unlike	Chhattarpur	and	other	areas.		This	informality	is	not	
generated	by	state	power,	as	Roy	suggests,	but	by	state	weakness.		Similarly,	AAP	reforms	in	
Sangam	Vihar	appear	to	have	underestimated	the	extent	and	resilience	of	local	control	over	
non-network	sources.	 	This	has	 led	to	AAPs	 longer	term	strategy	of	reducing	non-network	
sources	altogether.			
	
The	Malviya	Nagar	Project	shows	the	importance	of	understanding	informal	infrastructures	
as	 complex	 socio-technical	 systems.	 	 Insufficient	 appreciation	 for	 this	 led	 the	 MNC	 to	
approach	the	project	without	adequate	awareness	of	the	situation	they	were	entering	into	
and	has	continued	to	present	difficulties	for	the	project.		The	experience	of	the	PPP	project	
in	Malviya	Nagar	suggests	that	the	challenges	of	delivering	uninterrupted	water	supply	can	
be	significantly	underestimated.	 	The	deteriorated,	modified	and	little-understood	physical	
infrastructure	 in	 the	project	 zone	 requires	 a	 substantial	 amount	of	work	before	 relatively	
simple	 technology	 such	 as	 water	 meters	 and	 bulk	 flow	meters	 can	 be	 used.	 	 Without	 a	
physical	network	of	hydraulically	sealed	units,	‘smart’	water	technology	such	as	SCADA	and	
hydrological	modelling	cannot	be	implemented.			
	
A	further	complication	is	that	the	private	company	and	the	state	agency	do	not	enjoy	high	
levels	 of	 mutual	 trust.	 	 Their	 relationship	 could	 be	 characterised	 as	 adversarial	 and	
competitive.	 	 The	 initial	 structuring	 of	 the	 water	 network	 improvement	 project	 –	 as	 an	
assessment	of	the	private	operator’s	suitability	 for	the	management	of	additional	areas	 in	
the	 future	 –	 places	 private	 and	 public	 sector	 in	 competition,	 not	 partnership,	 with	 each	
other.	 	 The	 impact	 of	 PPPs	 on	 the	 distribution	 of	 knowledge	 for	water	management	will	
depend	 on	 the	 contractual	 provisions	 and	 practical	 working	 relationships	 in	 each	 case.		
However,	in	a	context	of	limited	trust	or	competition,	implicit	or	otherwise,	with	the	public	
sector,	there	is	a	danger	that	just	as	public	agencies	may	be	unwilling	to	share	information	
with	their	private	sector	rivals,	understandings	of	network	functioning	with	the	potential	for	
improved	public	services	may	be	held	with	private	for-profit	companies.		As	current	Indian	
urban	policies,	 such	as	 Smart	Cities	Mission	and	AMRUT,	 suggest	PPPs	as	 their	 ‘preferred	
execution	model’	for	urban	development	projects	these	tensions	pose	likely	obstacles	to	the	
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smooth	 implementation	 of	 these	 programmes	 (Ministry	 of	 Urban	 Development,	
Government	of	India,	2015,	p.	15).		
	
Reforms	such	as	the	PPP	project	at	Malviya	Nagar,	or	the	AAP’s	changes	in	Sangam	Vihar	do	
not	 necessarily	 reduce	 informality	 in	 urban	 service	 provision.	 	 Rather	 they	 change	 it,	
replacing	 some	 (such	 as	 illegal	 pipes	 or	 tubewell	 cartels	 in	 AAP	 strongholds),	 bypassing	
others	(private	tubewells	and	cartels	in	BJP	strongholds)	and	introducing	new	informalities	
of	 their	 own	 (the	 relationship	 between	 the	 PPP	 and	 the	 DJB,	 the	 high	 cost	 of	 ‘after	 the	
meter’	leaks,	differential	ability	to	access	decision	makers).		Even	where	informality	appears	
to	be	reduced	by	rationalisation	and	commercialisation	this	operates	as	a	transfer	of	power	
and	 knowledge	 to	 larger	 scales	 (wealthy	 local	 residents	 to	multinational	 company,	 street	
cartels	 to	 local-level	 party	workers).	 	 Understanding	 ‘informality’	 as	 not	 restricted	 to	 one	
class	or	sector,	suggests	that	the	process	of	reducing	‘corruption’	in	water	governance	and	
the	 introduction	 of	 private	 sector	 management	 may	 simply	 transfer	 discretion	 to	 larger	
scales	or	actors	operating	with	different	 logics;	 financial	concerns	as	opposed	to	social,	 to	
give	a	crudely	simplified	example.		
	
Historical	 experience	with	 private	 sector	water	management	 suggests	 that	 the	 rigidity	 of	
contracts	 is	 somewhat	 dependent	 on	 the	 social	 and	 political	 climate	 (P.	 B.	Mehta,	 2013).		
The	 regulation	 of	 water	 governance	 through	 contract,	 as	 in	 a	 PPP	 model,	 presents	 an	
assessment	of	the	value	of	private	sector	management	as	hinged	on	the	relative	influence	of	
state	 agencies,	 local	 governments,	 and	 their	 lawyers	 over	 private	 sector	 actors	 (often	
wealthy	multinationals)	against	the	relative	influence	and	control	of	state	agencies	and	local	
government	over	their	own	workers.		Where	the	private	sector	has	real	independence	from	
local	 political	 actors,	 private	 sector	 management	 may	 post	 a	 threat	 to	 informal	
arrangements	 and	 could	 therefore	 be	 seen	 as	 enabling	 of	 greater	 democratic	
responsiveness.	 	However,	 in	my	case	study,	the	social	 licence	to	operate	 is	very	real,	and	
there	 are	many	ways	 for	 local	 politicians	 and	 residents	 to	 obstruct	 a	 project	 of	 this	 kind	
should	 they	wish	 to.	 	Given	 this	 context,	 it	 is	 important	 for	 resource	management	 reform	
initiatives	 to	 include	 local	 representatives	and	 secure	 their	 support.	 	Numerical	density	of	
voters	in	low-income	neighbourhoods	gives	them	a	key	lever	over	elected	representatives.		
The	 concerns	 mentioned	 above	 over	 distribution	 of	 knowledge,	 water	 and	 influence,	
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suggest	 the	 dangers	 of	 both	 the	 facile	 celebration	 of	 private	 sector	management	 and	 an	
over-dogmatic	 rejection	 of	 it	 and	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 guides	 to	 future	 empirical	 research	
grounded	in	specific	cases	and	across	them.			
	
	
WAYS	FORWARD	FOR	RESEARCH	AND	PRACTICE	
To	summarise:	My	research	suggests	that	key	water	governance	roles,	formal	and	informal,	
are	personalised	and	discretionary	and	permeable	to	social	power	relations	more	broadly.		
This	aspect	of	urban	hydrology	can	vary	from	site	to	site,	not	just	between	regions	of	India,	
but	also	with	size	of	settlement	and	even	within	a	neighbourhood.		In	addition,	its	resilience	
to	 external	 interventions,	 poses	 greater	 challenges	 than	 network	 supply.	 	 Increases	 in	
transparency	and	accountability	are	as	difficult	as	they	are	necessary.		Further,	the	reliance	
on	groundwater	by	both	public	and	private	actors	offsets	the	costs	of	a	lack	of	state	water	
supply	onto	natural	resources,	remote	places	and	future	generations.			
	
My	 findings	 indicate	 that	 the	 need	 for	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 of	 non-network	
water	sources	 is	an	 important	dimension	of	 improving	water	access	 in	urban	areas	where	
the	public	network	supply	is	limited.		They	also	suggest	that	extension	of	the	formal	network	
is	a	preferable	solution.		Groundwater	use	is	a	very	low	quality	urban	water	source	and	the	
aquifer	degradation	 increases	the	 importance	of	 finding	alternative	methods.	 	Lastly,	PPPs	
under	 an	 operations	 and	maintenance	model	 are	 not	 necessarily	 anti-poor	 and	 can	 be	 a	
means	of	increasing	service	efficiency,	given	appropriate	governmental	oversight.		However,	
while	 this	 is	 the	 case	 for	 the	 Delhi	 PPP	 studied,	 it	 may	 well	 be	 difficult	 to	 replicate	
elsewhere.			
	
The	time	and	resources	available	for	this	research	have	allowed	a	start	on	this	work	but	 it	
could	 be	 extended	 in	 several	 ways.	 	 Working	 on	 a	 politically	 and	 legally	 sensitive	 topic,	
access	was	challenging.	 	This	 issue	 is	also	apparent	 in	work	by	other	researchers	 (Alankar,	
2009;	Borthakur,	2015;	Ranganathan,	2014a).		On	a	follow-up	visit	in	2017	I	found	access	to	
be	far	easier,	and	I	am	planning	for	future	work,	to	spend	more	time	with	politicians,	party	
workers	 and	neighbourhood-level	 brokers.	 	 This	has	particular	 salience	given	 the	 contrast	
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between	 AAP’s	 disappointing	 performance	 in	 Delhi’s	 2017	 municipal	 elections	 and	 their	
strong	majority	in	the	2015	Assembly	elections.		Relatedly	given	the	scarcity	of	information	
on	informal	water	use,	and	difficulty	of	access,	more	rigorous	and	comprehensive	research	
into	 informal	water	businesses	would	be	valuable	 in	generating	 information	as	a	 first	step	
towards	understanding	the	operation	of	the	sector.			
	
I	 suggest	 that	 informal	 water	 access	 in	 some	 areas	 is	 linked	 to	 historically	 structured	
influence	over	land	and	politics.		At	the	same	time,	it	is	a	continuation	of	traditional,	and	still	
widespread,	forms	of	decentralised	water	supply	and	delivery.		I	am	continuing	work	on	the	
development	 of	 Delhi’s	water	 supply	 over	 early	modern,	 colonial	 and	 post-independence	
eras	to	trace	the	contemporary	relevance	of	historical	tendencies	and	transformations.				
	
This	 study	 focussed	 primarily	 on	 two	 areas	 of	 South	 Delhi,	 Malviya	 Nagar,	 Sangam	
Vihar/Deoli,	although	I	also	conducted	research	interviews	in	other	similarly	situated	areas	
(Chhattarpur,	 Shahpur	 Jat,	 Tigri,	 Khanpur,	Deoli	 village)	 and	 visited	many	more.	 	Working	
with	 the	 PPP	 in	 a	 large	 area	 of	 west	 Delhi	 which	 has	 a	 similarly	 high	 concentration	 of	
unauthorised	 colonies	 to	 Sangam	 Vihar	 would	 be	 the	 logical	 next	 step	 for	 a	 more	
comprehensive	comparative	extension	of	the	research.		
	
In	regard	to	future	research	more	widely,	urban	water	supply	in	south	Asia,	its	informalities,	
and	 relation	 to	 reforms	 is	 an	 area	 with	 rich	 scope	 for	 development.	 	 There	 are	 three	
directions	 that	would	repay	 investigation.	 	 India’s	Smart	City	Mission	 is	promoting	a	more	
speculative	approach	to	urban	management,	attempting	to	attract	investors	and	lenders	by	
safeguarding	 projects	 against	 political	 risk	 through	 a	 special	 project	 vehicle	 at	 city	 level	
(similar	 to	 the	 UKs	 urban	 development	 corporations).	 	 The	 majority	 of	 cities	 under	 the	
Mission	have	chosen	area-based	development	projects.	 	These	are	 intended	 to	have	24/7	
water	supply.		As	these	smart	city	projects	are	only	a	small	part	of	their	respective	cities,	this	
seems	likely	to	extend	small-scale	water	PPPs	across	the	country.		However,	without	Delhi’s	
political	 prominence,	 bureaucratic	 resources	 and	 civil	 society	 campaign	 on	 water	
privatisation,	 the	 design	 of	 contracts	 for	 these	 PPP	 initiatives	may	 be	 less	 favourable.	 	 In	
Delhi	it	appears	that	the	water	originally	intended	for	the	PPP	was	in	fact	distributed	across	
the	 city;	 however,	 in	 water	 PPPs	 in	 Pune	 and	 Nagpur,	 the	 opposite	 has	 happened:	
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neighbouring	areas	have	seen	a	decline	 in	availability	as	water	 is	redirected	to	the	higher-
demand	 PPP	 areas.	 	 The	 effect	 of	 these	 new	projects	 on	water	 availability	 in	 their	 cities,	
their	political	accountability	under	the	special	project	vehicle	structure,	and	the	effects	that	
international	investment	under	this	model	has	on	urban	governance	are	future	questions	to	
be	explored	here.			
	
A	second	stream	of	work	would	be	to	move	from	private-sector	to	public	sector-led	reforms.		
The	 latest	wide-scale	change	 in	Delhi’s	water	provision	 is	 the	emergence	of	 the	AAP	onto	
India’s	 political	 scene	with	 at	 least	 the	 promise	 of	 change	 (Naqvi,	 2017).	 	 Unfortunately,	
many	 of	 these	 changes	 have	 been	 taking	 place	 since	 my	 fieldwork	 ended.	 	 As	 Delhi	
government	the	AAP	has	introduced	water	reforms	from	a	progressive,	populist	perspective,	
rather	 than	 the	 commercial	 orientation	 that	 usually	 dominates.	 	 The	 AAP	 government	
reduced	the	cost	of	water	connections	for	unauthorised	colonies,	introduced	a	lifeline	free	
water	tariff,	and	made	it	possible	to	apply	for	a	water	connection	regardless	of	tenure	status	
(Bhan,	2016).	 	They	have	also	attempted	to	counter	corruption	 in	the	DJB,	 informal	water	
supply	and	Delhi’s	privatisation	initiatives.	 	Since	the	AAP	government	came	to	power,	the	
DJB	 has	 laid	 pipelines	 and	 released	 piped	 water	 in	 101	 unauthorized	 colonies,	 including	
some	blocks	of	Sangam	Vihar,	and	pipelines	have	also	been	 laid	 in	another	1033	colonies.		
Outside	 of	 Delhi,	 state-led	 reforms	 of	 urban	water	 supply	 have	 also	 been	 taking	 place	 in	
Orissa	and	Maharashtra	and	appear	to	be	progressive	changes	to	the	existing	system,	rather	
than	grafting	in	enclaves	of	private	expertise.		This	would	appear	to	be	a	more	sustainable	
model	 for	 India	as	a	whole,	yet	 I	am	unaware	of	 research	being	done	 in	 this	area.	 	These	
reforms	are	mostly	taking	place	in	the	smaller	towns	and	cities,	which	tend	to	be	neglected	
by	academic	 research	 (de	Bercegol,	2017;	Denis	&	Zérah,	2017).	 	As	 India	urbanises	 these	
areas	 are	 the	 fastest	 growing,	 yet	 least	 resourced.	 	 Any	 opportunity	 for	 positive	 future	
impact	over	the	country’s	urbanisation	trajectory	cannot	afford	to	ignore	these	sites.			
	
Lastly,	a	 changing	climate	will	 severely	 impact	 life	 in	 south	Asia,	particularly	 in	 relation	 to	
surface	 and	 groundwater	 use.	 	 More	 erratic	 and	 reduced	 monsoons,	 increased	 flooding	
from	glacial	melting	over	the	next	decade	and	reduced	river	flow	thereafter,	combined	with	
polluted	and	depleted	aquifers	 are	 threats	 to	 social	hydrology	 in	a	 region	which	 supports	
around	 a	 fifth	 of	 the	 world	 population.	 	 Developing	 understandings	 of	 the	 relationships	
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between	urbanisation,	water	governance	and	 reform	are	 important	now	and	will	 become	
increasingly	urgent	over	time.			
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APPENDIX WQ 
Water quality measurements for locations in Project Area (Project DPR Appendices and DMA Report, 2011, p192) 
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APPENDIX WU 
Water use and billing for locations in Project Area (Project DPR Appendices and DMA, 2011, 
p175) 
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APPENDIX MR 
Meter Replacements by DJB before start of PPP (PPP Detailed Project Report Appendices and 
Demand Management Area Report, 2011, p188) 
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APPENDIX PD 
Population density in PPP zone (PPP Detailed Project Report: p74-75) 
